Appellants in these companion cases were jointly indicted and tried for conspiracy to violate Code Ann. § 79A-811 (b). The jury returned verdicts of guilty and appellants appeal from the judgments of conviction and sentences entered on the verdicts. Substantially similar enumerations of error have been filed in each case. Accordingly, the two appeals have been consolidated for appellate review and will be considered in this single opinion. The record is voluminous and the facts will be discussed only insofar as they are relevant to the particular legal issue under discussion.
1. Pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. § 26-3004, investigating officers sought and obtained a warrant, subsequently extended, authorizing a wiretap on the telephone located at the “headquarters” of the suspected conspiracy. Appellants’ motion to suppress the taped evidence obtained from the wiretap was denied. On appeal, appellants enumerate as error the denial of the motion to suppress this evidence, asserting that the applications submitted in support of wiretap warrant were fatally defective.
“Wiretapping and surveillance are the subjects of federal and state law and both must be complied with where applicable.”
Orkin v. State,
Appellants contend that the facially valid applications contain material misrepresentations with regard to “other investigative procedures.” The evidence adduced on the motion to suppress amply demonstrates that the applications contained no misrepresentations
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in this regard. See generally
Lee v. State,
Appellants also attack the applications on the basis of an insufficient compliance with 18 USCA § 2518 (1) (e). That statute requires that the application contain “a full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous applications known to the individual authorizing and making the application, made to any judge for authorization to intercept, or for approval of interceptions of, wire or oral communications involving any of the same persons, facilities or places specified in the application, and the action taken by the judge on each such application ...” “The statute does not require a fully detailed statement about the contents of the interception...” United States v. Kilgore, 518 F2d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 1975). Appellants point to no evidence which would show that the applicant had more knowledge concerning the previous wiretaps application than was disclosed by him in the applications. Under such circumstances, we must assume that the disclosure which was made was a “full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous applications known” to the applicant. Cf.
Granese v. State,
For the reasons discussed above, it was not error to deny appellants’ motion to suppress the wiretap evidence because of insufficient compliance with the requirements of 18 USCA § 2518 (1) (c) and (e).
2. Appellants also assert an erroneous denial of their motion to suppress based upon the state’s insufficient compliance with 18 USCA § 2518 (8) (a). That statute provides in relevant part: “Immediately upon the expiration of the period of the order, or extensions thereof, such recordings shall be made available to the judge issuing such order and sealed under his directions . . . The presence of the seal provided for by this subsection, or a satisfactory
*843
explanation for the absence thereof, shall be a prerequisite for the use or disclosure of the contents of any wire or oral communication or evidence derived therefrom . . .” Contrary to appellants’ apparent assertions, “where a single order [is] extended, the tapes [do] not have to be sealed until the end of the last extension. Where the intercept is of the same premises and involves substantially the same persons, an extension under these circumstances requires sealing only at the conclusion of the whole surveillance. [Cits.]” United States v. Scafidi, 564 F2d 633, 641 (2d Cir. 1977). The evidence with regard to the custody of the tapes
prior
to their being sealed after the end of the extension was sufficient to demonstrate with reasonable certainty that no deliberate tampering with or accidental alteration to the tapes had resulted during the presealing period. See generally
Alfred v. State,
The statute requires that the tapes be sealed “ [i]mmediately upon the expiration of the period of the order, or extensions thereof...” In the instant case, there was apparently a two day delay between the expiration of the extension of the wiretap order and the tapes being sealed by the judge. However, in spite of the two day delay, on the record before us “[t]here was no showing of prejudice to [appellants] in the delay. The purpose of [18 USCA § 2518 (8) (a)] is to safeguard the recordings from editing or alteration. There was no showing that the integrity of the interceptions was in any way violated.” United States v. Sklaroff, 506 F2d 837, 840 (5th Cir. 1975). It appears that the two day delay in the instant case was occasioned, at least in part, by “administrative delay.” See United States v. Falcone, 505 F2d 478, 483-484 (3d Cir. 1974). Accordingly, the two day delay in sealing the tapes does not constitute a violation of 18 USCA § 2518 (8) (1) requiring the suppression of those tapes.
3. The trial court did not err in refusing to allow appellants’ counsel to withdraw a prior stipulation that the court reporter would not be required to transcribe the wiretap tapes while they were being played for the jury. See
State v. Knowles,
4. A review of the record demonstrates that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing certain witnesses for the state to remain in the courtroom after appellants had invoked the rule of sequestration. See generally
Ruffin v. State,
5. Over appellant Allison’s objection, the state was allowed to introduce evidence of his involvement in a drug smuggling scheme some two years prior to the drug smuggling conspiracy of which he was charged with being a member in the instant case. The trial court *844 instructed the jury that this evidence was being admitted solely for the limited purpose of showing plan, scheme, motive or bent of mind. The admission of this evidence is enumerated as error.
“Drug cases are no different from any other cases. If the defendant is proven to be the perpetrator of another drug crime and the facts of that crime are sufficiently similar or connected to the facts of the crime charged, the separate crime will be admissible to prove identity, motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind, or course of conduct.”
