Joseph R. GLANCEY, William Porter & Juliаn F. King, Appellants, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania STATE EMPLOYES’ RETIREMENT BOARD, Appellee. Thomas N. SHIOMOS, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania STATE EMPLOYES’ RETIREMENT BOARD.
610 A.2d 15
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Decided May 18, 1992
Argued Oct. 25 and Oct. 26, 1990.
McDERMOTT, J., concurs in the result.
Stephen P. Gallagher, Philadelphia, for Porter.
James E. Beasley, Barbara R. Axelrod, Philadelphia, for King.
Abbott A. Leban, Philadelphia, for appellee.
F. Emmett Fitzpatrick, III, Philadelphia, for Shiomos.
Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS and CAPPY, JJ.
CAPPY, Justice.
This case presents the question of whether judges removed from office for disciplinary reasons, pursuant to
For the reasons set out as follows, we conclude that neither the history nor the language of the Constitution support a conclusion that
Procedural History
Involved in this appeal are four individual Petitioners whose cases have been consolidated at two docket numbers. As each Petitioner raises the identical issue we shall resolve the matter in one opinion, referring to separate facts when necessary.
The Petitioners are all former judges of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, who have been removed from judicial office by this Court. Such disciplinary action occurred after the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board (JIRB) of Pennsylvania, which is established pursuant to
Following removal from office, each of the Petitioner judges sought to collect his monthly pension benefits from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania State Employees’ Retirement System (SERS). Each application was denied by the State Employees’ Retirement Board (SERB), under the purported authority of
The particular facts relevant to each of these four cases may be briefly summarized as follows. Petitioner Joseph R. Glancey became a judge on the Philadelphia Municipal Court effective January 6, 1969. He remained in that office until he resigned on March 31, 1988, under the cloud of the Roofers’ Union scandal. JIRB, in due course, recommended the removal of Petitioner Glancey based upon his misconduct. Prior to the matter being argued and reviewed by this Court, however, he resigned. This Court reviewed the record of JIRB and entered an order which “forever barred (Glancey) from holding judicial office in this Commonwealth.” See, In the Matter of Glancey, 515 Pa. 201, 527 A.2d 997 (1987) (Glancey I) and In the Matter of Glancey, 518 Pa. 276, 542 A.2d 1350 (1988) (Glancey II).
When Petitioner Glancey filed an application seeking to withdraw his own pension contributions and seeking to receive a reduced retirement allowance for the rest of his life, SERB denied his request. The Board determined that Petitioner Glancey was entitled to no more than the return of his own contributions, plus statutory interest. The Commonwealth Court affirmed. See, Glancey v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, State Employees’ Retirement Board, 126 Pa.Commw. 457, 560 A.2d 263 (1989).
The second Petitioner, William Porter, was appointed to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on December 30, 1971. He was elected to a full ten-year term commencing January 7, 1974, and was reelected to a second term commencing January 2, 1984. Judge Porter received $300 from the Roofers’ Union under unacceptable circumstances during the year 1985, but did not engage in any
On July 22, 1988, SERB denied Petitioner Porter‘s request for his vested retirement benefits.1 A divided panel of the Commonwealth Court affirmed, holding that since Porter had “forfeited” his office, this was akin to “removal” under Section 16(b) and, therefore, he was not entitled to retirement benefits. See, Porter v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, State Employees’ Retirement Board, 129 Pa.Commw. 290, 565 A.2d 512 (1989). The Commonwealth Court noted that if Petitioner Porter was elected or appointed to judicial office in the future—a possibility which was not precluded by his suspension—he would be entitled to become a member of SERS again. However, his pension benefits would only run from that date forward. Id., 129 Pa.Commonwealth at 295, 565 A.2d at 515, n. 4.
Petitioner Julian F. King was appointed to the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, in December of 1971, at which time he became a member of SERS. He was elected to a ten-year term commencing November of 1973, and was re-elected to another ten-year term in November of 1983. On July 20, 1988, this Court entered an Order directing that Judge King be removed from office; that his salary cease from that date forward; and that he thereafter be ineligible to hold judicial office. See, Cunningham. The evidence indicated that Judge King had received $200 in
On May 17, 1988, Petitioner King filed an application with SERS seeking to withdraw a lump sum amount equal to his own contributions plus statutory interest, along with a reduced retirement allowance for life. SERB denied this request, with the exception of permitting King to withdraw his own contributions, plus interest. The Commonwealth Court affirmed. See, King v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania State Employees’ Retirement Board, 129 Pa.Commw. 444, 566 A.2d 323 (1989).
