Glenn Estate
299 A.2d 203
Pa.
1973
Check Treatment

*1 ad property liberty by deprivation life, quire for notice and preceded opportunity judication the case.” Mul to the nature hearing appropriate Bank Trust U.S. Co., v. Hanover & lane Central 306, 313 (1950). Court re- Superior order of the

Accordingly, remanded to court below versed and case consistent this opinion. with proceedings the consid- Mr. Chief Jones took no part of this case. eration or decision

Glenn Estate. Before Jones, 1972. C. Argued September 25, J., Pomeroy, Nix and Eagen, Koberts, Mander- O’Brien, INO, JJ. *2 Rothman,

E. A. Jr., David with him Wiley Bucey, for appellant. Gerlach,

G. Donald John O. Unhovic, with him 0. Schreiner, & Bryson Reed, Smith, McOlay, and Shaw for appellee.

Opinion Mr. Chief January 19, Jones, 1973:

By his “Last Will and dated Testament”, 22, June Richard A. 1967, Glenn bequeathed his estate personal to his B. Richard Glenn. adopted son, Testator also devised real estate to the son. The residue appellant is devised and to Lee bequeathed Robert Glenn, decedent’s and the Mercantile Bant of brother, Dallas, Texas, trust. The trustees are directed distribute the income to Richard B. “for Glenn, his benefit or that of his family”, with discretion to invade the prin to benefit the cipal and his appellant family. Distribu tion of shares is scheduled to be made Richard B. appellant, at Glenn, ages thirty-five, forty forty-five.1 provided pre-deceased The testator if Richard B. Glenn

him, personalty Glenn, would be distributed to Robert Lee brother, Phillips, sister; realty Vivian his deceased wife’s body of Richard A. Glenn was on discovered February February 1972. 1, On 1972, 2, charged Richard B. Glenn was arrested and with his father’s murder.2 committing has admitted to the acts re

sulting interposed in his father’s but he has death, insanity. defense criminal His trial was scheduled July postponed, upon appellant’s but was 5, 1972, pending disposition appeal of this motion, appellant’s lower court’s denial of for an Petition Ad Appel vancement funds from the decedent’s estate. purportedly necessary an lant seeks to de against fend the criminal indictment him. The execut questioned, successfully or3 has in the court below, whether the ofAct appellant’s §§1-16, should bar §§3441-3456, advancement. *3 provides slayer that “[n]o shall any way acquire any property

in any or receive benefit as the result of the death the decedent. . . .” Act of §3442. 816, §2, The term “slayer” “any person in is defined the Act as who pass residuary would estate and the of the trust Glenn, issue, would inure to the benefit of Robert Lee or his Presbyterian the Mt. Lebanon United Church. 2 Inquest, proffered At the Coroner’s the Commonwealth the testimony companion Glenn, of a female of Richard B. who had spent night the of the murder at the decedent’s home. She testified struggle upon that, entering that she in heard the basement and basement, standing she saw the over decedent’s bat- body. assisting appellant tered The witness also testified to in the body corpse removal of decedent’s from his home. The was removed Virginia, to West it where was later discovered. 3 Glenn, brother, Robert Lee the decedent’s was named executor. provided unwillingness in The will that event or in- ability, Company Mellon National Bank and Trust should serve right executor. Robert as Lee Glenn renounced his to serve and testamentary letters were thus issued to Mellon National Bank and Company. Trust or as an accessory a principal either as

participates, killing and unlawful in wilful fact, before the Id. §3441. other any person.” court of the lower the order that urges Appellant abridges presump- denying appellant’s criminal forthcoming proceed- in his innocence tion of and equal protec- due process him thereby denying ing, tion of the law. Pa. Estate, In re Tarlo’s cites

