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Gilson v. Sirmons
520 F.3d 1196
10th Cir.
2008
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Docket

*1 of all the clear absence does not act

jurisdiction.

Moreover, agency itself is an the Board court, supreme established

of the state 17-101, court, and its deci- see Rule subject supreme review the

sions are case,

court, In this id. 17-316. see only

Thayer which was opinion, Committee recommendation, apparently report aby panel Board

could not be reviewed disquali- Board members were all

because Therefore, need- supreme court

fied. problem. action resolve the

ed to take step extraordinary take

Rather than special panel, it decided to

appointing Nothing in dispute

hear itself. rules that court of this

disciplinary divests authority.

inherent state establish provisions of law

These the Justices clear ab-

New did not act Mexico jurisdiction issuing

sence the show- They protected are therefore

cause order. judicial immunity.

by absolute

III. CONCLUSION judgment of the dis-

We AFFIRM the

trict court. GILSON, Lee Petitioner-

Donald

Appellant, Warden,

Marty SIRMONS, Oklahoma Penitentiary, Respondent-

State

Appellee.

No. 06-6287. Appeals,

United States Court

Tenth Circuit.

April *2 Federal

Timothy Payne, R. Assistant (James Drummond, A. Public Defender Defender, and Mariatu Federal Public Writing Specialist, Kargbo, Research *3 briefs) Penalty Death with him on the Division, Office of Corpus Habeas Federal Defender, City, Federal Public Oklahoma OK, Petitioner-Appellant. for Attorney Draper, Saul Assistant Preston Edmondson, (W.A. Attorney Drew General Oklahoma, with him on the General of brief), OK, City, Respon- Oklahoma denb-Appellee. HENRY, Judge,

Before Chief Circuit BRISCOE, Judges. TACHA and Circuit BRISCOE, Judge. Circuit Gilson, Lee an Donald Okla- Petitioner de- prisoner homa state convicted first murder and sentenced to gree child abuse death, court’s appeals the district denial § corpus peti- 2254 habeas his U.S.C. jurisdiction pursuant to tion. exercise We § 1291 and affirm. 28 U.S.C.

I. BACKGROUND facts of this case were pertinent well summarized the Oklahoma Court (OCCA) Appeals resolving of Criminal appeal: Gilson’s direct February On re- skeletal (8) eight year Shane mains of old Coff- man in an freezer were found abandoned formerly next home located to mobile mother, by his Bertha Jean Coff- rented mo- subsequent man. A search photograph of [Gil- bile home revealed son], February On authorities County from the Cleveland Sheriffs Of- fice met with mobile [Gilson] Living home. mobile home with was Bertha Jean Coffman [Gilson] (12) children, year her twelve old four (10) (11) Isaac, Tia, year old eleven ten (7) year and seven old year Tranny old The children were Crystal. immediately found the deplorable conditions and un- the trailer taken removed from sanitary. The children were removed Hospital City. in Oklahoma Children’s from Coffman’s home until conditions and Bertha Jean Coffman were [Gilson] improved. It was about this time that deputies. detained Coffman Bertha Jean met [Gilson]. Examinations of the children conduct- They were working janitors both emergency ed room revealed Little Axe Schools. fixed up Tranny Crystal healthy were with a Coffman’s trailer get so she could her However, small few scars on each. children back. The children were sub- Tia Isaac and were malnourished and sequently returned their mother. emaciated. Tia’s feet were swollen and *4 Thereafter, began [Gilson] spending difficulty had walking. she She had more and more with time Coffman and gangrenous tissue her right on foot. On given authority was the discipline to right large open her buttocks was a children. In June of the oldest condition, ulcer. was in Isaac the worst child, Jeremy, away ran [as a result of needing emaciated and assistance to Gilson], by his mistreatment The next was walk. He malnourished and had month, Coffman her and children walked injuries, stages several in various [Gilsonjs to trailer for a visit and healing, never throughout and scars his body. returned their to home. pos- Whatever In their initial interview police, with they sessions had were left at Coffman’s and Coffman both [Gilson] denied trailer. knowledge only [Gilson]’s as to trailer had the manner which bed- rooms; They Shane died. had stated he run slept [Gilson] and Coffman away during early from home part room and one the other room contained they November and had him found dead working [Gilson]’s leather material. As in the weeds near Coffman’s trailer. result, a all five children were forced to They decided that him in the putting sleep living on blankets in the room. thing freezer would the best to do. They outside, permitted were not go to However, in subsequent interviews both but had to remain the trailer at inside all and Coffman this story [Gilson] recanted times. The children were taken out of knowing and to admitted more about the school and claimed to be homeschooled surrounding circumstances Shane’s Coffman, although no evidence of [Gilson], death. From interviews with homeschooling was ever found. The Coffman, the Coffman children and oth- permitted go children were also not witnesses, picture er the following church. emerged. disciplined and Coffman both [Gilson] The four Coffman children mentioned discipline the children. This took sever- above, with along victim in the murder forms, wall, including al standing at case, brother, this another thirteen time, a sometimes for hours at and beat- (13) year old Jeremy, lived with their belt, stick, boards, ings with a bamboo Coffman, in mother Bertha Jean a mo- rulers, ruler, wooden metal bull- home. fall During bile whip. The children were also made to County Department Cleveland Sheriffs bathtub, sit often for hours at a complaints received of sexual abuse withheld, time. particularly Food was committed upon one of the Coffman chil- Tia, punishment. Isaac and (not from as The boyfriend dren Coffman’s then [Gilson]). upon abuse inflicted Shane Coffman re- investigating detective visited Coffman’s mobile home August sulted his death on crying. they He could hear Shane trial, Tranny testified that he last said At sitting in the later Shane further stated his brother Isaac saw had Tranny gotten said Shane and Coffman told them night, bathtub. [Gilson] going the bathroom away. in trouble for had run Shane carpet. He said that living room shortly police In a made to statement bathtub, put into the was before Shane arrest, trial as after his admitted Tranny him with board. beat [Gilson] stated that on [Gilson] State’s Exhibit beatings received several Shane said 17,1995, he in the August put had Shane board, body. all over his After he punishment. said [Gilson] bathtub beating, put Shane into [Gilson] lesson, trying teach Shane a so hours, couple Shane After bathtub. him put him and in the spanked he got the bathtub. He then let out of where he was to remain until he bathtub Tranny said again. [Gilson] trouble into disruptive behavior. He stopped the took outside then Shane and Coffman in the bathtub was initial- said water Tranny know what did not the trailer. help pain from the ly warm to outside, while he was Shane happened changed then it to a spanking, but scream- said he could hear Shane but he cry- said Shane was cold bath. *5 and carried Coffman ing. [Gilson] him ing as Coffman talked to about his Tranny the inside trailer. back Shane said he then laid down on behavior. He swollen, he was arms were said Shane’s couch with the the to watch television “weird”, had breathing and he a soft he fell eventually rest of kids where to [Gilson]’s his head. Pursuant spot on asleep. was in and out Coffman rules”, children the other were “house talking to before she bathroom Shane [Gilson] to talk to Shane. permitted not lay to to A went the bedroom down. to the bathroom and carried Shane then later, living came into while Coffman placed Tranny him in the bathtub. said room tears and told to come [Gilson] heard few the other children a he and He Coffman had to bathroom. said and He banging screams noises. more laid taken Shane out the bathtub and and Coffman were said both [Gilson] lips him on floor. Shane’s were blue they Shane when heard with breathing. and he said [Gilson] The children then decided to screams. performed approximately he CPR for an sleep. they said were try go and to He his hour to an hour and half. When time [Gilson] later awakened some unsuccessful, were took [Gilson] efforts and told that Shane had and Coffman bed, wrapped the comforter off away, and [Gilson] run and Coffman up placed him back in the Shane and for him. going to look were bathtub. first sent [Gilson] Isaac testified said he and Coffman dis- [Gilson] wetting at the to stand wall Shane cussed to do next. He what said Coff- standing he the bed. While Department man was that the worried wall, hit him [Gil- with board. [Gilson] DHS) (hereinafter Human Services eventually took and Coffman Shane son] away take kids if the would her authori- and him in the put to the bathroom they died. ties found out Shane had So said made all [Gilson] bathtub. Isaac bathtub, waiting in the until left Shane go the other children to bathroom to gone sleep the other had children bоy tell Shane what bad he was. and remove him from the house. [Gilson] and He said that both Coffman [Gilson] they carried Shane said outside remained in the with bathroom Shane him in the back of a truck. He placed while the children watched television. “just him they dumping said discussed were knocked off railing. their Coffman him out “buryfing] somewhere” called for [Gilson] to come and fix the they of the boonies.” But decid- middle living doors. left [Gilson] room options right neither of were ed those he had been watching where television though “even he alive he wasn’t with put the other children and family bein part would still doors back on their railings. [Gilson] (sic) on ... property, thought her about left the bathroom. Coffman Shane freezer, putting him the it wouldn’t struggled again. returned [Gilson] concreting hurt him over. and then it the bathroom to see what the noise was making And bed of it.” flower out So about. He saw the doors had fallen off body took and Coffman Shane’s [Gilson] again so took them and them set on to the freezer located next Coffman’s the floor. Coffman said she remained in put trailer and him inside. said [Gilson] the bathroom with Shane while [Gilson] he and Coffman told the other children went back to the room. living had run away. Shane while, After a stepped [Gilson] into Bertha Coffman at trial Jean testified the bathroom and told Coffman to leave disciplining by making her children Shane alone for a while. So Coffman wall, them stand the time-out left the bathroom get dry Shane them, only bottoms, spanking on their prepare clothes and lunch. When she a cloth belt paddle. or wooden saw that already prepared [Gilson] had She also testified that [Gilson] disci- lunch, Coffman laid down on her bed. plined her children spanking them She aby was awakened in the noise with the paddle, wooden but various coming bathroom and saw out places their bodies. Coffman stated *6 the bathroom. When asked how Shane quick a temper [Gilson] had and did not was, responded he fine [Gilson] was and up the children tearing want his trailer. was blowing he bubbles. Coffman police August In her on statement coffee, sat cup down to have a of then 17, 1995, Coffman said she and [Gilson] decided to check on Shane. She found sexually found Shane assaulting him quiet breathing. but not She called younger punishment, they brother. As for they and out pulled [Gilson] Shane wall, him made stand at the time-out gave the bathtub and him CPR. She said paddled then Coffman him. When they until waited the other children wall, Shane refused to stand at the Coff- asleep taking body were before the spanked again. man him When Shane the freezer. Coffman also stated that directed, still would not do as Coffman died, began once Isaac and Tia Shane screamed at she him. Shane then faint- receiving discipline the brunt the get ed. Coffman could not When a re- [Gilson], from Shane, sponse put piece from she Shane’s skeletal remains were not on his still ice chest. When he did not (6) approximately found until six months picked respond, up Coffman him and Therefore, after his death. the medical him took to the bathroom where she examiner, Dr. was Balding, not able to placed him a of cool She tub water. make a determination as to the cause of eventually said Shane came and want- The testify death. medical examiner did to get ed out of the tub. She said injuries to certain bones which were hit slipped and his head on the faucet. upon his examination of the evident re- pushed stated Coffman she Shane’s injuries him The included a keep shoulders to in the mains. fracture bathtub. They struggled, right jawbone. injury and the shower doors the The was second-stage proceed it showed conclusion to be “acute”

determined a result ings, was which were conducted as healing, and therefore signs of no conviction, jury found old at the murder than a week Gilson’s less probably factors aggravating fracture was of both Another existence time death. of the skull. and recommended by the left side State alleged also found on formally the two fractures sen testified Gilson was Balding Dr. death sentence. of two different blunt trial court at a later by were the result the state tenced from missing A was tooth force blows. hearing. were also jaw. Fractures right appeal challenging filed direct Gilson blades, collarbone, shoulder found in July his convictions and sentences. On ribs, legs, both several numerous OCCA, dissent- judge with one spine. All the fractures in the vertebrae sen- ing, convictions and affirmed Gilson’s acute, and not result were ruled I, The P.3d at 929. tences. Gilson play. normal childhood re- subsequently denied Gilson’s OCCA Bertha Jean Coffman quest rehearing. petition Gilson filed a for charged degree first with jointly