Finally, Petitioner Thomas N. Shiomos served as a judge on the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County from January 3, 1973 until his retirement on March 1, 1984. At the time of his retirement he began receiving a monthly pension benefit of $1,883.61 from SERS. Thereafter, this Court granted Petitioner Shiomos status as a Senior Judge, pursuant to the power set forth in
On November 28, 1986, JIRB commenced disciplinary proceedings against Petitioner Shiomos, and on August 5, 1987 recommended that he be removed from office. The Board found that Shiomos had accepted cash gifts on at least six occasions from the Roofers’ Union, and had lied to FBI agents in an attempt to cover up his misconduct. On November 4, 1987 this Court entered the following Order:
AND NOW, this 4th day of November, 1987 the recommendation of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board in the instant proceeding is accepted, and it is ORDERED that respondent, Thomas N. Shiomos, be forever barred from judicial duties or office.
In each instance, appellants herein filed a petition for allowance of appeal to this court pursuant to
Discussion
This case brings into collision two competing concerns of the highest order in our society. First, that public officials—including judges—who betray the public trust, must expect to endure the most weighty sanctions for their conduct. Secоnd, in conflict with the first, is the concern that no individual—even an errant public official—should be stripped of his or her contractual right to receive deferred compensation, see McKenna v. State Employees’ Retirement Board, 495 Pa. 324, 433 A.2d 871 (1981) (Nix and Flaherty, JJ., concurring) (pension benefits are based upon contract theory of deferred compensation), without explicit statutory or Constitutional authority.
In unraveling this conundrum, we begin by observing that the language of
Sec. 16. Compensation and retirement of justices, judges, and justices of the peace
(a) Justices, judges and justices of the peace shall be compensated by the Commonwealth as provided by law. Their compensation shall not be diminished during their terms of office, unless by law applying generally to all salaried officers of the Commonwealth.
(b) Justices, judges and justices of the peace shall be retired upon attaining the age of seventy years. Former
and retired justices, judges and justices of the peace shall receive such compensation as shall be provided by law. No compensation shall be paid to any justice, judge or justice of the peace who is suspended or removed from office under section eighteen of this article or under article six.
(c) A former or retired justice or judge may, with his consent, be assigned by the Supreme Court on temporary judicial service as may be prescribed by rule of the Supreme Court.
Section 16(b) nowhere uses the word “pensions” or “retirement benefits” in referring to that which is forfeited by reason of a judge‘s removal. Rather, the word “compensation” remains undefined in the Constitution, thus requiring a broader analysis of the language and history of Section 16(b) in order to derive that term‘s meaning.
First, with respect to the language, the inherent ambiguity is heightened by the juxtaposition of Sections 16(a) and 16(b) in the Constitution, which deal with distinct subjects yet allow a common sentence to straddle the two provisions. Section 16(a) traces its origin to the Constitution of 1790, and provides that full-time judges shall be “compensated by the Commonwealth as provided by law.” Section 16(b) owes its origin to the Constitutional Convention of 1967–68, and deals primarily with former and retired judges. The latter provision mandates the retirement of judges at age 70; it provides that former and retired judges “shall receive such compensation as shall be provided by law;” it finally includes a sentence dealing with removal from office, which ostensibly applies to both sitting and former or retired judges, creаting an overlap between 16(a) and 16(b). It is this final sentence, hung in limbo between two otherwise unrelated constitutional provisions, which generates the confusion in the instant case. It states as follows:
No compensation shall be paid to any justice, judge or justice of the peace who is suspended or removed from office under section eighteen of this article (the JIRB
provision) or under article six (the impeachment provision).
The first question is what the word “compensation” means in Section 16(b). The Commonwealth Court in Glancey, in its effort to make sense of this imprecise language hung between two sections, found it significant that the word “compensation” is used in Section 16(b), while the word “salary” is used in other parts of the Constitution, including Section 18(h).2 This difference in language, according to the Commonwealth Court, indicated that Section 16(b) was meant to broadly encompass all sorts of “compensation,” including pension benefits.
