35 Ga. App. 599 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1926
For an injury received by him on June 28, 1923, the industrial commission awarded to II. L. Lankford compensation at $15 per week for not exceeding 350 weeks. After receiving the weekly payments for 86-2/3 weeks, he applied to the commission for the approval of an agreement between him and his employer for a lump-sum settlement of any and all compensation that might be due to him in the future. The application coming on to be heard on February 17, 1925, the commission made the following award thereon: “Application for a lump-sum settlement was made in this case, whereby the insurer agrees to pay the sum of $160 in a lump-sum settlement. It appearing that the payment of this amount is equal to the value of the probable future payments, the
According to our interpretation of the several pertinent provisions of the compensation act (Ga. Laws 1920, p. 167), an employee can not be deprived of the compensation to which he is entitled thereunder by any agreement between himself and his employer, notwithstanding its approval by the industrial commission. Section 7 of the act provides, “That no contract or agreement, written or implied, no rule, regulation, or other device, shall in any manner operate to relieve any employer in whole or in part of any obligation created by this act, except as herein otherwise expressly provided.” Section 19 provides that no agreement of settlement shall be binding unless approved by the commission; but the com
The lump-sum settlement in this case, as ought to be true in every ease, represented the converted cash value of the weekly installments to which the employee would be entitled, considering his then apparent condition. The commission, of course, had the authority to approve the settlement. But if it sought to adjudicate against a change in condition or to determine that such and such a change would or would not take place, it exceeded its powers, because under section 45 the employee is entitled, under certain conditions (see U. S. Casualty Co. v. Smith, 162 Ga.—, 133 S. E. 851; Gravitt v. Ga. Casualty Co., supra), to a review of any award or settlement upon a change of condition. If it should appear that since the settlement or award the claimant has undergone a change of condition, due to his injury, for which he should be compensated as by weekly payments for a longer period or in a greater amount than was contemplated and represented in the lump-sum received, the settlement would not be conclusive even though it be solemnly approved by an order of the industrial commission. It is not binding, and no action of the commission can make it so. The lump sum agreed on must be fixed at an ’amount which will equal the total sum of the probable future payments capitalized at their present value upon the basis of interest at five per cent, per annum (see section 43). But if it should subsequently develop that the “probable future payments” should be extended for a longer time or increased to a larger amount than the commission estimated at the time of the settlement, its judgment, based on probability, will be subject to review and to be superseded by a new award, based on the actual facts, increasing the compensa
This conclusion may appear to be radical; but, even so, we think no other is possible under a correct interpretation of the statute. The workmen’s compensation act wrought far-reaching-changes in the law, uprooting from the field of its operation principles theretofore so firmly fixed that it is difficult to divorce the mind from them and to think solely in terms of the rules substituted. In Goelitz v. Industrial Board, 278 Ill. 164 (115 N. E. 855), the Supreme Court of Illinois said: “The fundamental basis of workmen’s compensation laws is that there is a large element of public interest in accidents occurring from modern industrial conditions, and that the economic loss caused by such accidents should not necessarily rest upon the public, but that the industry in which an accident occurred shall pay, in the first instance, for the accident.” Whether the particular provisions which we are called upon to construe may be unconstitutional as unduly encroaching upon the liberty of contract, or otherwise (see the Smith case as last above cited), no question as to their constitutionality is raised in this ease; otherwise this court would have no jurisdiction. In the absence of a proper challenge of the validity of these provisions, they are to be regarded as constitutional and valid. It is true that, whether a constitutional question is raised or not, a statute should be so construed as not to infringe the constitution, if it can be reasonably done (Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Floyd, 159 Ga. 311 (125 S. E. 709)), but, whether the construction which we have adopted in this case will carry the act of unconstitutional limits, we think that the provisions under consideration are not reasonably susceptible of a different interpretation. The Smith case was decided by this court, and later went on certiorari to the Supreme Court, by which the judgment of this court was affirmed. In that case it was unnecessary for this court or the Supreme Court to determine whether the industrial commission has the power to refuse an application to review an approved settlement upon the ground that such settlement was conclusive; for
The above views are in harmony with the weight of authority. In the case of Holland, 72 Ind. App. 588 (126 N. E. 236), upon facts similar to those of the case now under consideration, it was held that approval of a lump-sum agreement and payment of the sum fixed by the industrial board did not have the effect of extinguishing compensation liability of the employer, arising from a change in condition on account of the original injury taking place after said date, in view of workmen's compensation act, §§ 43, 45. The sections referred to are substantially the same as the language of the Georgia act on the subject of reviews of awards and settlements. In St. Joseph Mining Co. v. Pettitt, 90 Okla. 242 (216 Pac. 657), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in construing a section of the act of that State similar to section 45 of the Georgia act, said: “An agreement entered into between the employer and the employee as to the facts with relation to the injury, and approved by the industrial commission under section 7294, Comp. Stat. 1921, under which agreement the employee received a lump-sum amount, is not a release of liability for the injury sustained, but is the basis of the award of the industrial commission, and an award made thereon has the same force and effect as an award made upon a hearing, and may be reviewed under the provisions of section 7296, Comp. Stat. 1921.” The court in
The McCarthy case, 336 Mass. 444, cited by the commission in the present case, was believed by the Supreme'Court of Indiana, in the Holland case, supra, not to be “supported by the better reason.”
Judgment affirmed.