46 Conn. App. 313 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1997
Opinion
The plaintiffs in the second case, Maria Mason Sybalsky and Julia Sybalsky,
Subsequent to the collision, the defendant maintained that, under the policy at issue, its underinsured motorist obligations had a limit of $50,000. The plaintiffs, however, contended that they were entitled to $1,360,000 in underinsured motorist coverage, as a function of “stacking” the $340,000 coverage on each of their four insured vehicles. Pursuant to the terms of the policy, the plaintiffs’ claim was submitted to arbitration. At arbitration, the plaintiffs argued that since the collision occurred in Connecticut, the New York insurance contract should be reformed to reflect the underinsured motorist benefits of $340,000 per accident, which is the amount of liability coverage purchased by the plaintiffs. In addition, the plaintiffs continued to assert that they had $1,360,000 available to them for underinsured coverage as a result of their stacking. By a two to one vote, the arbitration panel concluded that the defendant, pursuant to the insurance contract, had to provide the plaintiffs with $340,000 in underinsured motorist coverage, which was the equivalent of the policy’s liability coverage. The arbitrators also ruled that stacking did not apply.
Both parties filed applications in the Superior Court, the defendant to correct the panel’s decision, and the
On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that New York law requires New York insurance policies to incorporate the minimum underinsured motorist requirements from Connecticut. Therefore, the plaintiffs argue that Connecticut law requires that New York insurance policies provide, at a minimum, underinsured motorist coverage equal to the policies’ liability limits. The plaintiffs finally assert that Connecticut law requires insurance policies to provide “stacked coverage” for each of the insured’s vehicles. We disagree.
The parties have stipulated, and we conclude, that the law of New York controls the construction of the insurance contract at issue, having been executed in New York. Here, the relevant New York statute pertaining to liability insurance provides: “Every owner’s policy of liability insurance . . . shall also provide, when a motor vehicle covered by such policy is used or operated in any other state or in any Canadian province, insurance coverage for such motor vehicle at least in the minimum amount required by the laws of that state or province.” N.Y. Ins. Law § 5103 (McKinney 1985).
In the present case, the insurance policy issued by the defendant complies with New York law, as reflected in its “Out of State Coverage” provision. That provision provides: “If an auto accident to which this policy applies occurs in any state or province other than the one in which your covered auto is principally garaged, we will interpret your policy for that accident as follows:
Applying New York law to the present case, we find American Transit Ins. Co. v. Abdelghany, 80 N.Y.2d 162, 603 N.E.2d 947, 589 N.Y.S.2d 842 (1992), controlling on the issue of minimum underinsured motorist coverage. In American Transit Ins. Co., the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a New York insurance policy required that New York insureds be provided minimum uninsured motorist coverage beyond that provided in New York if that vehicle was being operated in a state that imposed greater minimum underinsured motorist requirements on its residents. Id., 164. The New York Court of Appeals stated: “In sum, we hold that New York law requires insurers to provide the minimum uninsured motorist coverage prescribed by the laws of the State in which the accident occurred. The purpose of Insurance Law § 5103 (e) is to protect New York insureds by assuring that, notwithstanding any New York law to the contrary, the minimum insurance coverage required under the laws of the situs of the accident will apply.” Id., 168-69.
In addition, the New York Court of Appeals in Country-Wide Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 55 N.Y.2d 162, 163, 433 N.E.2d 118, 55 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1982), found that the minimum amount of coverage required for an accident is that which is stated in the Vehicle Responsibility Act of that state. In that case, a New York driver driving a New York registered car in North Carolina had an automobile liability policy with a minimum of $10,000
Similarly, in Smith v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 181 App. Div. 2d 342, 343, 585 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1992), the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division held that since Ontario, Canada’s Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act had a minimum requirement of $200,000 of uninsured motorist coverage, that the limits of $10,000 of uninsured motorist coverage in the insured’s New York policy became $200,000 for the accident in Ontario. The court reasoned that it was not a case where the plaintiffs sought to create otherwise unavailable coverage by applying the law of Ontario, rather they sought to apply Ontario’s minimum coverage with respect to the same type of insurance that now exists in their New York policy. Id., 344-46.
We therefore conclude that the language of the insurance contract, § 5103 of the New York Insurance Law (McKinney 1985), and New York casé law obligate the defendant to provide only the minimum underinsured motorist coverage required by Connecticut.
We next turn to the law of Connecticut to determine the minimum required underinsured motorist coverage that the defendant must provide for the plaintiffs. General Statutes § 38a-336 (a) (2) provides in pertinent part:
Because Connecticut’s minimum required underin-sured motorist coverage is $20,000 per person and $40,000 per accident, we will not read into the plaintiffs’ New York insurance policy an amount higher than that required by Connecticut law. Therefore, since the plaintiffs purchased $50,000 worth of underinsured motorist coverage from the defendant, the trial court was correct in finding that that amount met Connecticut’s minimum underinsured motorist requirements, and was the correct amount to award the plaintiffs under this policy.
We disagree with the plaintiffs’ contention that § 38a-336 mandates that the plaintiffs are entitled to the equivalent of their liability insurance under the policy issued by the defendant. There is nothing in § 38a-336 or § 14-112 requiring that underinsured motorist coverage must
We refuse to construe this statute as requiring out-of-state drivers to make a written election to request underinsured motorist coverage in an amount less than their policy’s liability coverage. In the present case, the plaintiffs, who executed their insurance policy in New York and had registered and garaged their vehicles in New York, were not required to make a written request for a lower amount of coverage, as prescribed by § 38a-336. We therefore agree with the trial court in its reduction of the amount of coverage to be provided by the defendant from $340,000, which was the policy’s liability limit, to the $50,000 worth of underinsured motorist coverage that the plaintiffs had purchased.
We finally disagree with the plaintiffs contention that their coverage for each of their automobiles should be aggregated or stacked, providing $1,360,000 worth of coverage on four cars that were each insured for $340,000. In Kent v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 226 Conn. 427, 432-33, 627 A.2d 1319 (1993), our Supreme Court held: “[W]e have found stacking to be available when the insured has paid separate premiums for the underinsured motorist coverage afforded to each
In the present case, the arbitrator’s panel correctly concluded that the plaintiffs did not have a reasonable expectation that their coverages would be stacked when they purchased their insurance policy from the defendant. The plaintiffs did not pay separate premiums that would entitle them to aggregate coverage. Furthermore, stacking is not permitted in New York, where the contract was executed; Sisson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 94 App. Div. 2d 953, 464 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1983); and the insurance policy at issue expressly excluded stacking. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the plaintiffs are not entitled to stacked or aggregate coverage.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
We refer in this opinion to Glens Falls Insurance Company as the defendant and to Maria Mason Sybalsky and Julia Sybalsky as the plaintiffs. Two actions were filed in the trial court, both seeking to correct the same award. There was one judgment file and one appeal by the plaintiffs, whose application to correct was denied.