71 Neb. 59 | Neb. | 1904
Plaintiff's in error, defendants below, and hereinafter called defendants, complain of a judgment for restitution in an action for forcible detainer. November 1, H. D. Estabrook leased the. premises in question to the defendant Godwin for the “term from the first day of November, 1901, until the first day of December, 1901, and thereafter from month to month so long as the rent shall be paid and the other covenants of the lease kept and performed. * * * This lease not to be in force later than the 1st day of November, 1902.” Godwin took possession and has held it ever'since. The codefendant Brown is in possession of a portion of the premises under a sublease from God-win; before the expiration of the lease an extension for two years, by mutual consent, was indorsed upon it and signed by the parties. By deed dated October 28, 1902, Estabrook conveyed, the premises to the plaintiff Harris. The deed was delivered to Harris November 5, 1902. November 8, notices were served on defendant Godwin, by both Estabrook and Harris, of the sale and that his lease would terminate in 40 days, and that November’s rent was payable to Harris and that it was demanded by him. On November 10 the formal three days’ notice to quit was
It is then urged by the defendants that the forfeiture at common law, where there is no statute to aid it, must be a demand on the precise day the rent becomes due of the amount of the periodical payment; that such demand must be before sunset and continue until after sunset, with demand of possession at that time. This rent was due on November 1. Mr. Harris’ deed was only delivered to him November 5, and payment of the rent was demanded by him on the 8th; notice to leave was served on the 10th, and this action brought on the 14th of the same month; there was therefore no demand of the money on the day that if became due, and none of the above formalities enacted upon the premises. Defendants claim that, since the statute is invalid and the common law requirements have not been complied with, there Avas in this action no demand and no forfeiture, and the judgment of restitution is consequently erroneous. They say that no statute of the state of Nebraska, except the void one contained in the amendment of 1875, abrogates this rule of the common law, and that the holdings in this state, that tenants failing to pay rent shall be deemed holding over 'their term, all rest upon this void statute. The defendants also claim that by the terms of the lease the rent Avas payable at the office of Estabrook’s agent; that the demand for the payment of rent by Harris Avas in writing, and served by a deputy sheriff, and designated no place at which the rent should be paid; that no change of agent was made and, before the commencement of this suit, the rent was tendered to Mr. Estabrook’s agent, who refused it. He had in
Tbe position of tbe plaintiff, defendant in error here, appears on page 17 of bis brief: “If we are correct in our position tbat, under tbe law of the state of Nebraska and under tbe terms of this lease, nonpayment of rent gives the lessor an option to be exercised at any reasonable time thereafter by demand and notice to terminate the lease for nonpayment of rent, then it follows,” etc. He claims that tbe right to forfeit at any time after a default for rent, by a demand for it under tbe terms of this lease, existed independently of tbe act of 1875.
Tbe only clause of tbe lease on Avhich a forfeiture is claimed is, “If tbe said rent be not paid promptly at tbe time tbat tbe same becomes due, then this lease shall at once terminate, and the party of tbe second part agrees to surrender tbe immediate possession of the same.” This clause, undoubtedly, would be sufficient at common law to warrant a forfeiture of tbe lease, if a demand were made Avith due formality of payment of rent on the day it became due and it were not paid. Does it Avaive such demand? If not, is tbe act of 1875 excusing such demand valid?
There can be no question, and none is raised by tbe plaintiff, as to tbe fact tbat at common law a demand, Avith all due formalities, must be made on the day the rent becomes due and before tbe tenant enters upon another term. Tbe cases cited by defendants’ counsel abundantly establish tbat this demand is required at common law, unless expressly waived. Ordinarily, such waiver is contained in tbe Avords “without further notice or demand” in tbe provision for tbe forfeiture, as in tbe case of Pendill
We are constrained to think that, in the absence of a statute permitting demand and forfeiture for overdue rent at any time, plaintiff had no right of action for forcible detainer in this case.
It remains only to consider whether the act of 1875 is open to the objections made to it. It seems clear, and no attempt is made by the plaintiff to dispute it, that it is obnoxious, under the former decisions of this court, to both of the objections made against it. Its subject is not expressed in its title, and it does not repeal the section which it seeks to amend.
It is recommended that the judgment of the district court be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings according to law.
REVERSED.