THOMAS G. GIUCA v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
(AC 37508)
Connecticut Appellate Court
Argued October 26, 2016—officially released March 21, 2017
Beach, Mullins and Lavery, Js.*
(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Sferrazza, J.)
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Jennifer F. Miller, deputy assistant state‘s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state‘s attorney, Emily Graner Sexton, special deputy assistant state‘s attorney, and Jo Anne Sulik, supervisory assistant state‘s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
PER CURIAM. The petitioner, Thomas G. Giuca, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claims that the court improperly denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus by concluding that he failed to establish that his mental state at the time of his guilty plea rendered his plea involuntary, unknowing, and unintelligent in violation of the federal due process clause.1 We affirm the judgment of the habeas court.
The following facts, as found by the habeas court, and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. In August, 1977, the petitioner was charged with murder. At that time, the petitioner had unrelated sexual assault charges pending against him in other files. During the murder trial, defense counsel raised the defenses of insanity and extreme emotional disturbance. In February, 1979, following a trial, the jury found the petitioner guilty of murder. Following the guilty verdict and prior to sentencing, defense counsel and the prosecutor learned of possible jury misconduct. In light of thе possibility of a retrial and the jury‘s rejection of the defenses, the prosecutor and the petitioner negotiated a plea bargain, which disposed of all the сriminal charges against the petitioner. On March 20, 1979, the petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of murder, four counts of sexual assault in the first degree, and one count оf attempt to commit sexual assault in the first degree in exchange for a total effective sentence of eighteen years to life imprisonment. The court sentenсed the petitioner in accordance with the plea agreement.
Thirty-one years later, in 2010, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that in March, 1979, he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia that manifested as either violent aggression or obsequious pliability, and that his condition had been aggravatеd by the stress of having been found guilty of murder. The petitioner alleges that, as a result, he was incapable of expressing to his attorney his true desire to decline the plea offer and to proceed with a new trial.
Following a trial, the habeas court concluded that the petitioner failed to satisfy his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his due process rights had been violated. The court noted that the petitioner‘s evidence consisted of a summary of reports of mеntal health care professionals regarding the petitioner‘s mental condition; the summary had been compiled in 1978 by his trial counsel in preparation for an unsuccessful motion to suppress. The petitioner‘s trial counsel testified that he thoroughly advised the petitioner of his options, his right to pursue a jury trial, and of his recommendation that the petitioner accept the plea agreement. The petitioner testified at the habeas trial that, although he did not express a desire to reject the
“A guilty plea . . . that is nоt both voluntary and knowing is in violation of due process and thus void. . . . For a guilty plea to be truly voluntary, the defendant must understand the law in relation to the facts. . . . Moreover, since a defendant waives several constitutional rights when he elects to plead guilty to a criminal offense, the choice of a guilty plea is of profound significance. . . . In рleading guilty, a defendant waives his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury and his right to confront his accusers. . . . A guilty plea, therefore, is constitutionally valid only if the rеcord affirmatively discloses that the plea was entered voluntarily and intelligently. . . . A guilty plea may satisfy constitutional requirements even in the absence of literal comрliance with the prophylactic safeguards of Practice Book §§ [39-19 and 39-20], respectively. . . . A determination as to whether a plea has been knowingly and voluntarily entered entails an examination of all of the relevant circumstances.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Daniel v. Commissioner of Correction, 57 Conn. App. 651, 655-56, 751 A.2d 398, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 918, 759 A.2d 1024 (2000).
“[W]here the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct . . . and whether they find support in the facts that appear in the record.” (Internal quotаtion marks omitted.) Perez v. Commissioner of Correction, 80 Conn. App. 96, 99, 832 A.2d 1210, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 934, 837 A.2d 805 (2003).
The petitioner claims that the court erred when it concluded that he failed to establish that his right to due process was violated because of his disturbed mеntal state at the time of the plea, such that his plea was unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary. We are not persuaded.
Only the petitioner and his trial counsel testified at the habеas trial. The only evidence presented by the petitioner regarding his mental state at the time of the plea was the petitioner‘s own testimony that he was
The judgment is affirmed.
* The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.