186 Iowa 1187 | Iowa | 1919
On November 8, 1908, the pl-aintiff, then about 21 years old, being indebted to defendant for attorney’s fees, made to the defendant a promissory note for $100-, payable one year after date. On this note, under date of March 2-0, 191-2, defendant obtained a judgment by default against plaintiff in the district court of Dallas County, for the principal sum of $102.15 and costs. The plaintiff was, at this time, the owner of an undivided one-tenth part or share of 513 acres of land in Dallas County, subject to a life estate of his father and mother, then about 65 years of age, and subject to a proportionate part of a charge of $1,600 on the entire property in favor of third parties, payable after the death of the life tenants.
The defendant received from the sheriff the usual certificate of sale, and, at the end of a year, a sheriff’s deed. This action was begun in 1917, to set aside the sale and deed, as well as the judgment on which the execution issued. The grounds alleged for such relief are that original notice of the action was never served upon plaintiff, as required by law, and because thereof the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render the judgment; that the levy of said execution was excessive and fraudulent; and that the sheriff, in making the levy, sale, and return, did not observe the directions and provisions of the statute necessary to a valid and effective sale.
The defendant admits the procurement of the judgment, the issue and levy of the execution, and sale of the land thereunder, but denies all other allegations of the petition.
The trial court found for the defendant, dismissed the bill, and plaintiff appeals.
The evidence shows, without material dispute, that plaintiff’s interest in this land was worth anywhere from $6,000 to $10,000. The land was made up of 40-acre tracts and lots of the government survey. The sheriff, as a witness, admits that he is acquainted with the value of such lands, and that he then knew that this land was worth $150 per acre. The defendant was the only bidder at the sale, and the sheriff, after going through the form of offering four 40-acre tracts in a quarter section, without receiving any «•bid, put up the entire quarter, and sold plaintiff’s interest therein to defendant for $50. In a similar manner, he struck off to defendant plaintiff’s interest in an 80-acre tract for $25, in a 40-acre tract for $10, in six government lots for $50, and in a 3'3-acre lot for $7.82.
If, instead of an undivided interest in 513 acres of valuable property, the debtor had been so unfortunate as to own a like interest in 5,000 acres, the same astute process of dividing and subdividing the bid could, with equal ease, have been made to cover his entire holding, and with equal reason, the same plea could now be made in its justification. Although it was the duty of the sheriff, if there were no bidders, or if the amount offered was grossly inadequate, to postpone the sale, he did not postpone it, but proceeded to sell the entire 14 different tracts to the defendant, as above noted, on bids so glaringly inadequate that the mere statement of them is their sufficient condemnation. See Code Section 4029; Swortzell v. Martin, 16 Iowa 519; Fortin v. Sedgwick, 133 Iowa 233, and cases there cited.
Such being our view of the effect of the act of the sheriff, it is unnecessary for us to consider whether, in the absence of abuse of discretion by the officer, the inadequacy of the bid alone affords sufficient ground for the relief asked by the plaintiff. In Jonas v. Weires, 134 Iowa 47, we held, under the circumstances there presented, that the objection to the adequacy of the bid did not apply to the sale of an undivided interest in a single tract. Under the peculiar circumstances there considered, the correctness of the decision need not be questioned. II.ow general may be the operation of the rule there followed, and what its limitations, the disposition of this appeal does not require us to consider or decide. It may be said, however, that the subject is treated, to some extent, in the very recent case of Drake v. Brickner, 180 Iowa 1166, 1172. See, also, Tiernan v. Wilson, 6 Johns. Ch. 410, 415. It is also to be noted that, in the case before us, the execution creditor and the sheriff did not sell or