were with for of certiorari the United writ in the death of by child abuse murder That Supreme petition Court. States Coffman, injury count of and one Shane April Court on denied for the abuse suffered to a minor child Oklahoma, U.S. 2001. Gilson remaining children. by each of (2001). 1496, 149 L.Ed.2d 381 121 S.Ct. They jointly charged also with con- were appeal pending his direct was still While unlawfully remove a dead spiracy to Gilson, OCCA, in accordance before of a dead body and unlawful removal rules, an filed procedural with Oklahoma body. particu- filed a bill State [The application post-conviction relief asserting that and Coffman lars applica- the OCCA. OCCA denied to death connec- should be sentenced Septem- post-conviction tion for relief on murder charge first tion with the 1, 2000, unpublished opinion. in an ber aggravating of two factors: on the basis 20, 2001, this August Gilson initiated On (1) especially hei- that the filing pro action (2) corpus federal habeas cruel; nous, atrocious *7 proceed pauperis se in forma motion they probability a that existence of counsel. appointment a motion for of criminal acts of violence would commit counsel appointment motion for of continuing a to Gilson’s pose threat would and, 20, 1997, Gil- granted was on March society.] August approxi- On (8) petition mately prior corpus son filed his federal habeas eight [Gil- months ROA, trial, eleven for relief. asserting grounds Coffman entered son]’s Alford 9, 2006, August to all counts. Doc. 13. On the district pleas omitted] [footnote denying tried and con- an subsequently opinion was court issued order Id., except dis- charges petition. victed on all he Doc. 29. The Gilson’s committing injury found of of guilty granted not Gilson a certificate trict court Jeremy, Tranny issues, a minor child as on six and we subse- appealability Crystal. ap- a quently granted Gilson certificate pealability one additional issue. (Okla. State, Gilson v. 8 P.3d 895-98 (Gilson I) (internal para Crim.App.2000) OF II. STANDARD REVIEW omitted). graph jury, numbers gov- is appeal review of Gilson’s injury to minor Our connection with two provisions of Antiterror- convictions, by child erned concluded Gilson’s sen Act of Penalty Death tence life At the ism and Effective imprisonment. should be 1203 (AEDPA). Sirmons, 701.7(C). § Snow v. 474 tit. 21 Stat. That pro- statute (10th Cir.2007). F.3d Under vides follows: AEDPA, applicable the standard of review person A commits murder in the first depends upon claim particular to a how when death of a child results by that claim resolved the state from the willful or injuring, malicious courts. Id. torturing, maiming using or of unreason- by

If a claim was addressed on the merits force said person able or who shall by courts, may grant cause, the state we not willfully procure permit any or relief federal habeas on the basis of that said acts upon done pur- the child claim unless the state court decision “was suant to Section 7115 of 10 of Title to, contrary an or involved unreasonable Oklahoma It Statutes. is sufficient for of, application clearly established Federal the crime of murder in the first degree law, as determined person willfully either tortured States,” the United 28 U.S.C. or used upon unreasonable force 2254(d)(1), § or “was based on an unrea- injured child or maliciously or maimed in light sоnable determination of the facts the child. presented of the evidence in the State 701.7(C). § Okla. Stat. tit. According 2254(d)(2). proceeding,” § court id. record, to the alleged State two alter- reviewing “When applica- state court’s native theories how Gilson violated law, precluded tion of federal we are from i.e., 701.7(C), § that Gilson either was di- issuing simply the writ because con- rectly responsible willfully or mali- in our independent judgment clude ciously injuring, torturing, maiming or us- applied the state court the law erroneously ing upon Shane, unreasonable force or that Abbott, incorrectly.” McLuckie knowingly permitted Bertha Jean Coff- (10th Cir.2003). “Rather, F.3d man to do so. we must application be convinced that the trial, At the State submitted verdict objectively was also unreasonable.” charge form for the murder that listed not does require abject “This standard our only option guilty or not guilty, but deference, ... but prohibits nonetheless us also stated: substituting from our own judgment for FURTHER, Snow, following the state we make the court.” F.3d (internal omitted). quotation finding

at 696 marks of fact as to the for our basis guilty: verdict of If claim was not resolved the state Unanimous as to child [ ] abuse murder courts on the merits and is not otherwise barred, procedurally permitting our Unanimous as to [ ] standard re- child is, searching. view more That because abuse murder *8 2254(d)’s § deferential of standards review to underlying theory [] Divided as the apply circumstances, do in not such we I, object- Gilson at P.3d 898-99. Gilson the court’s legal review district conclusions ed the underlying to instruction that in- de findings, any, novo its factual if jury formed the “that while verdict their McLuckie, clear error. at F.3d 1197. guilt degree of as to first murder must be unanimous, they not unanimously need III. ANALYSIS agree theory they as to the under which Split underlying verdict on theories at Id. 899. arrived their verdict.” at The child abuse murder conviction trial objec- state court overruled Gilson’s charged adopted was tion and the verdict form submit- degree Gilson first by jury child abuse murder in of violation Okla. ted the State. “When the con- in this conviction. its death connection with and returned deliberations eluded its the argued Schad that finding appeal, to On direct verdicts, in addition (‘divided requiring the trial court erred in not last listed above state the box guilty, underlying theory’) agree theory was a of first- jury single to the as to Supreme Arizona murder. The checked....” rejected argument that and affirmed Court proceed habeas federal In these and sentence. Schad Schad’s conviction that “conviction for his ings, Gilson a sought subsequently granted and was murder, jury on a based divided capital petition for of certiorari the United writ guilty was of to whether he verdict as that Supreme Court on issue. States child abuse led ‘committing’ the death, such the ‘permitting’ Although urged Supreme Schad Shane’s constitutional abuse, by holding in his “to case th[e] is violation Court decide ” Sixth, Br. 22. process.... Aplt. at and Fourteenth Amend- right Eighth, to due require jury a in state ments unanimous a) v. Arizona Schad cases,” 501 111 S.Ct. capital U.S. 2491, the to do More Court1 declined so. “clearly federal law” established The it specifically, “ha[d] the Court noted that support argu- in of his cites suggested returning general that in never in ment Court’s decision is jurors cases be Arizona, verdicts such should 111 S.Ct. U.S. Schad (1991). agree upon single a means required peti- L.Ed.2d 555 commission, indict- any more than the Schad, Schad, Jr., Edward tioner required specify one ments were in Arizona state court with first- charged In- 111 S.Ct. 2491. trial, alone.”2 Id. During degree murder. Schad’s stead, concluded that Schad’s Court advanced alternative theories of prosecutor charac- murder, challenge [wa]s “real to Arizona’s felony premeditated and while first-degree murder as a sin- that, most, terization Schad himself claimed gle crime to which a verdict not be jury need reject- theft. The guilty mere statutory and, limited to one alterna- general in a ed Schad’s assertions 630-31, ...” verdict, first-degreе him of mur- tive. Id. at 111 S.Ct. 2491. convicted words, subsequently sentenced to other the Court concluded that der. Schad was observes, plurality long plurality opinion it been Souter wrote As has Justice Schad, joined by which was three other Jus- general single a crime rule that when separate Justice a con- tices. Scalia authored ways, jurors can be committed in various (which, together with Justice Sout- currence agree upon need not the mode of commis- outcome). opinion, For er’s controlled the constitutional, only rule is it sion. That convenience, purposes of refer Justice indispensable probably system in a plurality opinion as the decision of Souter’s requires verdict to con- unanimous States, Marks “the Court.” See v. United body has vict. When woman's charred 188, 193, U.S. 97 S.Ct. 51 L.Ed.2d 260 house, been in a and there is found burned (1977) (“When fragmented Court decides ample out evidence that the defendant set explaining single no rationale case and her, kill it would absurd him to set Justices, enjoys the assent five result strangled jurors free because six believe he may holding be viewed as that (and her to death caused the fire accidental- position taken those Members con- who ly hasty escape), while others six judgments in the on the curred narrowest *9 her believe he left unconscious and set (internal grounds.” quotation marks omit- fire to her. kill ted)). Schad, 649-50, at 2491 S.Ct. following J., compel- (Scalia, (citations omitted). 2. Scalia offered the concurring) Justice ling why rationale for no such rule exists: law, presented by premeditation constitutional issue Schad and the commission of permissible was “one of the limits in felony defin- a not independent [we]re elements conduct, ing criminal as reflected in the crime, but rather [we]re mere jurors applying instructions to the defini- satisfying means of a single rea mens ele- tions,” unanimity.” of jury and “not one ment.” Id. at 111 S.Ct. 2491. 2491. Id. S.Ct. left, however, That still the issue of Addressing that constitutional issue “whether Arizona’s choice unconsti- [wa]s head-on, acknowledged the Court that resolving issue, tutional.” Id. In this there a “point which differences began Court by stating that its “sense of important between means become so that appropriate specificity a [wa]s distillate of they may reasonably not be viewed as concept process of due with its de- end, to a but alternatives common must be mands for fundamental ... fairness differentiating treated as what the [Due rationality for the that is an essential com- requires Process Clause] to be treated as ponent of that Continuing, fairness.” Id. separate Id. at offenses.” S.Ct. that, Court stated “[i]n translating noted, example, 2491. For the Court these rationality demands fairness and history “nothing suggested] that [its] judgments into concrete adequa- about the permit Due Process would a Clause cy legislative determinations, of [it would] State to convict a anyone charge under of history look both to practice and wide as generic ‘Crime’ that of so combination values, guides to fundamental as well as to embezzlement, findings of reckless analytical testing narrower methods of murder, driving, burglary, evasion, tax practical equivalence moral and of the dif- ... littering would suffice for conviction.” ferent mental states m[ight] satisfy that Id. the mens single rea element of a offense.” In “attempting] what define consti- held, Id. “The enquiry,” the Court “is un- tutes an immaterial as difference to mere dertaken with a threshold presumption means and what constitutes a material dif- legislative competence to determine the requiring separate ference theories appropriate relationship between means crime to be as separate treated offenses defining and ends in the elements of a subject id., separate jury findings,” 637-38, 111 crime.” Id. at S.Ct. 2491. Court indicated it would afford substantial Court held use ... of “[t]he to a interpretation deference state court’s process due aas measurement of the sense of its Specifically, own state statutes. appropriate specificity im- assumes the Court stated that a State’s courts “[i]f portance history widely shared have determined that statutory certain al- practice as concrete fun- indicators what ternatives are mere means of committing rationality require.” damental fairness and offense, single independent than rather el- Expanding Id. at 2491. S.Ct. crime, ements of the simply [it] [would] notion, this Court explained: liberty ignore [be] at that determination particular way Where a State’s defin- [we]re, conclude the alternatives has a ing long history, crime or is in fact, independent elements under state use, widespread unlikely it is de- law.” fendant will able to case, noted, demonstrate Schad’s “by Court deter- proof the State has shifted the burden of mining general that a as verdict to first- to what an permissible inherent element [wa]s under law, offense, Arizona the Arizona or has single defined as crime that, effectively multiple inherently ha[d] decided under state offenses that are *10 Court, ... two states are defini- the mental Conversely, “[i]f a freakish separate. satisfy finds equivalent a crime that to be means to supposed the of of elements tion offense, in criminal history single or the of analogue in the rea element a no mens lighten will jurisdictions reasonably of other notions of they law must reflect burden. culpability, defendant’s blameworthiness equivalent in perceived their whereas a difference the cir- principles to Id. Applying these case, culpability to degrees of would be reason by Schad’s presented cumstances they that that identified different of- “significant it conclude concluded was of equation Applying of the mental states Id. these altogether.” fenses Arizona’s case, murder felony murder and premeditated the Court noted principles to Schad’s blameworthy state of species as of question ... whether fel- [wa]s that “[t]he of prove single to offense required mind ony ever treated as the [could] murder be first-degree murder substantial f[ound] by deliberation, equivalent of murder Id. contemporary echoes.” historical as particular robbery in murder whether the Court perspective, a historical From case be charged in treat- [Schad’s] [could] law, intent to “[t]he noted that at common 644, 111 equivalent.” as Id. at ed thus felony to were kill the intent commit Citing its decision in S.Ct. 2491. Tison single concept of of aspects alternative Arizona, 1676, 95 107 S.Ct. ” con- aforethought.’ Id. From a ‘malice (1987), the L.Ed.2d 127 Court concluded perspective, the Court noted temporary everyone that or not would “[w]hether premed- “retained that most state statutes agree precip- the mental state that felony and some form of murder itated robbery itates death the course of ... alternative of satis- murder as means it equivalent premeditation, moral [wa]s first-degree state that fying the mental equivalence clear that such could reason- presupposes.” Id. found, enough rule ably [wa]s which Further, Court, citing a S.Ct. argument disparity out the that this moral from issuing state-court decisions series of treating them as alternative bar[red] the Court’s deci- through the date of satisfy means to the mental element of a sufficiently sion, “there [wa]s concluded single Id. offense.” of the two mental widespread acceptance satisfying means states as alternative b) rejection The OCCA’s Gilson’s crime single rea element of the mens argument Schad-based persuade first-degree [it] murder to process, Gilson first raised his due departed from Arizona ha[d] argument on appeal. direct &c/ia.d-based norm.” Id. at 2491. “Such purported reject argu- OCCA contemporary acceptance historical and so, In doing ment on the merits. ver- definition of the offense and Arizona’s lengthy expla- following OCCA offered the noted, dict the Court practice,” “[wa]s nation for its decision: they not of- strong d[id] indication argument, part the second of his principle justice some so rooted fen[d] right a unanimous people conscience of our asserts [Gilson] the traditions and by as as Id. to be ranked fundamental....” verdict was violated the verdict forms (internal omitted). quotation marks allowing to return a as “divided underlying theory” guilty verdict. also considered “the function

The Court charged he was perform of mental state that differences with child abuse mur- the alternative the relative seriousness of other- defining der the commission of child abuse or criminal acts.” wise similar or identical abuse According permitting child which 111 S.Ct. 2491.

