GLORIA CARIGNAN v. PAUL R. DUMAS JR.
Docket: Oxf-16-82
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
Decided: January 19, 2017
2017 ME 15
SAUFLEY, C.J., аnd ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
Argued: November 9, 2016; Reporter of Decisions
[¶1] Paul R. Dumas Jr. appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Oxford County, Clifford, J.) granting summary judgment in favor of Gloria Carignan and denying Dumas‘s motion for summary judgment. Dumas contends that the court erred by interpreting a provision of the Paper Streets Act,
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The summary judgment record contains the following facts. Brady v. Cumberland Cty., 2015 ME 143, ¶ 2, 126 A.3d 1145. Gloria Carignan оwns unencumbered title to real estate located at 3 Holyoke Avenue in Rumford,
[¶3] Paul R. Dumas Jr. owns property described in two separate deeds: one (the “Casco Bank Parcel“) dated January 22, 1976, and recorded in the Oxford County Registry of Deeds; and another (the “Rumford Paper Company Parcel“) dated July 18, 2014, also recorded in Oxford County. The Rumford Paper Company Parcel is dеlineated on the Ninth Addition Plan, and is contiguous to the Casco Bank Parcel, which is delineated on a subdivision plan titled Fourth Addition to Rumford Falls, dated August 10, 1906, and recorded September 19, 1906. Together, Dumas‘s property (collectively the “Dumas
[¶4] The Carignan Parcel is bordered on the west by Willow Street, a paper street depicted on the Ninth Addition Plan. Dumas‘s lots 2172 through 2177 are bordered by Willow Street on the east, and his lots 2160 through 2164 are bordered by Willow Street on the west. A portion of Willow Street runs
[¶5] Willow Street was never formally accepted by the Town of Rumford, and neither party alleges any private or public use of the road until the 1970s, when Dumas asserts that a portion of Willow Street was maintained for logging purpоses.1
[¶6] Rumford Paper Company is the successor-in-interest to RFPC. In conveying the Carignan Parcel to the Perrys in 1973, RFPC expressly reserved
[f]orever, to and for itself, its successors and assigns . . . rights to authorize and consent to the authorization, construction, and maintenance through any and all the streets, avenues, parks, reserved and other open places shown on the [Ninth Addition Plan], of surface railways to be propelled by horses, electricity or steam; or other power, or sewers, water pipes, gas pipes, electric
wires, both overhead and underground, and all other matters and things for which streets are customarily used . . . .
When Rumford Paper Company conveyed the Rumford Paper Company Parcel to Dumas, it expressly included in its conveyance “all of the fee interest, and any other interest or rights of the Grantor previously reserved or otherwise held by Rumford Falls Power Company in Willow Street . . . as shown upon [the Ninth Addition Plan].”
[¶7] On May 15, 1997, the Town voted pursuant to
[¶8] On November 8, 2013, Carignan filed a complaint against Dumas and Robert Richard, an alleged contractor for Dumas, asserting six causes of action related to Richard‘s use of Willow Street to access the Dumas Parcel. In response, Dumas asserted affirmative defenses and counterclaimed, pursuant to the Paper Streets Act, P.L. 1987, ch. 385 (effective September 29, 1987) (codified at
[¶9] Carignan stipulated to a partial dismissal of her claim, and amended her complaint to seek declaratory judgment, naming Dumas, RFPC, and New Page Corporation as defendants. RFPC and New Page Corporation were later dismissed from the action, leaving only Carignan and Dumas as parties. In January 2015, Carignan and Dumas filed cross-motions for summary judgment as to Carignan‘s claim and Dumas‘s counterclaim for declaratory judgment.
[¶10] On May 4, 2015, following a hearing on thе cross-motions, the Superior Court (Oxford County, Clifford, J.) entered an order granting summary judgment for Carignan and denying summary judgment for Dumas. The court concluded that pursuant to
[¶11] Dumas filed a motion for reconsideration on May 18, 2015, which the court denied on July 29, 2015, and was entered on the docket on February 12, 2016. On February 24, 2016, Dumas timely filed notice of appeal.
A. Issue on Appeal
[¶12] Dumas argues on appeal that when read together with
B. Standard of Review
[¶13] Cross-motions for summary judgment are reviewed de novo pursuant to
[¶14] We review de novo “the trial court‘s interpretation and application of the relevant statutes and legal concepts.” Remmes v. Mark Travel Corp., 2015 ME 63, ¶ 19, 116 A.3d 466. We will analyze a statute‘s plain language to effect the Legislature‘s intent, and will “consider the provision at issue in the context of the entire relevant statutory scheme.” Brooks v. Carson, 2012 ME 97, ¶ 19, 48 A.3d 224.
