8 N.W.2d 808 | Minn. | 1943
Lead Opinion
Plaintiff was employed as a "chicken picker" by Boote Hatchery Packing Company at Worthington, whose business is that of buying, dressing, and preparing poultry and other farm products for the market. Defendant's business is that of a building contractor. In August 1940 he was engaged by the hatchery to do some repair work at its plant. This job included breaking up and removing an old cement floor and reconstructing it. Some of the hatchery's men assisted defendant's workmen in the job. The reason for this arrangement was to save employing more expensive labor, the hatchery men being paid at a lower rate than that paid defendant's workmen.
During the evening and far into the night of August 28, a crew of men composed partly of hatchery employes and employes of defendant were at work breaking up and removing a section of the old cement floor and placing reinforcing steel in that area preparatory to laying the new floor the next morning. The area so prepared was located between the dressing room of women employes (where they changed their street clothes for their working apparel) and the "roughing" room, where they worked. As the situation then was, they could not go from their dressing room to their place of employment unless a bridge or some other contrivance was built over the portion of the area to be laid to new cement. The hatchery superintendent requested defendant to devise and construct such a means of egress, and defendant's workmen did so between 7:00 and 7:30 in the morning of August 29. Plaintiff entered the dressing room before the men got at the job. About half an hour later, when she was ready to go to work, she saw the new structure and realized at once its purpose. It is appropriately referred to in the record as a "catwalk." When plain-tiff reached about the middle of it it collapsed, causing her serious injuries. Predicating her cause upon defendant's negligence in its construction, she brought this action. It is conceded that if the ordinary negligence action lies she established her cause. *502
To avoid such liability, defendant pleaded, and it was admitted by the reply, that both employers, i. e., the hatchery and defendant, were under the workmen's compensation act. Therefore, so defendant contends, and the court adopted his view, since plaintiff has elected to accept compensation under the amendment to the act here in question, she cannot now maintain a common-law negligence action against him. The barrier is said to be Minn. St. 1941, §
Many cases involving this troublesome section have come here for review. In the memorandum opinion of the trial judge, after reviewing many of them, he concluded that these "unfortunately, but perhaps unavoidably, do not give any too accurate a pattern to follow." As to the first case there discussed, Uotila v. Oliver I. Min. Co.
The importance of the question presented is obvious. Difficulty of solution should not frighten us from trying to find a more "accurate pattern" for the bench and bar "to follow" than those one may gather from our prior decisions. *503
In the Anderson case we discussed and sought to distinguish the facts there appearing from those in the Rasmussen case, but in deciding it we obviously limited the scope and effect of the test laid down in the Rasmussen case, for we there determined (
"We hold that the mere supplying of a necessary product, such as electric power, does not create the relationship of a common enterprise. Nor does the fact that both companies had sent out employes to locate the trouble alter the situation. It was not a joint or concerted action. Each company was acting independently of the other. The admitted facts show that plaintiff and George Penny, defendant's employe, were each acting individually and for their separate employers. That both parties were seeking to locate trouble on their respective lines in approximately the same location at approximately the same time was incidental and fortuitous and did not create the legal relationship of common enterprise."
Again, in the later case of Tevoght v. Polson,
"* * * this court held squarely that the mere supplying of a product by one employer to another did not bring the employers within either clause (a) or clause (b) of the amendment, that is, the vending and delivery of supplies upon the premises of one of the employers does not amount to either a furtherance of a common enterprise or to the accomplishment of the same or related purposes. We must therefore hold that the rule announced in the Rasmussen case is modified to the extent that it does not apply in a situation such as that now before us where one employer is merely engaged in delivering a commodity to another employer."
Our latest case is that of Gentle v. Northern States Power Co.
Going back to the Seidel case,
"within the quoted language of both (a) and (b). The enterprise common to both employers here was the repairing of these elevator doors — defendant's need required it to be done, and the desire of plaintiff's employer to profit by doing the work. * * * Defendant's servant at plaintiff's bidding attempted to aid in the accomplishment of the same or related purposes in operation on the very premises where the injury was received."
