Aрpellants, representatives of a certified class of former “at-will” employees of Amoco’s credit card facility located in Dеs Moines, Iowa, appeal from an order of the District Court 2 granting summary judgment to Amoco on their claims for bonus payments for 1994. We affirm.
I.
Beginning in 1993, appellants worked under a bonus program, the Amoco Variable Incentive Pay Program (“VIP Plan”), under which they were paid an annual cash bonus if the company met certain goals. The VIP Plan remained in effect for employees of the Des Moines facility until September 20,1994, when the facility was sold tо a third party. As a result of this sale, the employment relationship between appellants and Amoco was terminated, and appellants began working for the facility’s purchaser.
Appellants contend that, because they worked for Amoco for nine months during 1994, they are entitled to receive a pro rata share of the bonus paid under the VIP Plan for 1994. Amoco disagrees, arguing that the plain language of the VIP Plan, a copy of which was distributed to each appellant at the time the Plan was instituted, provides that, to receive a bonus under the Plan, an employee is required to be “actively employed” by the company on the last day of the year for which benefits are sought. 3 According to Amoco, because none of appellants was an Amoco employee on December 31, 1994, none is eligible to receive a bonus payment for 1994.
Thе District Court granted Amoco’s motion for summary judgment finding that the “unambiguous” language of the VIP Plan required appellants to be employees of Amoco on the “allocation date” of December 31, 1994, in order to qualify for bonus payments under the Plan. Joint App. at 384-85 (District Ct. Order). The former employeеs appeal, arguing that this conclusion is contrary to Iowa law.
4
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment,
see Blaise v. Fenn,
II.
Appellants argue that Amoco’s unilateral act of selling the Des Moines facility
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prevented them from fulfilling the conditiоn precedent of year-end employment necessary to receive benefits under the Plan, and that Iowa law provides that their failure tо comply with the terms of the agreement should be excused. Appellants rely on a number of Iowa cases to support their position. Amoco argues that these cases are distinguishable primarily because each plaintiff in the cited cases had an “individually negotiated” employment contract which the employer subsequently breached. Appellees’ Br. at 6. We conclude that the cases cited by appellants are distinguishable. We therefore hold that the plain, unambiguous language of the VIP Plan requiring year-end employment for receipt of benefits should be enforced as written in accordance with Iowa law.
See Lange v. Lange,
In
Dallenbach v. Mapco Gas Prods., Inc.,
We disagree with appellants’ characterization of the Dallenbach decision, which in our view stands merely for the proposition that a bonus arrangement should be enforced according to its terms. Contrary to the facts in Dallenbach, appellants were not induced to accept new positions or new methods of salary computation by Amoco’s promise of a bonus, and Amoco did not attempt to retroactively alter the terms of the VIP Plan.
Appellants also rely on
Kollman v. McGregor,
Again, appellants’ reliance is misplaced. Kollman is factually distinguishable from the present situation because the plaintiff was operating under a specific, one-year employment contract and was not, as is the case here, an at-will emрloyee. The existence of a durational employment contract, which is lacking in appellants’ case, was crucial to the cоurt’s decision in Kollman and, consequently, the Kollman decision fails to bolster appellants’ argument.
In
Hilgenberg v. Iowa Beef Packers, Inc.,
Because the employees in Hilgenberg were induced by the employer to accept new supervisory positions in part based on the employer’s promises of year-end bonuses, this case is distinguishable from the present case. Appеllants were not induced by promises made in the VIP Plan to alter their employment relationships with Amoco. The employer in Hilgenberg could not, in the circumstances presented, abrogate its individually-negotiated bonus arrangements with the em *679 ployees who had agreed to become supervisors in reliance on the company’s promise of year-end bonus payments. Amoco made no such promise to induce appellants to change their employment status.
In sum, we conclude that the cases cited by appellants fail to support their position and that Iowa law requires enforcement of the terms of the VIP Plan as written.
See Berryhill v. Hatt,
III.
We affirm the judgment of the District Court.
Notes
. The Honorable Charles R. Wolle, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.
. Amoco's VIP Plan states in relevant part: "If you participate, you are eligible to receive a cash payout from the Variable Incentive Plan for a plan measurement period if: You are actively employed on the last dаy of the plan measurement period.” Joint App. at 83. The "plan measurement period" is the calendar year. Id.
.The parties agree that appellants’ claim for benefits under Amoco’s VIP Plan is not governed by ERISA, but is an issue of contract interpretation governed by Iowa law.