State v. Johnson,
6. Appellant Allison urges that it was error to fail to suppress the voice identification testimony of two officers. The contention is that the testimony was based upon the officers’ interview with Allison prior to which he was not advised of his Miranda rights and during which he was induced to confess by being offered “the slightest hope of benefit.” Code Ann. § 38-411.
A Jackson-Denno hearing was held and the evidence adduced at that hearing authorized the trial court’s conclusion that the officers had in fact advised Allison of his Miranda rights before the interview was conducted. See
Dougherty v. State,
7. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the state, after having rested, to reopen its case and to recall two witnesses for further testimony.
Flynt v. State,
8. The indictment went out with the jury without the guilty plea of appellants’ co-indictee being concealed. Although appellants’ counsel had been given the opportunity to inspect the indictment before it had been sent out with the jury, no issue concerning the existence of the co-indictee’s guilty plea thereon was raised until after the jury had returned guilty verdicts against appellants. The trial court did not err in allowing the indictment to go to the jury without excising the guilty plea.
Flowers v. State,
9. During the closing argument for the state, appellants interposed an objection and made a motion for mistrial premised upon an alleged impermissible comment by the prosecutor on appellants’ failure to testify. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial and gave no curative instructions to the jury to disregard the comment. A review of the transcript demonstrates no error in the trial court’s actions. The statement asserted to be an impermissible comment on appellants’ right to remain silent was, in fact, a permissible comment on appellants’ failure to produce evidence in rebuttal of that produced by the state. See generally
Mahar v. State,
10. Appellants enumerate as error the denial of their motions for a directed verdict of acquittal. “It is axiomatic that a conspiracy is ‘a corrupt agreement between two or more persons to do an unlawful act . . .’ [cit.]; that its existence ‘may be shown by either direct or circumstantial evidence’ [cit]; and that ‘After the fact of conspiracy shall be proved, the declarations by any one of the conspirators during the pendency of the criminal project shall be admissible against all.’ [Cit.] It is required for a conviction in a felony case that the testimony of an accomplice must be corroborated. [Cit.] However, ‘It is not required that this corroboration shall of itself be sufficient to warrant a verdict, or that the testimony of the accomplice be corroborated in every material particular. (Cits.) Slight evidence from an extraneous source identifying the accused as
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a participator in the criminal act will support a verdict. (Cits.) The sufficiency of the corroboration ... is peculiarly a matter for the jury to determine. If the verdict is founded on slight evidence of corroboration
connecting
the defendant with the crime, it can not be said, as a matter of law, that the verdict is contrary to the evidence.’ [Cit.] Yet, in order ‘to sustain a conviction in a felony case upon the testimony of an accomplice, there must be corroborating facts or circumstances, which, in themselves and,
independently
of the testimony of the accomplice, directly connect the defendant with the crime, or lead to the inference that he is guilty, and more than sufficient to merely cast on the defendant a grave suspicion of guilt.’ [Cits.]”
Caldwell v. State,
The application of the aforesaid principles of law to the evidence in the instant case demonstrates no error in the denial of appellants’ motions for a directed verdict of acquittal. The existence of a drug smuggling conspiracy and appellants’ membership therein was shown by direct evidence, the testimony of an unindicted co-conspirator. This direct testimony was sufficiently corroborated in the instant case. See
Mitchell v. State,
With regard to appellant Allison, the corroborating evidence was in the form of his own taped conversations secured from the wiretap. This evidence from an “extraneous source,” the wiretap tapes of appellant Allison’s own statements, while perhaps not sufficient standing alone to demonstrate Allison’s participation in the conspiracy, was sufficient corroborative evidence connecting him with the drug smuggling conspiracy. “Conduct of the defendant, before, during, and after the commission of a crime may be considered by a jury in establishing his participation to determine whether such conduct was sufficient corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice to sustain conviction. [Cit.]”
Stanford v. State,
In the case of appellant Gilstrap, not only was the testimony of the co-conspirator corroborated by Gilstrap’s own conversations on the tapes, but also by the testimony of an undercover agent who directly implicated Gilstrap as a member of the drug smuggling conspiracy.
Once a prima facie showing of the existence of a drug smuggling conspiracy and of appellants’ membership therein had been established, the door was then open under Code Ann. § 38-306 for the admission into evidence of the declarations of the other conspirators made during the pendency of the conspiracy, including the wiretap conversations to which appellants had not been parties. See
Mitchell v. State,
After a review of the entire record, we find that a rational trior of fact could reasonably have found from the evidence adduced at trial proof of appellants’ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,
11. Appellants argue that while the indictment charged a single conspiracy to smuggle drugs into Georgia, the proof at trial showed several unrelated drug conspiracies. Our review of the transcript demonstrates that the evidence authorized a finding that there was but one overall agreement among the conspirators to smuggle drugs into Georgia, an agreement which developed in stages over time and pursuant to which the various conspirators performed different functions in developing and in carrying out the overall drug smuggling objective. See
Price v. State,
12. Lastly, appellants assert that even in the event that no single enumeration of error establishes a sufficient basis for reversing their convictions, the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding those
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enumerations warrants the grant of a new trial. “ ‘Any error shown upon the record must stand or fall on its own merits and is not aided by the accumulative effect of other claims of errors.’ ” [Cit.]”
Firestone Tire &c. Co. v. Pinyan,
Judgments affirmed.