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Goble v. Montana State Fund
325 P.3d 1211
Mont.
2014
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*1 GERBER, LYNN DERRICK GOBLE Appellants, Petitioners v. FUND, STATE

MONTANA Appellee. Respondent DA 13-0286. No. 5, 2014. February on Briefs Submitted April 15, 2014. Decided 2014 MT 99. 374 Mont. 453.

325 P.3d 1211. *2 Bulman, Appellants: Rasmusson, For C. Thomas Eric Bulman Associates, PLLC, Law Missoula. Martello, Appellee:

For McGregor, Thomas E. Daniel B. General, Special Attorney Fund, Assistants Montana State Helena. JUSTICE McKINNON Opinion delivered the of the Court. (Goble) (Gerber) Appellants ¶1 Derrick Goble and Lynn Gerber (WCC) from appeal the Montana Compensation Workers’ Court’s 28,2013 March denying orders summary judgment motions for (MSF) granting and Montana State summary Fund’s motion for judgment. We affirm. following We consider the appeal:1

¶2 issues on 1.Whether the properly 39-71-744, ¶3 WCC MCA, determined that § rendered ineligible rehabilitation benefits. 39-71-744, MCA, 2.

¶4 Whether appellants’ violates constitutional rights equal protection. 39-71-744, MCA, 3. Whether appellants’

¶5 violates constitutional rights to process. substantive due 39-71-744, MCA, Whether appellants’ violates constitutional

rights procedural process. due 39-71-744, 5. Whether appellants’ MCA violates constitutional 1 Goble/Gerber have set forth in their “Statement of Issue #2: Whether Compensation holdings Wimberly Compen. Fund, Workers’ Court’s v. State Ins. Fund, MTWCC regarding and McCuin v. Montana State MTWCC may however, Code Ann. not, 39-71-744should be prior reversed.” The Court visit two aponte decisions and sua WCC reverse them. areWe nevertheless confident that analysis our herein proceedings will be beneficial further before the WCC interpreting provisions 39-71-744, §of MCA. We have restated issues accordingly. from excessive fines. to be free

BACKGROUND in the 8, 2004, right shoulder while injured his July On Goble Controls, Inc. in with ECC scope employment of his course and Controls, Inc. irjury, ECC was County. time of Goble’s Missoula At the claim, paid Goble liability for his accepted insured MSF. MSF indemnity and medical benefits. later, charged with the commission years Two Goble was stipulated MSF before criminal offenses. Goble and

numerous following history of Goble’sincarceration:2 WCC to the DC-06-294, Goble, No. 6, 2006, in Cause State v. On November Court, Counfy, Missoula Goble Fourth Judicial District Montana On December and one misdemeanor. pled guilty to three felonies 18, 2006, a term of incarceration Goble sentenced to was case, to run with all counts greater days than 30 consecutively with Cause Nos. DC-06-103 concurrently but assessments, fees, DC-04-520, and fines. financial plus 6,2006, pled guilty to three felonies two On November Goble DC-06-103, Goble, Montana Cause No. misdemeanors State v. Court, County. On Missoula December Fourth Judicial District *3 each 18,2006, years to incarceration for on Goble was sentenced for each of the and to 6 months incarceration felonies assessments, fees, misdemeanors, together with financial fines. 18,2006, he the terms admitted had violated

On December Goble Goble, v. Cause No. DC- probation of his in State and conditions Court, 04-520, County. District Missoula Montana Fourth Judicial 18, 2006, prior deferred sentence was On December Goble’s on years incarcerated for five the two revoked and he was ordered case, to run one in that his sentence felonies and misdemeanor DC-06-294, together in consecutively the sentence with with assessments, fees, fines. financial 24,2007, being a felon July pled guilty Goble to the offense

On America v. of a firearm in United States possession stolen Goble, CR-07-31-M-DWM, States No. United Derrick Cause parties’ stipulated to the and the facts. While The Court is limited WCC’s record clearly parties, history it not been set out of Goble’s incarceration has period for a in excess that was incarcerated nevertheless sufficient to establish Goble days substantially longer of 30 and for than weeks. Montana, District Court for the District Missoula Division. On 21, 2007, to 84 months of November Goble was sentenced incarceration, plus fee. His sentence was to run assessment consecutively with the in Cause No. DC-04-520 and sentence concurrently with the No. DC-06-294 and DC- sentences Cause 06-103.