Mr. Chief Justice Gallagher and Mr. Justice Loring concurred in the result, saying, in view of certain cases there cited (
"* * * it may properly be held that plaintiff's employer and defendant were engaged in a course of business in the furtherance of 'related purposes,' in operation on the premises where the injury *505 was received. We confess, however, that we are unable to seehow a person engaged in the business of operating an apartmentbuilding equipped with elevators and one engaged in thebusiness of repairing elevators can be engaged in a course ofbusiness in 'furtherance of a common enterprise.' So to hold would mean that everyone making repairs to or furnishing material for an apartment or commercial building would be engaged in a common enterprise with the owner of the building. We do not believe that such construction was ever intended by the legislature. With that part of the opinion we are unable toagree." (Italics supplied.)
The Seidel opinion was filed April 29, 1938. It is interesting to note that on July 29, 1938, the opinion in Pittsburgh P. G. Co. v. Carey (8 Cir.)
"The two companies involved were not engaged in the same or related purposes, were not mutually or reciprocally interested in a commercial way, nor had the business of one a necessary relation toward or in conjunction with the other."
We refrain from further citation of our cases, since these may be readily found under notes in 6 Dunnell, Dig. Supp. § 10407.
1. There can be no doubt that the amendment was remedial legislation. Therefore it should receive such fair and liberal construction "as to make it a workable one, thereby giving force and effect to the legislative purpose." Tomasko v. Cotton,
2. Legislative intent, however, is to be ascertained from the language employed by the lawmakers. But if that language be doubtful "that construction must be adopted which militates against a forfeiture," where that was the clear legislative purpose. Needles v. Keys,
3. That the language of the present enactment comes well within the doubtful class is obvious. The cases we have discussed demonstrate that.
4. Prior to the adoption of the workmen's compensation act the injured workman was limited to the common-law action for negligence. He could proceed against his employer or against anyone else whose negligence, as defined by the law and within its limits, had caused him harm. Under the compensation act, adopted *507
in 1913, as construed in Hansen v. N.W. Fuel Co.
Later, in 1921, the legislature adopted L. 1921, c. 82, § 31, which superseded L. 1913, c. 467, § 33. This was amended by L. 1923, c. 279, § 1 (Mason St. 1927, § 4291). By L. 1937, c. 64, § 5, § 4291 was reënacted and is now Minn. St. 1941, §
"No other state has such a provision as that incorporated in this amendment [L. 1923, c. 279, § 1], and it was left to this court to interpret its provisions, which especially in the case of subd. (b) are rather vague and uncertain. The legislativehistory of c. 279 *508 throws no light whatever upon the purposes of the legislatureor the extent to which it sought to restore to the employe hiscommon-law right of action. It may be that it intended that hiscommon-law right of action should only be eliminated insituations like those where contractors and subcontractors areengaged on the same project and their employes exposed to thehazards created by such mutual engagements." (Italics supplied.)
Unquestionably the legislative purpose was to enlarge the rights and remedies of the injured workman. His employer, under the original act, was well taken care of, and these rights under the second subdivision of the amended act were retained for him. He has lost nothing by the change. Since it was the injured workman the legislature sought to help, we should now say without equivocation that (
And that was the view of Mr. Justice Pirsig in his concurring opinion in Gentle v. Northern States Power Co.
"Undoubtedly, it was the thought of the legislature that it was unjust that the rights and protection afforded several workmen of different employers under the workmen's compensation act should be different when these employes were working together on the same premises, on the same project, and subject to the same risks of injury. The subdivision under consideration sought to carry out that policy."
Speaking of our prior cases he said (
"Misled by the confusing language used in the subdivision, we have not proceeded from this point of view. We have examined not the common activities of the employes but rather the common purposes or enterprise of the employers. These tests have only *509 an indirect relation to the policy sought to be effectuated, and, in consequence, endless and fruitless litigation has come before this court over their application. * * * The statutory terms 'common enterprise' and 'same or related purposes' of theemployers should be construed to mean that their employes wereengaged in some common activity which brings them within thepolicy underlying the subsection." (Italics supplied.)