C. Operation of the Paper Streets Act
[¶15] The Paper Streets Act was enacted in 1987 to “clarify title to old, proposed, unaccepted streets shown on subdivision plans, and to eliminate the possibility of ancient claims.” Id. ¶ 24 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The various sections of the Act must be read as complementary, Fournier v. Elliott, 2009 ME 25, ¶ 21, 966 A.2d 410, and sections 3031 through 3034 “shall be liberally construed to affect the legislative purpose of” the Act.
[¶17] Section 3032 provides that if, within the later of fifteen years after recording or September 29, 1997, a municipality has not voted to accept a proposed way laid out in а subdivision plan recorded prior to September 29, 1987, and it has been neither constructed nor used as a way, then the way is deemed vacated as though by order of the municipality pursuant to
[¶18] At issue here is whether section 3031 applies to pre-1987 subdivision plans. Our common law presumption is that “absent language to the contrary, legislation affecting procedural or remedial rights should be applied retroactively, whereas legislation affecting substantive rights should be applied prospectively.” In re Guardianship of Jeremiah T., 2009 ME 74, ¶ 18, 976 A.2d 955 (quotation marks omitted); see also Greenvall v. Me. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2001 ME 180, ¶ 7, 788 A.2d 165. Similarly, we have said that “all statutes will be considered to have a prospective operation only, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is clearly expressed or necessarily implied from the language used.” Coates v. Me. Emp‘t Sec. Com., 406 A.2d 94, 97 (Me. 1979) (quotation marks omitted); see also
[¶19] We have noted, discussing the Act as a whole, that it was “intended to apply retroactively.” Glidden v. Belden, 684 A.2d 1306, 1314 (Me. 1996) (noting that “the law was intended as a ‘comprehensive attempt to deal with a
[¶20] There are, however, certain provisions of the Paper Streets Act that we have held do not apply retroactively. For example, we have stated that subsection 3031(4) applies only to subdivisions recorded after 1987, and have never explicitly applied subsection 3031(1) or the first paragraph of subsection 3031(2) to pre-1987 subdivisions. Id. ¶¶ 2, 25-26.
[¶21] The court below relied upon our decision in Tisdale to conclude that section 3031 as a whole applies to pre-1987 subdivision plans. In Tisdale, we decided that plaintiffs who sought a declaratоry judgment as to their rights to use a right of way could not have acquired rights pursuant to subsection 3031(2) because their lots were not shown on a 1969 subdivision plan that
[¶22] If we now were to apply subsection 3031(1) and the entirety of subsection 3031(2) to pre-1987 subdivision plans, as Carignan urges, sections 3031 and 3032 would be in conflict. Section 3032 terminates public rights in proposed, unaccepted ways if those rights are not utilized and the ways are not accepted by the town within fifteen years after the date of recording or by September 29, 1997, whichever comes later.
[¶24] We therefore hold that subsection 3031(1) of the Paper Streets Act does not retroactively apply to proposed, unaccepted ways laid out on subdivision plans recorded prior to September 29, 1987. This holding comports with our jurisprudence concerning statutory interpretation as well as the overall purpose of the Paper Streets Act. The Act is intended to be read broadly to clarify title to old, proposed, unaccepted streets, and prospective application of subsection 3031(1) serves that purpose. Public rights to proposed, unaccepted ways recorded prior to September 29, 1987, are clarified by operation of section 3032 within the limitations period established by that section. Public rights to proposed, unaccepted ways recorded on оr after September 29, 1987, are clarified by operation of subsection 3031. Private
[¶25] By reading subsection 3031(1) to apply only prospectively, the various provisions of the Paper Streets Act are brought into harmony. Any interpretation that would apply subsection 3031(1) to apply retroactively would yield absurd results.
E. Public Rights to Willow Street
[¶26] Because the lоwer court erred in its application of subsection 3031(1) to pre-1987 subdivision plans, its conclusion that the incipient public rights to Willow Street expired by 1940 was error. Willow Street was recorded prior to September 29, 1987, and therefore the public rights to the way were subject to section 3032. It is undisputed that Willow Street has never been accepted as a way by the town of Rumford. Pursuant to section 3032 it is therefore considered vacated as of September 29, 1997, if it was not “constructed or used аs a way.”
