159 S.W.2d 231 | Tex. App. | 1942
This suit was filed by the appellants, A. C. Goen and M. P. Goen, real estate brokers, against the appellee, P. C. Hamilton, to recover a brokerage commission in the sum of $600 alleged to have been due the appellants in connection with the sale of a section of land belonging to the appellee.
The appellants alleged substantially that they were duly authorized and licensed real estate dealers and salesmen under the laws of Texas; that on or about March 27, 1940 the appellee requested appellants to find and procure a purchaser of the land at $19 per acre or for a price acceptable to appellee; that appellee then and there placed and listed said land with appellants for sale, agreeing and promising to pay them a commission of 5% of the purchase price; that on or about April 2, 1940 the appellants did procure a purchaser for such land who did in fact purchase the land from the appellee on April 8, 1940 on terms satisfactory to the appellee; and that they were the procuring cause of the sale whereby appellee became bound and liable and promised and agreed to pay them the 5% commission on the purchase price, amounting to $600, for which they prayed judgment. Other than that which may be implied from these allegations, there were no express allegations as to whether the brokerage contract was written or oral.
The appellee answered by the general issue and by what was termed two special exceptions. The general demurrer, as so denominated, was overruled. One of the so-called special exceptions was overruled and the other sustained. The one sustained, in our judgment, amounted to a general demurrer. Upon appellants' refusal to amend, the court dismissed the suit.
The exception sustained by the court was as follows: "Defendant excepts especially to said petition because nowhere does the Plaintiffs allege, with particularity, any agreement made to this Defendant as to the sale of the land involved in this suit, nor does it state whether the contract was oral or in writing, nor does it give this Defendant notice of the type and kind of proof he will be required to meet under said allegations, and that therein and thereby the said petition is vague, indefinite and is not specific in any detail, and of this he prays the judgment of the court."
The only basis for the court's sustaining the above exception and dismissing the suit upon appellants' refusal to amend was upon the theory that under the provisions of the Real Estate Dealers License Act, Art. 6573a, Vernon's Ann.Civ.Statutes, it was necessary for the appellants to allege a brokerage contract in writing as a condition precedent to bringing the suit. Naturally this theory is appellee's contention in this court, while the appellants contend that such matter is one of evidence and not of pleading. The point thus involved seems to be one of first impression in this jurisdiction.
Sec. 22 of the Real Estate Dealers License Act contains the following provision: "No action shall be brought in any court in this State for the recovery of any commission for the sale or purchase of real estate unless the promise or agreement *233 upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum thereof, shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some person by him thereto lawfully authorized."
From an examination of Art. 3995, Vernon's Ann.Civ.Statutes, commonly referred to as our statute of frauds, it is apparent that the above language from section 22 of the Real Estate Dealers License Act was copied literally from the statute of frauds with the additional clause making it specifically applicable to real estate commission contracts. Therefore, the decisions as to the pleadings in this respect under the statute of frauds would at least be persuasive here unless some good reason exists for a different rule.
In Lewis v. Alexander,
In Gonzales v. Chartier,
Also, in Cross v. Everts,
This same rule was in effect re announced by this court in Street v. Johnson et al.,
It will thus be seen that it is settled in this State that a pleading declaring upon a contract coming within the statute of frauds is not subject to an exception because of the failure to allege the agreement to have been in writing. 33 Tex.Jur. 437, Para. 22. With equal soundness we think the same rule would apply to a suit of this sort coming under the provisions of the Real Estate Dealers License Act, which in some respects is merely an extension of the statute of frauds. This is particularly true because the Act as a whole nowhere specifically provides that such allegations shall be made, yet, in section 13 of the same Act it is provided that no broker suing for such commission shall "bring or maintain" such an action without alleging and proving that he was a duly licensed real estate dealer or salesman. If the Legislature had intended that it should also be alleged that the contract was in writing, it would, no doubt, have so provided in section 13 or elsewhere in the Act. At any rate, since the brokerage contract is required by law to be evidenced by writing, under the above allegations the presumption prevails that it was in writing.
Although we are apparently without precedent in this State in our conclusion above, we are not unsupported by authorities from other jurisdictions. Under a similar law in New Jersey the Supreme Court of that State in Adams et al. v. Grady,
We therefore conclude the court erred in sustaining the exception and dismissing the suit. However, if the agreement sued upon herein was actually not evidenced by memorandum or writing signed by the appellee or his representative as provided in the Act in question, our decision in this respect may be of little comfort or benefit to the appellants, provided we are correct in our decision of January 12, 1942 in the case of Landis et al. v. W. H. Fuqua, Inc.,
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.