In the present case it is plainly to be seen that defendant, an independent construction contractor, and the hatchery were not engaged in a "common enterprise" or in the "accomplishment of the same or related purposes" at the time and place of plaintiff's injury. True, they were both interested in having the repair job done, but that is true whenever one contracts for any improvement, whether a repair job or new construction. Common enterprise could be said to have existed while the hatchery workmen were engaged with those regularly employed by defendant, since they were working together and exposed to the same risks. In that event, if harm had come to one of them, obviously it would be but fair and just that, since both employers were under the act, the workmen so employed should stand in the same relation to each other and to their employers as if they were working for a common employer.
5. Plaintiff, a "chicken picker," was clearly not engaged in anything relating to the repair work or the building of the catwalk. Let us suppose that in the Seidel cane,
The workmen's compensation act was enacted to simplify and rearrange the obligation of the master to the servant in relation to injuries received in the employment. There was no intent to change or interfere with the relation between the servant and third persons or to interfere with the servant's right of action against third persons, except as that right might affect compensation from the master. To step outside of that sphere and deny the servant his right of recovery against third persons would be to unjustly discriminate against him as compared with other persons injured by third persons and to deprive him of a cause of action left to others. To do so would be beyond the scope of the act as expressed in its title and would not be germane to its purpose. The act evinces no purpose to deprive an employe of such a cause of action under the ordinary relationship, although providing for subrogation in proper cases. It confines the deprivation of such causes to servants of masters engaged in a common enterprise or in related purposes on the premises where the injury occurs. The strict tenor of the words used places the distinction solely on the "common enterprise" or "related purposes" of the masters, regardless of whether the injured servant be engaged in such enterprise or purpose; but we must interpret the language in the light of the purpose and intent of the act, as this court did in construing the original railroad fellow-servant act, which in its tenor applied to all servants of railroads, whether exposed to the extra hazards peculiar to railroading or not. This court held that to so apply it would be unconstitutional discrimination in favor of those not exposed to railroad hazards. It would allow them to recover for injuries caused by the negligence of a fellow servant in circumstances like those where servants of nonrailroad masters could not recover. It held that the legislature intended only to apply the law to servants exposed to the extra hazards of railroading. So construed, the classification was justified. Lavallee v. St. P. M. M. Ry. Co.
We adopt this view with confidence that we have arrived at the true solution of the problem. All expressions in our former opinions inconsistent with this conclusion are overruled.
Order reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
Some further facts, which I think control decision, should be stated. The Boote hatchery and defendant were engaged in the common enterprise of repairing the floor to which the construction and use of the catwalk was an incident. Defendant furnished the materials and part of the labor. Boote furnished part of the labor. Their employes worked side by side in tearing up the old floor, putting the reinforcing steel in place preparatory to pouring concrete, and in all the operations. Boote and defendant had two general purposes in view, viz.: (1) To save expense by using Boote's labor as far as possible, because it was cheaper than defendant's; and (2) to get the work done efficiently without interrupting the operation of Boote's business. To accomplish these purposes, some of Boote's employes worked part time picking chickens and part time on the repair work, and the catwalk was installed to enable Boote's employes to get across the new floor to be poured without coming in contact with it.
1. The instant case is ruled by Olson v. Thiede,
2. While the majority opinion entirely ignores the case of Olson v. Thiede,
The court reaches its decision by the process of construction. This process is that the language of the statute is of doubtful meaning; that construction must be invoked to discover the true meaning; that, although the statute in terms provides that an employe shall not have a right of action against a third party subject to the act, who is engaged with the injured employe's employer in furtherance of a common enterprise or in the accomplishment of the same or related purposes, the real intention was not to deprive an injured employe of such right of action unless in addition the employes of the third party and of the injured employe's employer were exposed by the work being done to the same or similar risks, for the reason that the statute is one to restore employe's rights of action against third persons, and that, if not for other reasons, such a result is compelled in order to avoid unconstitutionality resulting from distinguishing between injured employes and others in their right to sue others than their employers. To make such a construction possible, all our cases inconsistent with the results announced are overruled. I cannot assent to the methods of construction employed or to the reasons given to justify them.