Goble, support 2013 MTWCC 9-12. back at the Goble owed child ¶¶ time of his incarceration. parties stipulate any further Goble was advised

his state or federal criminal matters that his incarceration would impact receipt of compensation his workers’ benefits. 22,2006, that, pursuant On June MSF notified Goble to 39-71-

744, MCA, going MSF was to terminate payment temporary benefits beyond May 29,2006, Thereafter, as a result of Goble’sincarceration. 25, 2009, on March MSF notified Goble that he would have been (PPD) permanent partial entitled to 120 weeks of benefits (for 1, 2006, beginning May per at a rate week a total of $252 $30,240), but that he was not entitled to receive those benefits while he parties was incarcerated. The do not dispute Goble was period during the entire 120-week which he was eligible to PPD receive benefits. August In scope employment while in the coruse and of his Vann’s, County,

with Inc. in Missoula claimant Gerber sustained an injury right to his accepted liability shoulder. MSF also for Gerber’s paid claim and him indemnity and medical benefits. MSF notified eligible Gerber that he weeks, was to receive PPD 48.75 at week, per rate of of May $287.16 as 2010. MSF also notified sum, Gerber that he had option lump to receive benefits in a these which Gerber declined. In December 2010 Gerber was sentenced to period of days. incarceration in excess of 30 Gerber was not advised that his incarceration affect would his workers’ benefits. January In notifying 2011 MSF sent Gerber a letter him that he was ineligible approximately remaining to receive the weeks ofhis PPD benefits, $4,381.02, amounting to due to his incarceration. Goble and each appealed ineligibility Gerber the WCC their 39-71-744,

receive sought benefits under MCA. Gerber *4 joinder certification as a class petition. action and with Goble’searlier The WCC denied both motions and the claims Goble and Gerber 27, individually. hearing, went forward At the November 2012 argued same issues which now raise on the 28, 2013, appeal. granted On March the WCC MSF’s motions summary judgment toas both Goble and Gerber and denied claimants’

457 joint Gerber filed summary judgment. Goble cross-motions appeal. notice of OF REVIEW

STANDARDS v. novo. Wiard judgment de summary grant review a We 132, 295, 13, Mont. 79 P.3d 318 MT Liberty Corp., ¶ Ins. 2003 N.W. summary judgment, grant denial reviewing In the WCC’s 281. summary ruling on a motion for standard this Court uses same genuine there is an absence judgment; “we determine whether is entitled to moving party and whether of material fact issues Co., Cas. Satterlee v.Lumberman’s Mut. a matter of law.” judgment as the WCC’s 265, 222 566. We review 368, 9, 353 P.3d Mont. 2009 MT ¶ Ins. Compen. Mut. Lund v. State for correctness. legal conclusions (1994). 611, 612 346, 348, 868 Fund, Mont. P.2d law, and we question is a constitutionality of a statute The v. Henry State legal conclusions for correctness. court’s review a lower 449, 982 126, 10, 294 P.2d Fund, MT Mont. Ins. Compen. ¶ it conflicts with “unless constitutionality presumed, of a statute is court, reasonable constitution, beyond of the judgment in the 321, 13, Fund, MT Ins. Compen. ¶ v. State doubt.” Powell constitutionality of 518, 15 challenging the party P.3d 877. The Mont. unconstitutional proving the statute a statute bears the burden exists, be any it must Henry, 11. If doubt beyond ¶ a reasonable doubt. Powell, 13. of the statute. ¶ resolved in favor

DISCUSSION pursuant to benefits assessing a claimant’s entitlement When MCA), (WCA; chapter we Act Title Compensation the Workers’ iiyured. the time the claimant was in effect at apply statutes Fund, 12, 303 Mont. Ins. 2000 MT Dunnington Compen. v. State 14, 297 MT (citing Hale Royal Logging, v. P.3d 475 1245). Therefore, the WCAis the 2003 version of claim, applicable and the 2007 version is to Goble’s applicable identical, However, nearly aside these two versions are Gerber’s claim. one minor difference which will be discussed below. from 39-71-703, MCA, for an of PPD provides the basis award states, pertinent part: benefits and disability permanent partial suffers a injured If an worker total permanent total or longer temporary is no entitled to permanent partial to a benefits, the worker is entitled if that worker:

disability award (a) iqjury; wage loss as a result has an actual *5 458

(b) permanent impairment rating.... has a (2) greater When a worker receives a Class 2 or class impairment , person as converted to the whole ... and has no wage compensable injury actual loss as a result of the disease, occupational eligible payment the worker is for receive impairment only. award only relevant difference the between 2003 and 2007 versions provides 703 is that the undisputed impairment § latter that an award may paid lump requested be in a sum if by the claimants. See 39-71- § 703(7) (2007), case, MCA. In the instant Goble and Gerber met all the 703(1) criteria in set forth for benefits § and were deemed to be Gerber, to PPD by “entitled” MSF. the claimant under which the (2007) provisions applied, of 703 did elect pursue lump § not sum payment. Issue One: properly

