delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a suit brought by Clarence L. Gleason and Luevenia Gleason, his wife, appellees, who will be hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs, against C. C. Cunningham, appellant, who will be hereinafter referred to as defendant, in the circuit court of Mаrion county, to recover for personal injuries sustained by Luevenia Gleason and damage to an automobile, the property of Clarence L. Gleason. The damage complained of, was the result of a collision оn March 12, 1941, between two trucks of the defendant and the automobile driven by plaintiff, Clarence Gleason, and an automobile driven by Roger McClung, on the road known as the Oil-Field road, a hard surfaced road in Marion county.
Defendant was operating two tank trucks upon the Oil-Field road in a northerly direction, some 700 or more feet south of where that road intersects U. S. Highway 50, and a short distance north of the B. & 0. railroad tracks, near Salem, Illinois. At approximately 5 p.m. thesе two trucks, the first one driven by Cash Leturno and the second one or the one to the south, driven by J. E. Johnson, both in the employ at that time of defendant, were proceeding in a northerly direction at a speed of about 25 dr 30 miles per hour. Thе two trucks, at that time were about 25 or 30 feet apart. Plaintiff, Clarence L. Gleason, was driving his automobile in the same direction with his wife, Luevenia Gleason, the other plaintiff, as a passenger in the front seat with him, at a speed of abоut 25 or 30 miles per hour, and about 25 or 30 feet behind the second truck. About the same distance behind the Gleason car, and being driven at about the same rate of speed was an automobile; driven by Roger McClung.
Suddenly the first truck driven by Leturno stopped on the pavement, as did the second one. There is no affirmative evidence that either signaled their intention to stop. Mrs. Gleason screamed a warning to her husband, who applied his brakes. According to Gleason’s theоry, his car came to a stop about six feet behind the second truck and the McOlung car then struck the Gleason car and knocked it forward into the truck. McClung’s theory was that Gleason’s car did not stop, but struck the second truck, rebounded and then was struck by McClung’s car, and knocked forward into the truck again. In any event, as the result of the impact, Mrs. Gleason was thrown against the dashboard and the windshield and sustained injuries to her back and neck.
Plaintiffs’ complaint consisted of two counts, which charged the defendant with negligence in that its employees permitted their automobile trucks- to stop and stand upon the highway without first giving any signal or warning to the vehicles behind .them, as a result of which negligence, the automobile оf Clarence L. Gleason was damaged and Luevenia Gleason sustained personal injuries. Defendant’s answer admitted ownership of the trucks and denied generally, the negligence alleged.
Upon a trial of the case before a jury, a verdict was returned in favor of plaintiff, Clarence L. Gleason in the sum of $25 and in favor of plaintiff, Luevenia Gleason in the sum of $10,000. At the close of all of the evidence defendant made a motion to instruct the jury to find the issues in favor оf defendant. The court reserved its ruling on this motion and later denied same. Motion for judgment non obstante veredicto was filed by defendant and denied by the court. Upon a remittitur in the sum of $4,000 by plaintiff, Luevenia Gleason, motion for new trial was deniеd and judgment entered in favor of Luevenia Gleason in the sum of $6,000 and in favor of plaintiff Clarence L. Gleason, for $25 from which judgments appeal is prosecuted to this court.
Gleason, Mrs. Gleason and MeClung all testified that no signal, indicating an intеntion to stop was given by the truck drivers ahead. Both Leturno and Johnson testified that they did not remember whether they signaled or not. Leturno testified that he did not know if the stop light was working and Gleason testified positively that no red light was flashing. Leturno, in front, tеstified that he stopped his truck because of a line of traffic in front of him, and is corroborated by Johnson, who says that there was at least one car in front of Leturno and by the witness, L. C. Egan, who was some distance away. This is disputed by the testimоny of Mr. and Mrs. Gleason, Cecil Hodges, Paul Bundy, Edgar Harold and Roger MeClung, who all say that there was no car ahead of the two trucks of defendant company.