[¶28] Rather than disputing Dumas‘s allegations of the use of Willow Street in the 1970s and 1980s, Carignan objects only to the admissibility of affidavits alleging its use in the 1970s and 1980s. The trial court noted, and we
[¶29] By contrast, Carignan asserts in her statement of material facts that Willow Street was never developed or improved, which Dumas admits to the extent that Willow Street was not developed or improved by the Town prior to 1940. As we previously noted, Dumas also admitted to Carignan‘s asserted fact that “[a]t no time was there use or construction of the easterly side of Willow Street at any time meaningful to this cause of action.” According to the Ninth Addition Plаn, Carignan‘s parcel abuts the easterly side of Willow Street. While it seems implausible that only one half of Willow Street was ever “constructed or used as a way,” because a fact-finder would need to decide between these competing versions of the truth—whether, at what times, and to what extent Willow Street has been used or constructed within the meaning of section 3032—and accepting either Carignan‘s or Dumas‘s version of events would yield different results pursuant to the relevant law, therе is a genuine issue of material fact, and summary judgment as to the deemed vacation of public rights in Willow Street was improper. See Angell v. Hallee, 2014 ME 72, ¶ 17, 92 A.3d 1154.
[¶30] In addition to its conclusion that the public retained no rights in Willow Street, the trial court concluded that Dumas retained no private rights in Willow Street and had acquiesced to the encroachment of Carignan‘s garage on any easement he might hold over the way, thereby abandoning any hypothetical easement. This conclusion, however, is supported by neither the parties’ statements of material facts nor an application of the law to those facts, for several reasons.
[¶31] First, subsection 3031(2) terminates private rights only if the “private rights created by the recording of the plan are not constructed and utilized as private rights” within 20 years of recording.
[¶33] Further, the trial court erred to the extent that it found that Dumas had abandoned any easement to which he might be entitled. In order to find abandonment of an easement, the court would need to find “(1) a history of nonuse coupled with an act or omission evincing a clear intent to abandon, or (2) adverse possession by the servient estate,” neither of which is clear from the record. Laux v. Harrington, 2012 ME 18, ¶ 21, 38 A.3d 318.
[¶34] Because we agree with Dumas that the court erred in its application of sections 3031 and 3032 of the Paper Streets Act and its finding that Dumas had abandoned any easement to which he might be entitled, we vacate the court‘s summary judgment in favor of Carignan and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
James B. Haddow, Esq. (orally), Petruccelli, Martin & Haddow, LLP, Portland, for appellant Paul R. Dumas, Jr.
Stephean C. Chute, Esq. (orally), South Casco, and Thomas S. Carey, Esq., Carey & Associates, P.A., Rumford, for appellee Gloria Carignan
Oxford County Superior Court docket number RE-2013-66
Notes
1-A. Deеmed vacation. A proposed, unaccepted way or portion of a proposed, unaccepted way laid out on a subdivision plan recorded in the registry of deeds prior to September 29, 1987 is deemed to have been subject to an order of vacation under section 3027 if, by the later of 15 years after the date of the recording of the subdivision plan laying out the way or portion of the way or September 29, 1997, both of the following conditions have been met:
A. The way or portion of the way has not been constructed or used as a way; and
B. The way or portion of the way has not been accepted as a town, county or state way or highway or as a public, utility or recreational easement.
1. Public rights. From the date of recording of a subdivision plan in the registry of deeds, the public acquires rights of incipient dedication to public use of the ways laid out on the plan. If a proposed way laid out in the plan is not accepted by the municipality within 20 years from the date of recording of the plan, the public rights in that way terminate.
2. Private rights. A person acquiring title to land shown on a subdivision plan recorded in the registry of deeds acquires a private right-of-way over the ways laid out in the plan. If a proposed, unaccepted way is not constructed within 20 years from the date of recording of the plan, and if the private rights created by the recording of the plan are not constructed and utilized as privatе rights within that 20-year period, the private rights-of-way in that way terminate.
Unless title has been reserved pursuant to Title 33, section 469-A, when the private rights established by this subsection are terminated as provided in this subsection or by order of vacation by the municipality, the title of the fee interest in the proposed, unaccepted way for which the private rights-of-way have terminated passes to the abutting property owners to the centerline of the way.