However, we find this distinction to be a hollow one. Sitting judges receive a “salary.”3 Former or retired judges do not; they receive “compensation” at irregular intervals, because they sit by special appointment only. The framers of Section 16, having drafted the language to straddle both 16(a) and 16(b), had no choice but to use the word “compensation” in the latter provision, since it referred to both sitting judges (who draw a regular paycheck), and former or retired judges (who receive only sporadic remuneration). The word “compensation” in Sec-
Nor is it significant, as the Commonwealth Court seeks to suggest in King, that a subcommittee of the Constitutional Convention changed the word “salary” back to “compensation” two days before the end of the Convention. King, 129 Pa.Commw. at 449, 566 A.2d at 327. This change occurred only after it was discovered that a subcommittee on style and drafting had inadvertently interchanged the words. Id. Such a correction in language was therefore perfectly consistent with the interplay between Section 16(a) and Section 16(b), discussed above, since the drafters intended the language to apply to both full-time and former or retired judges. Moreover, the comments of Delegate Barry, at the time the change in wording occurred, indicate that it had nothing to do with pension benefits.4
We therefore conclude that the language of the Constitution does nothing to solve the question whether pension benefits are meant to be included within the term “compensation” under Section 16(b). It becomes necessary to explore the history of the Constitutional Convention of 1967–68, in order to attempt to derive an understanding of the Framers’ intent in drafting this inherently ambiguous provision.
We begin by observing that the Journal of the Constitutional Convention of 1967-68 reveals little discussion of pension benefits, generally, in the context of Section 16(b). Indeed, the last sentence of 16(b) attracted little attention throughout the debates, because the bulk of the discussion centered around fixing a mandatory retirement age of 70 for judges in the Commonwealth, as well as the related issue of allowing competent judges to be appointed on an as-needed basis, after retirement.5
The history of the Convention reveals only sporadic mention of the pension issue under what became Section 16(b). One of the earliest meetings of the Sub-Committee on Retirement and Post-Retirement Service of Judges shows an agreement by the sub-committee to consider the following broad issue: “Should the question of pensions—qualifications, amount, etc.---be dealt with in the Constitution?”6
“2. Retirement Compensation Benefits—
This sub-committеe was unable to agree on how this subject should be treated in the Constitution. While there was general agreement that only former justices and judges who had completed at least one term in office and those who retired or were retired for mental and physical disability should be entitled to retirement compensation, there was disagreement as to whether these restrictions and others ... should properly be included in the Constitution. The majority of the Committee ... take the view that specific details and restrictions as to pensions are properly questions for the legislature and not the Constitutional Convention. They believe that the Convention should draft as flexible a document as possi-
ble and that if what they consider to be statutory details are included in the Constitution, the effective life expectancy of that document will be unnecessarily shortened ...”9
It is significant that throughout this debate in the subcommittee, the language relating to the forfeiture of “compensation” by removed judges—now the critical language in Section 16(b)—was already in place. Such language had appeared in the first draft proposal of the sub-committee as early as December 20, 1967.10 Thus, it is clear that the word “compensation” did not еncompass “pension benefits,” in the early stages of the convention which drafted Section 16(b), since that very issue was still being debated by the sub-committee without consensus.
Moreover, it is significant that each time the sub-committee addressed the pension issue in the context of this new constitutional provision, it specifically used the words “Retirement Compensation Benefits,”11 indicating that it clearly understood the difference between this term and the generic term “compensation” for purposes of the pension forfeiture provision.
As late as February 8, 1968, in reviewing drafts of Proposal 7, which included the provision which later became Section 16(b) relating to compensation forfeiture, the Judiciary Committee issued a memorandum containing the following query: “Section 14(b) L.10—Does ‘compensation’ include pension to which a judge may have a vested
The language and history of the provision which became
First, there has been no provision in the Pennsylvania Constitution dealing with pension forfeiture for over 200 years. Although the Constitution has explicitly dealt with the subject of judicial “compensation” since the year 1790,15 and has inferentially required that pensions be treated as part of the adequate “compensation” mandated by Section 16(a),16 the matter of pensions, including pension forfeiture,
Second, not only do the minutes of the Convention suggest that the matter of pension forfeiture was intended to be left to the legislature, but the legislature of this Commonwealth specifically enacted a statute in 1978 which dealt with this topic, in a comprehensive fashion. The Public
However, this Court‘s sensible decisions holding that pension benefits are part of the adequate “compensation” See, Goodheart, mandated by
Indeed, because Section 16(b) is a negative provision which strips away rights, it would threaten to contradict and run afoul of our long line of cases treating pensions as a contractually guaranteed element of “compensation” under Section 16(a), if it were to be loosely interpreted to diminish rights without strict constitutional safeguards not present in the language of Section 16(b).