1207 murder, in degree first the no general requirement resulted there is that the jury’s disagreement verdict as showed jury reach a agreement unanimous on “just what [he] [citation did.” and the preliminary factual issues which un- omitted]. [Gilson] footnote acknowl- derlie the verdict. edges this has that a general Court said Schad, Supreme the Court ad- guilt process verdict satisfies due and the constitutionality dressed Ari- the unanimity concerns where defendant is zona holding Court’s that a in charged the alternative with malice general verdict as to first-degree mur- murder, aforethought felony long and so permissible der is under Arizona law as as a facie case made each prima premeditation and the commission State, alternative. v. See James 637 felony independent are not elements of (Okl.Cr.1981). However, P.2d crime, but rather are mere means of distinguishable by he asserts his case is satisfying a single mens rea element. unique its circumstances. sub- [Gilson] analysis, In its the Court looked “both to jury mits that the in disagreement history practice and guides wide as legal, case went to the rather than the values, fundamental as well as to nar- factual, basis of the crime charged, “be- analytical rower methods testing the 1) ‘committing’ ‘permitting’ cause moral practical equivalence of the abuse murder conceptually child are dis- different mental may satisfy states that 2) tinct crimes and these alternative the- the mens rea element of a of- single guilt ories fundamentally repug- are 637-38, fense.” 501 at U.S. S.Ct. each nant to other.” [citation omitted]. argues contradictory [Gilson] nature language The found the of the charged the alternative crimes is illus- first-degree Arizona murder statute was by differing trated actus reus re- in respects identical all relevant to the quirements for each crime. language defining the first statute argues response The State by degree, murder differences of passed committing permitting child abuse by Pennsylvania Legislature in 1794. merely are by different means which U.S. 111 S.Ct. 2502. The child abuse may murder committed. Court also looked to oth- decisions from Court, Citing cases from this the State “ er agreed state courts which ‘it was jury not required was necessary jurors that all the should agree specific by means which agree in the determination that there committed, the crime only that the was a and premeditated deliberate de- charged. defendant committed crime deceased, sign to take life of the Both [Gilson] the State cite to in the conclusion that the defendant was Arizona,

Schad at the time engaged the commission (1991). 115 L.Ed.2d 555 felony, one; of a or an attempt commit argues that supports Schad it juror was sufficient that each finding degree murder first beyond convinced a reasonable doubt commission of child abuse and first de- the defendant had committed gree by permitting child abuse crime of murder the first separate are containing offenses inde- ” that offense is defined statute.’ pendent which upon elements Id., Sullivan, quoting People v. N.Y. agreement. must be unanimous (1903). 122, 127, 65 N.E. 989-990 State relies on the proposition Schad for Although recogniz- [footnote omitted]. that where there are alternatives offense, proving the actus ing reus the state courts were not unanimous *12 O.S.1991, 21 charged under de- Supreme Court respect, the in this 701.7(C) provides: § which widespread was sufficient there cided of two mental states of the acceptance in the A commits murder person C. al- felony-murder as premeditation a child degree first when the death of the satisfying of mens means ternative or malicious results from the willful first- single crime of of the rea element maiming using or injuring, torturing, the Court persuade murder to degree by person of unreasonable force said from departed not the that Arizona had cause, procure or willfully or who shall 641, 111 S.Ct. at 501 at norm. U.S. done permit any of said acts be 2502. child upon pursuant the to Section determinations,

Having these made 7115 Title 10 of the Oklahoma Stat- of rather, question, “[t]he the stated Court for the crime of utes. It is sufficient ever may murder be felony is whether the degree in the that murder first by of murder equivalent the treated as willfully or person either tortured deliberation, particular in whether upon used unreasonable force charged this as case robbery murder injured maimed maliciously child or or equivalent.” thus 501 treated as may be the child. 644, 111 S.Ct. 2503. The

U.S. mur- degree This of first section Court concluded: Supreme ways der statute sets out different agree everyone or would Whether degree offense of murder which the first that precipitates the mental state that It by may child abuse be committed. robbery of is in the course death mali- may by the willful or be committed premeditation, it equivalent moral injuring, torturing, maiming, cious or us- equivalence that could clear such is by unreasonable force the defen- ing of found, enough reasonably which is child, by upon dant or defendant’s argument this to rule out the causing, permit- or willfully procuring them treating disparity moral bars ting abuse. This sec- the acts child men- satisfy alternative means person tion that “a specifically states single of a tal element offense. degree murder in the first commits 644, 111 at 2503- child ...” S.Ct. when the death of a results at 501 U.S. injury” from “willful 4. either or malicious “willfully permitting” those acts to be “consid- recognizing their While Therefore, statutory done. under exhaust the universe [did not] erations mur- degree of first language crime judg- relevant potentially those by under der child abuse is committed legitimacy defining ments about the provision This either circumstance. com- facts as mere means to the certain felony-murder provisions not unlike offense”, of one mission 701.7(B) set alter- of section which forth not fall found the Arizona law “did felony-mur- ways committing native beyond the bounds of fun- constitutional der. rationality.” 501 damental fairness argument at 2504.

U.S. at is correct [Gilson] child to commit including intent we are not con- present In the case the first stat abuse into murder premedi- cerned with the alternatives of enactment, relatively see murder, ute is recent but with those felony tated and (Okl. State, Tucker P.2d by permitting child abuse Cr.1984), crime of child and that child abuse murder child abuse and child abuse permitting abuse murder the commission of child abuse. prior did not exist to 1982. See 1982 all when elements the crime However, § c. Okla. Sess. Laws (citations charged proven, were omit legal culpability the fact that of a ted). defendant whose abuse of a child results State, See also Neill v. 896 P.2d permits that child’s death or who (Okl.Cr.1994), denied, 552-53 cert. child to be abused to the extent U.S. 116 S.Ct. 133 L.Ed.2d *13 only recently death results has been ac (1996); State, 740 840 P.2d Crawford knowledged by this State does not mean 627, (Okl.Cr.1992); Newsted v. Legislature the cannot define first de State, 734, (Okl.Cr.), 720 P.2d 737-38 gree child abuse murder to been have denied, cert. 107 S.Ct. by committed either actual the commis (1986); State, 93 L.Ed.2d 599 James v. by sion of the acts of abuse or the willful (Okl.Cr.1981). 637 P.2d permitting of the acts to abuse to occur. in present The evidence the case 701.7(C) §

With the enactment of the a prima showed facie case was made and Legislature clearly has stated its inten all of the proven sup- elements were to punish tion to first degree murder the port guilt a finding of as to either child use upon of unreasonable ‍​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‍force a child by abuse murder the permitting or commission of the of force unreasonable child to used a abuse or child upon by be child when the death abuse murder of a child results. permitting child abuse. The evidence supporting the

Having the conclusion [Gilson] found commission of child perpetrator abuse and the of was the of permitting child abuse the abuse inflict- to be to committing alternative means ed upon Shane came from the other the crime of first degree by Coffman children who testified that both abuse, require child constitutional “[t]he [Gilson] their mother beat Shane ment of a jury unanimous verdict applies day murder, of the carried him to only appel to the ultimate of issue bathtub, stayed him in guilt lant’s or innocence of crime bathroom while he cried and screamed. charged, not the by alternative means Supporting can evidence also be found in which the crime was committed.” Coffman’s statement that she saw [Gil- (Okl. State, Rounds v. 679 P.2d coming of son] out bathroom Cr.1984). State, In Powell v. P.2d then in found Shane the bathroom not (Okl.Cr.1995), 775-76 this Court breathing. stated: supporting Evidence conclusion prior Court has [T]his reaffirmed its permitted the abuse from [Gilson] comes holdings that a jury failure of to indi Coffman’s statement she was in the guilt cate the of their finding basis struggling bathroom with Shane when was not error there where was but a the shower doors fell down. charged, single crime i.e. first bathroom, entered the but once murder. “Whether or not [murder] twice to attend the shower doors. was committed with malice afore supports own statement [Gilson]’s during thought, the commission of that he was conclusion aware that Coff- felony goes to the factual basis of abusing man was Shane the bath- the crime.” When the verdict room. unanimous that a defendant commit jury’s indicating The it guilt verdict murder in the degree,

ted first such underlying theory verdict satisfies Fur divided as to the process. due ther, there is no due process disagreement violation was a as to the factual O.S.1991, death, enacting 21 man- ed the offense and as

basis 701.7(C) was committed. merely the crime has Legislature § in which ner Supreme Court stated Schad: theAs way committing first created another suggested that in re- have never We degree murder. general verdicts such cases

turning statute, setting language agree jurors required be should committing means of forth alternative commission, single means upon murder, makes the crime child abuse were any more than indictments analogous felony-mur the crime of it specify one alone. required 701.7(B) O.S.1991, § fel Under der. cases, litigation generally, as in these when a death ony-murder is committed may jurors persuaded “different commission of evidence, results from a defendant’s even pieces different upon underly line. they agree specifically bottom of several listed when *14 Plainly general require- is no there prosecu felony-murder In a ing felonies. jury agreement ment that the reach tion, underlying felony the is proof of factual the issues preliminary necessary the to intent prove needed (citation the which underlie verdict.” felony v. a murder conviction. Fields omitted). (Okl.Cr.1996), State, 923 P.2d 634 631-32, 111 at at 501 U.S. S.Ct. denied, 117 cert. (1997). Further, 1704, 137 L.Ed.2d 829 Here, single was a crime there alter charged when the crime is the by degree murder child charged-first native, felony more than one with or not it was commit abuse. Whether felony, underlying a con charged of child through the commission ted stitutionally unanimous verdict is re permitting of child through or abuse only respect to the quired with ultimate goes the factual basis of the abuse guilt defendant’s or inno issue crime. The verdict was unanimous charged crime and not with cence committed the crime. by respect alternative means which prоcess. a verdict satisfies due Such v. the crime was committed. Blackwell State, P.2d Plunkett v. See (Okl.Cr.1983). State, 12, 16 663 P.2d (Okl.Cr.), denied, 479 cert. U.S. (1986). 675, 93 107 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d find the child abuse murder stat We 701.7(C), § sepa- enactment of The interpreted in ute should be the same degree first provision rate within the 701.7(B). §as Proof of un manner murder statute to address the death of derlying child is needed to act of abuse abuse, is as a of child indica- child result necessary the intent for a child prove intent Legislature’s tive of within conviction. See Fairchild abuse murder legislation the last two decades to draft (Okl.Cr. State, P.2d 618-19 specifically protection aimed 1999) degree mur (holding crime of first S.Supp. welfare of children. 10 O. See general intent der child abuse is (Oklahoma 1993, § seq. 401 et. Child crime). constitutionally unanimous A Act); Licensing 10 O.S. Care Facilities required only respect with verdict (the § Supp.1995, seq. 7001-1.1 et. Okla- the ultimate issue of the defendant’s and, Code); homa Children’s 10 O. charged of the crime guilt or innocence (Oklahoma § S.Supp.1995, seq. 7101 et. respect to alternative Reporting Child Abuse Prevention the crime was commit Act). means which Although specifically directed child has result- ted. situations where abuse (internal I, P.3d at para-

