Godley Independent School District v. Woods
21 S.W.3d 656
Tex. App.
2000
Check Treatment

*1 GODLEY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL

DISTRICT, Appellant, WOODS, Appellee.

Dan C.

No. 10-99-317-CV. Texas, Appeals

Court of

Waco.

June *2 Becker, & Eichelb-

Suzanne Schwartz P.C., Austin, aum, appellant. for M. Wambsganss, Andrew L. Kristina Brown, Pruitt & Pe- Kennedy, Thompson, Worth, terson, P.C., appellee. Fort DAVIS Justice Before Chief Justice VANCE, and Justice GRAY. OPINION VANCE, BILL Justice. Godley Independent

Dan Woods sued (GISD), claiming School District breach teaching employment contract. Via GISD asked action, alleging trial court to dismiss the pled that Woods had not that he exhausted his administrative remedies. When the so, brought court refused to do GISD interlocutory appeal. We conclude that affirmatively where the fails to establish the court’s but could juris- conceivably be amended to establish diction, party must attack the seeking to have the suit dismissed for want of We affirm the trial court’s order because file a ruling GISD did not first and obtain special exceptions petition. to Woods’ July against Woods filed suit GISD on 22, 1997, claiming that breached his GISD teaching employment by failing contract expenses reimburse he incurred attend- ing the Texas Bandmasters Association Meeting July and Convention by withholding wages and retirement con- days tributions for he was authorized to be discretionary person- absent from work on did not that he had al leave. Woods available administrative exhausted the support remedies or facts which would conclusion that he had done so or an ex- ception requirement. to the exhaustion answer, 7,1997, August filed on original its all of alle- generally GISD denied gations and claimed that his suit was (Tex.App. Waco, barred his failure to exhaust the admin- 16 S.W.3d 459-60 — h.); Trussell, to resolve istrative remedies available complaints. juris- 409; GISD filed a 447. If 989 S.W.2d at 24, 1999, asking diction on June the dis- alleged fail facts to establish trial trict court to dismiss Woods’ claims be- court’s should be *3 not alleged cause he had nor shown that he opportunity peti allowed the to amend the had exhausted his administrative remedies. Bus., tion. Texas Ass’n 852 at S.W.2d of a hearing The court conducted on GISD’s Blue, 446; However, at 446. 989 S.W.2d 11, 1999, August on and denied the the court can dismiss the claim without 9, request September ap- on 1999. This if it allowing opportunity to amend can followed, peal again arguing with GISD that no claim within the court’s determine that Woods’ suit should be dismissed for jurisdiction can be stated consistent with want of because he has failed City Saginaw v. Car alleged. facts of to claim or that he show exhausted ter, 1, (Tex.App 3 996 S.W.2d . —Fort remedies to re- administrative available 1999, filed); Lyford Ramirez v. Worth dispute. Tex. solve his Civ. PRAc. & Rem. Dist., 902, 900 Indep. Consol. Sch. S.W.2d (Vernon 51.014(a)(8) Supp. Code Ann. 1995, (Tex.App —Corpus 906 Christi no . Ltd., 2000); Ranch, City Austin v. L.S. of writ). way, “the trial court Stated another 750, (Tex.App. 970 S.W.2d 752 —Austin plaintiff must allow a 1998, pet.). no jurisdictional a pleadings amend its to cure plaintiff has not long defect so as

