delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiffs, George Gocheff and Marguita Gocheff, doing business as the Marjan Company, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of St. Clair County against defendants Earl and Mary Breeding on October 12,1973. The cоmplaint alleges that defendants individually and jointly retained the services of plaintiffs pursuant tо a retainer contract attached as exhibit A to the complaint and that as evidеnce of the value of the services rendered, defendants gaVe and executed a certain demand note of August 10,1973, in the face amount of *943.56 which is attached as exhibit B to the complaint.
On October 12, 1973, upon application, the circuit court appointed рlaintiff George Gocheff as special officer for service of process on defendants. On December 6, 1973 the court entered an order of default and judgment order in the total amount of *1226.63, representing the amount of the demand note plus *283.07 in attorney fees in favоr of plaintiffs and against defendant Earl Breeding. No judgment was entered against Mary Breeding. On Marсh 28,1974, defendant Earl Breeding filed a motion to set aside default judgment which, by stipulation, was later continued indefinitely.
On December 6,1976, the circuit court entered an order sustaining the default judgment аnd dismissing defendant’s motion to set aside same. Defendant Earl Breeding now appeals from that order and argues that the default judgment against him is invalid, because George Gocheff, a party plaintiff, individually served process on him. We agree.
Section 13.1 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110, par. 13.1) provides in pertinent part as follows:
“(1) Writs shall be served by a sheriff, or if he is disquаlified, by a coroner of some county of the State. The court may, in its discretion upon motion, order service to be made by a private person over 21 years of age and not a party to the action. 000
(2) Summons may be served upon the defendants wherever they may be found in the State, by any person authorized to serve writs * * (Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant casе it is undisputed that if service was made at all, it was made by plaintiff George Gocheff and not by a sheriff or coroner. The statute in clear and unambiguous terms requires that a private person making service cannot be a party to the action. As is noted in the Civil Practice Aсt (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110, par. 13.1, Historical and Practice Notes, at 103 (Smith-Hurd 1968)), “The restriction against service by a party is a codification of the law which existed prior to the 1937 amendment.” (People ex rel. Lafferty v. Feicke,
Where service of process is not carried out in accordance with the manner provided by lаw it is invalid, no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired, and a default judgment rendеred against the defendant is void. (Escue v. Nichols,
Plaintiff argues that no service of process was required, because the contract and note filed as exhibits with the complaint each contain a “confession of judgment” clause. Judgments by confession, without service of process, are authorized under section 50(3) of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110, par. 50(3)). However, the judgment against defendant was a default judgment entered upon the basis of the complaint and еxhibits. No person or attorney confessed judgment against the defendant in accordance with the note and contract as is required by section 50(3) in order to obtain a valid
For the reasons discussed herein, we hold that the judgment against the defendant is void for lack of jurisdiction over the defendant. The order of the circuit court dismissing defendant’s motion to vacate default judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to vacate the order of default and judgment order entered in this cause.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
EBERSPACHER and G. J. MORAN, JJ., concur.