Appellant an adjudi that for the proposition 172 Atl. 139 (1934), is neces in a criminal proceeding cation of prior guilt can be barred “slayer” before the alleged sary of the on the basis decided Estate, inheritance. Tarlo’s held that Slayer’s Act,4 precursor present shot his fatally daughter, of a father who estate from taking not precluded committed was suicide, then the father since by inheritance, estate daughter’s The prior of murder. been “adjudged” guilty had not who person Act contained provision “[n]o . . ... murder". shall guilty shall be finally adjudged Since added.) . .” to inherit. . (Emphasis entitled Act contains and the Slayer’s Act is prior repealed, in Tarlo’s Estate holding no language, such similar moment this matter. is a relic without that no disinheri- taken the position has conviction and that without prior tance is possible follow without constitutionally permit- can conviction of an amount sufficient him the advancement ting to the criminal charges the defense insanity construct that a murder him. It is clear conviction *4 against a bar reasonable doubt is beyond by evidence proved issue relitigating guilt Court Orphans’ to the In re Kravitz “slayer”. of the convicted innocence 4 Act, 1917, 7, P. Intestate June L. 23 of the Section §136, repealed, 816, 429, §23, L. Act of P. 20 P.S. §3456. 20

465 (1965). But, 418 Pa. 211 A. 2d 443 Estate, 319, pro- appellant’s argument due that he has been denied equal protection of the reason cess and law, presumption innocence curtailed when fact that the is pre- from an advancement decedent’s estate is denied, necessary pre- supposes is a that a criminal conviction requisite Act. to his disinheritance under prior There in a criminal con- is hint the Act that necessary of murder antecedent dis- viction inheritance. urges of an also that the denial advance- right effect denial of

ment the estate will assistance of the of his own counsel effective private choice where a is available fund, i.e., estate, permit right. corollary, the exercise As a urges an he that the denial of advancement from prevent obtaining psychiatric him from estate will necessary of in- evaluation to establish defense sanity. right indigent of an in defendant a criminal right

trial to the assistance of counsel ais fundamental Wainwright, essential to a fair trial. Gideon v. 372 U.S. (1963). 335 Eule 318 of the Eules Criminal Pro comports cedure with the mandate of in Gideon. The digent’s right to counsel this Commonwealth is codi fied in the Public Defender Act of December 2, as 1968, 1144, §6, amended, which §9960.6, legal any person alia, inter counsel to furnishes, charged with an indictable offense who is unable to for lack of obtain counsel sufficient funds. Further generally while is not entitled more, as right state-appointed psychiatric expert a matter of sanity,5 testimony respecting his the Mental Health and 5 Ashe, Smith 93, Commonwealth ex rel. v. 364 Pa. 71 A. 2d denied, ; Green, (1950) cert. Commonwealth v. U.S. (1943). 172, 29 A. 346 Pa. 2d *5 of October Mental Retardation establish pro- does art. IY, §408, of to determine for the physicians cedure appointment if of criminal defendants. Appellant, the competence counsel and both appointed is thus provided indigent, for evaluation. the machinery psychiatric for the untenable posi- there is support Assuming has the right tion the accused indigent that not of choice, merely appointed counsel his private an accused “slayer” could not permit we still counsel, neces- to the extent inherit from his alleged victim, to The express of his defense. to the cost sary defray from bene- “slayer” of the Act the prohibits language Any “in from decedent’s estate. the any way” fiting the appel- before adjudicating funds policy obviate the legislative lant’s would culpability the Act. underpinning alternatively irrespective contends that,

Appellant of funds is statutorily the advancement whether of estate the constitutionally compelled, expenditure for choice and for the counsel appellant’s funds the administrative am- is within evaluation psychiatric It that these argued expenditures bit of the executor. could the testator’s and thus intent, effectuate would on the record, made. We find indication properly decedent’s testamentary nor reason that dictate, does be promoted by grant appellant’s intent would therefore that for We hold Petition Advancement. the Petition for Advance- to grant executor’s refusal abuse of discretion. not an ment was to costs. pay affirmed. Order Opinion Concurring Mr. Roberts: on solely in the result that ground I concur to trustee corporate establish record fails by refusing invade corpus its discretion abused make advancements that source to the trust in the appellant. trust vests trustee “au- so much of thority use thereof as it deems advisable said son’s education and support, welfare family.” and that (Emphasis added.)

Mr. joins Justice Mandekino in this concurring opinion.

Commonwealth v. Pearson, Appellant.