¶18 Whether the WCC determined that 39-§ 71-744, MCA, rendered incarcerated ineligible for disability or rehabilitation compensation benefits. Goble and Gerber contend that the WCC misconstrues 744 as § allowing it to from deduct their PPD benefits one week benefits for incarceration, week of effectively each drawing down all of benefits to zero. argue that the “time limit on benefits” language in 744 referring § should be read as to the statute of -603, limitations through MCA, contained 39-71-601 §§ and not to the payment of their PPD benefits to which Goble/Gerber would entitled, otherwise be but for their incarceration. MSF responds plain meaning clearly supports 744 interpretation the WCC’s of the statute. (2003) We observe that 744 744 identical. 744(1) provides:

Section [A] eligible claimant is not for disability or rehabilitation compensation benefits while the claimant is for a period exceeding days 30 in a jail correctional institution or as the felony result conviction of a or a misdemeanor. The insurer remains liable for medical benefits. A time limit on benefits provided chapter otherwise in this is period not extended due to a of incarceration. “Weconstrue a statute to legislative ascertain the intent give legislative Letasky, 51,

effect to the will.” State v. MT ¶ (citing 152 P.3d 1288 Compen. S.L.H. v. State Mut. Ins. 948). Fund, 362, 16, 2000 MT 303 Mont. The Court’s step interpreting first plain language, statute is look at its language if the unambiguous, is clear and no further interpretation is statute, office of of a Letasky, 11. “In construction required. or in what is in terms and declare judge simply is to ascertain omitted or to therein, to insert what has been contained not substance 1-2-101, MCA. omit what has been inserted.” not a claimant is above, provides As forth set during or rehabilitation eligible incarcerated, the incarceration provided the time when the claimant is Furthermore, specifically “[a] states that days. the statute exceeds 30 chapter is provided otherwise this time limit on benefits considering plain In period due to a of incarceration.” extended Legislature intended it clear that language of *6 ineligible receive days of 30 to be incarcerated in excess claimants rehabilitation benefits. ineligibility immune from the argue they that are Goble/Gerber ¶23 was eligibility their to receive benefits language § of 744because § ineligibility They argue that prior determined to their incarceration. to a “forfeiture” upon incarceration amounts to receive benefits based right. argument would constitutionally protected of a Goble/Gerber’s limit” mean that interpret “eligible” the and have us words “time eligible of who become while 744 forfeits the benefits § incarcerated, before, are and that such benefits they are and from confinement. Such an presumably payable upon discharge of and interpretation provisions inconsistent the clear § with Court, among adaptations, other to insert require would the from in contravention eligible” “forfeiture” and remove “not the statute 1-2-101, of MCA. § note, WCC, in of a further did the that the absence We as

¶24 of to an incarcerated provision payment such as the benefits § bear the cost essentially public claimant would mean that the would first, through payment the of an incarcerated individual twice: second, public The benefits; through and cost of incarceration. the 39-71-105(1) (3), MCA, WCA, in policy of Montana’s as set forth § relationship provide wage-loss is to benefits which bear a reasonable possible as wages to actual lost and “to return a worker to work as soon injury or disease.” Both after the suffered a work-related worker has by 744 offered objectives interpretation are of § thwarted wage-loss when If were to receive benefits Goble/Gerber. Goble/Gerber returning to earning wage incapable they incapable are 39-71-105, statute, work, § of the as stated purpose then clear incarcerated has MCA frustrated. A worker who has become would be committing a crime. job from the force as a result removed himself Goble/Gerber, therefore, of their losing wages are not as a result

injuries, activity. but rather as result their criminal parties stipulate during that Goble was incarcerated eligible entire that he period 120-week was otherwise to receive PPD payments, and that was for approximately Gerber final 16 payment period. weeks his 48.75-week As a direct result incarcerations, benefits, Goble received no PPD and Gerber’s approximately were terminated after 34 weeks. We conclude interpreted that the WCC applied provisions of 703 and correctly. 39-71-744, MCA, Issue Two: Whether appellants’ violates rights constitutional equal protection. argue Goble/Gerber equal violates their

