*1 McCASKILL, Gloria J. Plaintiff-
Appellant, CORPORATION,
SCI MANAGEMENT Services, Incorporated, Illinois
SCI
doing Evergreen business Ceme
tery, Smith, al., Sam et Defendants-
Appellees.
No. 00-2839. Appeals,
United States Court of
Seventh Circuit.
Argued Jan.
Decided April Sypulski, IL,
Jamie G. argued, Chicago, for Plaintiff-Appellant. Schwartz, Gaur,
Frederick L. Shanthi V. argued, Mendelson, IL, Littler Chicago, for Defendants-Appellees. BAUER, MANION,
Before ROVNER, Judges. Circuit ROVNER, ILANA DIAMOND Circuit Judge.
Gloria McCaskill
suit
filed
federal
against
Management
Corpora-
SCI
tion,
Smith,
Evergreen Cemetery, Sam
“SCI”)
and Patrick Comer (collectively
al-
leging that she was terminated from her
*2
time, howev-
that
VII,
Since
proceeding.
42 dent”
Title
in
of
at
violation
position
SCI
the matter
er,
resolved
Supreme Court
alleges
the
seq.
§ 2000e et
She
U.S.C.
Corp.-Alabama
Tree Financial
in violation of
in Green
contract
of her
denial
79, 121 S.Ct.
Illinois
Randolph,
of the
violation
42 U.S.C.
Act,
(2000),
the em-
rejecting
Collection
Payment and
148 L.Ed.2d
Wage
At
interference
oral
seq., and tortious
distinction.
bedded/independent
et
ILS 115/1
underlying
jur-
those
The facts
that the
agreed
parties
with contract.
the
argument,
ap-
on
to the issues
are irrelevant
Tree.
issue is resolved
isdictional
allegations
involve
essentially
peal, but
however,
dissent,
raises a
The
complaints of
forwarded
that McCaskill
jurisdic
court’s
challenge
this
to
distinct
her subordinates
from
harassment
sexual
court did
tion,
that the district
arguing
alleged
the
who was
supervisor,
to her
case,
must
and that we
the
actually dismiss
manager, and
harasser,
general
to the
the court to determine
in order for
remand
to
owed
compensation
that
was denied
she
proceeding
the
to dismiss or
as a result.
eventually
her and
terminated
certainly
We
compelling
in
arbitration.
complaint and
the
moved to dismiss
SCI
that
the district
the
agree with
dissent
Federal
pursuant to the
compel arbitration
its intent
have
clear
court should
made
(“FAA”),
§ 1 et
Act
9 U.S.C.
Arbitration
case,
that
dismiss this
Arbitration
and the Illinois Uniform
seq.,
in fact
the case
hinges on whether
(“IUAA”),
seq.
et
SCI
710 ILCS
Act
5/2
case,
in
howev
A
this
remand
dismissed.
agree-
signed an
that
asserts
McCaskill
er,
parties agree
all
pointless
because
dis-
employment
all
providing that
ment
the case.
district court dismissed
that the
through binding
putes shall
resolved
compel
the court to
appellees
asked
acknowledging the
Although
arbitration.
case,
no
and dismiss
arbitration
provision,
of the arbitration
applicability
stayed.
the case be
requested that
party
that
the arbitration
asserts
McCaskill
have in
could not
Accordingly, the court
because it
is not
agreement
enforceable
arbi
stay;
tended
effectively
fully and
vin-
her from
prevents
tration,
only
it
have dismissed
could
grounds
rights.
Title
She
dicating her
VII
that the case is
agree
parties
case. The
in the arbitra-
provision
in a
this
dismissed,
seems little
and therefore there
(1) requires each
agreement which
tion
the intent of
in a
Where
point
remand.
attorneys’
its own costs
party
pay
clear,
case is
court to
we
dismiss
outcome and
regardless fees
Kaplan
jurisdiction. See
have
one-
party
pay
shall
mandates
each
(7th
Bros., Inc.,
Shure
paid
to be
compensation
half
of
Cir.1998)
had
(appellate
other
as well
one-half
arbitrator
that case
order stated
though
even
minute
agree
Because we
of arbitration.
costs
where
prejudice,
without
was dismissed
provision renders
fee
a whole evidenced clear
record read as
in this Title
agreement
unenforceable
case); Spitz v.
to end the entire
intent
action,
argu-
consider the
we need not
VII
Cir.1999)
443, 447-48
Tepfer, 171 F.3d
costs.
note that
regarding
ment
We
though district
jurisdiction even
(finding
challenged
initiаlly
had
summary judgment
granting
court order
this
this court to hear
ability injunction request,
not mention
did
jurisdic-
court lacked
arguing
SCI
injunctive
pursue
plaintiff
where
failed
compel-
court’s order
tion over the district
summary judgment
and “tenor of
relief
on the distinction
ling
based
intent to
trial court’s
opinion reflects the
“indepen-
and an
an “embedded”
between
lawsuit”;
dispose
all the issues in the
at issue
explicitly
court’s
the in-
failure
address
herе provides for the arbitration of a num
junction request “is the sort of technical
ber of employment-related disputes,
in
upset
defect
does not
the order’s final-
cluding those based on harassment or dis
ity, for it
implicitly
is clear that the court
crimination.
