79 Va. 429 | Va. | 1884
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court:
On the 30th day of September, 1859, John G. Rinker and Rebecca, his wife, conveyed to W. L. Clark, trustee, a certain steam engine and saw mill, together with certain other personalty and a small tract of land, lying in the county of Frederick, to secure the payment to the appellant, John Glaize, of a debt due by Mrs. Rinker, amounting to $2,000. Afterwards, on the 9th day of January, 1861, the Rinkers sold the engine and saw mill to one Martin E. Alexander, and conveyed the same to him by deed of that date, in which John Glaize and Clark, the trustee, united. And by deed of even date Alexander conveyed the engine and mill to Clark, trustee, to secure the payment of the purchase money, evidenced by four bonds executed by himself with one Castle as surety, and payable to Mrs. Rebecca E. Rinker. These bonds amounted in the aggregate to the sum of $1,128.76. On the 17th day of April, 1861, the appellant was indebted to the appellee, George Glaize, in the sum of $3,893, evidenced by note or notes; and on that day, in consideration of the transfer to the latter by the former of certain notes and bonds, and an assignment out of the debt of the Rinkers to the amount of $1,145.84, as of September 16,1860, the note or notes of the appellant were surrendered by the appellee. Added to the notes and bonds thus transferred, the assignment out of the Rinker debt aggregated the sum of $3,969.11, or $76.14 in excess of the appellant’s indebtedness to the appellee, which the latter paid in cash to the appellant. The assignment of April 17, 1861, was in writing, signed by the appellant, and is as follows: “I hereby assign to George Glaize, $1,145.84, as of September 16th, 1860, with interest from that date, out of the debt of John G. Rinker and Rebecca Rinker, his wife, to me, which is secured in their deed of trust to Wm. L. Clark, Jr., trustee, and I hereby authorize him to exercise such control of the said debt and trust as he may find necessary for the purpose of
In the year 1879, the real estate conveyed by the trust deed of September 30, 1859, was by the trustee, Clark, advertised for sale by direction of the appellant, John Glaize. Thereupon the appellee, George Glaize, filed his hill in the court below, praying that the trust he administered under the direction of the court, and that the balance due by virtue of the partial assignment of the Einker debt he ascertained and first paid out of the proceeds of sale. John Glaize answered the bill, insisting that by the assignment of April 17th, 1861, only the Alexander bonds were assigned, which, if not collected, it was because of the plaintiff’s delay and carelessness, and that no interest under the trust deed of September 30, 1859, was assigned to the plaintiff. But this defence the circuit court overruled by the decree now complained of.
The question we have to determine is, whether by the assignment of April 17, 1861, George Glaize became the assignee of the Alexander bonds. It is admitted that those bonds were not made payable to John Glaize, the beneficiary in the trust deed of September 30th, 1859, hut were payable to Mrs. Rebecca E. Rinker. Nor is it claimed that those bonds were at any time in the possession of John Glaize. It would seem that upon their execution they were delivered to Clark, the trustee, in the deed by Alexander, to secure their payment, and that they remained in his possession until they were delivered by him to Messrs. Barton & Boyd, attorneys, upon the written order of Mrs. Rinker in 1871. George Glaize is very emphatic in his testimony that no assignment of the bonds was made to him, and that he never saw them until after the institution of the present suit. He testifies further, that he declined to take an assignment of them, for reasons stated to John Glaize pending the negotiations between them. We think his version of the case is sustained by the proofs. It would seem strange if the parties had intended
The testimony is contradictory and not altogether satisfactory. But, upon the whole case, and recognizing the well established rule which requires an affirmance of the action of the lower court, unless manifestly erroneous (Womack v. Tankersley, 78 Va. 242), we feel constrained to affirm the decree in the present case, with leave, however, to either party, when the case goes hack to the circuit court, to have an inquiry, if desired, to ascertain the true balance due the appellee upon the principles settled hy the foregoing opinion.
Richardson and Hinton, Js., concurred in the opinion of Lewis, R.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting, said:
I do not concur at all in the opinion of the majority. My own views are briefly as follows:
“ I hereby assign to George Glaize $1,145.84, as of September 16th, 1860, with interest from that date, out of the debt of J. G. Rinker and Rebecca Rinker, his wife, to me, which is secured in their deed of trust to Wm. L. Clark, Jr., trustee, and I hereby authorize him to exercise such control of the said debt and trust as he may find necessary for the purpose of carrying out this assignment, for which value has been received by me.
Witness my hand and seal.
Teste: John Glaize.”
W. L. Clark, Jr.
It cannot be denied that the assignment on both sides between these parties was absolute. John received his bonds and can-celled them, and_ assigned the bonds, &c., assigned by him for value." That the transaction was complete between the parties is evident from the fact that George, in receiving the assigned paper, paid the balance in money to John—$76.14.
There is only one question in this case and that is this: The
. The Rinker debt was thus divided into two parts in 1860. In 1861 the assignment was made out of it by John to George. And which part of it was assigned to George ? The Alexander bonds, or the other part of it ? Hot the Alexander part. This is the sole practical question in this case, and there is very little difficulty about it. The original debt of the Rinkers to John was $2,000; the Alexander debt was $1,128.16, which, taken from $2,000, left $811.24.