A plea jurisdiction urges affirmatively pled itself out of court[.]” that the deter power court lacks the Ramirez, 900 S.W.2d at 906. subject City mine the matter of the suit. Trussell, 407, v. 10 410 Cleburne of question Because is a 2000, (Tex.App pet.); no Bland . —Waco law, ruling of we review the trial court’s on Blue, 441, Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 989 S.W.2d novo, applying de 1999, (Tex.App pet. granted). 445 . —Dallas the same standards that the trial court plaintiff must facts which affir The 2; applies. City Saginaw, at 996 S.W.2d jur matively show that the trial court has of apply at 446. the de 989 S.W.2d We isdiction. Texas Ass’n Bus. v. Texas of (Tex. Bd., granting of a 440, novo standard to both the Air Control 852 S.W.2d 446 1993). and to the denial of plain Absent an that the allegation plea. City Houston v. Mor jurisdictional such See tiffs are fraudu lent, ua, 126, (Tex.App. 127 allegations the court take the 982 S.W.2d must 1998, pet.). as true and must construe —Houston [1st Dist.] liberally them favor of the when Id.; jurisdiction may A be an

ruling plea. on the Continental Cof Cazarez, 444, raising vehicle for a failure-to- appropriate Prods. Co. v. 937 S.W.2d fee (Tex.1996); challenge exhaust-administrative-remedies Dep’t 449 Texas Mental Pearce, plaintiffs suit.1 Grounds v. Tolar Health and Mental Retardation v. obtaining judicial review of 1. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative dures their prerequisite resorting remedies as a Property Catastrophe decisions. Texas Ins. part statutory court has been of Texas school II Ass’n v. Council Co-Owners Saida Johnson, v. law since before 1900. Nance 84 Towers, (1986) S.W.2d 644 cite [other 706 401, (1892); 19 S.W. 559 Plummer of action is de- omitted]. When a cause Gholson, (Tex.Civ.App.1898). 44 S.W. 1 statute, statutory provi- rived from a era, requirement has been the modem mandatory are and exclusive and sions recognized flowing the fact that the from respects complied with in all or the must be bring employment right to a breach of maintainable, juris- action is not for lack of against district contract action a school 646; II, Mingus Saida v. Wad- diction. controlled statute: 551, 1084, ley, 115 Tex. 285 S.W. 1087 regula- Legislature creates rules and Education, (1926); agencies proce- Butler v. State Board for administrative tions Dist., Dist., (Tex. Indep. Sch. Sch. 971 S.W.2d (Tex.1986). Subject exceptions, to certain 1998), grounds, rev’d other App. — Waco requires Texas law whose claim v. Lamar (Tex.2000); Janik S.W.3d 849 concerns the administration of school laws Indep. Consol. Sch. 961 S.W.2d disputed and involves fact issues to ex (Tex.App. [1st Dist.] — Houston statutorily provided haust administra denied). Although writ we are unable tive remedies with the Commissioner of the nature of contract determine before turning Education to the courts for GISD,2 that he alleged with Agency relief. Texas Educ. v. Cypress- signed “teaching contract” with dist Dist, Indep. Fairbanks (Tex.1992); Gibson v. Waco rict.3 between teachers Contracts *4 751, (Tex.Civ.App. Corpus exceptions, may 581 S.W.2d number of all of which — 1979, n.r.e.). susceptible good-faith Christi writ ref d to "a mistake in inter- Dist., Id.; Indep. Grounds v. Tolar Sch. preting appeal. 707 S.W.2d law" at trial and on 889, (Tex.1986). However, see, Dist., 891-92 e.g., on Febru- Indep. Gibson v. Waco Sch. 10, 2000, 199, ary Supreme 1998), the Texas Court over- (Tex.App. 971 S.W.2d —Waco Mingus Wadley,holding: (Tex. ruled grounds, 22 rev’d on other S.W.3d 849 Although Mingus represented 2000) the dominant (listing exceptions four to the exhaus- decided, approach when it was "the mod- doctrine); Indep. tion Mitchison v. Houston policy em direction of is to reduce the (Tex.App.— Sch. S.W.2d vulnerability judgments of final to attack on denied) (list- Houston writ [14th Dist.] ground subject that the tribunal lacked exceptions proposed by plaintiff). six jurisdiction.” matter [citations omitted]. decline, though, interpreta- apply We this Mingus We therefore overrule to the extent Petroleum to for sever- tion Dubai this case plaintiff's that it characterized the failure to First, importantly, al reasons. and most it is statutory prerequisite juris- establish a as unnecessary. We the trial determine dictional. The trial court in this case had court did not err for which do not reasons jurisdiction wrongful because a claim for depend upon viability the continued of the use death jurisdic- was within its constitutional of a to the to raise an ex- tion, plaintiffs not because the satisfied all haustion of administrative remedies issue. grounds listed in former [Civil Practice Secondly, we have not had the benefit of the 71.031(a). and Remedies section Code] parties' briefing on this issue because Dubai Thus, while defendants in this Court and parties Petroleum was decided after the sub- the Kazis appeals in court of framed Thirdly, mitted their briefs. we do not believe argument their in terms of whether the Supreme interpret that the Du- Court would district court did subject- or did not have change bai Petroleum to effect such our argu- matter we consider those so, procedures. If the Court intends to do it ments in the context of whether the Kazis it which cases before be suitable right established their under the statute to See, e.g., vehicles for such decision. Bland go right forward with this suit. "The of a Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 989 S.W.2d 441 suit, plaintiff frequently to maintain a while (Tex.App. pet. granted). There- —Dallas going question jurisdic- treated as tion, fore, although possibility we note the go reality has been said to case, may apply Dubai Petroleum to this we right to relief rather than to do it. not base our decision on of the court to afford it.” (1990). § C.J.S. Courts at 23 Code, teaching 2. Under the Education con- Kazi, Dubai Petroleum Co. v. 12 S.W.3d categories: probationary, tracts fall into three (Tex.2000). 