“Disqualification and Forfeiture of Benefits. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no public official or public employee nor any beneficiary designated by such public official or public employee shall be entitled to receive any retirement or other benefit or payment of any kind except a return of the contribution paid into any pension fund without interest, if such public official or public employee is convicted or pleads guilty or no defense to any crime related to public office or public employment.”
Section 1312 of the Act defines “crimes related to public office or public employment” in great detail, spelling out twenty-two specific offenses which shall trigger the pension forfeiture provision. Section 1313 allows the return of the public official‘s contribution into the pension fund, but allows SERB to retain such contributions until it is determined whether a fine or restitution is required.
If this Court were to read the words “pension benefits” into
Third, such an interpretation of Section 16(b) would result in a treatment of judges which is different from, and more drastic than, the treatment accorded to all other public officials under the Pension Forfeiture Act. It is beyond peradventure that if Petitioners were members of the legislative or executive branches of government, including the Governor or the highest ranking public officials serving in the Pennsylvania Senate, they would forfeit their retirement benefits only in accordance with the detailed strictures of the Pension Forfeiture Act. Although it is abundantly clear that members of the judiciary must be held to extremely high standards given the public trust which is reposed in them, other public officials are held to the same high standards. The Pennsylvania legislature has spelled out these standards in the Pension Forfeiture Act. Any reading of the Constitution which would treat one co-equal branch of government differently, and more harshly, than any other branch of government—whether the legislature, executive, or judiciary—particularly where a matter as fundamental as retirement benefits is at stake, must come as a result of an explicit, rationally-based Constitutional directive, rather than by judicial fiat.
Fourth, an interpretation of Section 16(b) which requires an automatic forfeiture of pension benefits, upon removal of a judge for any reason, would lead this Court into a quagmire of contractual dilemmas. Is the judge entitled to a return of his or her own pension contributions, as is authorized under Section 1313(a) of the Pension Forfeiture
Respondent SERB, in effect, would have us draft a code of pension forfeiture law and append it to Section 16(b), allowing that Board to write its own rules based (ironically) upon the procedures already established under the Pension Forfeiture Act. It would have us construct a rule that a judge may receive a return of his or her past pension contributions, as is authorized under Section 1313(a) of the Pension Forfeiture Act, while SERB would be authorized to permanently withhold the balance. But under what Constitutional authority? It would have us conclude that the judge is entitled to statutory interest on his or her benefits returned. Under what language of the Constitution? The reason the Framers of Section 16(b) did not deal with these critical contractual issues was not due to inartfulness, but because Section 16(b) had nothing to do with pension benefits. Any interpretation of Section 16(b) to the contrary would yield a multitude of contractual comрlexities, about which the Constitution is tellingly silent.
Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, an interpretation of Section 16(b) requiring automatic forfeiture of retirement
An interpretation of Section 16(b) which would automatically require pension forfeiture, each time this Court in its best judgment disciplined a judge for the sake of preserving public confidence, chills rather than fosters the scheme established by JIRB and the Constitution.
Loss of retirement benefits, particularly where an individual has invested many years of service on the bench, is a serious matter. It strips an individual of his or her expectation in remuneration for services already performed. Often it seriously impacts upon a spouse and family, who have
If Section 16(b) were interpreted as Respondents urge, this Court would be forced to make a pеnsion forfeiture decision each time it invoked the JIRB provisions, for any reason, whether it involved acceptance of a gift, inappropriate public intoxication, or conduct relating to physical or mental infirmities of a judge for which he or she may not even be responsible. If the Journal of the Constitutional Convention of 1967-68 makes anything clear, it is that the purpose of JIRB and related constitutional provisions was to vest wide latitude with this Court, to suspend or remove not only for crimes and morally reprehensible conduct, proven with certainty, but for any conduct which might shake the public‘s confidence in the judiciary. Requiring automatic pension forfeiture under Section 16(b) would frustrate this flexible mandate; it would force this Court to adopt the extreme penalty of pension forfeiture, effecting judges and their families for life, even where such a dire consequence may be far too serious a punishment to fit the crime, or lack thereof.