How, in determining which of the two parts of this Rinker debt was assigned by John to George, if we turn to the assignment itself, we find that John assigned to George “$1,145.84, as of 16th September, 1860, with interest from that date out of the debt of John G. Rinker,” &c. There can be no just ground" to contend that the part assigned to George, of the Rinker debt, was the $811.24, not due by Alexander, and remaining of the debt after the Alexander bonds are taken out of it. And if the interest is computed on'the $1,128.16, from March 26, 1860, its date'on°the $1,100, and adding the $28.16 due that day, and deducting the legal commission of the trustee, it makes the amount actually assigned, as of that day, within a few cents. And if we look further to the addendum to the record, in which is printed the statement used at the date of the assignment between the parties, which is substantially the same filed with the deposition of John, except that the two columns of figures, the one in ink, and the other in pencil, are distinguished the
While this decree seems to me to be clearly erroneous, from the face of the papers cited above, that conclusion becomes still more apparent from the evidence in the cause. Mrs. Rinker .is dead, and Alexander has left the country; so their depositions are not taken. But George Glaize has testified at great length, and it is clear from his deposition, and the admissions drawn from him, that the assignment to him was of the Alexander bonds, and that he was unwilling to take in exchange for the paper of John any paper on Mrs. Rinker, as she was his near relation and he was unwilling to have any necessity imposed upon him to distress her. In his deposition on cross-examination, George says, “They are put down here (that is, in the statement made at the time of the assignment), as he signed them over to me. The Martin-Alexander note, as we called it, was the last one taken; ” then correcting himself (that should be John G. Rinker and wife).
And again he says: “It appears to me there was a little difference paid by the one or the other of us to make it come out even. But it was understood before we closed, that this deed of trust upon John G. Rinker and wife on the saw-mill, as they claimed, was to be paid to me without any trouble or costs.” And again, “Glaize and Rinker got me to take it out of the
But independent of George’s deposition, the record shows that Barton & Boyd were substituted by George, as his counsel in lieu of William L. Clark; and their receipt is in the cause for these identical bonds, so taken from Captain Clark, in which they sign themselves as attorneys for George Glaize; and, again, in a note to Captain Clark, trustee, they say: “ Please proceed to execute the trust from Marlin E. Alexander to you to secure four bonds to you, &c. * * * * You are authorized to abate the interest for four years, viz: From April 17th, 1861, to April 17th, 1865. Barton & Boyd, attorneys for George Glaize, assignee of John Glaize.” If he was not the assignee of these bonds, he was certainly taking some unusual steps towards what he had no concern with. Yet the circuit court in its decree declares that he was not the assignee of these bonds.
Captain William L. Clark says, that in 1867 he met George and Mr. Alexander’s manager, Castle, and George said to him that he did not wish him to take any further action toward collecting the money (the Alexander bonds), or to receive any more of it himself; that he and Mr. Castle would settle it between them. Captain Clark adds: “I was fully informed by them that my agency in the matter was desired by them to he dispensed with.” Castle was the agent of Alexander, and was managing the saw-mill. George thus took complete control of the bonds, dismissed the chosen agent both of John and Mrs. Rinker, and took it in hand along with Castle, to arrange all about it himself, and employed his own lawyers, who regarded only his own instructions, and who took possession of the bonds and ignored altogether John and Mrs. Rinker in their management. . For, Mr. Boyd says in his deposition: “ I have no recollection of Captain John Glaize exercising any control over the
Captain Clark also proves that large sums were paid on the bonds which were all admitted by George to have been received by him; $285 at one time, $274.25 at another time, and $190 at still another time. John, in his depositions, says that he assigned the debt of Alexander to George and undertook to exercise no further control-over-it; that he gave a notice to the trustee, which was required to close the deed, that time was given; that Castle -was paying, up the debt; the case looked favorable; George took the collection of the debt out of the trustee’s hands and said he would attend to it himself after that, and that he never had anything to do with it after that; that he found a man who wanted to buy the saw-mill and told George, but George did not go to see the man; that he had no knowledge of the order hy George to abate four years’ interest and was not at all consulted about it; that every other debt he assigned to George was collected hy him ; that on the date of the' assignment, April 17,1861, he notified Captain Clark, the trustee, that he had assigned the Alexander bonds to George and that after the assignment the Alexander bonds were placed in the hands of George and that George placed them in the hands of Captain Clark for collection, and that George took them out of Clark’s hands. Now, if these bonds were placed in the hands of George, and assigned for value by John in 1861 and there remained all these years and were entirely controlled by George, a large part of them collected by George, a part released and time given,-and- the trustee dismissed hy George, and the exclusive-management assumed hy George, what ground is there to-charge John, the assignor, if a part of the debt was lost hy the over-confidence of George in his new and promising friend, Castle, who afterwards spirited the saw-mill across the Potomac river into Maryland.
And it further appears that George did not conclude that those
The circuit court, as we have seen,.held that the Alexander bonds were not assigned to George and that he had not been guilty of any default or laches which had caused their loss. It is difficult to imagine what rule of diligence would be applied to George or how any question of default or laches could apply to him if the bonds had not been assigned to him, but some other bond or debt. It is clear to me that the decree of the circuit court is erroneous and should be reversed.
Fauntleroy, J., concurred in the opinion of Lacy, J.
Decree affirmed.