(a) The language of the statute is not of doubtful meaning. The expression "common enterprise" was used to define the work in which a servant was engaged under the fellow-servant rule. Mr. Justice O'Brien, who was counsel for the commission which drafted the workmen's compensation act and who was its draftsman, speaking for the court in Schoen v. C. St. P. M.
O. Ry. Co.
Heretofore, we have experienced no difficulty in determining what rule to apply. All the cases cited in the majority opinion and others2 have uniformly applied and adhered to the language of the statute. In every one of them the test of liability has been not the common activities of the employes of the third party and of the employes of the injured employe's employer, but the common activities of the third party and of the employer. In Olson v. Thiede,
The statute but uses terms long deemed by this and other courts and by text writers clearly to define similar concepts under analogous circumstances. It is doubtful, to say the least, whether or not the court's efforts to redefine terms which are themselves definitions — for that is what it is doing — makes for increased clarity. A thing may be overdone, as, for example, "painting the lily." By stirring, clear water may be made muddy.
(b) True, while the statutory rule is plain enough, its application to a given set of facts may involve difficulty, as the large number of cases involving the construction and application of the statute plainly demonstrates. It must be remembered also that it is *515 equally impossible to formulate a precise rule definingwhen employes are exposed to common hazards of their employment.
"All the decisions that have been rendered and all the textbooks that have been written have not succeeded in giving a definition of who are fellow servants which is plain and broad and comprehensive enough to be universally applicable or to be universally accepted. * * * The reason for all which arises from the fact that the relations between the two persons employed by the same master vary in almost every case. Fellow servant is therefore a relative term, which must be applied to the special conditions presented in each case." Glover v. Kansas City B. N. Co.
Likewise, what is in furtherance of a "common enterprise" or in the "accomplishment of the same or related purposes" depends on the facts in each case. Note, 15 Minn. L.Rev. pp. 257, 258.
However desirable it may be to have a definitepattern for deciding cases, in the very nature of things no such result is attainable. What is the pattern sought? If it is a rule of law, the statute in question answers the quest. If it is a formula to be applied mechanically in resolving fact situations, the answer must be that the facts must be found and the rule applied in cases arising under the statute the same as in other cases. Because determinative facts vary, the process of decision is not, and cannot be, a matter of mere mechanics. Judgment and skill are needed to adapt the applicable rule to a given case. Certainty is attainable in large degree by strict adherence to established rules of decision. We may avoid uncertainty by adhering to the statute and our prior construction of it.
"Where the call is for individuality in product of the legal mill, we resort to standards. And the sacrifice of certainty in so doing is more apparent than actual. For the certainty attained by mechanical application of fixed rules to human conduct has always been illusory." Pound, "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law," pp. 142-143. *516
(c) The plain language of the statute in effect prohibits the court — a caution born perhaps out of experience and to guard against what is being done in the instant case — from engrafting on the statutory test of liability, namely, the common activities of the third party and the injured employe's employer, any additional tests, which of course includes that of the common activity of the employes of the parties mentioned. The language of the statute, omitting parts not here material, is that an employe shall have a cause of action for personal injuries against the third party "only where theemployer liable for compensation and the other party * * * legally liable for damages * * * were engaged * * * (a) in furtherance of a common enterprise, or (b) the accomplishment of the same or related purposes * * * and not otherwise." (Italics supplied.) Whether or not we like it, the statutory rule is the one which it is our duty to administer. We have no right to change it in any way. "Judicial erosion of a statute * * * is as much forbidden as outright judicial disobedience. Evasion, under the guise of construction, is barred." Scott v. Prudential Ins. Co.
The intention and meaning of the legislature should be determined primarily from the language of the statute itself. Resort to conjecture is not permissible. Where, as here, the words of the act are plain and the legislative purpose manifest, it is not permissible to seek a hidden meaning at variance with the language used and to engraft such meaning on the statute. Such construction leads to amendment of the statute rather than ascertainment of the legislative intent. Mellen Lbr. Co. v. Industrial Comm.