Gilson 900-03 homa’s choice is with principles consistent omitted). graph numbers sure, of due process. To be Oklahoma’s directly decision to include both the com- c) Gilson’s entitlement habeas federal permission mission and resulting abuse on this claim relief in the death of a child in its definition of above-quoted language ap- makes first-degree appears unique parent properly OCCA conducted among said, the states.3 however, That part analysis. first Spe- Schad there is contemporary support from other cifically, it as a concluded matter of state states for treating the notion of the willful that, law “[w]ith enactment commission and willful permission of child 701.7(C), § Legislature [Oklahoma] abuse as alternative means of satisfying clearly punish ha[d] stated its intention to the actus requirements reus single as first murder the unrea- use of offense. In particular, several other states upon permit- sonable force a child or the treat willful commission and willful permis- ting of upon unreasonable force to be used sion as alternative means satisfying the a child when the of a death child results.” requirement actus reus of lesser criminal I, 8 P.3d at 902. Unfortunately, E.g., offenses. § Cal.Penal Code 11165.3 however, the OCCA failed to conduct the (defining crime of harming “Willful second, arguably more important, part endangering of child” to include situa- “a i.e., analysis, the Schad determining *15 tion in any person which willfully causes or whether the Legislature’s Oklahoma deci- suffer, permits any child to or inflicts sion to treat “the commission of child thereon, unjustifiable physical pain or permitting abuse and the of child abuse mental suffering”); § Conn. GemStat. committing [as] alternative means to 53- the crime first 21 degree by (defining “Injury of the crime of murder child or risk of to, abuse” principles injury of, was consistent with impairing of or morals children” process. place due In of analysis, this any the to person “wilfully include who or simply OCCA the pre- reviewed evidence unlawfully permits any causes or ... child sented at trial and concluded “a prima placed to be in such situation that the life facie case was and all made of the ele- endangered”); or limb of such child is Ida- proven support ments were to finding of § ho Code Ann. 18-1501 (defining the guilt as to either by child abuse murder “Injury crime of to children” to include the commission of child abuse or child “[a]ny who, person under circumstances or by abuse permitting murder child abuse.” likely produce great bodily conditions to Id. at 902. death, harm or willfully permits causes or Conducting part suffer”); the second of the Schad child to 111.Comp. 720 Stat. analysis novo, de we conclude that Okla- (defining the crime of “Endan- 5/12-21.6 2007) 3. Although ("this we have Sept.20, not found (Mich.App. another first- in- cаse Oklahoma’s, degree murder statute similar to felony volved underlying murder ... with the significant abuse”); find it other felony first-degree states routine- child Tenn ly charged 39-13-202(a)(2) allow criminal defendants to be § Code Ann. (defining first first-degree felony degree with death "killing when murder to the include an- permission results the perpetration from commission or other committed in the of or E.g., People Morgan, severe attempt aggravated child abuse. v. perpetrate to ... child 593, Cal.Rptr.3d Cal.4th aggravated neglect”). 170 P.3d abuse [and] child (2007) Thus, (noting that a violation of the end result in those effec- states is felony Oklahoma, i.e., "merg- tively California’s child abuse statute the same as in de- the homicide”); resulting es People with a charged fendant in such case is first- with Moore, degree No. 2007 WL 2742781 at *3 murder. Eighth Amendment penalty to violates his health of child” life or gering in “willfully case did not rights cause[s] who because the any person include of a child unanimously personally life or health that he find either permit[s] or endangered”); killing 18 to be Coff- age of of Shane participated under the (defining § 200.508 requisite possessed Nev.Rev.Stat. man or that he “Abuse, endangerment neglect or crime of eligible make him for the death intent to “wilfully both to include of child” penalty. al- “permit[ting] or

causing]” a) Enmund and Tison The decisions in (de- §Ann. 40.1-103 lowing]”); Va.Code. injuries “Cruelty and fining crime Tison, Supreme In Enmund and “willfully causing] ... include children” to explored culpability Court [a] the life of child be permitting] or pun- necessary imposition capital for §Ann. Wyo. 6-4-405 endangered”); Stat. felony-murder involving ishment cases chil- (defining “Endangering crime of so, doing In both cases convictions. “willfully causing] per- dren” include Punish- to the and Unusual looked Cruel mit[ting]”).4 As noted Amendment, Eighth Clause of the ments Schad, “unlikely” it is that such which prohibits “punishments which legal would relatively common definitions severity length or are their excessive they “at acceptance” if were “retain wide greatly disproportioned the offenses and rationali- fairness odds with notions Enmund, charged.” 458 U.S. at compre- fundamental ty sufficiently (internal quotation marks omit- S.Ct. 501 U.S. at process.” hended due ted). Moreover, Gilson has 111 S.Ct. 2491. Enmund, “explicitly the Court dealt issue, the two means at established that felony distinct of all mur two subsets i.e., permis- and willful willful commission Tison, 149, 107 ...” ders. 481 U.S. at sion, reus require- actus proving *16 “At one was En- pole [defendant] 1676. first-degree charge at ment of the himself; minor in mund the actor an disparate exempli- as to issue “are so here scene, robbery, on the who armed not nei inherently separate Id. fy two offenses.” intended kill nor found to have ther was 643, Thus, 2491. we conclude 111 S.Ct. any culpable mental state.” Id. “The had is entitled to federal habeas Gilson not capital punishment held Court relief on issue. this cases,” in these and thus disproportional violation Enmund/Tison Id. Eighth Amendment. violative 150, the pole 107 S.Ct. 1676. At other the argues, citing Gilson next killed, felony actually murderer who “the Florida, Court’s Enmund decisions kill, kill.” attempted to or intended to Id. 3368, 782, 102 73 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. Eighth that the Amend Arizona, The Court held 1140, (1982), and Tison v. 481 imposition no hurdle to the 137, 1676, posed ment 95 L.Ed.2d 127 U.S. 107 S.Ct. (1987), imposition punishment in such capital the death cases. two support there is no decision to treat acts at issue as Although single impo- meeting a actus history practice for the alternative methods of or state-wide first-degree punishment crime of capital permit- for the reus element of the child sition of abuse, clearly question whether it ting of child that is not abuse murder. The is severe Rather, capital impose punishment proper inquiry permissible for under Schad. ques- separate proper inquiry under a crime is a constitutional Schad such constitutional (i.e., contempo- Eighth an rather than a whether tion Amendment there is historical and/or issue). Legislature's rary support Due Process Oklahoma

1213 Tison, the Court expanded on the Ultimately, the Court held that “major principle of proportionality by addressing participation in felony committed, com- two related cases fell between the bined with reckless indifference to human categories felony-murder expressly ad- life, is sufficient satisfy the Enmund dressed in Enmund. petitioners in culpability requirement.” Id. Tison, brothers, two had assisted their S.Ct. 1676. inmate father and another convict in es- Although not by Gilson, cited the Su caping prison. from During the course of preme Court’s decision in Cabana v. Bull the escape, the group’s car broke down ock, 474 U.S. and one of the brothers flagged down L.Ed.2d (1986), is also relevant to our passing car which family contained a analysis. Enmund/Tison Cabana awas four. The group proceeded to kidnap procedural case in which the Court “deter family. rob the While brothers were mine[d] whose hands the [Enmund/Ti nearby, the father and the other convict son-mandated] decision that a defendant shot and killed all four members possesses requisite degree of culpabili kidnapped family. Neither at- brother ty properly lies.” 474 U.S. at tempted to assist the victims before, dur- S.Ct. 689. In addressing issue, ing, or after the shooting. Moreover, both Court emphasized that its “ruling in En- brothers continued with the two escap- mund d[id] not concern the guilt or inno ees and the group was not apprehended cence of the defendant” and “establishe[d] until days several 151-52, later. Id. at no new elements of the crime murder S.Ct. 1676. that must be found jury.” Id. at The Supreme Court concluded that al- 385, 106 S.Ct. 689. Continuing, the Court though petitioner neither actually killed or noted that “[t]he decision whether a partic specifically intended to kill any of the vic- punishment ular the death penal —even tims, the Eighth Amendment did pro- ty appropriate any given case is not —is hibit from being them subjected to the one that [it] ha[d] ever required to be death penalty. In reaching this conclu- made a jury.” To the contrary, the sion, the Court noted that critical “[a] facet noted, “the decision whether a sen of the individualized determination of cul- tence is disproportionate so as to violate pability required in capital cases is the Eighth Amendment in any particular mental state with which the defendant case, like other questions bearing on commits the crime.” Id. at 107 S.Ct. *17 whether a criminal defendant’s constitu 1676. “Deeply ingrained in our legal tra- tional rights have violated, been has long dition,” noted, the Court the “is idea that been viewed as one that a trial judge anor the purposeful more is the criminal con- appellate court is fully competent duct, the more offense, serious is and, the make.” Id. Thus, S.Ct. therefore, 689. the more it severely ought to be stated, the Court “Enmund punished.” does not im turn, Id. In the Court noted pose any particular form procedure that “the of reckless disregard for human life upon the States.” Id. If a implicit in criminal knowingly defen engaging in criminal dant’s conduct activities satisfies the carry known to grave a Enmund or risk of requirements death Tison represents imposition for highly culpable a of the mental state, death a mental penalty, held, the may state that “the Eighth taken into account in making a Amendment itself capital is not sentencing violated his or judgment when that conduct her regardless causes execution its of who makes the natural, though inevitable, also not lethal determination requisite of the culpabili result.” 157-58, Id. at 107 S.Ct. 1676. ty....” words, Id. other “[a]t what the justifies constitutionally conviction State process a criminal its in point

precise capital sentence. of imposition determina- the Enmund make chooses facts standpoint that response the in the from concern State of little tion is Thus, the Court support Id. sufficient are Constitution.” in this case court reviews habeas the held, a federal for eligible “when finding [Gilson] that been has penalty the death that a claim sentence. death the meet does one who” on imposed shows record note the Initially we impo- for requirements or Tison Enmund rendered, were the verdicts after “the court’s penalty, the of death sition the Bill strike counsel moved defense to an examina- limited cannot be inquiry [Gilson] arguing Particulars of Rather, the instructions. jury of tion the for constitutionally eligible longer no course entire examine the must court failed to because penalty death the de- against proceedings the state-court committed unanimously that he find whether, at to determine in order fendant to the death led act which intentional requisite process, in the point some properly has objection This the victim. culpa- the defendant’s finding as to factual review. appellate the issue for preserved 387, 106 Id. made.” bility has been I, the Proposition in addressed As held, “the has,” the Court it “If 689. verdict general in this case was verdict by vir- correct presumed must be finding murder with first guilt 2254(d), unless ... and § tue of 28 U.S.C. underlying as to heavy jury disagreeing can bear petitioner the habeas Therefore, will review we presumption, factual basis. overcoming the burden applica- Eighth light basis to hold that factual obliged the court is eligibility. Enmund interpreted death as determine law to Amendment ble death by the is not offended ] Tison [and (Okl. State, 918 P.2d In Wisdom 387-88, 106 S.Ct. sentence.” con Cr.1996), held defendant by Child Degree Murder of First victed En- b) rejection Gilson’s The OCCA’s victim actually killed Abuse who claim mund/Tison for the eligible hand was own his/her raised his first Enmund/Tison acknowledges [Gilson] sentence. death reject- OCCA appeal. The direct claim urges reconsideration. but ruling this merits, stating claim on ed the offer, omitted). (citation We decline follows: finding supports a Here, the evidence assign- second his contends [Gilson] victim. killed the actually that [Gilson] death sentence that his of error ment vic beating the participated and Fourteenth Eighth violates to the he was the time taken prior tim II, 9,§ Article Amendments, as well as in the bathroom [Gilson]was bathroom. because Constitution the Oklahoma Coffman, after the victim O.S.1991, under conviction room, exiting was seen Coffman left *18 701.7(C), eligibility § establish failed immediately before Shane the bathroom of In the first sentence. the death for certainly This evidence found dead. [Gilson] subpropositions, several death for the eligible [Gilson] renders killed, fact he in prove failed to the State sentence. major partici- kill or was attempted to ruled on previously not has This Court indif- showing reckless felony in a pant First convicted defendant whether a He contends life. to human ference by permit- Murder Abuse Degree Child only each if can sentence stand his death Both eligible. abuse is death child ting underlying murder the theories and the State direct us to Tison [Gilson] case is by the permitting of child Arizona, v. 481 U.S. 107 S.Ct. abuse, apply we analysis used in (1987) L.Ed.2d 127 application Enmund and Tison. the death penalty to a defendant who Here, the evidence shows [Gilson] was not kill does own hand. his/her a major participant in the felony. Act- Tison, felony-murder case in which the ing jointly Coffman, with he took Shane kill, defendant did himself not the Su- outside the trailer and was party to con- preme Court held that a defendant who duct which elicited screams from the not actually did commit the act which child. He and Coffman took Shane back death, caused who major but was a par- trailer, inside the they took both him ticipant felony in the and who had dis- back to the bathroom they both played reckless indifference to human remained him in the bathroom for life, may be sufficiently culpable to re- periods of time. This clearly evidence ceive the death penalty. 481 U.S. at supports the conclusion partic- that his 158, 107 at S.Ct. 1688. ipation was major and substantial. Court stated: argues that, worst,