protection being because are differently similarly treated than individuals, situated and this difference in treatment bears no rational relationship legitimate governmental to a interest. In addressing the step equal protection analysis, first identify classes involved as qualify those workers who for PPD benefits under 703, and those workers with the same criteria who subsequently period incarcerated for a days. They argue excess of 30 that the WCC erred determining similarly these classes are not situated.3 Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, II, Constitution, and Article Section ofthe Montana no person equal shall be denied protection of the laws. “The basic rule of equal protection persons is that similarly respect situated with to a legitimate governmental purpose of the law must receive like *7 Fund, treatment.” 140, Rausch v. State Compen. Ins. MT 2005 ¶ 22). Powell, 327 Mont (citing P.3d analyzing When ¶ claim, (1) equal protection the Court a three-step process: follows identify the classes they involved and determine if similarly are (2) situated; determine appropriate of scrutiny apply level to to the challenged legislation; apply appropriate level of scrutiny challenged to the Henry, statute. 27. ¶ It necessary is for the plaintiff identify to a similarly situated against class “ which the plaintiff’s can compared class be because vacuum; ‘[discrimination cannot exist in a it can be found in the point proceedings, attempted At some in the Goble/Gerber to introduce an theory equal protection concerning additional under their claim the definitions of the rejected theory. The classes. WCC this We find that the WCC not abuse did its by allowing theory, discretion not this alternate and thus will address it. ” Freeman v. in similar circumstances.’ people treatment of unequal 1995) (9th (quoting Atty. Cir. Ana, City Santa 68 F.3d 1982)). (D.C. Cir. Inc., 684 F.2d People, U.S. v. Irish Gen. the factor to isolate similarly class is identifying a situated goal The Freeman, at 68 F.3d impermissible to discrimination. allegedly subject equivalent if are similarly situated Thus, groups two alleged constituting the than the factor respects other all relevant 390, 27, 325 Sys., U. 2004 MT Snetsinger v.Mont. See discrimination. MT Agrie., 2007 445; Dept. Oberson v. U.S. 19-20, 519, 171 P.3d 715. 339 Mont. ¶¶ classes that are identify two context, Gerber/Goble present In the except the factor respects

similarly in all relevant situated identify are defined The two classes incarceration. whether consider properly for PPD In order to eligibility benefits. situated, examine the nature similarly we must classes are the two 39-71-116(27), MCA, origin. statutory PPD benefits and their PPD as: defines worker, reaching maximum a after condition in which physical

a healing: medical

(a) impairment.... permanent has a

(b) capacity but able to return to work some is work; ability to impairs the worker’s permanent impairment (c) iryury. wage a has an actual loss as result pre- the claimant to a PPD serve to restore Specifically, Satterlee, 23. We for a limited amount of time. wage level accident previously explained: have work, claimant, is entitled who is able to return

The benefits, which serve to restore claimant wage supplement a if the claimant has suffered decrease wage level pre-accident Additionally, the PPD claimant is to work. wages upon return award, compensates the impairment entitled to an This benefit physical loss of function. permanent claimant for the benefit, paid over a and is is smaller than the total time, a claimant designed compensate period of but shorter wage. earning to return to work and re-commence who is able returns to work is to a claimant who payment of an award returning injured purpose of [WCA’s] with the stated consistent to the work force. workers

Rausch, Thus, designed for the 23.4 benefits are worker who is ¶ job pool, able to return to work in the worker’s but nevertheless suffers loss, wage 39-71-116(27), or impairment partial both. Section MCA. Trust, 162, Compensation In v.MACoWorkers’ MT ¶31 Caldwell 923, 361 Mont. P.3d we considered whether the denial of rehabilitation benefits to a claimant equal protection violated when the age-based basis for the denial eligibility turned on claimant’s for 39-71-710,MCA, security “retired,” social benefits. Section deemed benefits, ineligible any therefore for workers’ disabled eligible security worker for social retirement benefits. We determined (1) similarly that two situated classes were created: those vocational eligible eligible rehabilitation security, claimants who are not for social eligible those vocational rehabilitation claimants who are eligible to receive security social retirement benefits. We stated that 39-71-710, MCA, similarly “§ creates two classes out of situated persons, distinguished only by age-based deemed‘retired’provision 39-71-710, Caldwell, 18; MCA.” § see also Reesor v. Mont. State ¶ Fund, 370, 12, 325 1, 103 1019; Satterlee, 2004 MT Mont. ¶ ¶ Caldwell, together, As we 703 and § deem construed similarly create two classes out persons, distinguished situated by the provision relating of 744 incarceration. Both classes are composed of workers who qualify disability otherwise (of members) under but one class which Gerber/Goble are denied those benefits based on the sole distinguishing factor of incarceration. an currently Whether individual is incarcerated bears no relation receiving individual’s likelihood of PPD benefits prior to incarceration. The WCC determined that equal protection Goble/Gerber’s claim similarly

failed due the lack of situated classes. The WCC’s Renee, determination on largely was based State v. 1999 MT P.2d 893. Renee required dealt with a statute which sentencing court to consider felony alternatives non-violent Renee, Renee, offenders. 14. Defendant who was convicted of claim, misdemeanors, brought equal protection arguing that the apply Renee, statute should also to misdemeanor offenders as well. “wage supplements” statutory language Our use of the term in Rausch refers to Mont., 1991, legislative {see was discontinued in the 1991 session Laws ch. 4) changed calculatedby multiple § and to a benefit formula which considers factors, including wage 39-71-703(l)-(9), Thus, despite loss. See MCA. the use of the term, explanation purpose discontinued above Rausch of the of 703 benefits is still instructive to the instant case. felony offenders are non-violent that misdemeanor 14. We held *9 sentencing considerations of purposes for the similarly situated not and duration quality in the to the differences part due in effects on long term and in groups, the two between punishment felony as by a conviction brought about liberty interest an individual’s Renee, We 31-32. ¶¶ conviction. of a misdemeanor compared to that criminal of different convicted individuals explained similarly not felonies—are non-violent offenses—misdemeanors distinguishing sentencing. The purposes situated for in bore a direct Renee the two classes characteristic between consideration the court’s requiring the statute relationship to Renee, 30-33. sentencing ¶¶ alternatives. case, if misdemeanor reasoned that the WCC present In the purposes for similarly are not situated felony

non-violent offenders Renee, unincarcerated to then analysis pursuant equal of an protection are also not injured workers injured workers and the conclusion that essentially came to similarly The WCC situated. similarly situated by Goble/Gerber were presented the classes treating for incarcerated claimants exists because a rational basis so, By doing the WCC claimants. differently from unincarcerated trying we are isolate the factor —incarceration—that subsumed equal protection Defining the classes against test a rational basis. clarity with tedious, and if not done analysis can be difficult and up the factor we vision, swallowing in the may result class definition evaluating an problem An inherent in attempting are to examine. in a defining in the classes challenge to a statute lies equal protection truncating the way effectively will test the statute without similarly Thus, analysis. Goble/Gerber have established to unincarcerated PPD beneficiaries virtue situated Renee, therefore, inquiry here. does not direct provisions of 703. qualify who finding that workers We conclude the WCC erred also similarly workers under 703 are not situated period for a meeting who are incarcerated the criteria but days. excess of 30 claim is addressing equal protection step The second scrutiny apply appropriate level determining equal protection Henry, 29. We review

challenged legislation. ¶ scrutiny: strict recognized tiers of challenges one of three under Price, State v. 2002 scrutiny, or basis. scrutiny, intermediate rational has 42. This Court 33-34, 57 P.3d MT ¶¶ neither compensation statutes the workers’ previously held that nor involve fundamental rights suspect of a class infringe upon the trigger scrutiny analysis. Henry, 29; which would a strict ¶ Co., 45, 50 270, 279, 937 Heisler v. Hines Motor 282 Mont. P.2d Co., (citing Stratemeyer 147, 151, v. Lincoln 259 Mont. 855 P.2d (1993); Serv., 40, 42, Sodding Cottrill v. Cottrill 229 Mont. (1987)). 895, 897 P.2d applies We have held that the rational basis test considering challenges when equal protection to the workers’ Henry, 29; Zempl Employers’ statutes. v Uninsured ¶ Fund, 424, 430, 938 658, 662 Heisler, (1997); 282 Mont. P.2d 282 Mont. at (citing Stratemeyer, P.2d at 50 259 Mont. at 509). at foregoing, apply Based on the we will the rational basis test to equal protection challenge. Goble/Gerber’s The final step equal protection in our analysis apply is to appropriate scrutiny challenge. level to evaluate the constitutional Henry, requires 32. The rational basis test ¶ to bear a statute relationship legitimate governmental Satterlee, rational to a interest. 33). such, (citing Henry, As we must public policy address the *10 considerations that underlie the WCA.These considerations stated are 39-71-105(1) (3), MCA, in § as follows: objective An ofthe compensation Montana system workers’ provide, fault,

is to regard wage-loss without and medical suffering benefits to a worker from a injury work-related or disease. Wage-loss injured benefits are not intended make an worker whole but are intended assist a worker at a reasonable employer. limitation, cost to the wage-loss Within that the benefit bear a relationship wages should reasonable to actual as a lost injury result a work-related or disease.

(3) A worker’s removal from the workforce because of work- injury related negative worker, or disease has a impact on the the worker’s family, employer, general Therefore, the and the public. objective of the compensation system workers’ is to return the worker to work as possible soon as after worker has suffered a injury work-related or disease. wage

“Actual loss” means “the wages that a or worker earns qualified to earn after the heeding worker reaches maximum are less wages than the actual the worker received of injury.” at time 39-71-116(1), MCA. upon statutory provisions, Based these policy ofMontana’s to provide wage-loss WCA is benefits which a bear reasonable relationship wages to actual lost to return a worker to work as possible. provisions soon as The pool 744 remove from the § eligible beneficiaries those who individuals cannot return to work due

465 Because wage. actual unable to earn an are to incarceration and who job force himself from the removed claimant has an incarcerated to his incarceration crime, wages are attributable his lost committing a to collect Permitting incarcerated iiyury. his and not suggest, would benefits, as Goble/Gerber workers’ wage-loss benefits provide undercut ofthe WCAto principal objective a a result of wages lost as relationship to actual a that bear reasonable rationally of 744 ineligibility iiyury. provision a work-related of the See interests WCA. governmental legitimate advances concluding that 744 such, err in Satterlee, the WCC did not 28. As equal protection. rights to not violate Goble/Gerber’s did §39-71-744, MCA, appellants’ violates Three: Whether Issue process. due rights to substantive constitutional rights to their substantive argue that 744 violates arbitrarily provides unreasonably and it process due because They assert ineligible 703 benefits. incarcerated claimants “a instrument of 744 is further interpretation that the WCC’s maintains that MSF it “forfeits” their benefits. punishment” because legitimate there is is satisfied because process due substantive arbitrary. patently it is not of the statute and purpose process reaffirms substantive due theory underlying “The contains a Due Process Clause concept that fundamental actions, governmental arbitraiy component which bars substantive them, as a and serves implement used to regardless procedures State, Dept. v. governmental action.” Newville oppressive check on (1994). Thus, Servs., Family P.2d “ a test of the requires process analysis due ‘substantive enact power to in relation to the State’s of a statute reasonableness ” at Newville, at P.2d 267 Mont. legislation.’ Mont. 254, 263, 717 Co., Burlington Ry.N. (quoting Raisler v. (1985)). take power use its The State cannot individual; against an unreasonable, action arbitrary, capricious *11 reasonably Legislature must be by enacted the therefore, a statute satisfy to in order legislative objective permissible to a related Newville, Powell, (citing process. ¶ of substantive due guarantees 801). 250, 883 P.2d at 267 Mont. at equal protection to pursuant our already have determined We treating for a rational basis

analysis that there exists abiding. We choose to remain law differently from those who arbitrary, 744 is not to state that except further will not elaborate policy in the set forth governmental purpose legitimate and the serves 39-71- statutes. Section compensation ofMontana’s workers’ provisions Furthermore, by Legislature MCA. a statute enacted the 13). Satterlee, Powell, presumed to 10 (citing be constitutional. ¶ ¶ proof have the challenging Goble/Gerber burden constitutionality they Henry, have failed to meet. 11. correctly purpose The Dissent notes that one the WCA is family negative impact reheve a worker’s from the occasioned Dissent, injury resulting wage worker’s work-related and loss. However, neither nor suffering their families are negative impact injuries. Rather, to their due work-related the families suffering negative impact Goble/Gerber are due Goble/Gerber’s activity decisions to conduct criminal which led to incarceration. As the correctly WCC’s explained, orders injured

Non-incarcerated rely provide workers on their benefits to necessities life for themselves and provided families. Incarcerated workers are the necessities of fife (food shelter) and due to their incarceration. Likewise one of the results of their incarceration they provide is that cannot for their irrespective families of whether had suffered an industrial injury.

Additionally, benefits, compensation just workers’ wages, like subject garnishment purposes fulfilling for the support child obligations. 39-71-743,40-5-411, However, See §§ MCA. a child support obligor’s wages or workers’ benefits can be garnished to the extent that he or she employed. continues to be While this undoubtedly creates a serious financial hardship families that rely on such support, remedy problem this is not ours to make. despite And the Dissent’s assertion purely 744 is punitive thus unreasonable in process a substantive due analysis, as discussed in Issue policy sound Legislature’s decisions underlie the decision not to allow longer earning individuals who are no wages due to incarceration to continue to wage-loss receive benefits. argue also

¶43 Goble/Gerber violates their process by substantive due undermining quid pro quo basis of the WCA. Black’s Law Dictionary quid defines pro quo “[a]n as action or thing exchanged that is thing for another action or of more or less equal Dictionary value.” Black’s (Bryan ed., Law A. Gamer 8th 2004). ed., occasions, West As this Court has held on several enactment of the WCA compromise demonstrated a industry between and labor in which guaranteed labor recovery, received no-fault industry was relieved of the possibility large potentially uncapped Satterlee, system. recoveries in the tort (citing 37¶ Stratemeyer Co., v. Lincoln 276 Mont. 67 at 915 P.2d 175 at 179 *12 an (1996». employer both an requires the WCA Essentially, in value. proportional rights give up to employee of foundation quid pro quo violates the argue that 744 § employers, their rights to sue WCA, they gave up their in that the correctly However, as the WCC in return. anything did not receive an it reflects that quo because noted, quid pro the upholds and, to the workforce return claimant cannot PPD ineligible for he deemed that be correspondingly, requires that, 744 renders incarcerated while additionally note benefits. We any medical benefits, provides it still ineligible for Contrary to the claimants, even while incarcerated. due to benefits with the Goble/Gerber, to be consistent deem 744§ of we assertions rights their that of the WCA.The claims Goble/Gerber quid pro quo failure of 744’s have been violated because process to due substantive mistakenly ignores the fundamental quid pro quo to maintain the In of the WCA. Legislature’s enactment compromise by reached the gained predictability exchange recovery, employers for no-fault be payments that would compensation insurance consistent workers’ such, claims not. As way personal iiyury a that tort were capped in that serves as a windfall arbitrary governmental an action 744is not rather, to rationally related suggests, but to insurers as Dissent Thus, respect to with legitimate governmental purpose. assertions, hold the statute does quo we that quid pro Goble/Gerber’s rights. process due not violate their substantive MCA, 39-71-744, appellants’ violates Four: Issue Whether process. due rights procedural constitutional to procedural process due they were denied Goble/Gerber assert that, guilty pleas their as a result of they because were informed eligibility their to proceedings, they criminal would lose in their a minimum” the argue that “at receive PPD benefits. Goble/Gerber to receive duty notify would be unable State had a them incarcerations, notify them and the failure PPD benefits due to their process. They procedural due constituted violations underlie justice offair play that the notions and substantial assert of a loss to be informed right process requires to due individual right any action is taken. before II, provides that 17 of the Montana Constitution Article life, without due deprived liberty, property person “[n]o shall be that workers’ of law.” This Court has held process claimant. property of the individual are considered be the 205, 24, 295 Co., MT Mont. v. N.H. Ins. Lockhart protections procedural calls for process is flexible and such 744. “Due particular Eldridge, as the v. situation demands.” Mathews 424 U.S. (1976) (internal quotation 96 S. Ct. marks and Fabrication, omitted); Dept. citation Inc. v. Labor Wheelsmith Mont. Indus., 27, 17, 298 Specifically, & 2000 MT P.2d 713. procedural process requires due consideration three distinct factors: “(1) private action; will interest that be affected the official deprivation through risk of an erroneous of such interest *13 used, value, procedures probable any, and the if of additional or (3) procedural safeguards; government’s substitute and interest.” of Insts., 105, 109, 956, Dept. M.C. v. 211 Mont. 683 P.2d 958 903). Mathews, (citing 424 U.S. at S. atCt. We not persuaded by argument they that

¶47 Goble/Gerber’s were procedural process. not afforded due We first note that both by Goble/Gerber were advised letter from MSF PPD that their benefits would be terminated the provisions under of 744. § Goble/Geber ineligibility contested their hearing and WCC conducted a and their arguments. They provided notice, considered were were counsel, represented by opportunity and had an to present evidence argument. and Additionally, Eldridge when the Mathews v. applied,

¶48 factors are it is clear procedural § that withstands a process challenge. due provide any arguments Goble/Gerber have failed to any that there is of deprivation rights. risk an erroneous of argue Goble/Gerber do not being that their PPD benefits were terminated mistake accident MSF, on of hearing held, behalf or that had they been would have been able to receiving continue they their PPD benefits while were Instead, they argue 744, alone, incarcerated. standing that § is arbitraiy oppressive. Goble/Gerber have not provided sufficient argument demonstrating noted, 744is unconstitutional. As § the WCC ignorance Goble/Gerber’s of the existence 744 does not mean that procedural their process rights Wiard, due were violated. MCA, 39-71-744, Issue Five: appellants* Whether violates

constitutional to he the imposition excessive free from fines. argue Goble/Gerber that 744violates the Excessive Fines Clause because the forfeiture their PPD is punitive both grossly disproportional crimes, to their that the crimes were receiving convicted are unrelated to compensation workers’ benefits. argues MSF that the Excessive only pertains Fines Clause to criminal cases, applicability and has no to a workers’ case. MSF maintains that if even the Excessive applied, Fines Clause forfeiture of PPD benefits does not constitute a fine. Good, on v. 2004 MT The WCC relied State II, not violate Article

100 P.3d to find that 744 does Constitution, imposition prohibits Montana of the Good, we that a district court’s restitution fines. In held excessive purposes ofthe constituted a fine for the order for a criminal defendant Clause, separate is not part because “restitution Excessive Fines Good, it.” aspect is an punishment the offender’s but from shall, 46-18-241, MCA, sentencing “a court (citing which states that restitution”). sentence, an offender to make full part require as of the 321, 328, 118 S. Ct. Relying Bajakajian, on U.S. v. 524 U.S.

