MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Lead Plaintiffs Lawrence F. Glaser and Chen Kuang bring this putative class action against defendants The9 Ltd. (“The9”), Xiaowei Chen, George Lai, Hannah Lee, Tony Tse, and Jun Zhu, alleging violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, and Exchange Act Section 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a). Plaintiffs allege that between November 15, 2006, and July 15, 2009 (the “Class Period”), defendants fraudulently misrepresented facts relating to the likelihood of their renewal of a certain extremely profitable exclusive license granted them by a third company. Defendants now move to dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, and specifically because plaintiffs fail to adequately plead scienter, defendants’ motion is GRANTED in its entirety; and plaintiffs are granted leave to replead their complaint.
I. FACTUAL SETTING
For the purposes of the present motion, the following facts — drawn from the complaint, documents incorporated by reference therein, Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) public disclosure documents, and documents known to the plaintiffs and upon which they relied in bringing this action 1 — are taken as true.
A. Background
Lead Plaintiffs Lawrence F. Glaser and Chen Kuang seek to represent the class of persons who purchased The9’s American Depositary Shares (“ADS”) and options during the Class Period, November 15, 2006, through July 15, 2009. (Compl. ¶¶ 15, 23.) Defendant The9, incorporated in the Cayman Islands with its principal place of operations in China, operates multiplayer online video games
2
in China.
(Id.
¶ 16; Def.’s Mem. at 3.) The9’s stock trades as ADS on NASDAQ. (Compl. ¶ 16.) As relevant to this action The9 contracts with video game developers, such as non-parties Blizzard Entertainment Inc. (“Blizzard”) and Electronic Arts, Inc. (“EA”), to provide and run the networks and servers on which those developers’
On February 3, 2004, The9 entered into a contract (the “WoW Contract”) with Blizzard’s parent company, Vivendi Universal Games (“Vivendi”), to be the exclusive operator of Vivendi’s game World of Warcraft 4 (“WoW”) in China. (Id. ¶29.) The WoW Contract, which was amended in January 2007 to replace Vivendi with Blizzard, was to expire on June 7, 2009. (Id. ¶¶ 29-30.) The9 launched WoW in China on June 5, 2005; and in the third quarter of 2005, The9’s revenues rose 2,096% to $22.8 million. (Id. ¶¶ 29, 32.) Of that amount, The9 attributed $22.3 million to WoW. (Id. ¶ 32.) WoW would go on to account for over 90% of The9’s revenues in 2006, 2007, and 2008. (Id. ¶ 16.)
In March 2006, a gaming news website reported that tensions had arisen between The9 and Blizzard over whether operation of WoW’s first expansion pack, Burning Crusade, was included in the original deal. (Id. ¶ 36.) And in April 2006, The9 contracted with NCsoft Corporation (“NCsoft”) to operate NCsoft’s game Guild Wars, a competitor of WoW, in China. (Id. ¶ 37.) Later in April, a different gaming news website reported its belief that Blizzard would “evaluate” partners other than The9 for operation of WoW in China. (Id. ¶ 38.) Moreover, plaintiffs’ Confidential Witness One (“CW1”) 5 , a Blizzard employee in 2005 and 2006, alleges that Blizzard was displeased with The9’s overall handling of WoW and that Blizzard expected WoW to generate larger revenues in China than it had. (Id. ¶ 39.) Plaintiffs claim these tensions “inereas[ed] the likelihood that The9 would not renew the WoW Contract when it was set to expire in June 2009.” (Id.)
B. The Class Period
1. Alleged Misstatements and Omissions During the Class Period
The Class Period begins on November 15, 2006 and ends on July 15, 2009.
(Id.
¶¶ 1, 43.) Plaintiffs allege that defendants, specifically Zhu and Chen, made fraudulently misleading statements during that period that fall generally into three categories. The first category consists of statements allegedly indicating defendants’ beliefs that renewal of the WoW Contract was likely. The second is made up of statements allegedly representing either
On November 16, The9 released its third quarter 2006 financial results and held a conference call. (Id. ¶¶ 43-44.) Before the call, The9’s Investor Relations (“IR”) Manager, stated:
Before we start I would like to read you the Safe Harbor statement. During the course of today’s call certain projections or forward looking statements may be made regarding The9’s future financial performance or future events. We wish to caution you that such statements or predictions are based on current information and expectations and actual results may differ materially from those projected in the forward looking statements. We would also like to refer you to documents that the Company has filed with the [SEC]. These documents contain additional information concerning factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those contained in the management’s projections or forward looking statements.
(Kutcher Decl. Ex. 23 at 2 (this passage, stated as above, is hereinafter referred to as “The9’s Conference Call Safe Harbor Statement”).)