76-77 continuing, and term. Tex. Educ.Code. Ann. blush, holding At first this in Dubai Petrole- 1996). 21.002(a) (Vernon Each of the dif- appears represent change um a sea in the types contract ferent carries different statu- way analyze we should the issues here. The rights privileges. §§ tory id. 21.101— See present simply case is a breach of contract contract), (probationary .106 21.151—. 160 $500, alleging damages claim in excess of contract), (term (continuing 21.201-.213 con- claim that would fall within the constitution- tract) (Vernon Supp.2000). 1996 & poli- al of the district court. The cy Supreme reasons the looked to overruling Mingus present Woods attached a document entitled "God- when are in cases ley Independent Assign School District Dual in which the doctrine of exhaustion of ad- appen applies, given ministrative remedies that the ment One-Year Term Contract” as an However, subject doctrine is not absolute but is to a dix to his brief. this document (Vernon 21.255, 21.258, 21.301, 21.307 regulated school districts are the terms 1996); Cypress-Fairbanks of the Education Code. Educ.Code 21.151-.160, Dist., 90; Gibson, 21.002, 21.101-.106, §§ at (Vernon 200-01; Janik, 961 S.W.2d at Supp.2000). 21.201-.213 1996 <& S.W.2d at becomes, then, whether Additionally, there are fact issues at stake 323. The issue controversy claims the trial court should have dismissed in the because Woods occupies it representations proceeding posture as now that GISD made certain pleadings they and on the as now stand. performance of his contract and that complied require- he with the district’s this suit Before the court could dismiss leave, asser- personal ments to take his giving without Woods has controverted its tions GISD amend his it must deter- genera] denial. impossible mined that it was for Woods way in such a as to amend withholding claims City confer on the court. wages of his and retirement contributions 3; Ramirez, Saginaw, 996 allege could be construed to that the dis However, at 906. as we have him wrongfully suspended trict without shown, may be able to amend under pay, specifically a claim that falls pleadings to assert that he has exhausted *5 procedures of the Edu the administrative remedies, inif fact he his administrative 21.251(a)(3) (Vernon § cation Id. Code. has, the of estab- which would have effect 1996). petition were construed in Thus, jurisdiction. lishing the court’s way, the district court Johnson which would show the court’s amendment over an County would impossible in this case. not appeal from the decision of the Commis 21.307(a)(1) able to may § Because Woods be sioner of Education. Id. (Vernon 1996). the court’s petition amend his to establish Because such a construc opportu to an possibility in a he was entitled tion would result juris the nity of to do so before the could establish the GISD, the court, granted. Id. give we diction could be the trial must Bus., prompt party, had the burden of opposing Texas Ass’n that construction.4 of plead to his any ing the court to alert Woods 852 at 446. Under construc S.W.2d the tion, A petition plainly in defect. though, Woods’ on challenge pleading proper of school laws vehicle volves the administration Thus, legal there is a rule disputed “though fact issues. he was the basis that and petition the might applicable, which required to exhaust the administrative essential allegations Education omits one or more provided by remedies the Code scope[.]” its bring plaintiffs for claim within he could look to the courts Paso, 7.057(a), 876 City §§ Fernandez v. El S.W.2d relief.5 Tex. Ann. Educ.Code. provision of a written ... a appear anywhere violatefs] in the record. does not Therefore, school dis- employment contract between the we consider it. Till v. cannot 730, Thomas, employee (Tex.App.— [where trict and a school district 1999, monetary harm to causes ... pet.). Further violation the] Houston [1st Dist.] more, employee.” probationary the refers to a the contract Ann. Educ.Code 1996). 7.057(a)(2)(B) (Vernon § In such type provided in the Edu period of the for case, appeal § from the Commissioner 21.102. cation Code. Tex. Educ.Code document, court would be to a district we Education Even if we could consider 7.057(d). County. § type under Travis Id. cannot determine the of contact employed without further which Woods was changes pro- 5. Whether Dubai Petroleum information. exhaust of a failure to cedural ramifications change not which remedies does opposed a construction in administrative 4. As requirement exhaust those complaining deci- that an individual ] of an or Woods is "action! in court. he succeed of trustees remedies before school district board ] [a] sion! (Tex.App. denying Paso writ to its — El denied) doing we affirm its order so. (citing 2 McDonald, Texas Civil (1992)). Thus, special PRACTICE 9:25