It excludes
types
other
*3
claim.”).
against
found
Spitz on this
claims likely
brought
SCI,
to be
by
such as
disputes related to non-competition or con
ITOFCA,
The
cites
Mega-
dissent
Inc. v.
fidentiality agreements,
“any
and
claim
Inc.,
360,
Logistics,
Trans
235 F.3d
363
against
Company
Employee
which
(7th Cir.2000),
proposition
for the
par-
that
upon fraud,
is based
theft or other dishon
agree
ties cannot
to
and an
¶
est conduct
employee.”
Agreement
2.
attorney’s assertion at oral argument can-
The
agreement
arbitration
further speci
appellate jurisdiction.
not create
The
fies as follows:
case, however, recognizes
repre-
that such
can
sentations
indeed determine appellate
Each
may
party
legal
retain
counsel
jurisdiction.
In that
the court was
pay
shall
its own costs
attorneys’
deprived
of appellate
because
fees, regardless of the outcome
counterclaims had been dismissed “without
Each party
arbitration.
shall
one-
pay
prejudice,” and thus could be
refiled at
half of
compensation
paid
be
time. The court refused
appellate
to find
arbitrator(s),
as well as one-half of
jurisdiction based on
parties’
rep-
mere
any other costs relating to the adminis-
existed,
that
resentation
such
tration of the arbitration proceeding
because it was inconsistent with the law.
(e.g.
rental,
etc.).
room
reporter,
Id. at
panel
ITOFCA
¶
Agreement,
4. Some сourts have refused
stated, however, that it
MegaTrans’
asked
to enforce
agreements
which
attorneys at
they
oral
if
would
mandate that
pay
each
half the
represent
to the court
that MegaTrans
arbitration,
costs of
while others have con
would not refile the
Id. at
counterclaims.
sidered
the cost-shifting provision
365. The court stated that
Mega-
“[h]ad
renders the arbitration proceedings inaс
so,
Trans done
we could have treated the
See,
cessible for that
individual.
e.g.,
district court’s dismissal of the counter-
531 U.S.
having
claims as
prejudice,
been with
thus
373;
L.Ed.2d
Brown v. Wheat First Secu
winding up
litigation
and eliminating
rities, Inc.,
(D.C.Cir.2001);
In Gilmer of civil enforcement sufficiently vigorous 20, 26, 111 S.Ct. Corp., 500 lawyers held to ensure (1991), Court In order rights. L.Ed.2d 26 may persons be willing represent statutes under federal be would long as grievances, for arbitration civil legitimate appropriate her statu vindicate effectively it would litigant Congress determined forum, in the arbitral action tory cause for all lawyers compensate necessary to serve continue will the statute a case. on reasonably expended time purposes. deterrent remedial right n. Id. at 873 Advisors Financial Cigna Williams purposes integral to therefore fees Cir.1999). See *4 to the is central often statute and of the Opportunity Employment Equal also from redress to seek ability persons of — House, Commission Waffle recognition of In Title VII. of violations 754, 761, L.Ed.2d 755 —, pro- attorney’s fees the of importance the arbi impact of construing (narrowly ef- deterrent remedial and to the visions that exis the to hold agreemеnt tration VII, for SCI conceded counsel Title fect of between agreement tence of an the if construe that we EEOC’s at oral affect the does not private remedies). allowing the as not agreement the One of all to right seek fees, attorney’s that then Title VII is by to arbitrator award provided remedies pre to a plaintiff awarded of may be the attorney’s deprives fees agreement 2000e-5(k), § 42 U.S.C. is unenforce- vailing plaintiff, Title VII and under remedies Dunning v. Simmons in we noted able. Airlines, Inc., Cir. in the arbi- provision attorney’s fees ordi party should 1995), prevailing a that just does quite plainly agreement tration special fee absent narily recover party shall that each It mandates that. an award rendering such circumstances regardless of attorney’s fees own pay its Dunning, emphasized unjust. we In at- SCI the arbitration. outcome of to the provision of the importance fees a language with plain that to avoid tempts Title VII: purposes SCI, to According interpretation. novel litigation in VII Attorney’s fees Title only what McCas- regulates provision proportion limited a are not not what she paying, for responsible kill is in case damages monetary assessed awarded, possible it is for and thus bemay because, a recognized, has Congress as attorneys’ her fees award arbitrator to “not suit acts rights in civil plaintiff agreement, the arbitration with consistent as a ‘private also himself alone but for pay that her as she award long uses vindicating policy attorney general,’ meaning plain defies the attorneys. That highest Congress considered that no has identified other words. SCI A .... omitted] [citations importance.” that a hold in a court would which context it make would proportionality rule of pay her requiring person provision difficult, for individu- impossible, if not means the actually op- attorney’s fees own rights civil meritorious als with pay required be party posing damages relatively potential small but her, pay her then she must fees This the courts. redress from to obtain obviously attorney. provision own Congress’ inconsistent totally required be party can that neither means Congress enacting in purpose of the other attorney’s fees pay ar- private-sector fee recognized party, directly through either or the straw- case Remanded for further proceedings approach by man advocated SCI. consistent with opinion. fact, the Ninth Circuit reached that MANION, Judge, Circuit dissenting. regarding a
conclusion
similar clause in
Co.,
Graham Oil Co. v.