During the November 16, 2006 call, an analyst asked Zhu when Zhu expected Burning Crusade — the WoW expansion pack — to launch in China and whether The9 and Blizzard had had any “new negotiations” regarding Burning Crusade. (Compl. ¶ 44.) Zhu replied that the companies had “always believed that Burning Crusade is part of our original licensing agreement,” and that “[d]uring the four years of exclusive license there’s no possibility that a company other than The9 can operate Burning Crusade in China.” (Id.) Zhu went on to say that The9 and Blizzard were “active in discussion” concerning “the marketing arrangement and the timetable for the Burning Crusade in China,” and that “we’ll continue to communicate with them in the coming two and a half years.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges those statements were false and misleading because they misrepresented or failed to disclose that
(i) there were tensions between The9 and Blizzard ...; (ii) there was a significant undisclosed risk that The9 would not be able to renew the WoW Contract ...; (iii) the Individual Defendants and other Company insiders understood that there was likely a finite amount of time to financially benefit from WoW; and (iv) the Individual Defendants and other Company executives engaged in a scheme to personally benefit from WoW before the expiration of the WoW Contract.
(Id. ¶ 45.) The9’s ADS increased from $4.92 to $28.36, a twenty-one percent rise, on November 16. (Id. ¶ 47.) At the same time, Incsight, Ltd. (“Incsight”), a company owned by Zhu sold 86,499 shares of The9 for about $2.37 million between November 15 and November 24, 2006, at an average price of approximately $27.42 per share. (Id. ¶¶ 17(a), 48,148.)
Despite alleged appearances, however, according to CW4, a former executive at The9, “Zhu told Company executives in early 2007 that he viewed it as very unlikely if not impossible for The9 to be able to renew the WoW Contract.”
(Id.
¶ 40.) CW4 also claims that “Zhu understood that The9’s relationship with Blizzard had been ‘ruined’ by early 2007.”
(Id.)
In addition on May 21, 2007, EA, a competitor to Blizzard in the video game development industry, purchased 15% of The9’s shares for $167 million.
(Id.
¶ 52.) EA also granted The9 the exclusive right to publish one of EA’s games, FIFA Online, a multi
Zhu addressed the EA investment, among other issues, on a May 22, 2007 conference call announcing The9’s first quarter 2007 earnings. As with the November 16, 2006 call, the IR Manager stated The9’s Conference Call Safe Harbor Statement at the start of the May 22, 2007 call. (Kutcher Decl. Ex. 25 at 1-2.). Later on the call Zhu stated, “we believe The9 is well positioned for sustainable growth.” (Compl. ¶ 56.) Zhu also denied that EA’s investment would “have any impact on our relationship with Blizzard” because the companies’ games were focused on different genres. (Id. ¶ 57.) Finally, to an analyst’s question about the possibility of extending the WoW Contract past June 2009, Zhu said, “the relationship between [Blizzard and The9 is] very good, but currently we haven’t talked about things beyond '09.” (Id. ¶ 59.) The9’s ADS increased $4.76, or 12%, to $44.23 on May 22. (See id. ¶ 62.) The ADS reached a Class-Period high of $51.97 on July 13, 2007. (Id. ¶ 64.) Despite the alleged additional misstatements detailed below, however, the ADS’ price declined, at first dramatically and then steadily, through the end of the Class Period, July 15, 2009. The9’s ADS traded in the mid-$45 range in August 2007; in the $30s in October 2007; at $25 by the end of November 2007; around $20 in January and February 2008; near $25 in May 2008; around $18 and $19 in August and September 2008; at $13 in April 2009 before Blizzard announced that it would not renew the WoW contract with The9; at $10 directly after that announcement; and at $8.68 at the Class Period’s close in July 2009. (Id. ¶¶ 65, 75, 83, 85, 90, 97,106,110,157,159.)
On June 28, 2007, The9 filed its Form 20-F 6 for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2006, with the SEC. The9 Limited, Annual Report (Form 20-F) (June 28, 2007) (hereinafter the “Fiscal 2006 20-F”); (see also Kutcher Decl. Ex. 4.) Therein under “Risk Factors” The9 noted (1) its “limited relevant operating history,” which makes it “difficult to evaluate our prospective business,” (The9 had formed in 2000 and only launched its first MMORPG in February 2003); and (2) the “potential failure[s]” to “successfully launch and operate new online games licensed to us,” or to “license ... additional online games.” In addition, specifically concerning risk factors related to WoW, the Fiscal 2006 20-F stated
If we are unable to maintain a satisfactory relationship with Blizzard or any other online game developer that has licensed a game to us, or if Blizzard or any of our other online game licensors either establishes similar or more favorable relationships with our competitors in violation of its contractual arrangements with us or otherwise, our operating results and our business would be harmed, because our business depends significantly upon our exclusive licenses to operate WoW.... [W]e cannot assure you that Blizzard or any of our other online game licensors will renew its license agreement with us.... Any deterioration of our relationship with Blizzard or any of our other online game licensors could harm our future resultsof operations or the growth of our business.
Fiscal 2006 20-F at 9.