exception op is the method which the GRAY, dissenting opinion. Justice posing party triggers the duty court’s GRAY, Justice, dissenting. TOM give party the opportunity to amend to state a claim within the court’s Let us make it less difficult and less “If special exceptions and when those are expensive get disposition to either to a granted, heard and and if and when the dispose or merits cases will amend, adequately does not then never be reached on the merits. Because unnecessarily yet this case creates another properly the suit can be Bar dismissed.” procedural quick barrier to a and efficient Watson, Houston, City Inc. v. case, respectfully resolution of a I dissent. (Tex.App. [1st — Houston denied); also Dist.] see Wash Woods is a school teacher. He sued ington v. Fort Bend 892 Godley Independent School District (Tex.App 5.W.2d [14th . —Houston various all stemming claims from his rela- denied). 1994,writ Dist.] tionship Godley. any with “Under con-

struction, though, plainly Thus, who is faced with a involves the administration of school laws disputed that it believes fact issues. Thus he was does not confer required to exhaust administrative on the court in which it is filed provided remedies by the Education Code If, has two choices. after analyzing the before he could look to the courts for petition, opposing party believes that 7.057(a), §§ relief. Tex. Educ.Code. Ann. pleading party peti cannot amend the *6 21.255,21.258, ...” Maj. Op. 21.301 at 660. jurisdiction tion to any show under circum stances, may it plea jurisdic file a to the question majority The the chose to de- position correct, tion. plea is the Godley cide is whether must challenge If, hand, should granted.6 be on the other Woods’s to plead failure facts sufficient to petition the susceptible is to amendment to jurisdiction show the trial court has by show the court’s opposing the special exception before it challenges the party special should file a exception and jurisdiction by plea trial court’s a to the obtain an order to amend. If the pleading jurisdiction. majority The holds that a required fails or refuses to amend or if is In the first. this majority every plea manner the holds that opposing party still plead believes that the jurisdiction to asserting plaintiff the the jurisdiction does not confer on the has failed to exhaust administrative reme- court, plea jurisdiction a to the may be by dies should be if denied the trial court filed.7 could, theory, it in by be cured additional petition Woods could amend his to show special unless a pleadings, exception has the trial jurisdiction court has over filed, been an and amendment ordered. I challenge action. did GISD not find that this legisla- would frustrate the pleadings by special exception before ask- tive purpose allowing interlocutory ap- of ing the court to dismiss his claims want peals pleas jurisdiction from by to the jurisdiction. Thus, the court did governmental not err entities. PRAC. Civ. & event, disagrees 6. If the susceptibili- opposing party court about the 7. In either an is which amendment, governmental ruling a unit will have a ty petition from may of the to with- it appeal which it can under Section 51.014 of ruling plea jurisdiction hold a on the the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See require an amended without the 51.014(a)(8) § & Tex Civ. Prac. Rem.Code necessity special exception. aof (Vernon Supp.2000). 