Similarly, his con- we hold that the reckless duct was that of an disregard for human life omission-of implicit failing knowingly protect engaging in the victim criminal from activi- a potentially ties known carry a grave dаngerous risk of situation-and not that of death represents a highly culpable knowingly permitting the abuse to occur. state, mental a mental state that may To the contrary, [Gilson]’s conduct was be taken account into in making a merely the nonperformance of what capital sentencing judgment when ought done, to be as in cases criminal natural, conduct causes its omissions, (citation omitted). His active though inevitable, also not lethal re- participation in the abuse occurring in- sult. side his small trailer is very different Id. at 481 157-58, U.S. 107 S.Ct. at from a passive act of failing provide what is required by law. Tison modified the Supreme Court’s We next determine whether [Gilson] Florida, holding Enmund displayed reckless indifference to human 102 S.Ct. 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 Tison, life. In discussing this term in (1982), that Eighth Amendment for- the Supreme Court stated “[a] critical imposition bids the penalty death facet of the individualized determination on “one ... who aids and a felony abets of culpability required in capital cases is in the course of which a murder is com- the mental state with which the defen- mitted others but who does not him- dant commits crime.” 481 U.S. at kill, kill, self attempt or intend that a 157, 107 1687. The fur- killing take place or that lethal force will ther stated: employed.” Id., 458 U.S. at A narrow focus on question S.Ct. at 3376. whether given or not a defendant “in- Although this Court has that an held kill,” tended to however, is a highly analysis does not apply Enmund/Tison unsatisfactory means (citation definitively in the killer, case of the actual omitted), distinguishing culpable find it does most in a apply case dangerous where defendant was not Many the actual murderers. who *19 killer, (citation omitted). to, In do, much as as intend kill and are not criminal- one of the underlying theories of this ly liable at all-those act in who self- greater the felony-murder ishment for justification other or with

defense in the felo- hand, participation some the defendant’s the other ... On excuse murder, likely that acted may be the more ny murderers nonintentional life. and inhu- to human dangerous indifference most reckless among the 153-54, at who tortures 107 S.Ct. person Id., of all-the U.S. mane the victim caring whether another not 1685-86. dies, robber who shoots or the lives or reckless in has addressed This Court robbery, of the in the course someone only per as it human life difference fact the to the utterly indifferent actually killed. In who to those tains have the unintended may to rob desire indiffer so, found a doing we reckless victim as killing the consequence of largely on life turns ence to human property. taking victim’s

well as case, evidenced in but was facts to the value indifference This reckless of a creation by the defendant’s part every bit may be as life of human inherently danger situation desperate as an sense to the moral shocking State, life. Hain v. ous human (“[I]n com- ... kill.” “intent to denied, (Okl.Cr.), cert. P.2d killing is not the law, intentional mon 1031, 117 519 U.S. the most establishing only basis (1996), and the defendant’s L.Ed.2d 517 homi- of criminal form egregious physical serious conscious causing the Pe- the Model example, cide .... For the victim. and death suffering ‘mani- killing, nal treats reckless Code (Okl. State, 913, 931 Brown v. P.2d to the festing extreme indifference Cr.1998). life,’ equivalent to human value of support present in case The facts killing”). knowing and purposeful with reck- finding that acted [Gilson] “intent that when Enmund held Acts human life. in less indifference though not logical in its kill” results outside participated [Gilson] which taking of consequence-the inevitable injury to the child which caused trailer Eighth Amendment life-the human The child was pain. elicited screams the death permits the State exact trailer with back inside the brought weighing of the a careful penalty after head, arms, on his spot a soft swollen circum- mitigating and aggravating breathing. The victim irregular had and Similarly, hold stances. bathroom, an act in to the to be carried life im- for human disregard reckless Fur- again participated. [Gilson] which in crimi- knowingly plicit engaging in participated in [Gilson] acts whiсh ther carry grave nal known to activities the victim to bathroom caused inside the cul- highly represents risk of death cry. was and again scream state, state a mental pable mental that. Coffman struggle between aware of making may into account be taken the victim which victim judgment when sentencing capital bathroom in the injured property natural, its causes conduct damaged. inevitable, lethal re- though also [Gilsonj’s ele- argument focuses sult. child permitting of the offense ments Id., 157-58, 107 S.Ct. at “willfully” asserts that terms abuse and 1687-88. the statute “knowingly” contained determination, the above making degree mur- on first instruction looked to the Court also are not abuse by permitting child der found laws of states and several indifference equivalent of reckless capital pun- authorize which states *20 for human life. The elements of the convicted of felony murder for a killing offense of first murder per- occurring during the course of a robbery mitting child previously abuse have been kills, who neither does not intend that opinion. addressed in this We found the taken, life be nor contemplates that le- evidence this supported case a finding thal force will be employed by others. of the existence of those be- elements The against evidence appellant was that yond Here, doubt. reasonable we look he entered his victims’ home with a shot- beyond those elements and find [Gil- gun in hand. His confederate entered son]’s conduct illustrated a in- reckless too with a handgun. loaded Appellant difference to human life. The evidence held the victims at gunpoint while Ake supports finding subjec- looted the and attempted home to rape tively appreciated that his conduct would year victims’ twelve old daughter. likely result in the taking innocent Appellant also took a turn attempting to life. This is sufficient to make him eligi- rape her. Appellant frequently threat- ble for the penalty. death ened the lives of his as they lay victims In opinion, this we have previously hog-tied on the floor. After a discussion compared the crime child abuse mur plan action, to their appellant went der the crime of felony-murder for outside and turned his automobile purposes of determining sufficiency of around while he waited sound”, “for the the evidence to sustain a conviction. as Ake had instructed him to do. a comparison Such of the two offenses is again agree We during warranted this with the trial discussion court’s finding applicability of the death penalty. “the Defendant Hatch contemplated eligibility of a defendant convicted that a killing only was not possible, but of child abuse the permitting probable and further that lethal force of child abuse similar of a non- probably be employed.” Therefore, we triggerman convicted of felony-murder. find that appellant’s sentences of death Hatch, In P.2d at non-trig- justified are and are in compliance with german was sentenced to death for his Enmund and we AFFIRM each. participation the underlying felonies. Hatch, 701 P.2d Hatch and co-defendant Ake forced their The death sentence for a non-trigger- way into the home, victim’s ransacked man has also upheld been juris- in other the home at gunpoint and repeatedly White, dictions. In Florida v. 470 So.2d threatened to kill family of four who (Fla.1985), occupied defendant and two the house. Ake instructed companions outside, gained Hatch to entrance go to a home turn the car around, under a subterfuge. “listen for All the sound.” three men were Hatch did as he was told. Ake then armed and They wore masks. tied up shot each family member and fled the the people in the house and ransacked it. scene with Hatch. The two adult vic When one of the assailants’ mask fell tims died while two children sur face, from his the three assailants dis- State, (Okl. vived. Ake P.2d cussed victims. killing The defen- Cr.1983). dant vеrbally opposed killing. The In reviewing sentence, Hatch’s death two other victims, assailants shot the this Court stated: killing eight. six of the The three assail- Enmund, ants gathered then up Court held their loot and

that the death penalty cannot be returned consti- to the motel defendant’s room tutionally imposed against one who is where the loot divided. The Su-