On August 3, 2007, reports again surfaced of rumors on gaming websites concerning tensions between Blizzard and The9. (Compl. ¶ 67.) According to the news articles, however, Blizzard and The9 jointly announced that “ ‘[t]he media reports of disagreements between The9 and [Blizzard] are groundless, ... [Blizzard] and The9’s cooperation has been smooth and friendly.’ ” (Id. ¶ 68 (quoting the article quoting the joint announcement).) Then on August 29, The9 released its second quarter 2007 financial information and an accompanying press release, stating, “with all the [] high-caliber games to be launched in the future, we are confident that The9 will continuously capitalize on its unparalleled game portfolio so as to achieve long-term sustainable growth.” (Id. ¶ 71.) The August 29 press release contained a safe harbor statement similar to those stated at the start of the conference calls, but which also specifically included that “forward-looking statements can be identified by terminology such as ‘will,’ ‘expects,’ ‘anticipates,’ ‘future,’ ‘intends,’ ‘plans,’ ‘believes,’ ‘estimates’ and similar statements.” (Kutcher Deck Ex. 14 at 11.) The safe harbor provision went on:
A number of important factors could cause actual results to differ materially from those contained in any forward-looking statement. Potential risks and uncertainties include, but are not limited to, The9’s limited operating history as an online game operator, political and economic policies of the Chinese government, the laws and regulations governing the online game industry, information disseminated over the Internet and Internet content provides in China, intensified government regulation of Internet cafes, The9’s ability to retain existing players and attract new players, license, develop or acquire additional online games that are appealing to users, anticipate and adapt to changing consumer preferences and respond to competitive market conditions, and other risks and uncertainties outlined in The9’s filings with the [SEC].
(Id. (this passage, stated as above, is hereinafter referred to as “The9’s SEC Filing Safe Harbor Statement”).)
The9 launched the WoW expansion pack, Burning Crusade, in September 2007. (Compl. ¶ 75.) Then on November 16, 2007, The9 released its third quarter 2007 financial results and held a conference calk Like the November 16, 2006, and May 22, 2007 calls, this call began with the IR Manager reading The9’s Conference Call Safe Harbor Statement. (Kuteher Deck Ex. 26 at 1.) Later in the call, Zhu responded to an analyst’s question about extending the WoW Contract. Zhu said, “after [Burning Crusade] was launched we started discussions with [Blizzard] regarding the renewal of the contract as you mentioned. But so far we don’t have any comment. But we are very confident to eventually renew the contract of WOW with Blizzard.” (Compl. ¶ 77; Kutcher Deck Ex. 26 at 7.)
Lee resigned as The9’s CFO on January 18, 2008,- and was replaced by Tse. (Compl. ¶¶ 17(c), 85.) On February 22, 2008, The9 released its fourth quarter 2007 financial results and held a conference calk As with the prior conference calls, the IR Manager read The9’s Conference Call Safe Harbor Statement. (Kutcher Deck Ex. 27 at 2.) Later, in response to an analyst’s questions regarding license renewal, Zhu stated, “WoW has been in very strong growth during the past few years and also we are always in very good [sic] relationship with Blizzard.... So I was very confident that we believe that we can renew the contract in '09.” (Compl. ¶ 88.) Then,
Tse resigned as The9’s CFO on June 7, 2008, and was replaced by Lai. (Id. ¶ 98.) Then on June 30, 2008, The9 filed its Form 20-F for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2007. The9 Limited, Annual Report (Form 20-F) (June 30, 2008) (hereinafter the “Fiscal 2007 20-F”); (see also Kutcher Decl. Ex. 5.) In highlighting risks similar to those mentioned in the Fiscal 2006 20-F, the document stated,
[the WoW Contract] will expire on June 7, 2009. Since the launch of WoW in June 2005, we have derived substantially all of our revenues from WoW. If we are unable to renew this license ... our future results of operations will be materially adversely affected. We intend to vigorously pursue negotiations for the renewal of the WoW license, which negotiations are currently underway.
Fiscal 2007 20-F at 6. The form went on to detail the risk presented by potential deterioration of The9’s relationship with Blizzard, previously mentioned in the Fiscal 2006 20-F. Fiscal 2007 20-F at 6-7.
On August 8, 2008, The9 released its second quarter 2008 financial results, and held a conference call, again preceded by The9’s Conference Call Safe Harbor Statement. (Kutcher Decl. Ex. 28 at 2.) In response to an analyst’s question on renewal negotiations, Chen stated, “we at The9 have been in very active discussions with Blizzard ... and we’re continuing our negotiations and we hope that we will have results very soon. At this point, I cannot release any details, but let me just say that we are in very active discussion.” (Compl. ¶ 102.) Chen also discussed The9’s relationship with Blizzard, saying, “EA’s shareholding in The9 does not present a threat or negative conflict of interest to our renewing the license.... [And] one thing that’s very good that’s coming out of the discussions is how we can strengthen our communications between The9 and Blizzard.” (Id.) Chen concluded, “we’re very positive and optimistic about WoW’s continuing performance and growth in China.” (Id.)
Though apparently negotiating with The9 about renewal of the WoW Contract, on August 12, 2008, Blizzard announced that it had agreed to license three different games to NetEase.com, Inc. (“Net-Ease”), a competitor of The9.
(Id.
¶ 105.) The next day, Bosma sold an additional 500,000 shares of The9 for approximately $11.3 million.
(Id.
¶ 107.) Thereafter, more rumors appeared that Blizzard would not renew the WoW Contract with The9.
(Id.
¶ 108.) The9 responded by press release on September 5, 2008, stating, “The9 is currently in contract negotiations regarding [WoW’s] future operations in China. Recently there have been rumors that surfaced regarding the contract negotiations. These rumors are completely unfounded. The9 encourages all parties to refrain from believing in such rumors. The9 is actively conducting the contract extension negotiations.”
(Id.)
The press release concluded with The9’s SEC Filing Safe Harbor Statement. (Kutcher Decl. Ex. 20 at 1.) Then on November 18, 2008, The9 released its third quarter 2008 financials and held a conference call, again at the start of which the IR Manager read The9’s Conference Call Safe Harbor
The cooperation between Blizzard and NetEase is a natural outcome, which is also a normal business deal. I wish them get [sic] better and better. If we had not licensed WoW, The9 would be a company without WoW. The renewal of license [sic] will be in this June. Because we have to wait until the contract due [sic] to renew it. We are not in a hurry now.
{Id.)
On February 23, 2009, The9 released its fourth quarter 2008 and fiscal year 2008 financial results. {Id. ¶ 124.) The press release, which contained The9’s SEC Filing Safe Harbor Statement, indicated that gross profits had increased thirty-five percent and net income forty-five percent from 2007, and attributed those increases to WoW revenues. {Id.; Kutcher Decl. Ex. 20 at 11.) Plaintiffs contend that, in addition to being false and misleading for disclosing neither the tensions between Blizzard and The9 nor The9’s management’s alleged belief the company would be unable to renew the license, the financial results were false and misleading because The9 had “massive write-offs for FY08” when the non-renewal of the WoW Contract was eventually announced. (Compl. ¶ 125.) The9 held a conference call to discuss the fourth quarter 2008 financials on February 24. {Id. ¶ 126.) After the IR Manager read The9’s Conference Call Safe Harbor Statement, Chen responded to questions on WoW Contract renewal negotiations, on when The9 would launch WoWs second expansion pack, Wrath of the Lich King (“WLK”), and on related marketing efforts. (Kutcher Decl. Ex. 31 at 2, 6,10.) Chen stated,
[W]e cannot disclose any detail regarding that ongoing negotiation of renewal.... We are actively preparing for the localization of [WLK] and the material has already been submitted for authorities’ review. At this point we’re working very actively to make every preparation possible from content to technical and we hope to launch it as soon as possible.... We’re now actively preparing for its launch in China.... [But] I cannot principally agree ... that it looks like we’re launching [WLK] in Q2. The launch date of [WLK] has not been determined yet at this point.... We think that the key thing actually to attract new users for [ ][WLK] ... is not necessarily just advertisement but actually providing access to players.
(Compl. ¶¶ 126-127.)
After leaving Blizzard in 2006, CW1 became an investment consultant specializing in the video game industry.
{Id.
¶ 39.) According to him, “it was widely believed” by February 2009 “that Blizzard would not renew the WoW Contract with The9,” but would instead license the game to Net-Ease, despite Chen’s statements apparently to the contrary.
{Id.
¶ 122.) Supporting this allegation is the report of CW3, a “Customer Service Training Manager” at Blizzard, that Blizzard began training Net-Ease personnel in WoW customer service in March 2009.
{Id.
¶ 123.) CW3 claims that “The9 would have known these facts.”
{Id.)
Then on April 15, “unofficial reports emerged” that Blizzard had decided to license WoW to NetEase following the termination of The9’s license.
{Id.
¶ 129.) On April 16, Blizzard and NetEase issued a joint announcement to the same effect.
On July 1, 2009, The9 filed a Form 6-K reporting that “as a result of the non-renewal of the [WoW Contract], as well as [other factors] ... [The9] will record impairment and certain other charges in its financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2008.” (Id. ¶ 137.) The filing indicated that net income would be between fifty-five percent and seventy-five percent lower than as stated in the February 2009 financial results report. (Id.) On July 15, The9 filed it Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2008, which noted a seventy-two percent decrease in revenues between 2007 and 2008, several impairments and other charges to its 2008 financial statements, and concluded,
[t]hrough end [sic] of March 2009, [The9] and Blizzard were conducting ongoing negotiations, which formally commenced in April 2008 with respect to [The9] continuing to operate WoW in mainland China. On April 16, 2009, [The9] learned that WoW [sic] license would be licensed to another China-based online game company, [sic] [The9] believed that an agreement by which [The9] would continue to operate WoW beyond the expiration of the then existing license was imminent, [sic]
(Id. ¶¶ 138-142.)
This filing marks the end of the Class Period. Between July 1 and July 15, The9’s ADS price fell from $10.15 to $8.68. (Id. ¶ 142.) Plaintiffs claim that (1) defendants’ misstatements and omissions caused The9’s ADS price to be inflated during the Class Period; and (2) the disclosures starting with Lee’s resignation and ending with the report of alterations of the 2008 financial reports caused that price to fall from $21.76 on January 18, 2008, to $8.68 on July 16, 2009. (Id. ¶¶ 154-159.)
2. Allegations Supporting Scienter
Plaintiffs allege that during the Class Period, The9 and the Individual Defendants engaged in several fraudulent, illegal, or otherwise “shady” (Id. ¶ 152(c)) transactions. Plaintiffs claim that since defendants knew or recklessly disregarded that The9 would not be able to renew the WoW Contract, and that The9 and Blizzard were not on amicable terms, these transactions support an inference that The9’s management acted with scienter.
Plaintiffs first point to the around $28 million in sales of The9 stock made by Incsight — which was owned by Zhu — during the Class Period.
7
(See id.
¶¶ 17(a),
Plaintiffs also point to around $12 million in sales made by The9’s directors and management between December 2006 and September 2008. (See Compl. ¶ 148.) These sales include $3 million by defendant Lee between that December 2006 and March 2008. (See id.) Lee’s sales were made pursuant SEC Rule 10b5-l(c) 9 and disclosed to the SEC on Form 144s. (Kutcher Decl. Exs. 35-43; Def.’s Mem. at 16 n. 15.) Other than Lee, no individual defendant named in this action is alleged to have sold any shares during the class period.
Defendants also allegedly benefitted from certain manipulations of The9’s stock structure and policies. On November 20, 2008, The9’s board of directors increased the total shares available for option purchase rights from 2.5 million to 4.5 million.
(Id.
¶ 149.) Then on January 8, 2009, The9 adopted a shareholder rights plan under which shareholders would be entitled to purchase, essentially, two shares for the price of one should an outside entity acquire fifteen-percent or more of The9’s voting securities (the “Poison Pill”).
(Id.
¶ 117.) Plaintiffs allege that The9 “enacted the rights plan to prevent a third-party from acquiring control of [The9] in the event its shares plunged after the mar
Plaintiffs also contend that defendants benefitted from certain “related party transactions with [The9].” (Id. ¶ 152.) These transactions, described only in vague terms in the complaint, include (1) Zhu receiving $8 million in kickbacks from purchases of computer equipment from Hewlett-Packard Company; (2) The9 executives receiving “substantial financial benefits” from a written-off investment in a Korean game development company, Ideas; (3) The9 acquiring twelve percent of another Korean game development company, G10; (4) The9 jointly operating its online video games, including WoW, with a separate company partly owned by Zhu, Shanghai IT; (5) a The9 subsidiary granting Zhu and certain employees of the subsidiary stock options; (6) The9 granting Incsight equity warrants; and (7) The9 loaning $1.65 million to other “employees” to establish their own game development companies. (Id. ¶ 152(a)-(g).)
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard for Rule 12(b)(6)
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entertainment,
B. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 Claims
1. Scienter Requirement
“To state a claim under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, ‘a plaintiff must allege that the defendant (1) made misstatements or omissions of material fact, (2) with scienter, (3) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, (4) upon which the plaintiff relied, and (5) that the plaintiffs reliance was the proximate cause of its injury.”
Local No. 38 Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Pension Fund v. American Express Co.,
In addition to Rule 9(b), plaintiffs must also satisfy the pleading requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”).
ECA and Local 131 IBEW Joint Pension Trust of Chicago v. JP Morgan Chase Co.,
a. Motive and Opportunity
To satisfy “motive and opportunity,” plaintiffs must allege that defendants “benefitted in some concrete and personal way from the purported fraud.”
ECA
“[MJotive can be shown, however, ‘when corporate insiders allegedly make a misrepresentation in order to sell their own shares at a profit.’ ”
In re Citigroup Inc. Sec. Litig.,
b. Strong Circumstantial Evidence
“Where motive is not apparent, it is still possible to plead scienter by identifying circumstances indicating conscious behavior by the defendant, though the strength of the circumstantial allegations must be correspondingly greater.”
In re Citigroup,
For purposes of this action plaintiffs must “specifically allege defendants’ knowledge of facts or access to information contradicting defendants’ public state
On the other hand, actual identification of reports or other documents indicating defendants’ recklessness as to their public statements’ truth or falsity suggests an inference of scienter strong enough to survive motion to dismiss.
See, e.g., In re Citigroup,
Plaintiffs may also buttress an argument for strong circumstantial evidence with information obtained from confidential sources.
See Local No. 38,
Courts however will credit confidential source allegations, generally, in two situations. The first is when those sources’ positions and/or job responsibilities are described sufficiently to indicate a high likelihood that they actually knew facts underlying their allegations.
See, e.g., In re Scottish Re Group Sec. Litig.,
Two final requirements exist to credit confidential witness testimony. First, as is obvious, confidential sources cannot be used to “merely parrot[ ] ... eonclusory allegations contained in the complaint.”
In re Sierra Wireless, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
c. Competing Inferences Requirement of Tellabs
Finally, the law is clear that whichever path plaintiffs pursue to plead scienter, plaintiffs must plead an inference of scienter that is at least as strong and compelling as “any competing inferences rationally drawn from all the facts alleged, taken collectively.”
ECA,
2. Application to This Case
a. Motive and Opportunity
Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to support a strong inference of scienter based on motive; and even if the allegations did so, that inference is far weaker than the most compelling rational competing inference.
Plaintiffs contend that four allegations support their showing of motive: (1) insider stock sales generating $125 million in proceeds, (Pl.’s Opp’n at 16; Compl. ¶ 148); (2) the “related party transactions” including the investments in Hewlett-Packard equipment and the kickbacks received through those investments, the investments in two Korean game development companies, the joint operation of WoW with a The9 subsidiary, the granting of stock options, and the loans The9 made to its employees to start their own game development companies, (Pl.s’ Opp’n at 16; Compl. ¶¶ 152(a)-(g)); (3) the stock dividend The9 declared in January 2009, (Pl.’s Opp’n at 16-17; Compl. ¶ 121); and (4) The9’s adoption of its poison pill plan, (Pl.’s Opp’n at 17; Compl. ¶ 117.).
Plaintiffs’ allegations concerning insider stock sales fail for several reasons. First, those allegations demonstrate only gross proceeds without identifying net profits, and proceeds alone say nothing about a seller’s motive.
See In re eSpeed,
Finally, even assuming,
arguendo,
that Incsight’s sales were somehow sufficient to establish a plausible inference of motive, that inference is not as strong as the inference of non-fraudulent activity drawn from the facts viewed collectively. Indeed, plaintiffs’ own allegations undermine the inference plaintiffs advance. True that Incsight sold about 486,000 shares as The9’s ADS price rose from around $23 to its peak of $51.97.
(See
Compl. ¶¶ 47, 64, 148.) But Incsight retained upwards of 6 million shares as that price continuously fell to $8.68 at the Class Period’s end.
(See id.
¶ 142); Fiscal 2008 20-F at 67. It defies reason that an entity looking to profit on a fraudulently inflated stock price would hold close to ninety percent of its shares as share prices fell,
while knowing that the information illuminating the fraud was seeping into the market.
The same is true regarding both (1) Zhu’s increase in beneficial holdings, and (2) The9’s repurchase of 4.3 million of its own shares during the Class Period. Zhu’s increase in holdings and The9’s repurchase of shares, at a time during which, plaintiffs allege, The9 was overvalued and heading towards financial ruin, raises precisely the contrary inference from the one suggested by plaintiffs.
See In re eSpeed,
The much stronger inference drawn from plaintiffs’ allegations is that though the possibilities existed that Blizzard might not renew the WoW Contract, that The9 and Blizzard’s relationship might sour, or that The9’s prospects for future growth might turn pessimistic, The9 and its management believed — or at least hoped — that The9 would renew the WoW Contract and would continue to grow. Indeed, Zhu’s increase in beneficial ownership, and The9’s repurchase of shares and investments in equipment and subsidiaries, “signal[ ] only confidence in the future of [the] company.”
15
In re MRU,
769
b. Strong Circumstantial Evidence
As with their contentions regarding motive, plaintiffs’ allegations supporting an inference of scienter based on circumstantial evidence also fail both in sufficiency and as compared to the rational competing inference.
Plaintiffs argue that five elements of their pleadings support an inference of scienter drawn from strong circumstantial evidence. These are (1) that the confidential witness allegations indicate that the individual defendants knew of their statements’ falsity; (2) that WoW was the “core operation” of The9’s business; (3) that The9’s Fiscal 2008 20-F eventually wrote down net income by seventy-two percent; (4) that on November 16, 2007, Zhu stated that “after [Burning Crusade] was launched, we started discussions with [Blizzard] regarding renewal of the [WoW Contract],” yet on November 18, 2008, Chen said, “we have been conducting the talks with Blizzard [regarding the WoW Contract’s renewal] since actually May this year;” and (5) that Lee and Tse both resigned during the class period. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 17-22.) The Court addresses each allegation in turn, before considering them all in their entirety as per the requirement of Tellabs.
i. Confidential Witness Allegations
Plaintiffs argue that they “have adequately alleged that CW accounts are indicative of scienter.” (PL’s Opp’n at 20.) But three of the confidential witnesses— CW1, CW2, and CW3 — worked for
Blizzard,
not The9, and plaintiffs make no allegation that those sources ever had any contact with anyone at The9, much less with the Individual Defendants. CW1 and CW2 make allegations solely concerning the corporate environment at Blizzard— they do not make any contention that the “[un]happy[ness],” (Compl. ¶ 39), or “view[s]”
(id.
¶ 53), of Blizzard were ever made known to The9. And despite CW3’s allegation that The9 “would have known” that Blizzard had started training NetEase personnel to operate WoW in March 2009,
(id.
¶ 123), the law is abundantly clear that such allegations are insufficient to support scienter.
See Campo,
CW4 is perhaps a closer case, but as with the other sources, the Court concludes that his allegations must be discounted. CW4 is described as a former “senior executive” of The9.
(Id.
¶ 40.) He alleges that “Zhu told Company executives in early 2007 that he viewed it as very unlikely if not impossible for The9 to be able to renew the WoW Contract.”
(Id.)
In addition, “Zhu understood that The9’s relationship with Blizzard had been ‘ruined’ by early 2007.”
(Id.)
Missing from the complaint, however, is any indication of what aspect of The9 or its management CW4 was involved in, what CW4’s job duties entailed, what kind of access CW4 had to Zhu, in what form and context Zhu made his alleged statement, or how CW4 was privy to that statement. Such lack of description is, alone, fatal to CW4’s allegations.
See Local No. 38,
ii. Core Operations
Plaintiffs argue that “the fact that [allegedly false or misleading statements] concerned the core operations of [a] company supports the inference that the defendant knew or should have known the statements were false when made.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 17 (quoting
In re Atlas Air,
The only allegations in the complaint indicating that any defendant actually had knowledge going to the falsity of his or her statement are the allegations of CW4 that “Zhu told Company executives in early 2007 that he viewed is as very unlikely if not impossible for The9 to be able to renew the WoW Contract,” and that “Zhu understood that The9’s relationship with Blizzard had been ‘ruined’ by early 2007.” (Compl. ¶ 40.) 16 As discussed supra, however, the Court cannot credit CW4’s allegations as CW4 is not described in sufficient detail to convince the Court that he would possess the information alleged. Because plaintiffs present no other evidence supporting an inference that defendants were aware of contradictory facts when they made their statements, the mere fact that the WoW Contract was at the core of defendants’ business does not support strong circumstantial evidence of scienter — if indeed the “core operations” doctrine remains good law. 17
iii. Size of the Write-Down
Plaintiffs argue that “[t]he magnitude of the write-offs related to the loss of the WoW license — causing previously-reported net income to shrink by 72% — adds to the strong inference of scienter alleged.” (PL’s Opp’n at 18 (citing
In re Scholastic,
iv. Zhu and Chens’ Allegedly Contradictory Statements
Plaintiffs also contend that Zhu’s November 2007 statement — that The9 had had discussions with Blizzard regarding the possibility of renewal of the WoW Contract after Burning Crusade launched in September 2007 — is contradicted by Chens’ November 2008 statement — that The9 had been conducting renewal talks since May 2008 — and that that contradiction supports a strong inference of scienter. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 18-19.) Plaintiffs argue that a “later statement may suggest that a defendant had a contemporaneous knowledge of the falsity of his [earlier] statement, if the later statement directly contradicts or is inconsistent with the earlier statement.”
(Id.
at 18 (citing
In re Read-Rite Corp. Sec. Litig.,
v. Resignations
Plaintiffs argue that “[r]esignations, although not themselves sufficient, add to a pleading of circumstantial evidence of fraud.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 21 (citing
In re Scottish Re,
vi. Competing Inferences
Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not alleged facts establishing an inference of strong circumstantial evidence supporting scienter, it need not compare that inference against the competing inference that The9 hoped to renew the WoW Contract and therefore made a concentrated effort to achieve that goal. In any event, that inference is stronger than any inference possibly gleaned from the five categories of evidence discussed just above for the same reasons discussed
supra
at Section II.B.2.a. Indeed, the competing inference of no conscious misbehavior is supported, in addition, by the facts that (1) Blizzard and The9 engaged in over a year of formal, protracted negotiations concerning renewal; and (2) though under no duty to do so, Blizzard and The9
jointly
denied the vague internet rumors concerning their relationship and contract renewal. Even if plausible, which the Court holds it is not, plaintiffs’ inference that defendants knew their statements were false when made is far less compelling than the inference that defendants believed that they
C. Section 20(a) Claims
Plaintiffs also bring claims against the Individual Defendants pursuant to the Exchange Act Section 20(a). Such claims require “(a) a primary violation by a controlled person, (b) actual control by the defendant, and (c) the controlling person’s culpable participation in the primary violation.”
In re Security Capital Assurance,
D. Leave to Replead
“[I]t is the usual practice upon granting a motion to dismiss to allow leave to re-plead.”
In re eSpeed,
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in its entirety. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this motion [35] and close this case.
SO ORDERED
Notes
.
See ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd.,
. A multiplayer online video game differs from a game played solely by one individual in front of a screen in that in the former the player logs into a virtual network and then plays the game with or against other individuals also logged into the network.
. Zhu, Lee, Tse, Lai, and Chen are collectively referred to as the "Individual Defendants.”
. World of Warcraft is a "massively multiplayer online role-playing game,” or "MMORPG.” In an MMORPG, each player takes the role of an individual avatar and interacts with other players’ avatars in, and also interacts with, a massive virtual world. "Expansion packs” and/or "patches,” such as those discussed in this opinion, add geography and content to the virtual world, keeping the world dynamic and keeping players playing. Multiplayer online games, including MMORPGs, earn revenues by requiring players to purchase the game and also pay monthly or hourly playing fees, or both monthly and hourly fees.
.Plaintiffs complaint details allegations of four confidential witnesses. These witnesses are hereinafter referred to as CW(number).
. The SEC’s Form 20-F is, essentially, the equivalent of a domestic company’s Form 10-K — an annual report summarizing a public company's performance-filed by foreign issuers.
. Plaintiffs also allege that a company called Bosma, Ltd. ("Bosma”) sold around 3 million shares for around $85 million during the class period. (Compl. ¶ 148.) Plaintiffs suggest that those amounts should be included in calculating Zhu's share ownership since "Inc-sight had a longstanding voting agreement with Bosma ... pursuant to which Zhu exerted substantial influence over Bosma's interaction with [The9].”
(Id.
¶ 17(a);
see id.
¶¶ 48, 107, 147.) The voting agreement, however, did not give Zhu any ownership in Bosma’s The9 holdings; it merely required that Bosma and Incsight "agree[ ] to vote their respective shares to ensure that [The9's] board of directors consists of: (i) one director designated by Incsight, so long as it holds 5% or more of [The9’s] total outstanding shares, which initially shall be [Zhu]; (ii) one director designated by Bosma, so long as it holds 5% more of [The9’s] total outstanding shares, which initially shall be Stephen Law; (iii) two individuals mutually acceptable to Incsight and Bosma, but who are not otherwise affiliated with either of them, [The9], or any of [The9’s] shareholders; and (iv) an additional individual who is not affiliated with either Incsight, Bosma, [The9], or any of [The9’s] shareholders.” Fiscal 2006 20-F at 77. Because the agreement concerned only voting for The9’s board of directors, and did not involve benefi
. Incsight’s last alleged sale occurred on September 18, 2008. (Compl. ¶ 148.) And Zhu is not alleged to have made any sales in his own name. Thus Zhu's ownership did not decrease between May 31, 2009, when he owned 7 million shares, and July 15, 2009, the end of the Class Period.
. Rule 10b5-l(c) allows, inter alia, corporate insiders to trade otherwise restricted securities if the trader can demonstrate that material inside information known to him or her was not a factor in the trading decision. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-43154, at *23-24. This might be the case if, for example, before becoming aware of the information, the trader had adopted a written plan for trading in the security. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-l(c)(l)(i)(A)(3). As relevant to this opinion, prior to her Rule 10b5-l(c) trades, Lee would have had to "propose” those trades to the SEC on a Form 144. See United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Rule 144: Selling Restricted and Control Securities, http://www.sec.gov/investor/ pubs/rule 144.htm.
. '‘Opportunity/' which generally requires that defendants had access to inside corporate information,
see Stevelman v. Alias Research, Inc.,
. A plaintiff may also allege that defendants engaged in deliberate misconduct,
see In re Citigroup,
. It appears that a split exists in this District as to whether the use of confidential witnesses to plead securities fraud cases remains viable following the Supreme Court's decision in
Tellabs. Compare In re MRU,
. In fact,
Novak
did not explicitly lower the description requirement when other facts corroborate confidential sources’ allegations going to defendants' scienter. Rather,
Novak
removed a requirement that confidential sources be
named
when corroborative facts exist.
. In a footnote, plaintiffs cite cases from the Southern District of Ohio and the Districts of Nevada and D.C. apparently for the proposition that trading pursuant to a Rule 10b5-l plan cannot be considered on motion to dismiss. (Pl.’s Opp'n at 16 n. 20). To the extent that these cases make such holdings, that does not appear to be the law in this Circuit; nor does it appear to be uniform law without this District.
See Wietschner v. Monterey Pasta Co.,
. Indeed an even more plausible inference is that Zhu increased his holdings between May
. Though they do not, plaintiffs might have argued that the rumor reports on gaming websites alerted defendants to the inaccuracies of their statements. This argument would have failed, however, as media reports that do not "indicate particularized facts,” but instead "provide only generalized forecasting and speculation,” do not support scienter allegations.
Plumbers & Steamfitters,
. It is questionable whether the "core operations” doctrine has survived the PSLRA at all.
Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union No. 630 Pension-Annuity Trust Fund v. Arbitron, Inc.,