CONCLUSION
It is certainly appropriate for judges—like all public officials—to forfeit their expectation in future pension benefits where their conduct has malevolently betrayed the public trust in their office. The legislature of Pennsylvania has established a detailed statutory scheme to determine which conduct of judicial officers shall trigger such pension forfeiture. See,
However, it was not intended that this Court should strip a judge of retirement benefits each time it imposes removal under the JIRB provisions, without any regard for the nature or severity of the conduct at issue. Such a constitutional straight-jacket was specifically avoided by the Framers of Section 16(b). Nor is it required by the language of the Constitution. Given the need for flexibility and case-by-case options in the realm of sanctioning judges, the Constitution wisely leaves the distinct issue of pension forfeiture to the legislative branch.20
For all of the reasons set forth above, the judgments of the Commonwealth Court in the above cases are hereby REVERSED.
LARSEN, J., did not participate in the decision of this matter.
PAPADAKOS, J., files a joining concurring opinion in which ZAPPALA, J., joins.
NIX, C.J., files a concurring and dissenting opinion in which FLAHERTY, J., joins.
PAPADAKOS, Justice, concurring.
I join in the opinion authored by Mr. Justice Cappy because, in its well-reasoned and comprehensive review of a very difficult area of the law, it reaches a conclusion in which I am in full accord.
ZAPPALA, J., joins this concurring opinion.
NIX, Chief Justice, concurring and dissenting.
While I concur with that part of the majority‘s opinion which concludes that the decision of the Commonwealth Court affirming the Board‘s order of total loss of retirement benefits to the Appellants herein is an unjustifiable forfeiture of their “deferred compensation“, I must disagree with the result of that holding which allows these jurists to maintain their total retirement benefits up until the effective date of the order of suspension or removal. For the reasons that follow, I would conclude that
From the beginning of our civilization those who were favored to serve as judges were deemed to be members of society whose integrity could not be questioned and whose
In each instance before us today, the dereliction has been established and is not being challenged. Those issues have been resolved by our decisions in Matter of Cunningham, 517 Pa. 417, 538 A.2d 473 (1988) and In re: Glancey, 518 Pa. 276, 542 A.2d 1350 (1988). The situation is further exacerbated as the conduct in question is not related to the personal behavior of the jurist but rathеr concerns the jurist‘s behavior in the performance of his judicial duties. The only issue presented is the appropriate response to that errant behavior. Our response must, therefore, be appropriate to that behavior which caused damage to the integrity of the judicial process and its image. I do not believe that we can ignore the magnitude of the breach nor the irreparable damage it has cast upon the integrity of this system.
For the reasons that follow, I am constrained to conclude that the majority‘s result serves to compound the damage caused by the conduct it intends to sanction. The instant situation afforded the opportunity for this Court to re-enforce its previously expressed intention to maintain the integrity of the jurists of this Commonwealth. Matter of Cunningham, 517 Pa. 417, 538 A.2d 473 (1988). To the contrary, today‘s decision signals to all that our previous posture, enunciated in In re: Glancey, 518 Pa. 276, 542 A.2d 1350 (1988), was merely an aberration and business as usual will prevail.
In recognition of the august nature of a jurist‘s position in our society, both our Constitution and General Assembly enacted requirements that public officers, including judges, take an oath prior to entering upon the responsibility of office. This required oath of office and an individual‘s inclusion in the State Retirement Plan indeрendently operate to create a contractual relationship between the jurist involved and the State. Specifically,
“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support, obey and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of this Commonwealth and that I will discharge my office with fidelity.”
The requirement that an oath of office be taken by members of the judiciary was codified by the Legislature pursuant to
§ 3151. Oath of Office
Each judicial officer shall, before entering on the duties of his office, take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation before a person authorized to administer oaths:
“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support, obey and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of this Commonwealth and that I will discharge the duties of my office with fidelity.”
Any person refusing to take the oath or affirmation shall forfeit his office. A judicial officer shall be sworn upon his appointment or election, and after each retention election, and thereafter need not be sworn in any matter referred to him.
As the statute explicitly states, the taking of the oath is an prerequisite to “entering upon the duties” of office. Com-
In addition to the statutory requirement imposed upon those assuming the esteemed and powerful position of judge that an oath of office be taken, the oath itself imposes additional obligations upon the jurist. The oath of office required to be taken mandates that a judge “discharge the duties ... of office with fidelity.”