1218 from those himself that En- to disassociate failure found Florida

preme Court by Bertha perpetrated the abuse acts of imposition the not bar mund did Coffman, failure to either to the defendant’s and his due penalty death before, in respond and after during conduct or in his both deterred presence and active role in murders; surely his full must to what any the manner positive guarding the intimidating and mercy the capturing, from pleas for have been him- to disassociate victims; his failure victim, for a reasonable were sufficient robbery the mur- the from either self beyond a reasonable doubt to find juror any killing; opposing verbally der while in the major participant was a that he he acted evidence any the lack with reck- that he acted child abuse and coercion. under life. to human indifference less Norris, 799 v. 21 F.3d In Fairchild sen his death next (8th Cir.1994), Eighth Court the Circuit as an En modified should be tence supported evidence held the Appeals not done analysis was mund/Tison non-trigger- the defendant finding that a improper it would be trial court and the penalty. the death eligible for man was such a to conduct review for this Court an ac- case, defendant and the In that Bullock, In Cabana appeal. and killed a raped kidnapped, complice 88 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. U.S. the defendant found The Court woman. (1986), stated the kidnapping the in fully participated require does not Eighth the Amendment car, forced to her her the victim-followed findings jury required a the make money and took gunpoint, inside her Enmund; court, trial appellate a an arriving at Upon a purse. her from may requisite make the or a judge, house, subsequently raped deserted Id. at 474 U.S. findings. was outside of the defendant her. The can the at 700. This Court review S.Ct. by the was shot victim house when findings required record and make However, the defendant accomplice. Reviewing the by Enmund and Tison. gun when present been had case, find the facts in this evidence victim and death initially to the shown major finding that support [Gilson]’s a Eighth Circuit made. threats were abuse, felony child participation in in participation the defendant’s found indifference to with reckless combined robbery, kidnapping and the armed life, satisfy is sufficient human leaving victim alone his rape; Enmund culpability requirement. and his failure accomplice, the armed (internal I, para- 8 P.3d 919-22 by the vic- in his conduct be deterred omitted). graph numbers for mercy were sufficient for pleas tim’s Following the issuance of OCCA’s juror find that he a reasonable decision, for rehear- petition Gilson filed the felonies and major in participant arguing that Su- with the OCCA ing indifference that he acted with reckless just issued its decision preme Court had to human life. 466, 120 Jersey, v. New Apprendi present evidence Accordingly, (2000)5, and 147 L.Ed.2d full, active and know- case of [GilsonJ’s only jury could light Apprendi, that, underlying in the acts ing participation find- Shane, requisite Enmund/Tison upon make inflicted of child abuse appeal, resolving direct approximately Gilson’s Apprendi was decided its the OCCA issued decision month before 29, 2000, ings. August On is- explained OCCA have capital cases are denying an order petition sued Gilson’s not controlling: rehearing stating, pertinent part, cited, “Neither the cases nor oth *22 follows: case, er permits a judge to determine valid prior case law holding that must be by finding reasonable doubt.” vided for an range decision in defendant handicap, religion, sexual orientation or intimidate an individual it ment ponderance of the “[i]t [at] ethnicity. of facts that criminal offense acted with а purpose to stitutional statute. The New Supreme defendant in committing dividuals We have reviewed is not 2363. The remove from the 2362-63. The “unconstitutional for a is if the trial equally established because of penalties applicable. the New is the Apprendi extended term of exposed.” principles increase Supreme struck judge clear that such facts to which a criminal jury Jersey Jersey Id., Court further said race, color, evidence, by proof beyond Apprendi did not render in- In found, Court continued down as uncon- or the the assessment 102 [120] S.Ct. the involved in its Apprendi, Court said it “hate crime” group statute [120] underlying prescribed legislature by imprison- that and find gender, a pre- of in- S.Ct. it is pro- the the ings required by not i.e., not render invalid the rule of court, judge to decide whether Accordingly, person that expose him to leted). mum trial on all has U.S., the existence of a factor which makes the elements of an offense which car ries as its maximum penalty the sen charge.” Almendarez-Torres, tence of has found the one, ought (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis de cited cases hold is a crime a capital offense. What the requisite [120] S.Ct. require a trial an at penalty, the who is absolute death, that a findings. judge, Eighth to be imposed.... we find the elements of the Enmund; 2n. defendant rather may be left to the it charged jury or a entitlement the death Amendment does that, Cabana, [118 S.Ct. 1219] jury may Apprendi make the find- than a lesser with actions an guilty once a that maxi appellate Cabana, to penalty make of all does jury jury The 106 S.Ct. at 700. This Court was necessary not jury for a in a capital legally entitled to make the Enmund/Ti- every case to make finding of fact un- son findings appeal. [Gilson]’s direct derlying sentencing decision. Further, law, under Oklahoma in or- Finally, this previously Court has con- der to return a guilty, jury verdict of rejected sidered and the argument find, required beyond is reasonable principles guiding our deci- doubt, each element of the today sion render offense capital invalid state charged. In the sentencing sentencing phase of a requiring judges, schemes case, jury capital jury find, after a required verdict is holding a defen- beyond doubt, guilty crime, dant of a a reasonable capital the exis- find specific tence of aggravating aggravating factors im- before circumstances posing a Walton v. alleged sentence of death. and whether the aggravating cir- Arizona, outweigh mitigating U.S. 647-649 cumstances [110 evi- (1990); 111 L.Ed.2d upon dence. This is the basis 511] which the id., (Ste- at 709-714 [110 S.Ct. death imposed, 3047] sentence is not find- vens, J., dissenting). For ings reasons we culpability might as to which final). At became defendant’s conviction Ap- by required Enmund/Tison. issued, just been guilty time, had Apprendi entered defendant prendi right clear indication waived no and there was pleas the issues. Ap- determination it intended Supreme Court reasons, find foregoing key For undermine to overrule prendi controlling, and rehear- Apprendi Cabana, i.e., “es that Enmund holdings is denied. the issue ing on the crime new elements no tablished] (Okla.Crim. State, F-98-606 No. jury,” found that must be 2000) (Order Denying Re Aug. App. a particu decision whether that “[t]he *23 of Man Directing Issuance hearing and penalty— the death punishment lar —even date). is not one any given in case appropriate jury,” by a to be made required that [is] habeas to c) entitlement Gilson’s federal Indeed, 689. 106 S.Ct. 474 U.S. claim this on relief clear indicat any be such yet to there has challenges to three asserts Gilson Therefore, to obtain to allow Gilson ion.6 pro will decision, which the OCCA’s of relief on the basis corpus habeas federal First, Gilson in turn. ceed to address to be conclusive yet that has argument an ren that, the verdicts argues “[biased Court, and that jury by Supreme ease], no ly [wa]s there decided [in dered in actively participated the OCCA essentially unavailable to finding he] [that satisfy acts” sufficient appeal, is сriminal his direct it decided the time Br. at 49. Aplt. 2254(d). standards. § Enmund/Tison dictates of contrary to the Gilson, argument, that with In connection Ap in decision Supreme Court’s citing the challenge to second In his right to a he “has asserts prendi, decision, that allow OCCA’s of his Enmund-Tison jury determination to make ing the OCCA Enmund/Tison at 51. In oth Br. Aplt. death-eligibility.” “ne effectively findings would related suggesting words, to be appears he er findings.” Aplt. jury’s specific gate[ ] re petition for OCCA, denying his in therewith, Gilson connection Br. at 53. In Apprendi unreasonably applied hearing, jury believed of his argues that “[s]ome En deciding Gilson’s in key question Coffman ‘permit’ than nothing did more claim, of the stan light in mund/Tison abuse,” doing in physical commit the 2254(d), § is whether dards outlined rejected jurors specifically so “these claim in that same resolution OCCA’s with participated even finding he] [that appeal was of Gilson’s direct the context To at 49. crime.” Id. another to, application an unreasonable contrary or argument, we turn this address properly as it law of, federal clearly established that were jury instructions first decision the OCCA’s time of existed at the trial to determine at Gilson’s employed Ortiz, 2000). v. (July See Stevens have necessarily had to jury facts the what Cir.2006) (10th (noting F.3d 1235-38 on the first- reaching its verdict found identify must court federal habeas trial charge. The state degree murder clearly established apply outlin- following instruction gave the time the court existing precedent capital case aggravating factors absence of progeny, in Although Apprendi's some of right to a Arizona, the Sixth Amendment violated Ring U.S. particular posi- trial), support Gilson’s (2002) arguably lend (holding L.Ed.2d tion, well after Gil- were issued those judge, cases a trial statute that allowed Arizona by the OCCA. appeal alone, was decided presence son's direct or sitting determine ing the essential elements of the first- the conduct is dangerous and threatens degree murder charge: destroys or life. person may No be convicted of MUR- (Instruction 8). Id. at 948 No. DER IN THE FIRST DEGREE unless No person may be convicted of MUR- proved beyond the State has a reason- DER IN THE FIRST DEGREE unless able doubt each element the crime. both the fact of the person death of the First, These elements are: the death of allegedly killed and the fact that his a child under age eighteen; Sec- death was caused the conduct of an- ond, the death from the willful resulted person other are established as indepen- or malicious injuring, torturing using dent facts and beyond a reasonable force; Third, unreasonable by the doubt. proof Such must consist of evi- defendant engaged another and/or dence which is wholly independent of

the defendant. any confession made the defendant. AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE evidence, however, Such may be circum- person may ‍​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‍No convicted MUR- stantial and need not proof include DER IN THE FIRST DEGREE unless the identity of the person who caused *24 proved the State has beyond a reason- the death. able doubt each of element the crime. (Instruction 9). Id. at 949 No. FIRST, These elements are: the death of a child under age eighteen; that, You are instructed although your Second, the death resulted from the will- guilt verdict as to of the crime of FIRST ful or injuring, malicious torturing or DEGREE MURDER must be unani- using force; Third, unreasonable mous, you need agree unanimously which was knowingly permitted; theory to the upon you which arrive FOURTH, by person responsible for at that verdict. the child’s health or welfare. (Instruction 14). Id. at 954 No. CF96-245, State ROA—Case No. # File You are further instructed as to the (Instruction 6). at 946 No. The state trial following Definitions: gave court also the following instructions Knowingly personal awareness —With provided that more detail regarding how of the facts. apply was to the elements of first- Malicious —The imports term a wish degree murder: vex, annoy injure or person. another You are further as to instructed Responsible Person a Child’s Wel- for following Definitiоns: parent, Includes a legal guardian, fare— Direct Result —Immediate conse- custodian, parent, foster person eigh- quence which separated is not from its years age teen or older with whom initial cause other, independent fac- parent child’s any cohabitates or oth- tors. residing er adult in the home of the (Instruction 7). Id. No. child. No person may be convicted of Torture —Infliction great physical FIRST DEGREE MURDER unless his pain. conduct or the per- conduct another Unreasonable than Force—More that

son which he criminally responsi- is ordinarily used as a means of discipline. ble caused the death person of the alleg- edly killed. A -Purposeful. death is caused “Willful” is a Willful— conduct if the willingness conduct is a substantial to commit the act or omis- in bringing factor to, the death and about sion referred require but does not acts, that law, committed those ing permission, or to ac- violate the intent any necessarily group that this does not mean advantage. any quire role played no other also found 18). (Instruction No. at 958 differently, it is in the offense. Stated and the these instructions light of group of entirely possible that this second form, it is the verdict indicated on results played an active jurors found that Gilson jurors agreed that all twelve indisputable severely abusing role in Shane Coffman resulted Coffman the death of Shane death, that Ber- to his but prior the hours injuring, tor- or malicious from the willful the final act or tha committed Coffman As of unreasonable force. turing using or In- that resulted in Shane’s death. acts however, noted, jurors were divided deed, been di- finding such a could have sup- theories the two alternative which a combination of wit- rectly derived from conviction. One or the murder ported testimony from the testimony: nesses’ beyond a reason- jurors found more of regarding severe abuse surviving children another en- doubt that Gilson able “and/or jointly perpetrated by Gilson and Bertha i.e., Coffman, him, Bertha gaged with” leading up the hours Coffman injuring, or malicious committed the willful death, and Bertha Coffman’s own Shane’s force. torturing using of unreasonable in the testimony that she was bathroom words, jurors found group In other this just to his death prior alone with Shane that Gilson beyond a reasonable doubt the bathroom on and that Gilson entered togeth- alone or part, took an active either time during period two occasions Coffman, specific in the with Bertha er fix the shower doors. directly resulted Shane Coff- acts whether question The next generally man’s death. See Webster’s *25 culpability find- OCCA’s (1993) (de- Enmund/Tison Dictionary Int’l Third New jury’s with the find- ings were inconsistent involve or fining “engage” the term as “to found that Gilson “ac- ings. The OCCA (as person) in some affair or entangle in the abuse” of tively] participated] (defining id. the term “en- enterprise”); I, Coffman, 8 P.3d at Shane Gilson in gaged” esp. “involved a hostile en- as counter”). doing in “acted with reckless indif- and so jurors group The second human Id. at 921. More (which, ference to life.” would have group, like the first that specifically, the OCCA found Gilson encompassed anywhere from one to eleven “participated outside the trailer jurors) beyond [in acts] a reasonable doubt found injury the child which “person responsible that for” caused to [that] Gilson was pain,” “brought screams of [the Shane Coffman’s health or welfare and elicited trailer with “knowingly permitted” that another back inside the swollen child] Gilson arms, head, Coffman, person, spot irregular to commit the a soft on his Bertha breathing,” “carried to the bath- specific directly [the child] acts that resulted room,” Importantly, “participated inside the [in acts] Shane Coffman’s death. caused the to nothing group’s findings [that] [child] about this second bathroom Gilson, meant, aware of the necessarily suggested by cry,” scream and and “was rejected finding struggle between Coffman and the they “specifically [child] injured prop- in in the was participated [that [child] even with another which he] noted, erty damaged.” the in the Aplt. crime.” Br. at 49. As the bathroom “subjec- required jury to focus The also found that Gilson instructions the OCCA directly tively appreciated on the resulted that his conduct would specific acts Although likely taking the result in the of innocent life.” Shane Coffman’s death. sum, jurors In the found that Gilson’s group second had to have found Id. OCCA Coffman, felony child “major participation that Bertha know- the with Gilson’s abuse, combined with reckless Reviewing indifference the light record in of these life, satisfy standards, to human sufficient to [wa]s the readily reject we argu- Gilson’s culpability requirement.” Enmund Id. at ments. Although each of eyewitnesses the 922. the leading events up to the murder (Bertha Coffman and the four surviving We conclude that none of the OCCA’s children) gave slightly differing accounts, findings were inconsistent with the factual testimony, particularly their when com- findings jury necessarily that the had to physical bined evidence found at have made in reaching its verdict on the the trailer and the results of the autopsy first-degree charge. particular, murder performed Coffman, on Shane was more findings regarding OCCA’s Gilson’s ac- than sufficient each support tive participation leading the events up OCCA’s findings. In par- Enmund/Tison Coffman, death of Shane and Gil- ticular, Tranny Coffman testified that on life, son’s reckless indifference human day (i.e., last saw day Shane are not inconsistent with or precluded by death), Shane’s Gilson disciplined Shane findings jurors of those who deter- inside the trailer beating him with a mined that Gilson knowingly permitted, board, day later that accompanied Gilson committed, directly rather than specif- Shane and Bertha Coffman outside the directly ic acts that resulted in Shane’s trailer and Shane be heard could scream- Thus, reject death. Gilson’s assertion ing, Gilson and then jointly Coffman car- that the findings effectively OCCA’s nulli- ried Shane back inside trailer and jury’s fied verdict on the first-degree couch, him on placed as Shane sat on charge. couch, Tranny observed that Shane’s In his third final challenge swollen, were arms head had a soft decision, OCCA’s it, spot on and he breathing in a “the facts and in his simply evidence case (i.e., “weird” fashion making gargling-type support a finding d[id] of death eligibil sounds), Gilson then carried Shane to the ity” under Enmund Aplt. and Tison. Br. bathroom, point some thereafter More specifically, Gilson takes issue could Shane be heard inside the bathroom. finding with “[t]he OCCA’s [that he] was Tranny’s testimony was bolstered *26 ‘major in participant’ the offense and brother, Coffman, his of Isaac who testi- showed ‘reckless indifference for human that fied he used the day, bathroom that life’.Id. in observed Shane the bathtub with some gone, his hair of on his arms and bruises review, On federal habeas we must legs, making funny and failing noises to the presume OCCA’s factual determina respond questions to Isaac. In from addi- tions are correct and a presumption such to this testimony, tion all five witnesses may only be rebutted by clear and convinc testified more generally Gilson rou- ing contrary. evidence to the 28 U.S.C. tinely children, “disciplined” the including 2254(e)(1); Mullin, § Willingham v. 296 Shane, by beating them with various ob- (10th Cir.2002). 917, F.3d 922 Unless the jects. together, Considered this evidence OCCA’s factual determinations are shown more than support to each sufficient of clearly be wrong objectively and unrea findings the OCCA’s regarding Gilson’s ac- sonable, may we not overturn them on tions and mental state.7 federal habeas review. Miller-El v. Cock rell, 322, 324, 537 U.S. sum, 123 S.Ct. In conclude the OCCA’s (2003). L.Ed.2d 931 to, contrary decision was neither nor an Although correctly Gilson testimony, notes that tions of Bertha Coffman’s does findings OCCA's por- were findings improper inconsistent with not render the OCCA’s or be, subjective views merely the of, appear principles application unreasonable Justices; judgment should of individual and Tison. in Enmund outlined the maxi- factors to by objective informed end, sentenсe death Is Gilson’s Id. “To this possible mum extent.” disproportionate atti- public to the given must be attention his his- sentence concerning particular tudes offense? attitudes, legislative tory precedent, ar- Gilson appeal, issue his third In juries reflected response of and the violates the sentence his death gues that con- are to be sentencing decisions their of Clause Punishment and Unusual Cruel Id. sulted.” it is dis- because Amendment Eighth support In offense. proportionate b) propor- application OCCA’s asserts Gilson proposition, this tionality standards role in a direct find he had not “jury did Gil- analysis its In connection death,” [wa]s his “crime and that Shane’s on direct arguments son’s Enmund/Tison omission, Aplt. to act.” failing one of rejected addressed appeal, the OCCA circumstances,” “Under these Br. at 58. stating arguments, proportionality Gilson’s the death “imposition of argues, follows: as severity and irrevo- in its unique penalty, pen- argues the death Finally, [Gilson] in relation to the cability, is ‘excessive constitutionally disproportionate alty is consti- of his violation committed’ crime child abuse permitting to the crime v. Coker (quoting rights.” tutional penalty He the death murder. contends 584, 592, 97 S.Ct. Georgia, 433 U.S. (1) it does contribute (1977)). excessive as: is L.Ed.2d 982 punishment results goals to the a) Supreme Court Clearly established pain and suffer- imposition of needless