Both Leturno and Johnson claim that their trucks came to a gradual stop, so there would seem to be no logical excuse for not signaling their intention to stop. Johnson testified that he did not see the Gleason car before he stopped. He admitted however, that he looked into his rear vision mirror and saw it a few seconds after he had stopped. It is not controverted that Mrs. Gleason screamed a warning to her husband. A scream is a spontaneous expression so it may well be inferred that the stopping of the truck ahead was sudden.
It is uрon this record and these facts that counsel for defendant maintain that each plaintiff failed to prove the case of action alleged, and that the court erred in refusing to grant defendant’s motion at the close of all the evidence to find the issues in favor of defendant, and having reserved its ruling thereon, erred in failing to enter judgment notwithstanding verdict. In an action for injuries, the question of negligence is primarily for the jury, and only becomes a question of law when thеre is no dispute in the evidence and but one inference can be reasonably drawn therefrom. Campbell v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co.,
Counsel for defendant strenuously contend that even if it be assumed that the action of the drivers of defendant’s trucks in stоpping without signaling their intention so to do, was negligence it could not be the proximate cause of the injuries to plaintiffs. With this reasoning we cannot concur and, without elaborating thereon, do not find the cases cited by defendant in рoint, on this proposition. There seems to be ample justification in this record for the jury to believe that there was a sudden stopping of defendant’s trucks, without any signal to the car in the rear and with opportunity to do so. According tо the testimony of both drivers, Johnson looked in his rear vision mirror, not before stopping, but after. He could not help but anticipate that such stopping might probably and foreseeably cause injury to others behind, using this much traveled hard road. There was thus initiated a continuous succession of events linked together and traceable back to the first cause as the proximate cause of the injury. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Laack,
In any event, the question of what is the proximate cause must be determined from the particular facts of each particular case and are not questions of law for the court to determine, but questions of fact for the jury. City of Flora v. Pruett,
We do not believe that the lower court erred therefore in refusing defendant’s motion, offered at the close of all of the evidence to find the issues in its favor and in overruling its motion for judgment notwithstanding thе verdicts, nor in overruling the motion for new trial.
It is urged that the court erred in giving instructions Nos. 1 and 4 on behalf of plaintiffs. Instruction No. 1 told the jury that preponderance of the evidence means “that evidence which, in the light of all the facts and circumstances in the case, and guided by these instructions is, in your judgment entitled to the greater weight and credit.” The case of Meunier v. Chicago & Carterville Coal Co.,
Instruction No. 4 given on behalf of plaintiffs sets forth the substance of the statute forbidding the stopping of a motor vehicle without giving an appropriate signal to the driver of any vehicle immediately to the rear. Objection is made that this instruction was an abstract proposition of law, not applicable to the evidence in the case. In the light of the record herein submitted to us, we cannot hold that instruction No. 4 is subject to this objection.
It is argued on behalf of defendant that the verdict of the jury as to Luevenia Grleason is excessive, being for so great an amount as to indicate that the verdict was the result of passion and prejudice on the part of the jury. The evidence showed that Lnevenia Grleason had been under the care of two physicians, as a result of her injuries, one of whom had a bill for $99.50 and the other, chаrges of $110. The hospital bill was $42.70. There were other expenses, such as purchase of brace and transportation. She sustained a severe injury to her neck and back. It has been necessary for her to wear a brace fоr her back, which she will be compelled to wear for some time in the future. She was confined to her bed for two months and a half, and suffered pain from the date of the injury to the date of the trial a period of about seven months and hеr testimony was to the effect that she still suffers. One of the physicians testified that a previous tear of the womb was aggravated by this injury and would interfere with normal marital relations. The medical opinion was to the effect that she would have trouble with her back for a long time, that some suffering from such injuries get well, or at least improve and some never do. Unless the verdict is of such magnitude as to show passion and prejudice on the part of the jury, the Appellate Court has no right to disturb it, as the amount to be fixed is largely in the discretion of the jury. Grannon v. Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co.,
We do not believe that the amount of the judgment is excessive. There being no reversible error in the record, the judgment both as to Clarence L. Gleason and Luevenia Gleason will be affirmed.
.Affirmed.