56 Iowa 400 | Iowa | 1881
The statement in the application in regard to the amount of the mortgage is unqualified. The amount is stated absolutely as $3,000. But there was evidence tending to show that the plaintiff did not claim to know the precise amount, and was told by the agent to make an approximate statement of the amount, and that the statement made was made under such direction. It is claimed by the plaintiff, therefore, that while the application shows an unqualified statement, he should not be bound by it as such by reason of the direction under which it was made.
■ "Where a statement is written down by the agent precisely as it is given, there is some doubt as to whether the insured can be permitted to show that he intended something different.
But the' instruction which the defendants asked assumes that the statement may be taken as intended to be only an approximate statement, and be read as if the plaintiff had said that the mortgage amounted to about $3,000. The plaintiff does not, and cannot properly, claim more than that. For the purposes of the opinion, then, we shall treat the case precisely as if the statement had been that the mortgage amounted to about $3,000. The question then arises as to whether the plaintiff was bound even by that statement, unless he was
Before proceeding to the consideration of this question, we will say that we think that there can be no pretense that it was true (as we assume it to be stated) that the mortgage amounted to only about $3,000, or that the statement was approximately correct. The difference between $3,000 and $4,425 is "nearly fifty per cent. It would be trilling with language to say that $3,000 is about $4,425, or is approximately that sum.
In Hayward v. The New England Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 10 Cush., 444, the statement was that the mortgage was about $3,000. It proved to have been $4,000. It was held that there was a misrepresentation which avoided the policy. The court said: “It seems to us quite too clear to admit of a doubt that the answer given by the plaintiff in his application to the inquiry respecting incumbrances was materially false. Making all due allowances for the loose manner in which such documents are often prepared, and giving the plaintiff the full benefit of the word about as qualifying and limiting his answer, it cannot in any view be- deemed to be substantially true. To hold so wide a deviation from the fact to be immaterial would be to defeat the very purpose which the questions and answers in the application were intended to accomplish, and render them but a vain and idle ceremony.”
In Brown v. Peoples Mutual Ins. Co., 11 Cush., 280, the statement was that the mortgage was about $4,000. It amounted, in fact, with accumulated interest, to a little less than $4,900. It was held that there was a misrepresentation which avoided the policy. But in neither of those cases was the difference between the amount stated and the true amount as great as in the case at bar.
If the fact was that the plaintiff did know even about how much the mortgage on his property was he should have declined to make any answer at all until ho had ascertained. The companies had a right to be correctly informed, because
In our opinion the instruction asked by the defendant should have been given.
A large number of errors was assigned, but it is unnecessary that we should extend this opinion by the consideration of them farther than we have gone. The ground upon which we have disposed of the casé renders it improbable that the questions not noticed will arise upon another trial.
Neversed.