precedent (2) punishment grossly ing, and severity of the to the disproportionate clearly first task is to determine Our Georgia, v. See Coker crime. applicable this federal law established 2861, 2866, L.Ed.2d 97 S.Ct. Court, in several Supreme claim. (1977). constitu- discussing In Coker, cases, including as well Enmund sentence for tionality of the death Tison, general propor- has outlined kill, did not defendant who imposition tionality standards stated: Court Enmund standards, those “a penalty. death Under 153, 96 Georgia U.S. Gregg [428 and unconstitu- is ‘excessive’ punishment (1976)] L.Ed.2d 859 (1) contri- if it makes no measurable tional ob- announcing judgment opinion punishment acceptable goals bution to *27 penalty is death pur- “[t]he served that nothing more than the hence is and pur- principal two social pain said serve imposition poseless and needless and deterrence (2) retribution poses: out of grossly or suffering; by prospective offend- capital crimes severity of the crime.” proportion to the omitted). (citation Unless Coker, 2861. “A ers.” at 97 S.Ct. applied when those penalty death the test on either punishment might fail con- “Furthermore, measurably Eighth position Enmund’s these ground.” Id. goals, of these be, or both tributes one judgments should Amendment Moreover, noted, tran- the entire trial a review of unsupported by the evidence. As strongly suggests that much of Bertha script amply supported by findings were OCCA's testimony than truthful. was less Coffman's Tranny testimony and Isaac Coffman. than nothing purpose- dwelling. occupants house, it “is more The imposition pain elderly couple, less and needless an resisted and En- suffering,” and hence an unconsti- accomplices mund’s killed them. The punishment. tutional Coker v. Geor- result Enmund did not turn on the gia, 433 U.S. at 97 S.Ct. at 2866. mere fact that Enmund was convicted of Enmund, felony important murder. It is at 102 S.Ct. at to note U.S. how attenuated responsi- was Enmund’s bility for the deaths of the victims in

The Court stated that nei- that case. ther the deterrent nor the retributive case,

purposes penalty present of the death were ad- was con- by imposing penalty vanced the death victed of degree by first murder child upon Enmund as the Court was uncon- by abuse the commission of the child vinced “that the threat the death abuse or in degree the alternative first penalty imposed will be for murder will child through abuse the will- measurably deter one who does not Mil permitting ful of child abuse. 21 O.S. purpose 701.7(C). and has no intention or that life 1991, § We have determined Id., will be taken.” at 458 at 798- U.S. the evidence is sufficient to support ei- reaching 102 S.Ct. at 3377. In this ther ways of the alternative to commit conclusion, upon the Court relied degree first murder under the statute. fact killing only rarely occurred willfully permitting offense of child robberies, during the course of and such requires abuse murder a knowing and killing rarely as did occur even more permitting willful of child abuse to occur if resulted death sentences the evi- person authorized to care for the support dence did not an inference that child. Child abuse always does not re- Id., the defendant intended to Mil. death, sult in but death is the result U.S. 3377-78. often enough penalty the death retribution, for principle As justifiable should be considered as a de- stated the heart of the Court retribution felony terrent to the itself. Children rationale is that a criminal sentence are the most vulnerable citizens in our directly personal must be related to the They dependent communities. are on culpability of the criminal offender. parents, charged and others their care, sustenance, for justification protection,

As for care retribution as a Enmund, and guidance. Depending age executing very we think this depends physical development they much En- tend to be degree on the harm, culpability-what susceptible physical mund’s in- more Enmund’s tentions, death, expectations, if and actions even unreasonable force is in- context, were. American criminal long upon law has flicted them. Within this considered a legislative defendant’s intention-and action specific to address the guilt-to therefore his moral be critical legally crime of child abuse murder is to “the criminal culpa- justified. [his] (citation

bility,” omitted), and the Applying penalty death to this has penalties found criminal [Gilson], willfully, situation pur- wherein *28 unconstitutionally excessive in the posefully knowingly and vic- allowed the wrongdoing. absence of intentional tim to be to that abused the extent Id., at 458 U.S. at at 3378. resulted, in posi- death when he was a abuse, “geta- prevented

Enmund was the driver of the tion to have that cer- in way” robbery tainly car an armed of a serves both the deterrent and re- “Indeed,” argues, Br. at 62. he penalty. Aplt. of the death purposes tributive precedent to be no whatso- appears “there penalty will be death The threat a for a crime executing for defendant ever child abuse permitting for imposed failing prevent or permitting based on death of the child in the results which offense; of an nor is another’s commission responsibility parent a accentuates executing a defendant precedent there for with the care and charged person or Id. “His- there is no actus reus.” where that child a child has to protection legal a torically,” argues, “absent Gilson permits one who deter and will act, a duty prevent failure to act to abuse. all, let constituted no offense at crime has retribution, personal [Gilson]’s As for Second, Id. Gilson capital alone a one.” high. in is The this situation culpability precedent imposing is “no for argues there from that quite is different situation based on a state criminal statute death and the child abuse occurs where the require, does not and deter- which not aware of the abuse. individual is find, fails to the defendant mination which the death of responsibility for [Gilson]’s in offense.” Id. at participant was a attenuated as was the victim was not so Third, finally, argues that 64. and Gilson merely waited in Enmund who that of penalty based on imposition of the death car the victims were shot while “permitting” makes no meas- an offense of knowledge of or immediate con- had no goals punish- to the urable contribution of his co-defen- trol over the actions argument, support ment. of this Gilson participation personal dants. [GilsonJ’s produced proof trial no “[t]he asserts the vic- Coffman to abuse permitting harm, any resulting committed acts [he] resulted was tim to the extent that death (by harm be inflicted nor intended substantial, and there was major and another), children,” upon the and thus “the wilful participation that such proof unlikely threat of execution is to deter the the death knowing. Therefore [sic] required inaction to sustain the convic- for is not excessive retribution penalty (italics original). tion.” Id. at 67 Relat- his crime. edly, “executing Gilson asserts that a de- requirements Accordingly, we find avenge killing fendant he had no met, have been of Enmund Tison committing causing or intention of does penalty appropriate is an and the death measurably contribute to the retribu- first punishment for the crime of ensuring gets tive end of the criminal by permitting child abuse ” ‘just deserts.’ 68-69. assignment This these circumstances. problem arguments Gilson’s of error is denied. complete there is a disconnect be- (internal I, para- 8 P.3d at 922-24 tween them and the actual circumstances omitted). graph numbers example, might of his case. For while we c) challenges Gilson’s OCCA’s little, agree any, well that there is if histor- proportionality review contemporary support imposi- ical for or chal general Gilson asserts three penalty tion of the death on a defendant crime, lenges proportionality to the re act merely prevent OCCA’s who fails to First, glaring committing view. “there is a had no intention of who victim, precedential support causing lack of historical or the death of the those are presented him. circumstances here.8 In imposing penalty” upon the death not the does, however, appear relatively lowing to be convicted of first There to be defendant support among the for al- substantial states *29 Tison, Supreme Court made clear that 1995, Coffman’s death in August “the stat- proportionality review takes into account ute was § codified as 21 O.S. 843 and merely findings necessarily inher- ‘permitting’ defined as a crime committed verdict, jury’s any ent in the but also ‘by one under a legal duty to render aid to ” findings subsequently Enmund/Tison the child.’ Id. at 71-72. by appellate

made the state trial or courts. a) Clearly findings Supreme The OCCA’s established re- Court Enmund/Tison garding significant par- precedent Gilson’s active and ticipation and his reckless indifference to Gilson identifies Collins v. Youngblood, human effectively equated life Gilson with 37, 110 2715, 497 U.S. S.Ct. 111 L.Ed.2d 30 petitioners the two thereby Tison and (1990), as providing “clearly estab essentially allowed the OCCA to incorpo- lished federal law” applicable post his ex review, rate proportionality Tison’s own Collins, facto claim. including the Court’s conclusion impo- Court offered following explanation of penalty sition of the death in such circum- the constitutional prohibition against ex Thus, proper. stances was we are not post facto laws: persuaded that proportionality the OCCA’s Although the Latin phrase “ex post to, contrary review was anor unreasonable literally facto” encompasses any law of, application clearly established federal passed fact,” “after the it long has been law. recognized by this Court that the consti prohibition tutional post on ex facto laws Ex Post Facto Violation applies only penal statutes which dis issue, In his fourth Gilson advantage the offender affected first-degree murder conviction rests on Bull, 386, them. Calder v. Dall. 390- elements set forth in a statute enacted 392, (1798) 1 L.Ed. 648 (opinion of death, after thereby Shane Coffman’s re- Chase, J.); id., (opinion at 396 of Pater sulting a violation of Ex Post Facto son, J.); id., Iredell, at 400 (opinion of Clause. Gilson jury