The relationship between a public employee and the State Pension Plan is necessarily contractual in nature containing various mutual obligations. “It is well established that retirement benefits are founded upon a contract theory of deferred compensation.” McKenna v. State Employes’ Retirement Board, 495 Pa. 324, 334, 433 A.2d 871, 876 (1981) (Nix, J., concurring) (citing Harvey v. Allegheny County Retirement Board, 392 Pa. 421, 141 A.2d 197 (1958); Baker v. Retirement Board of Allegheny County, 374 Pa. 165, 97 A.2d 231 (1953); McBride v. Allegheny County Retirement Board, 330 Pa. 402, 199 A. 130 (1938); Retirement Board of Allegheny County v. McGovern, 316 Pa. 161, 174 A. 400 (1934)). I agree with Judge Barry of the Commonwealth Court when he so aptly noted:
What Glancey fails to recognize is that Sections 16 and 18 of Article V constitute “terms and conditions” upon which the receipt of retirement pay is premised. Put another way, at the time Glancey joined the system, that system provided that a judge could collect retirement pay unless
he was removed from office under Section 18 of Article V.
Glancey v. State Employes’ Retirement Board, 126 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 457, 463, 560 A.2d 263, 266 (1989). Accordingly, once the jurist engaged in conduct which was sufficiently violative of his oath of office to warrant suspension or removal, that act of misconduct serves to instantaneously sever the jurist from that very system which provided him a process for entitlements to the emoluments of his office. Accordingly, I would hold that the Board must calculate the loss of the Appellant‘s prospective retirement benefits only up until that date determined by the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board to be the first instance of misconduct engaged in by each jurist.
While the Order of the Board and its subsequent affirmance by the Commonwealth Court requiring the total loss of all state contributions to the pension funds of Appellants constitute an impermissible forfeiture, calculating the loss of prospective pension benefits from the date of misconduct effectuates the economic consequence of removal or suspension and is undeniably fair.1 Under this analysis there can be no risk of “forfeiture” as the moment the jurist engages in misconduct he simultaneously breaches his contractual obligation with the State and his entitlement to rights and privileges due him terminates instantly. Thus, it is the jurist‘s own affirmative conduct which precipitates the breach of contract and termination of his pension benefits, not the Constitution nor this Court. Accordingly, there is no loss or deprivation of any property interest in which the jurist had a reasonable expectation or right to possess. Clearly, once a jurist tarnishes the bench with his betrayal of the public trust, from that moment forward he can no longer realistically expect continued financial support from
This conclusion is predicated upon my belief that the phrase “no compensation” as employed in
Justices, judges and justices of the peace shall be retired upon attaining the age of seventy years. Former and retired justices, judges and justices of the peace shall reсeive such compensation as provided by law. No compensation shall be paid to any justice, judge or justice of the peace who is suspended or removed from office under section eighteen of this article or under Article VI.
Whenever this Court is called upon to interpret a particular constitutional provision, we are guided by the basic principle that “[c]onstitutional provisions are not to be read in a strained or technical manner. Rather, they must be given the ordinary, natural interpretation the ratifying voter would give them.” Commonwealth ex rel. Paulinski v. Isaac, 483 Pa. 467, 475, 397 A.2d 760, 765, cert. denied, 442 U.S. 918, 99 S.Ct. 2841, 61 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). Where more than one interpretation is possible, it is appropriate to “favor a natural reading which avoids contradictions and difficulties in implementation, which completely conforms to the intent of the framers, and which reflects the views of the ratifying voter.” Id., 483 Pa. at 477, 397 A.2d at 766. A constitution reflects the will of the people; thus, the people‘s natural understanding of the terms therein must be given full effect. Commonwealth v. Harmon, 469 Pa. 490, 366 A.2d 895 (1976); Berardocco v. Colden, 469 Pa. 452, 366 A.2d 574 (1976); Firing v. Kephart, 466 Pa. 560, 353 A.2d 833 (1976); Breslow v. School District of Baldwin Township, 408 Pa. 121, 182 A.2d 501 (1962).
While the plain meaning of “compensation” as used in this context suggests the inclusion of retirement and pension benefits in addition to salary, a thorough analysis of Section 16 in its entirety, compels the same conclusion. Section 16(b) also states that “[f]ormer and retired justices, judges, and justices of the peace shall receive such compensation as shall be provided by law.”