51.014(8). petition may “... the allegations While there contain Rem.Code Ann. him, nothing inherently wrong alleged by at- matter not in with new before by tempting clarify plaintiffs pleadings reply alleged the to those which have been to special exceptions, did the If the legislature the defendant.” Tex.R. Civ. P. it, require Supreme nor I. require not would Court had intended to exception, special allegations the new holding The majority bases their on the in appear would an amended necessarily concept plaintiff given that a must be the regarding special and the rules amend in opportunity any plead defect would exceptions amending pleadings could, Maj. ings theory, be cured. P. been the ones cited. Tex.R. Civ. theory” atOp. phrase 8. The “in is used 91; Tex.R. Civ. P. 62-65. plea jurisdiction because the must upon allegations Furthermore, Grounds, be decided based the Supreme the plaintiffs pleadings. City contained in the preferred Court noted that specifically the Trussell, Cleburne v. challenge the was bringing method of of (Tex.App. h.). The no v. Tolar Grounds — Waco should not be an Dist., 707 S.W.2d Indep. Sch. (Tex.1986). trial evidentiary hearing, and the court it Additionaby, clear that if not to hearing does resort evidence to plaintiff op court the an trial denied Bland amend, resolve it. Sch. Dist. portunity to or failed to consider (Tex.App. 989 S.W.2d 441 supplemental pleading, an or it amended — Dallas 1999, pet. an granted). Bland contains Lyford be error. Ramirez v. Con would excellent nature discussion (Tex.App.— sol. writ). hearing and the limited circumstances Ra Corpus Christi beyond which the trial court is look the mirez, granted the trial court pleadings. resolve The issue to at the it day after was filed.

hearing held: Corpus Christi “Unless simple plaintiff matter of whether the that no petition affirmatively demonstrates (1) affirmatively plead either: himself out plaintiffs of action exists or that cause (2) court; barred, or whether he has failed to require trial recovery is we pled himself within the of the give opportunity court court after an to amend. dismiss granting a motion to amend *7 summary Id. judgment.” or a motion for majority’s the rebanee on the While to say opportunity did the The Court not opportunity to the an need allow exception. by special had to It amend proper concept amend on a to is based pleading supplemental that either a seems law, concept mean a the this does not in appropriate or an would be amendment only way a special exception put to that the response asserting to an answer possible on of a de pleading notice plaintiff had failed to exhaust administra to it. fect the need cure When fifing tive remedies before suit. Supreme the require Court memorialized plaintiff facing plea ment that the a to the “AMEND” THE OPPORTUNITY TO to jurisdiction, must have the IN THIS CASE pleadings amend to meet the com their case, on supplemental Godley to In this filed its answer plaint, they cited rule, spe asserting jurisdic- 1997 a pleading regarding August not the rule lack of failed exceptions. tion Woods to exhaust cial Texas Assoc. Business because answer, Bd., administrative remedies. This v. Texas Air Control defect, 80; (Tex.1993); had alerting pleading to his 446 Woods P. Tex.R. Tex.R. Civ. ' 21 when file months by Supreme The rule cited been on for over P. Civ. Business, on in a Godley plea Texas Association filed fact, the had been plaintiffs supplemental 1999. In case provides that June action, long on file for so special exception with no that a requiring pre- to be filed, court, notice of dismissal for want of prosecution pared heard order parties. had been sent to the prepared the face and filed and then waiting for plea of the Woods still amendment to determine if the amended supplement refused to or plead- amend his pleading adequate filing another ing to correct for his failure pleading to the amended he had exhausted his plea jurisdiction. administrative reme- or a This is a dies or that for some reason he litigation was not needless use of resources when required to simply exhaust them. ample opportunity Woods had to amend chose to stand on his existing pleadings, allegations.