Products
The court has
ARCO
concluded
the arbi
Co.,
Div. Atlantic
ported to forfeit statutorily-mandated the L.Ed.2d 373 Reasoning that the right to recover attorney’s fees provided district court “could only have dismissed case,” under the Petroleum the Marketing Practices it juris concludes that we have (PMPA). Act Id. It diction further noted that the to review a district court’s decision right to attorney’s fees important was to that dismisses a cаse after ordering the the effectuation of the policies, PMPA’s to arbitrate. It then proceeds to specifically purpose the address deterring a the merits of this case. After franchiser from improperly carefully contesting reviewing the district court’s claims, meritorious accordingly opinion, it is clear and held to me that the district that the clause court case, contravened the PMPA. Id. did not dismiss this аnd there 1248. at The court fore then held that the its order is anot final decision under clause, attorney’s fees well I, § as two other Tree and 28 Green U.S.C. clauses, contravening therefore, not respectfully were severable dissent. from the as a Longstanding policy strongly federal fa-
whole—a claim not even
in
raised
this case
Tree,
arbitration.
vors
531 U.S. at
and therefore not before us here.
91,
Similar to Graham the clause here v. Hosp. Mercury Mem’l Corp., Constr. purports to forfeit statutory 1, 24, McCaskill’s 460 U.S. 74 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. right fees, (1983)). to attorney’s a remedy that we 765 Section the Federal already have recognized (“FAA”) is essential ful- Arbitration Act governs appellate the fill remedial and deterrent functions of review of arbitration It provides, orders. Title VII. Because the provision prevents part, in relevant appeal may аn from effectively her vindicating her from “a taken final with respect decision in the arbitral forum by preemptively 16(a)(3). de- § an arbitration ....” 9 U.S.C. her nying addition, remedies authorized Title appeal may In an not be taken VII, the arbitration agreement is unen- interlocutory from an order “compelling forceable. The 16(b)(3). district court’s order § com- arbitration ....” 9 U.S.C. pelling REVERSED, arbitration is and the FAA does not define term “final deci- did nоt But the district court ante at 625. Court In Green
sion.”
Nevertheless, the court
the case.
to its
dismiss
according
phrase
interpreted
re-
appellees
i.e.,
concludes that because
well-established,
meaning,
a deci
plain
compel
arbi-
the district court
quested
mer
litigation
on the
“ends
sion which
because
tration and dismiss
for the court
nothing more
and leaves
case be
party requested
neither
judgment.” 531 U.S.
to do but execute
(citations omitted).
could not have
stayed, “the
[district]
86,
Finally, the interpretation court’s benefit, of our *7 to conserve judicial its own re- decision is incomplete. ITOFCA As we sources and to aid this court on review. indicated in that litigants impact can Oleochemicals, Salim See F.3d 278 at 93 this court’s determination of jur- (urging “district courts in these circum- by isdiction representing the court that stances to be as clear possible as about pause 2. I to take note of an issue left unre tration a Dispute Timing can Control the Tree, solved the Supreme Court in Green Appeal, an 48-Aug. Fed. Law. i.e., whether a that, court may district (noting dismiss a during oral of Green Tree, Tree, under case at FAA all. Green justices some questioned whether U.S. at 87 n. S.Ct. (declining stay required FAA). or not a under the address whether district court should have This questioned court has also whether there stay dismissal). entered a rather a than any authority is statutory dismissing for a plain language gives of the FAA only court a case when arbitration. See Kroll power grant stay. Assoc., Inc., See 9 U.S.C. v. Doctor’s contrast, nothing 1993). in the FAA refers to the Cir. uncertainty surrounding power district court's to dismiss a case. See ability, district authority, court’s or to dismiss McClain, Stephen also H. FAA, Under a New Su a case yet under the another reason to Decision, preme Court Litigants Seeking Arbi- decline over appeal. this to dismiss truly intend they
whether ... or or mean
action something else mean to do they Dustrol, Inc. v. also
entirely.”). See 2002 WL
Champagne-Webber, * 2002) Jan.24, (N.D.Tex. (citing 122500, 4 clearly states court district case because court dismisses
that “the unadjudicated longer no
there are court.”). before the presently ap- lack I conclude that we
Accordingly, this case and over
pellate case therefore remanded
would have dispo- district for
back to the order. Without
sition or clarification opine proceed we agree- validity of the
on the
ment. COMPANY, INSURANCE
ALLSTATE Lakhia, subrogee of Sam
Plaintiff-Appellant, INCORPORATED,
MENARDS,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 01-2139. Appeals, States Court
United Circuit.
Seventh Nov.
Argued *8 5, 2002. April
Decided
