OPINION
Ryаn Goens (“Goens”) has filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the Johnson Superior Court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Goens argues that the traffic stop that resulted in his arrest for driving while intoxicated was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Wе agree and reverse the trial court’s denial of Goens’s motion to suppress.
Facts and Procedural History
On April 3, 2009, Officer Greg Lengerich of the Greenwood Police Department observed a Chevrolet minivan “without any operable brake lights.” Appellee’s App. pp. 1, 7. The offiсer initiated a traffic stop
Officer Lengerich proceeded to conduct standard field sobriety tests. Goens failed the horizontal gaze nystagmus, one-legged stand, and wаlk-and-turn tests. Goens was also offered a portable breathalyzer test, and the test indicated positive for the presence of alcohol. Goens then agreed to take a certified breath test, which established an alcohol concentrаtion equivalent (“ACE”) of .21 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
On April 8, 2009, Goens was charged with Class D felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated, Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an ACE of .15 or more, Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated, and Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an ACE of .08 or more. The State also alleged that Goens was a habitual substance offender.
On Jаnuary 14, 2010, Goens filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop. In the motion, Goens claimed that Officer Lengerich lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle because the vehicle had two operable stop lamps and was therefore in compliance with Title 9 of the Indiana Code. Goens therefore argued that “the stop, detention, subsequent arrest and seizure violated [his] rights secured by” the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and under Article One, Section Eleven. Appellant’s App. p. 13.
A hearing was held on the motion to suppress on April 12, 2010. Officer Lengerich was unable to appear, and the parties stipulated to the admission of his deposition testimony. During his deposition, Officer Lengerich stated that he could nоt recall whether only one stop lamp was not working or if all of the vehicle’s stop lamps were inoperable. Ap-pellee’s App. p. 15. At the hearing, Garza testified that he observed another officer move Goens’s vehicle to a nearby рarking lot after Goens’s arrest, and that only the stop lamp on the rear passenger’s side was inoperable. Tr. p. 24. At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court stated, “I think it has been established that there were two (2) lamps lighted.” Tr. p. 52.
Despite finding that two of the vehicle’s stop lamps were operating at the time of the stop, the trial court denied Goens’s motion to suppress after concluding that it was reasonable for the officer to stop the vehicle for one inoperable stoр lamp, if for no other reason than to inform the driver that the light was burned out. Tr. p. 53. Thereafter, Goens asked the trial court to certify its interlocutory order to allow for an immediate appeal. On May 12, 2010, the trial court granted Goens’s motion. Our court accepted jurisdiction of this appeal on July 16, 2010.
Standard of Review
Goens argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to suppress. We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence for an abuse of discretion. Montgomery v. State,
Discussion and Decision
Goens argues that his vehicle was equipped with two operating stop lamps and was in compliance with Indiana Code section 9-19-6-17(a). Therefore, Officer Lengerich lacked reasonable suspicion to conclude that Goens had committed an infraction or ordinance violation, the required predicate to initiate the traffic stop at issue. The State argues that the officer properly stopped Goens because his vehicle was not in compliance with either section 9-19-6-17 or section 9-21-7-1, the “good working order statute.”
“ ‘It is well-settled that a police officer may briefly detain a person whom the officer believes has committed an infraction or an ordinance violation.’ ” Datzek v. State,
Goens concedes that the stop lamp (or brake light) on the rear passenger side of his vehicle wаs inoperable. But he disputes the State’s initial assertion that none of his stop lamps were working properly.
The State relies on Officer Lengerich’s statement in his narrative report that Goens was operating the vehicle “without any operable brakе lights.” Appellee’s App. p. 1. But in his deposition, the officer testified, “I don’t recall if it didn’t have any [operable brake lights] or just one that wasn’t working.” Id. at 15. Passenger Garza, who observed the vehicle as it was driven away to a nearby parking lot after Goens’s arrest, tеstified that only the passenger side stop lamp was inoperable. Tr. p. 25. The trial court weighed this evidence and concluded, “I think it has been established that there were two (2) lamps lighted.” Tr. p. 52.