1228 tively the definition of crimes or that makes an action alter Every law

“1st. law, passing of the punishment increase the for criminal done before * * * done, innocent when which was acts. criminal; such action. punishes 41-43,110 497 U.S. at S.Ct. 2715. Every aggravates law that 2d. Gilson, is Although not cited there was, crime, than it greater makes it or Supreme opinion another relevant Cоurt Every 3d. law that committed. when 2000, May In that needs to be mentioned. and inflicts a punishment, changes approximately prior two months to the than the law an- punishment, greater ap- resolution of Gilson’s direct crime, OCCA’s when committed. nexed to peal, Court issued its deci- Every legal that alters the 4th. law evidence, less, Texas, 513, in and receives sion Carmell v. rules of (2000). different, testimony, 1620, than the law re- 146 L.Ed.2d 577 S.Ct. the time of the commission quired Carmell, acknowledged “that Court offence, to convict the of the in order Collins of what [’] [discussion constitute^] Id., (emphasis at 390 cryptic.” rather post law] an ex facto [wa]s offender.” original). 538, is, Id. at 120 S.Ct. 1620. That Early portrayed the Court opinions of calling categories the “[w]hile Colder’s four post exclusive definition of ex this as an laws, post of ex facto ‘exclusive definition’ laws, omitted). (citations So well facto also Beazell’s definition ] call[ed] DCarmell principles these that the accepted were ‘original a ‘faithful’ rendition of the under- Ohio, in Beazell v. U.S. Clause, standing’ though of the even (1925), was 70 L.Ed. quotation category omitted four.” Id. confidently summarize the mean- able to Thus, clarify the Court Carmell had to ing of the Clause as follows: category” post that the “fourth of ex facto settled, “It is decisions this laws mentioned Colder remained valid. that their cita- Court so well known And, 120 S.Ct. 1620. the Court with, any may dispensed tion be category clarified that this fourth punishes statute which as crime an “sufficiency aimed at what it referred to as committed, which previously act of the evidence rules” that “inform us done; when which makes innocent whether the evidence introduced is suffi- punishment more burdensome the (which cient to convict as a matter of law is commission, crime, or which after its convict, say jury only not to must but deprives charged one with crime of that, law, may as a matter of the case according to law defense available jury may submitted to the and the at the time when the act was commit- convict).”9 Id. at 120 S.Ct. 1620. ted, post ex facto.” prohibited Id., S.Ct., 169-170, at 68-69. b) rejection post ex OCCA’s Gilson’s (citation omitted) and footnote claim facto The Beazell formulation is faithful to post argu- Gilson asserted his ex facto our un- knowledge original best appeal. reject- ment on direct derstanding of the Ex Post Facto OCCA merits, Legislatures may stating Clause: not retroae- ed it on the as follows: [that, crime,] "sufficiency example prior purported pro- As an of the evi- of a rule," necessary dence to the case Court cited of Sir claimed that two witnesses were Fenwick, Parliament, Carmell, person high John which after convict treason.” crime, purported Fenwick’s amended "an act 529 U.S. at 120 S.Ct. 1620. *31 error, In challenges the first of his three assignment [Gil- In third of instructions, right to be free from the above stated law and contends his son] violated as the post jury facto laws was improperly ex was [Gilson] of on the elements jury 7115, § was instructed instructed under a law that was child abuse murder child abuse and enacted after the death of the victim and the time of not the law at which were many after of alleged acts abuse prohibition against The ex the offense. against were committed the other Coff- requires finding of post facto law man children. He contends some of the first, that the law was two elements: prosecution’s implied injured case he subsequent to the conduct enacted 1, prior children to November 1995. As second, being applied; it which was previously, stated acts of child [Gilson]’s disadvantage the offender it must one continuous transaction: abuse were State, by it. Allen v. 821 P.2d affected therefore, may while there have been (Okl.Cr.1991). 371, 375-76 some evidence of abuse inflicted [Gil- case, In present [Gilson] 1, 1995, prior to son] November most of charged causing with the death of Shane 1995, the acts occurred after November 17, August 1995. [Gilson] on or about apply and therefore it was not error to the other charged abusing was also Further, § to [Gilson]’s case. evi- July children between 1995 and Coffman injuries dence showed that certain to Tia 9, Prior to November February 1996. were, discovery and Isaac at the time of by child the first in February relatively recent. 701.7(C) O.S.1991, statute, § abuse certainly That abuse occurred after the O.S.1991, § for its referred to § O.S.Supp.1995, enactment of 21 7115. § definition of child abuse. Under argues applying next the ele- Permitting Child Abuse elements person of a for a responsible ment 3) 1) 2) knowingly, permitting, were: child’s health or welfare contained in the 4) force, injury or use of unreasonable §to 7115 violated ex 1996 amendment 5) age upon a child under the post principles facto as that element duty render aid legal one under a proof. lowered the State’s burden of He State, 751 P.2d to the child. Johnson v. prosecution trial asserts that at (Okl.Cr.1988) 1094, 1096 merely person to show he a had 1995, § renum- In November 843 was for the children’s health and responsible § S.Supp.1995, 7115. bered as O. welfare, proving a burden than lesser 1996, § defi- 7115 was amended and the legal duty had a to render aid as set “permitting” nition of was added to the § forth in “permitting” statute. The elements jury in this case was instructed 1) person responsible child are: a abuse part as follows: 2) welfare; know- for a child’s health or may per- convicted of person No 3) 4) injury/tor- ingly; permitted; injuring of a mitting beating ture/maiming/(use unreasonable proved has be- child unless State 5) force); upon age a child under the each element (2d) yond a reasonable doubt in- eighteen. 4-37. The OUJI-CR are: of the crime. These elements jury in this case given structions to the FIRST, person responsible re- permitting persons referred to welfare; SECOND, child’s health or sponsible for the child’s health or wel- THIRD, permitted; knowingly; consistent with OUJI-CR fare and were torture, (2d) FOURTH, injury, or use 4-37. force; FIFTH, ian, custodian, upon parent, person unreasonable foster age of eighteen. years age under the eighteen child or older with (2d) parent whom the child’s cohabitates or 4-37. The list of defini- OUJI-CR any residing other adult in the home of fol- given to included the tions Proving any the child. of the alterna- lowing: § tives in 7115 is lesser of a for a responsible Person child’s wel- proving burden than the minimum re- *32 a parent, legal guardian, fare-includes § quirement under 843 that the custodian, defen- parent, person foster a voluntarily dant had years age or assumed the care of eighteen older the child. parent the child’s cohabitates or whom residing adult in the home any other Further, the evidence in this case of the child. clearly parent- showed had a [Gilson] language This is consistent with O. child relationship with the children. 845(B)(4) § S.Supp.1992, renumbered as equal responsi- [Gilson] stated he shared 7102(B)(4). § O.S.Supp.1995, See bility in disciplining with Coffman (2d) also OUJI-CR 4-39. parenting the children. He said he and O.S.1991, the renumbered 21 family Under Coffman a pro- wanted to be “by § the element one under a parents. vide the children with two In legal duty to render aid to child” concerning statements disciplining in the uniform was defined instruc- children, part he often stated “that’s tions as follows: of being parents.” Coffman also stated person legal duty

A is under a to given authority she had [Gilson] to disci- aid to a if render child statute she, [a pline the children and that the chil- imposes duty a to render aid to the dren trying were all to a (husband-wife) (parent-child) child] [a evidence, family. Under this the State relationship per- exists that between proved parent-child relationship as and the duty [a son contractual child] §§ forth in Any set both 843 and 7115. to render aid to the child has been differences in the by definitions of one person] assumed that person [that legal duty under a to render aid to the voluntarily has assumed the care of child person responsible child’s the child]. [Gilson], welfare disadvantage did not (1st) 424. OUJI-CR deprive defense, him anof available nor O.S.1991, 843, §

Under in оrder to change necessary the facts to establish prove legal duty aid, to render Therefore, guilt. post no ex facto viola- prosecution had prove relationship to tion occurred. victim,

between the defendant and the (internal I, Gilson 8 P.3d at 914-16 para- parent-child, either husband-wife or a omitted). graph numbers duty contractual to render aid to the c) Gilson’s challenge to the OCCA’s ex child has been person assumed that post analysis facto or that the defendant had voluntarily Gilson general challenges asserts four assumed the care of the child. Under post OCCA’s ex facto analysis, which S.Supp.1995, § 10 O. in order to proceed First, support finding address turn. the defendant was Gilson contends responsible welfare, for the that “the OCCA child’s denied prosecution had to relief prove a certain rela- based on a continuous transaction tionship theory between the pertinent only injury-to-child defendant and the to the child, parent, either that of legal guard- charges” and “the result was that the evi- “ child) laws, it type (injury post one of crime facto the legal ‘alter[ed] dence of ” anoth- support was used to a conviction for required rules of evidence’ and the re “ (murder).” Br. at 74. In other Aplt. er ‘less, different, ceipt testimony, words, effect argues, [wa]s Gilson “the than required the law at the time of the penalty with the death for his punish [him] offense, commission in order to con ” against the other children who did crimes Calder, (quoting vict the offender.’ Id. Although Id. is correct not die.” Dall., 648). short, L.Ed. utilized a “continuous the OCCA asserts that “the point OCCA missed the theory, it transaction” clear from the that the change of statute included [him] opinion OCCA’s that rationale was jury might when the well not have found apply solely injury intended to to the him liable for murder under the earlier charges, first-degree child and not to the language....” Indeed, charge. it would have *33 unnecessary analyze been for the OCCA Although may Gilson well cor be remaining post arguments ex facto Gilson’s rect in asserting the newer statute had it concluded that the continuous trans- effectively “widened the net of those who theory action allowed the newer statute to responsible could be” held for permitting properly applied first-degree be to the (i.e., by child encompassing abuse individu Moreover, charge. simply murder there is who, statute, als under the older did not support no for Gilson’s bald assertion that victim), “legal duty” owe a to the child type (injury “evidence of one of crime that, important point by as concluded child) support was used to a conviction for amply supported by the OCCA and as (murder).” another the trial Our review of trial, presented evidence Gilson was re firmly transcript establishes that the first- sponsible under both the older and the charge spe- was based statutes, application newer and thus the regarding cific and substantial evidence case, although the newer statute to his day the chain of events on the of Shane’s incorrect, procedurally did in an not result death. post specifically, ex facto violation.10 More In challenge his second to the OCCA’s evidence, the State’s which we outline in decision, that, contrary Gilson asserts below, firmly greater detail established OCCA, by the conclusion reached voluntarily that Gilson had assumed the is a substantial difference between “[t]here children, care of Coffman and thus duty having prove legal to a child and under the older had a statute would have merely person proving cohabitates legal duty to render aid to Shane Coffman. parent with the of the child.” Br. at Aplt. sum, then, In we conclude that Gilson had 75. Gilson further asserts that the newer death, warning, fair at the time of Shane’s applied statute that was in case effec illegal, that his conduct was and thus there tively “widened the net of those who could was no ex facto Miller post violation. See ‘permitting’ be defined as such child Florida, 423, 429-30, 482 U.S. 107 S.Ct. “proving abuse” because mere cohabitation (1987) (noting that 96 L.Ed.2d 351 proving legal is a lesser burden than addition, legisla the Ex Post Facto Clause restrains duty....” Id. at 76. In he as serts, category enacting “arbitrary fourth of ex tures from or vindie- citing Calder’s 2005) (noting interpretations 10. To the extent Gilson takes issue with the that state court statutes, interpretation OCCA’s of the two we binding in of state law are on this court by interpretation. Par are bound OCCA’s proceedings). habeas Scott, (10th ker v. 394 F.3d Cir. noted, laws, previously pre- that individuals are have the evidence and ensures tive” effect). warning” of a law’s given “fair at trial overwhelming- sented State ly voluntarily established that Gilson as- reliance on Calder’s As for Gilson’s duty sumed a of care towards the Coffman laws, facto there category post of ex fourth Shortly children. after Gilson and Bertha First, with it. the newer problems are two relationship Coffman entered into a applied in Gilson’s case statute that was (well one another in the fall of 1994 before catego- fall within Caldeas fourth does not statute, they began living together), began In the newer which Gilson ry. particular, statute) (like simply outlines the assisting the older Coffman the care and disci- permitting elements of the crime of child pline July of her children. Gilson abuse, “sufficiency is not a of the evidence begin invited Coffman and her children to in that it does not “inform us wheth- rule” Thereafter, living with him at his trailer. introduced is sufficient to er evidence jointly engaged Gilson and Coffman Carmell, convict as matter law....” discipline care and of the children. For Second, example, Gilson established the rules re- assuming contrary, to the con- even garding sleep where the children could clude, stated, already for the reasons room), (only living they in the which rooms application was not harmed physically could inside the trailer words, of the newer statute. In other (they prohibited were from going either if within even the newer statute falls Cald- *34 bedrooms), they of the two when and what category er’s fourth and there was a tech- eat, prohibited could and them from at- violation, post nical facto ex we conclude church, tending playing school or or from beyond a reasonable doubt that Gilson was outside the trailer. regularly Gilson also by it prejudiced not because the State’s disciplined each of the Coffman children evidence was sufficient to establish his by way long periods standing guilt and under both older the newer wall, bathroom, beatings, placement in the statute. deprivation of food and contact with challenge In his third to the OCCA’s Lastly, the other children. during his in- decision, Gilson contends he “had no officials, terviews with law enforcement authority permit permis- or to withhold Gilson admitted that he and Coffman were because, sion from Coffman un- [Bertha] “plan[ning] bein[g] on husband and wife statute, ... language der the the [older] formin[g] family gettinfg] [were] legal duty.” Aplt. no Br. at had down,” ROA, some of the basics State specifically, More Gilson that “the State’s Exhibit that the two of mere fact of cohabitation did not ... con- equal them shared responsibility par- legal duty fer such and thus did not children, enting the both were prerequisite authority.” confer the Id. at in disciplining involved the children. