139 Ark. 83 | Ark. | 1919
The parties to this litigation make conflicting claims to certain lands in Lee County, formerly owned by Clarence McCaleb, who is the common source of the assertion of title. McCaleb owned a large body of land in that county containing about 1,300 acres, including 240 acres described as the SW!4 and the Wb¿> of the SEb£ of section 28, township 3 north, range 3 east, and on January 2, 1912, he sold and conveyed something over 1,000 acres of it to R. W. Buford and his wife, Emma Y. Buford, who subsequently conveyed to one Doan, who in turn conveyed to appellee Mallory. The description in the deed from. McCaleb to the Bufords was, in part, as follows: “The southwest and the west half of the southeast quarter of section twenty-eight (28), 240 acres, less 46 acres east of the railroad.” On the same day McCaleb executed a deed to F. T. Sellers conveying lands aggregating 312.31 acres, among which was a part of section 28, described as follows: “The southwest quarter (%) and the west half of the southeast quarter (bi) of section twenty-eight (28), less 194 acres lying west of the railroad, all in township three (3) north of range three (3) east.”
Sellers was acting as agent for the Bufords in the purchase from McCaleb of the lands embraced in the deed to the Bufords. The deed to the Bufords was filed for record on March 27, 1912, and the deed to Sellers was not filed for record until April 26, 1912. The line of railroad of the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company ran north and south through the southwest quarter of section 28, parallel with the east boundary line of the quarter section, leaving 46 acres on the east side of the railroad in that quarter section. The railroad does not touch the west half of the southeast quarter of section 28, and all of the other land described in the deed to the Bufords lie west of section 28.
Appellant Glasscock asserts title under Sellers to the lands conveyed in the deed from McCaleb to Sellers, and he has been in occupancy of the lands in section 28 east of the railroad. This action was instituted by. Mallory against Glasscock in the circuit court of Lee County for recovery of possession of all of the land except 46 acres lying on the east side of the west half of the southeast quarter (W% SEi^) of section 28. Appellant answered denying appellee’s' assertion of ownership of the land, and on his motion the cause was transferred to • the chancery court, where it proceeded to a final hearing which resulted in a decree in favor of appellee quieting his title and awarding possession of all the lands in section 28, except 46 acres lying on the east side of the west half of the southeast quarter.
.According to the facts, as disclosed by the testimony with respect to the location of the railroad, there are 126 acres east of the railroad in the two tracts described in the deeds as the southwest quarter and the west half of the southeast quarter of section 28. That being true, the exception in the deed of “46 acres east of the railroad” was void, and the effect of the deed was to convey the whole of the southwest quarter and the west half of the southeast quarter of section 28, 240 acres. Mooney v. Cooledge, 30 Ark. 640. Appellee had, therefore, a perfect record title to all of the lands in controversy, but he has conceded appellant’s right to 46 acres on the east side of the west half of the southeast quarter of section 28, and the correctness of the court’s decree in awarding it to appellant is not involved in this appeal. Appellee’s deed was recorded first in point of time and his title under it must prevail as against any conflicting claim, of appellant under the deed of McCaleb to Sellers. Penrose v. Doherty, 70 Ark. 256. Appellant cannot claim as an innocent purchaser for the reason that the description in the deed to Buford was sufficient to put him upon notice of the extent of that grant, and also for the reason that the deed to Sellers, which was in the line of his own title, gave record notice that 194 acres of the southwest quarter and the west half of the southeast quarter of section 28 was excluded from the land, leaving only 46 acres of those two sub-divisions to be conveyed by that deed. The legal title having passed to appellee, the burden of establishing grounds for reformation résted on appellant, and we do not think the testimony adduced by him was sufficient to warrant a court of equity in granting that relief. It is clear from the deed that the intention of McCaleb was to convey to the Bufords 194 acres out of those two subdivisions, and this is also apparent in the deed to Sellers.
There is testimony tending to show that Buford understood when he purchased the land that the railroad was to be his east boundary, but it also showed that he was ignorant of the true location of the railroad and supposed that he was to get the full acreage stipulated in his bargain. There are no equities in appellant’s favor which call for a reformation of the deed so as to give him title to all of the land east of the railroad. The rule is well established by this court that the evidence which would justify the reformation of a deed must be clear and decisive, and the testimony in this case does not measure up to that standard. Nor is it sufficient to show that there was an agreement between the owners of the contiguous tracts as to the boundaries. The dispute arises in this case, not as, to location of boundaries, but as to the substance of the respective conveyances under which the parties claim, and there is no reason for applying the doctrine of recognition of boundaries settled by agreement of the parties.
Our conclusion is that the decree of the chancellor is correct and the same is affirmed.