Consequently, we must first consider whether Goens’s vehicle, which had two functioning stоp lamps, was in compliance with Indiana' Code section 9-19-6-17(a). The general rule of statutory construction is that
[p]enal statutes should be construed strictly against the State and ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the accused. At the same time, however, statutes should not be narrowed so much as to exclude cases they would fairly cover. Also, we assume that the language in a statute was used intentionally and that every word should be given effect and meaning. We seek to give a statute practical appliсation by construing it in a way favoring public convenience and avoiding absurdity, hardship, and injustice. And statutes concerning the same subject matter must be read together to harmonize and give effect to each.
Merritt v. State,
Indiana Code section 9-19-6-17(a) provides:
A motor vehicle may be equipped, and when rеquired under this chapter must be equipped, with a stop lamp or lamps on the rear of the vehicle that:
(1) displays a red or an amber light, or any shade of color between red and amber, visible from a distance of not less than one hundred (100) feet to the rear in normal sunlight;
*833 (2) will be actuated upon application of the service (foot) brake; and
(3) may be incorporated with at least one (1) other rear lamp.
(Emphasis added). The only other statute referencing the number of stop lamps required under Indiana Code chapter 9 — 19— 6, provides that
[Á] person may not:
(1) sell; or
(2) drive on the highways;
in Indiana a motor vehicle, inсluding a motorcycle or motor-driven cycle unless the vehicle is equipped with at least one (1)' stoplight meeting the requirements of section 17 of this chapter.
Ind.Code § 9-19-6-6 (emphasis added). A violation of Indiana Code chapter 9-19-6 is a Class C infraction. See Ind.Code § 9-19-6-24.
When read together, these statutes require at least one, but only one, functioning stop lаmp.
In the alternative, the Statе argues that Goens’s vehicle was not in compliance with Indiana Code section 9-21-7-1, i.e. “the good working order statute.” That section provides in pertinent part:
A person may not drive or move on a highway a ... motor vehicle ... unless the equipment upon the vеhicle is in good working order and adjustment, as required in this article, and the vehicle is in a safe mechanical condition that does not endanger the person who drives the vehicle, another occupant of the vehicle, or a person upon the highwаy.
A violation of chapter 9-21-7 is a Class C infraction. See Ind.Code § 9-21-7-13.
The State has not alleged that the one inoperable stop lamp caused an unsafe mechanical condition; therefore we need only determine whether Goens’s vehicle was in good working order. In support of its argument, the State relies оn Freeman v. State,
In Freeman, the defendant was stopped because of an inoperable tail lamp. While concluding that the officer “validly stopped Freeman’s vehicle because the tail lamp was not illuminated,” we held: “[ijmplicit in [section 9-21-7-1] is a requirement that before operating a motor vehicle, one inspect his or her vehicle to ensure that its equipment, including taillights, works.” Id. at 342-43 (quoting Schumm v. State,
Goens argues that the State’s reliance on Freeman is misplacеd. He observes that, section 9-21-7-1 is found in Article 21, which is entitled “Traffic Regulation,”
Goens’s assertion that “stop lamps” are not specifically referenced in Article 21 is correct. Section 9-21-7-2 does require vehicles traveling on Indiana highways between sunset and sunrise to “display lighted head lamps and other illuminating devices!)]”
Furthermore, as set forth above, sections 9-19-6-6 and -17 only require at least one functioning stop lamp. Therefore, if the good working order statute is applied to stop lamps, Goens’s vehicle was in good working order as required by section 9-21-7-1 because two of the three stop lamps on the vehicle were functioning properly at the time of the stop. For all of these reasons, we conclude that Goens did not operate his vehicle in violation of either section 9-19-6-17 or section 9-21-7-1.
“Although a law enforcement officer’s good faith belief that a person has committed a violаtion will justify a traffic stop, an officer’s mistaken belief about what constitutes a violation does not amount to good faith. Such discretion is not constitutionally permissible.” State v. Rager,
Reversed.
Notes
. The United States Department of Transportation requires all passenger cars of less than eighty inches to have two tail lamps, two stop lamps, and one “high-mounted” stop lamp. 49 C.F.R. § 571.108 (2006).
. Chapter 9-21-7’s placement in Article 21 is curious because the contents of that Article generally concern operation of a vehicle on a roadway, and not mechanical requirements for vehicles, which are generally found in Article 9-19.
. But section 9-21-7-2 does apply to tail lamps, which are illuminating devices described in chapter 9-19-6. Therefore, although not specifically stated in Freeman, Indiana Code section 9-21-7-1 does apply to tail lamps.