These consolidated appeals arise out of a decision of respondent Michigan Department of Public Health (mdph) finding that petitioner Janice Smith, a certified nurse’s aide, had mentally abused a patient at the Gogebic Medical Care Facility. In Dockеt No. 168368, defendant AFSCME Local 992, AFL-CIO, appeals as of right an order of the circuit court vacating the arbitration opinion and award in whiсh Smith was cleared of abuse charges and ordered reinstated. In Docket No. 168369, petitioner Janice Smith appeals as of right an order of the circuit court affirming the mdph’s finding that she had engaged in the mental abuse of a patient. We affirm.
We first address petitioner Jаnice Smith’s argument on appeal that the mdph’s finding that she engaged in the mental and emotional abuse of a patient was tainted by a substantial and material error of law. Smith asserts that the agency improperly relied on a definition of the term "abuse” that exceeded the statutory definition contained in MCL 400.11(a); MSA 16.411(a). This argument is without merit.
Section 11(a) of the Social Welfare Act sets forth *695 the statutory definition of abuse as it relates to a licensed health cаre provider:
"Abuse” means harm or threatened harm to an adult’s health or welfare caused by another person. Abuse includes, but is not limited to, nonaccidental physical or mental injury, sexual abuse, or maltreatment. [MCL 400.11(a); MSA 16.411(a).]
In determining that Smith had abused a resident, the mdph relied on subsection b of the illustrations of mental and emotional abuse contained in the "working draft” of the "Bureau of Health Systems Policy & Procedure”:
General Standard
There is no fixed rule on when an interaction between an individual and a patient or resident is serious enough to warrant a finding of mental or emоtional abuse. Even minimal psychological harm may be enough; the answer always depends on the circumstances of the individual cаse. However, the following factual situations would provide a reasonable basis for concluding thát a finding of mental or emotional abuse is warranted:
a. The interaction coerces or intimidates the patient or resident into surrendering his or her money or personаl belongings; or
b. The interaction subjects the patient or resident to scorn, ridicule or humiliation; or
c. The interaction produces а noticeable level of fear, anxiety, agitation, withdrawal or other emotional distress in the patient or resident which is not otherwisе explainable.
d. The interaction involves a threat of physical harm, punishment, or deprivation.
In arguing that the illustration relied on by the mdрh exceeded the statutory definition of abuse in § 11(a), Smith contends that "abuse”, is limited to *696 harm or threatened harm to a patient’s or resident’s health or welfare. In essence, Smith claims that behavior that subjects a patient or resident to scorn, ridicule, or humiliation does not constitute "abuse.”
It is well settled that agencies are allowed "to interpret the statutes they are bound to administer and enforcе.”
Clonlara, Inc v State Bd of Ed,
In regard to the afscme’s claim that the circuit court erred in vacating the arbitration award in Smith’s favor, wе note that judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision is narrowly circumscribed. In
Lincoln Park v Lincoln Park Police Officers Ass’n,
The necessary inquiry for this Court’s determination is whether the award was beyond the contractual authority of the arbitratоr. Labor arbitration is a product of contract and an arbitrator’s authority to resolve a dispute arising out of the approрriate interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is derived exclusively from the *697 contractual agreement of the parties. Port Huron Area School Dist v Port Huron Ed Ass’n,426 Mich 143 ;393 NW2d 811 (1986). It is well settled that judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision is limited. A court may not review an arbitrator’s factual findings or decision on the merits. Port Huron, supra. Rather, a court may only decidе whether the arbitrator’s award "draws its essence” from the contract. If the arbitrator in granting the award did not disregard the terms of his employmеnt and the scope of his authority as expressly circumscribed in the contract, judicial review effectively ceases.
As an exсeption to the general rule of judicial deference, we have recognized that a court may refuse to enforce аn arbitrator’s decision when it is contrary to public policy.
Lincoln Park, supra
at 6-7, citing
United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v Misco, Inc,
In arguing for the application of this exception, plaintiff Gogebic Medical Care Facility relies on 42 CFR 483.13(c)(1)(ii), which prevents a medical care facility from employing individuals who hаve been:
*698 (A) Found guilty of abusing, neglecting, or mistreating individuals by a court of law; or
(B) Have had a finding entered into the State nurse aide registry conсerning abuse, neglect, mistreatment of residents or misappropriation of their property ....
Plaintiff argues that because the mdph has concluded that Smith committed abuse of a resident and flagged her name in the State Nurse Aide Registry, the arbitration award would violate 42 CFR 483.13(c)(1)(ii). We agree with plaintiff’s argument. The arbitration award, if enforced, would cause plaintiff to act unlawfully. We believe that this regulation reflects a "well defined” and "dominant” public policy in favor of protecting residents of long-term care facilities from abusive treаtment by nurse’s aides. In light of our decision upholding the mdph’s determination that Smith had committed abuse, we conclude that the arbitrator’s award reinstating Smith was properly set aside.
Finally, we consider Smith’s claim that she was deprived of her constitutional right to a meaningful review of the mdph’s decision because the lower court ruled on her appeal without benefit of a verbatim record of her hearing. However, petitioner failed to object or request that the administrative hearing be tape-recorded. Further, petitioner failed to timely raise this issue in her petition for review as required by MCR 7.105(1). Therefore, we conclude that petitioner has waived appellate review of this issue.
Affirmed.