91 Tenn. 163 | Tenn. | 1892
This is an action of replevin, involving the right to the possession of fifty barrels of corn. The Circuit Judge, trying the case without a jury, rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, and plaintiff appealed in error.
John Glasgow owned a small farm, some horses, cattle, and hogs in Stewart County. Being old, and having a large family dependent upon him, he placed the farm and live stock in charge of his son, C. A. Glasgow, in the spring of 1890, under a verbal agreement, whereby the son bound himself to cultivate the farm and support his father’s family and feed the stock out of the crop raised, taking the residue as compensation for his labor.
The son was a young man, living in his father’s family upon the farm.
In pursuance of the contract, the son, by his own labor and that of a hired hand, with some little voluntary assistance from his father and younger brother, cultivated a croii of corn, which yielded about one hundred barrels, worth two hundred dollars.
Such is the substance of the material facts, as detailed by the plaintiff, ■ who was the only witness in the case.
A part of the corn is the subject-matter of
The trial Judge was of opinion that the contract was fraudulent in fact and in law, and, as a consequence, adjudged the corn to be the property of the father, and subject to his debts.
In that view we cannot concur upon either ground. There is no evidence, not even an intimation or indication, direct or remote, of an intention to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. Hence, the contract cannot properly be held to have been fraudulent in fact.
It is true, as contended by counsel of appellee, that the finding of the trial Judge upon the facts of the ease is entitled to the same weight as the verdict of a jury; but neither is binding upon this Court, unless there be some material evidence to support it. Eller v. Richardson, 5 Pickle, 576.
As we have already seen, there is no evidence of a fraudulent- intent in this case.- Therefore, the finding of fraud In fact is without support, and cannot control the decision bore to be made.
The other ground of the trial Judge’s action involves a question of law; and upon that, as upon the facts, we cannot assent to his conclusion. The contract did not; contravene any rule of law or public policy. Consequently, it could not have been fraudulent in law.
In our judgment, a more natural, fair, and honest arrangement could not have been made by par
It is apparent from the crop produced that the plaintiff' was shown no great favor by the contract. Indeed, it is to be doubted that one occupying a different relation would have entered into an arrangement with so little promise of compensation for the labor to be performed.
Left in idleness, the farm could have yielded nothing. The old gentleman was not able to cultivate it himself, and thereby save the small surplus of the crop . for his estate. Had he been able but unwilling, that would have furnished no ground for legal complaint, for a debtor cannot, under our law, be coerced to work for the benefit of his creditor.
Again, no property of the debtor was incum-, bered, covered up, or placed beyond the reach of
Good morals, law, and public policy alike commend such contracts under such circumstances.
A farming contract between father and son, very much like the one before us, was upheld and enforced by this Court in the case of Leslie v. Joyner, 2 Head, 515.
All the corn belonged to the plaintiff, charged ■with the support of the family of his father. It was in no sense subject to levy for the father’s debt.
The case having been tried by the Circuit Judge without the intervention of a jury, this Court, upon reversal, directs such judgment as he should have rendered. Smith v. Hubbard, 1 Pickle, 306; Singleton v. Wilson, Ib., 347; Settle v. Marlow, 12 Lea, 474.
Reverse and enter judgment for plaintiff'.