Willie Glaze was convicted of rape, kidnapping, armed robbery, theft by taking (motor vehicle), and three counts of possession of a gun during the commission of a crime. Glaze appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and contending that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel. Finding no error, we affirm.
At trial, S. D. testified that on April 5, 1994, a little before 6:30 a.m., she stopped at a convenience store to buy coffee on her way to work. After she got back into her vehicle and drove away, she was about to make a turn when she heard from the back of the vehicle a voice instructing her to “keep going.” Then S. D. saw the barrel of a gun protrude between the front bucket seats, “[f]rom behind the passenger’s side” of the vehicle.
S. D. testified that the gunman told her to turn onto a driveway that led into the woods. There, the gunman ordered S. D. to “[c]ut the
Naked, S. D. walked to the road to get help. A passing motorist drove her to a police officer who was parked “just down the road.” S. D. was taken to a hospital, and a doctor examined her for evidence of sexual assault. Several hours after the incident, S. D.’s vehicle was located “around the corner from [the] convenience store” where S. D. had stopped that morning. Inside the vehicle were S. D.’s clothes that the gunman had taken with him.
S. D. testified that her assailant had a gun throughout the incident, and that she felt her life was threatened. S. D. did not get a good look at the perpetrator. She did, however, describe his race, and the coveralls he was wearing.
As part of the sexual assault examination, the doctor took swabbings from S. D.’s vaginal area. Sperm was detected in a vaginal swab taken from S. D. The sample was tested for DNA, and a male DNA profile was obtained. In June 1998, S. D.’s DNA profile and the DNA profile of the unknown male whose sperm was detected in the swab sample taken from S. D.’s vaginal area were entered into the Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”), a national database of DNA profiles.
In December 2006, the CODIS administrator for the Georgia Bureau of Investigation’s Division of Forensic Sciences was conducting a routine search of the CODIS database and received information that the DNA profile from the 1994 incident possibly matched the DNA profile of Glaze. After the CODIS identification was obtained, the police arrested Glaze pursuant to a warrant and obtained a buccal swab from him for additional DNA testing. An additional swab was also taken from S. D. The new swabbings were tested and compared to the 1994 swab samples taken from S. D. Glaze’s DNA profile obtained from the new sample matched the DNA profile of the male whose sperm had been obtained in connection with the 1994 incident.
At trial, S. D. was shown a photograph taken from a surveillance video camera at the convenience store the morning of the incident. The photograph depicted a man whose clothing and race fit the description S. D. gave of her assailant. An investigator’s testimony that the photograph was “grainy,” making it “hard to see close facial features,” was evident from the exhibits admitted at trial. And although S. D. did not say whether the individual in the photograph appeared to be her assailant, she identified the coveralls worn by the individual depicted in the photograph as the type and color of the coveralls her attacker wore. An investigator for the sheriff’s department testified that his investigation revealed that Glaze had been in the county area where the incident occurred on the date of the alleged crime.
1. Glaze contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. He argues that he was never positively identified, but was identified only through DNA evidence, and that the DNA evidence by itself was insufficient to support his convictions or to exclude the possibility that he had consensual intercourse with S. D.
On appeal of a criminal conviction, this Court’s duty is to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence. Moreover, the Court does not re-weigh. the evidence or resolve conflicts in testimony, but rather defers to the jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence.1
Concerning Glaze’s argument that the DNA evidence did not exclude the possibility that he had consensual intercourse with S. D., “[t]he testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact.”
The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Glaze guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offenses charged.
2. Glaze contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not “call any expert witness to rebut the state’s DNA evidence.”
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel under Strickland v. Washington,
“The decision whether to call an expert witness is a matter of trial strategy within the broad range of professional conduct afforded trial attorneys.”
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Walker v. State,
McKeehan v. State,
See id.
Glaze asserts that he did not fit S. D.’s description of her attacker because S. D. stated that her attacker was six feet to six feet one inch in height, and Glaze was five feet six inches in height. But evidence of Glaze’s height was not adduced at trial. At the hearing on Glaze’s motion for a new trial, Glaze testified that he was five feet six inches tall.
McKeehan, supra (citing Walker v. State,
See Johnson v. State,
OCGA § 24-4-8.
Baker v. State,
OCGA § 16-6-1 (a) (1).
Curtis v. State,
See Jackson v. Virginia,
Johnson v. State,
Id.; Mobley v. State,
Johnson, supra,
Davis v. State,
See Hendricks v. State,
See Hendricks, supra; Crawford v. State,