The controlling issue in this Title VII race-based discrimination appeal is whether summary judgment should have been entered for the defendant employer on plaintiffs retaliation claim on the ground that the claim was administratively barred because it was not specifically articulated in plaintiffs charge previously filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). We affirm both the denial of summary judgment for defendant and subsequent jury verdict in favor of plaintiff.
The proceedings relevant to this appeal are as follows. Plaintiff Dr. Gladys Gregory, an African-Ameriсan doctor who was hired and then terminated as a staff psychiatrist at Southwestern State Hospital owned and operated by the Georgia Department of Human Resources (DHR), filed this complaint against DHR alleging, inter alia, retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 20006. 1 After a jury trial resulting in a verdict on the retaliation claim for Dr. Gregory, the district court entered judgment in the amount of $10,000 against DHR.
Prior to the jury trial, DHR, relying on
Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc.,
In the EEOC charge of discrimination filed without the aid of counsel, Dr. Gregory alleged that she was terminated by *1279 DHR for “no legitimate reason.” In that charge, Dr. Gregory: (1) only marked the spaces for gеnder and race discrimination in the “charge of discrimination” portion of the template form, leaving the “retaliation” space blank; (2) indicated that she was hired as a physiсian/psychiatrist on July 15, 1999, and terminated on February 15, 2000; (3) asserted that she was not given a “legitimate” reason for her termination; and (4) contended that she “believe[d]” that she was discriminated аgainst, as she had been an exemplary employee. Moreover, she asserted that white and male doctors (1) were not required to provide doctor’s excuses when thеy used sick leave, (2) did not have negative performance memoranda placed in their records for arbitrary reasons, and (3) were not subjected to unwarranted terminatiоn. Dr. Gregory thus alleged, “I believe that I have been discriminated against on the basis of my race (Black American) and my sex (female).” (emphasis supplied). The EEOC subsequently issued a right to sue letter, resulting in the filing of this lawsuit. The lawsuit alleged, inter alia, “After Plaintiff complained to the administration of Defendant Fuller’s racially discriminatory treatment of Plaintiff, Defendants treated Plaintiff worse and even ended up terminating Plaintiff’s employment. Plaintiffs termination was motivated by her race and/or in retaliation for complaining of Defendant Fuller’s race discrimination against her.”
At trial, Dr. Grégory assеrted that her termination was motivated by her race and was in retaliation for her complaints about Fuller’s race discrimination. The trial record reveals that Dr. Gregory stated thаt, during her initial training period, Dr. Fuller reassigned more of his patients to her than he did to any non-African-American physicians and claimed that, as part of his regular discrimination against her, he (1) placed false and disparaging information about her in her personnel file, (2) assigned her a harder work schedule than non-African American physicians, and (3) required her to bring a doctor’s slip for missing work due to illness, which was not required of non-African American physicians. Evidence at trial also reveals that Dr. Fuller became angry that Dr. Gregory was “tallying” up the patients that each individual psychiatrist at the hospital had and, upon firing her, stated to other minority employees, “this is what happens when you mess with a privileged white male like me.”
In ordеr to prove retaliation under Title VII, a “plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) the adverse аction was causally related to the plaintiffs protected activities.”
Little v. United Technologies, Carrier Transicold Div.,
The purposе of this exhaustion requirement “is that the [EEOC] should have the first opportunity to investigate the alleged discriminatory practices to permit it to perform its role in obtaining voluntary comрliance and promoting conciliation efforts.”
Evans v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co.,
In light of the purpose of the EEOC exhaustion requirement, we have held that a “plaintiffs judicial complaint is limited by the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.”
Alexander v. Fulton County, Ga.,
The proper inquiry here therefore is whether Dr. Gregory’s complaint was like or related to, or grew out of, the allegations contained in her EEOC charge. Dr. Gregory, without thе aid of counsel, filed an EEOC charge after she was terminated. The ultimate act that she complained about was that she was terminated. At the point at which she filed the charge, she “bеlieve[d]” that she was terminated because of her race and sex. She set forth the relevant dates of discrimination in the charge, as well as the reasons why she believed she wаs terminated. Although not clear in the record, the EEOC presumably investigated, at least in some fashion, the possible reasons why Dr. Gregory was terminated, growing from her initial “belief’ that it was because of her race and sex. Indeed, there could be various permutations of non-legitimate reasons why an employee is ultimately terminated. In Dr. Gregory’s situation, for example, it could be that race and sex were the only reasons, as she initially believed, why she was terminated. It could also be, however, that Dr. Gregory was terminated in retaliation for having complained about Dr. Fuller’s disparate treatment of her, inter alia, during physician scheduling and patient assignments. It could further be that she was terminated for actual legitimate reasons, which is not likely the case here because there is a $10,000 jury verdict in favor of Dr. Gregory suggesting otherwise.
After a careful
de novo
reading of Dr. Gregory’s EEOC charge prepared without the assistance of counsel, and under the liberal EEOC charge strictures of
Sanchez,
we hold that the district court did not err in finding that Dr. Gregory’s retaliation claim was not administratively barred by her failure to mark the retaliation space on the EEOC template form. The facts alleged in her EEOC charge could have reasonably been extended to encompass a claim for retaliation because they were inextricably intertwined with her complaints of race and sex discrimination. That is, she stated facts from which a reasonable EEOC investigator could have concluded that what she had comрlained about is retaliation because of her complaints of Dr. Fuller’s disparate treatment to the hospital’s administration. Specifically, shortly after being subjected to certain allegedly discriminatory acts, she was terminated. An EEOC investigation of her race and sex discrimination complaints leading to her termination would have reasonably uncovered any evidence of retaliation.
See Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. Plaintiff initially included a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim, which she abandoned prior to trial. In that claim, she named defendants Southwestern State Hospitаl and Dr. Ken Fuller, M.D., her supervisor, as defendants. They both received summary judgment in their favor prior to trial, leaving only the retaliation claim for trial. They are not part of this appeal.