"It is not, however, in the power of courts to avoid legislation because it may seem drastic or inexpedient. It is not their function to supervise what the legislature sees fit to do, or to enforce *517
only such session laws as appear to be wise. It is not within their power to alter them because of hardship involved in their application to particular circumstances. When the legislature has the constitutional power to enact a given law, and it properly frames an act clearly expressing a legal intent, it is the duty of the courts to construe that act so as to effectuate it. The argument based on the inconvenience of the result is then out of place." State v. Rat Portage Lbr. Co.
A court is not justified in overhauling a statute into a form which it may think best for all concerned. State ex rel. Murane v. Jack,
(d) The purpose of the statute was not merely to restore to injured employes the right of action against third parties. If that was all that was intended, it is reasonable to assume that the restoration would have been made without the qualifications enumerated in the statute. The legislature was also dealing with the liabilities of third parties subject to the act. We cannot say that that question is of such unimportance as not to deserve legislative consideration. The legislature chose to deal with the matter not exclusively in terms of an injured employe's right of action or in terms of the third party's liability, but in both.
The history of the act shows that in its original form it divided third parties roughly into those subject and those not subject to the act. In cases of negligence, the former were liable only to the same extent and in the same way as the injured employe's employer; the latter were liable under the general law. Mathison v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co.
"All the parties were under the compensation law. Had Rasmussen received the same injury without the negligence of defendant he would have received an award from the Industrial Commission against his employer. Defendant meets the requirements of the act toward its own employes. This employe of the ice company had, prior to the 1923 law, the option to pursue the employer or the third party, but not both. The change in the law evidences the fact that the legislature concluded that if the third party bore a certain relation to the employer, and was itself under the compensation act, then the employe should be confined to his remedy under the compensation act. From a civic, economical and sociological point of view this position is sound. This reasoning rests upon the fact that the employe should get from the third party the same award that he would get from his own employer if it alone were responsible for the acts proximately causing his injury. Being engaged in a 'common enterprise' or in the 'accomplishment of the same' or 'related purposes' in operation on the premises puts all the employers so engaged in the relative, if not actual, position of an employer of any such employe. The third party being guilty of actual negligence, which is essential to its liability, should carry the burden in preference to the employer but the community of interest in accomplishment and purpose should under such circumstances, protect the third party from a greater award than would be imposed upon the employer; and the employe, under such conditions, should not be required to take less than the award which would come to him if the responsibility rested with his employer. In short the community of interest gives the third *519
party, who is subject to the compensation act, under this statute the status of an employer toward the employe. The argument that the employe cannot be deprived of his common law action is sufficiently answered by the case of Mathison v. M. St. Ry. Co.
We have never had any doubt concerning that purpose, although some other reasons for the act were suggested in Smith v. Kedney Warehouse Co. Inc.
(e) Mason St. 1927, § 4291, was uniformly construed, as I have indicated, from the time of its enactment until its repeal in 1937, when, coincident with its repeal, the legislature reinacted it as L. 1937, c. 64, § 5. The reftacted section appears in Minn. St. 1941 as §
"When a court of last resort has construed the language of a law, the legislature in subsequent laws on the same subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such language."
We cannot repudiate the prior construction of the act in question from the date of its original enactment to the time of its repeal and reënactment without setting at naught the adoption by the legislature of such construction of the act as part of the new statute. That alone is an insuperable obstacle to overruling our prior decisions construing the act. If defendant here was not liable under the rule of Olson v. Thiede,
(f) Finally, the answer, if one is needed, to the argument that the construction adopted by the court is necessary to avoid unconstitutionality is found in our decisions in Mathison v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co.
At the time of plaintiff's injuries, in August 1940, the test for determining liability was, as the statute provides, the common activities of the third party and the injured employe's employer. It is not seriously disputed that under the rule (applied just previously in June 1940 in Smith v. Ostrov,
Therefore I think that there should be an affirmance.
Dissenting Opinion
I concur in the dissent of Mr. Justice Peterson.