which, at stage, procedurally was sim-

ilar to the situation special excep- when a IT BUT IS REALLY granted tion has been but no amendment JURISDICTIONAL?

filed. For some claims of failure to exhaust

After almost administrative remedies it is two months to critical to dis- amend his pleading tinguish what the claim response direct is because the 11,1999 nature of the August remedy on administrative fre- a hear- quently on Godley’s plea jur- controls which court will abatement was held. isdiction was to review the deci- denied a written administrative Hill, signed Comyn order sion. v. County October 1999. From h.). legislature (Tex.App. denial the authorized —Waco appeal. direct review of the administrative Civ. PRAC. & decision would Rem.Code 151.014(8)(Vernon necessarily have to occur in a Supp.2000). Travis Coun- court,

ty in any district suit filed other APPLICATION court, with or exhausting without adminis- remedies, Woods had trative years subject over would be to a supplement or amend his Godley’s majority after As the an- out, swer great pains point was filed takes challenging the au- some of court’s thority brought to hear Woods’s claims could be in a dis- case because of trict court in County, Woods’s failure to Johnson if he had exhaust administrative actually remedies. He had exhausted his administrative rem- almost months to supplement or edies. amend his after was filed. ample opportu- This is I agree with the concern majority of the nity supplement or amend. Woods regarding the effect Dubai this situa- elected to stand on his pleadings. Having Kazi, tion. Dubai Petroleum Co. v. failed to allege he had exhausted his ad- (Tex.2000); Maj. 658-59, Op. remedies, ministrative or in the alterna- n. 1. The rational of Dubai is that if the tive, allege reason he required was not to problem *8 amendment, by could be cured remedies, exhaust such the plea to the problem is not one only

jurisdiction should granted have been and of pleadings. the rational of Dubai the suit dismissed. applies governmental asserting entities If Godley required special file a upon based exception jurisdic- before the failure to exhaustion of administra- tion, and if the spe- trial court denies the tive remedies which could conceivably be exception, amendment, cial like he did the simply cured the failure is jurisdiction, Godley will be pleading denied the abil- defect and can never be chal- ity bring an interlocutory appeal lenged by plea specifically legislature. special authorized or after a exception. upon Based very Godley At the least will be substan- logic, ruling against Godley tially delayed by procedure the additional correct and would be affirmed. entities preserve governmental

To ability to utilize an created legislatively appeal ruling of a on a

interlocutory case, I type a governmental not extend Dubai to

would Otherwise, no reason that

entity. there is disposi- in Dubai would not be holding Dubai appeal. Nor is

tive of this entire about exhaust-

limited to defects that could be

ing administrative remedies ap- by amendment. its broadest

cured any situa- apply Dubai would

plication, construction in which the most liberal

tion conceivably give the pleadings could

of the claim the

trial court of some against could make the defendant. an other- ability collaterally attack jurisdictional judgment valid

wise sup- Dubai was

grounds problem was the the unintend-

posed to cure. It have intent and negating legislative

ed effect of parties ways of the

trampling several frivolous traditionally disposed of

suits. ZAMORANO, Appellant,

Rosario Texas, Appellee.

The STATE of

No. 04-99-00725-CR. Texas, Appeals Antonio.

San 14, 2000.

June