While I believe that Section 16 itself operates to define “compensation” to include pension benefits, an analysis of other constitutional provisions also supports such an interpretation. Preliminarily, it should be noted that the Constitution grants certain powers and outlines a specified procedure, in general, to deal with the disciplining of judges. First, the Constitution creates a Judicial Inquiry and Review Board (J.I.R.B.),
Today‘s holding by the majority, allowing all compensation to survive until the effective date of the order of removal or suspension, clearly disregards the fact that the Legislature chose to employ different terms at different times because they intended those words to convey different definitions. The explicit reference to the term “salary” in Section 18(h) further reassures us that the term “compensation” as used in Section 16(b) was intended to have a separate and distinct meaning. This deliberate reference to the term “salary” in Section 18(h) above, unquestionably
Next, those who fail to recognize that the concept of “compensation” is a broad classification of which salary is merely a component or subsection are vulnerable to an unintended consequence resulting from their position.
I disagree and believe it is highly significant that Section 16(a) employs the term “compensation” rather than “salary” to assure that the value of the overall compensation package would not be diminished. This interpretation of
Prior to the 1968 Amendments,
Thus, pursuant to this analysis, I believe a proper resolution of this matter would necessitate directing the Board to calculate the value of the appellants’ pension plans as follows.2
The retirement benefits of former Judge Glancey who took judicial office in January of 1969, vested in January of
Similarly, former Judge Porter originally took office in December of 1971, so his pension benefits vested as of December 1981. His misconduct, like Glancey‘s, occurred in December of 1985, and the S.E.R.B. would be directed to calculate pension benefits up to the date of that misconduct.
Former Judge King was also first appointed to the bench in December of 1971, and his pension rights vested in December of 1981. Former Judge King first breached his oath by committing misconduct in December of 1983. Accordingly, the Board would be directed to compute the value of his retirement benefits as of that date. Such a consequence is required at a minimum and the preservation of judicial integrity in this Commonwealth demands no less.4
FLAHERTY, J., joins in this concurring and dissenting opinion.
Notes
As explained above, the problem with this sharp distinction between the words “salary” and “compensation” is that it ignores the pivotal fact that Section 16(b) is referring to both sitting judges and former or retired judges, making the word “salary” inapposite here. Former Judge Shiomos lost his pension benefits pursuant to theA review of these definitions shows that “salary is a part of a total compensation package, more specifically, present compensation. Public retirement benefits, again, are deferred compensation. Once a judge is removed and therefore has forfeited his office, no more services may be rendered and no more salary can be due. It necessarily follows that the section 16(b) prohibition against paying ‘compensation’ to a removed judge must refer to deferred compensation, i.e., retirement benefits. Id., 126 Pa.Commonwealth at 462, 560 A.2d 263 at 266.
Delegate Barry is Judge Francis A. Barry, now of the Commonwealth Court and the author of the Commonwealth Court opinion in the King case sub judice. Notwithstanding the majority‘s insistence that the course of action suggested in this dissent constitutes a “forfeiture“, we conclude that a jurist‘s entitlement to the emoluments of office automatically ceases upon the occurrence of his affirmative act of misconduct that was the predicate for the suspension or the removal. A forfeiture implies the taking of something to which a person was entitled. Once the oath is breached, there is no basis for entitlement.“Mr. President, this language was taken out by Style and Drafting. Wе think it is a substantive change and we ask that it be reinstated. Delegate Curran and myself as co-chairmen of the sub-committee recommend this, and it is with the consent of Delegate Amsterdam and Governor Scranton.
We feel if there is an order by the Supreme Court for suspension or removal of a judge, this states, the suspension or removal shall take effect as of the date of that order. It provides the salary shall cease from the date of that order. This is not taken care of by the language in the retirement section ...” II Journal of the Constitutional Convention. 1373, Feb. 29, 1968.
However, this undated, unofficial “analysis” by individuals who did not draft the language, can hardly be viewed as dispositive. When viewed in context of the numerous passages in the official minutes which indicate that the sub-committee was undecided, and that a majority of the drafters wished to leave the matter of pensions entirely to the legislature, this single wisp of history to the contrary only buttresses the conclusion that the Committee and Sub-committee were hopelessly undecided on the issue.“[T]he mandate that no compensation shall be paid to a judge removed from office under Section (18) or pursuant to Article VI, the impeachment proviso, is an exception to the grant of legislative discretion in the payment of retirement compensation.” King, 129 Pa.Commw. at 449, 566 A.2d at 327. See, SA-139.
“The judges of the supreme court and the presidents of the several courts of common pleas shall, at stated times, receive for their services an adequate compensation, to be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office ...”