(1998), punitive order was we found that because Good’srestitution ofthe Fines Clause. part, squarely purview it was within the Excessive fine, the offense and the relationship We considered the between “grossly that restitution order was determined therefore did not violate the Excessive Fines disproportional,” and Clause. are correct in their assertion the Excessive Hardy State ex rel. proceedings.

Fines Clause is not limited to criminal 43, 47-48, 319 Equalization, v. State Bd. 133 Mont. (1958). However, the forfeiture of argument 1063-64 their Fines Clause purposes benefits constitutes a fine for Excessive Good, brought unpersuasive. Unlike where the defendant *14 of imposed part fine claim order as a his excessive about restitution ineligibility for PPD punitive purposes, sentence for Goble/Gerber’s to consequence benefits is a of their incarceration and unrelated the Additionally, underlying terms of the sentence. Goble/Gerber’s of ineligibility punitive, aspect for PPD benefits was neither nor an Therefore, their forfeiture of PPD benefits punishment. because the fine, does not constitute a we need not discuss whether the effect of grossly disproportional. 744 is

CONCLUSION reasons, foregoing the of For the we affirm Order the WCC. ¶53 McGRATH, CHIEF JUSTICES BAKER and RICE JUSTICE concur. COTTER, dissenting.

JUSTICE grounds unconstitutionally I on the that 744 violates the dissent ignores process rights due ofthe claimants. The Court the substantive disability truth the worker but also basic that benefits sustain Further, begin rely upon those who him or her for sustenance. I cannot agree ineligibility provision “[t]he that with the Court’s conclusion legitimate governmental of the interests of rationally advances Opinion, the WCA.” 39-71-105, MCA, Legislature’s Section contains the “Declaration 39-71-105(3), MCA, public policy.” provides pertinent

part: “A worker’s removal from the workforce because a work- worker, injury negative impact related or has a on the the disease family, employer, general public.” worker’s the and the It can therefore fairly argued governmental one of ‘legitimate be that the interests” of the WCA to family negative relieve a worker’s from the impact by injury resulting disability occasioned the wage worker’s and However, complete disregard loss. consequences injured the to the employee’s family, 744 the supplements punishment against levied by justice system by the worker the criminal stripping away benefits the right worker has a vested and entitlement. arguing against In Goble and process Gerber’s substantive due challenge to freely § MSF concedes that the claimants are entitled argues, however, their benefits. It entirely that “it is legislature reasonable the determined that incarceration removes eligibility benefits, though may even those persons be entitled to such benefits” (emphasis original). It is here that MSF’s process analysis substantive due collapses, as does Court. this Goble and Gerber are indeed entitled to their PPD benefits. Their entitlement was fixed MSF when it determined that Goble sustained a wage 20% loss and Gerber wage a 10% loss. MSF adopted findings the physicians that both claimants permanent sustained person impairments whole permanent physical restrictions. question therefore becomes whether removing eligibility for these benefits in favor of paid the insurer who was cover workers’ impairment unreasonable, arbitrary, loss is oppressive. Newville, As we said in process “[substantive primarily due underlying examines the substantive and remedies to determine whether restrictions ... are arbitrary unreasonable or when balanced against purpose legislature in enacting the statute.” Newville, 267 Mont. at at 800. The restrictions in 744§ purely punitive and cumulative of the penalties already criminal imposed upon Gerber, Goble and punish as end is to the impaired worker for by taking his incarceration away Stripping his benefits. impairment benefits to which are unquestionably *15 entitled no rational underlying bears relation to the public policy ofthe WCA, which is at in part negative least to relieve the impact on a family worker’s occasioned as a result of injury the worker’s impairment. 39-71-105(3), MCA. I cannot application fathom how ineligibility provision “[t]he governmental interests rationally legitimate advances the

WCA,” money to which Court The Opinion, ¶ as this concludes. private pockets stays Goble are entitled instead and Gerber exchange providing insurers received valuable consideration who are entitled coverage. money to which Goble and Gerber insurance expense of claimants’ to the insurer at the becomes a windfall upon money child dependents who relied that established fund support Respectfully, giving money which and sustenance. of to company are entitled back to the insurance instead logic rationally advance any families does under stretch legitimate governmental interests of the WCA. reasons, foregoing For the I would conclude that unreasonable, arbitrary, oppressive, and that it violates the basis, claimants. I process substantive due On this would our declare it unconstitutional. I dissent from refusal to so. do joins dissenting WHEAT in the JUSTICE Opinion JUSTICE COTTER.

Case Details

Case Name: Goble v. Montana State Fund
Court Name: Montana Supreme Court
Date Published: Apr 15, 2014
Citation: 325 P.3d 1211
Docket Number: DA 13-0286
Court Abbreviation: Mont.
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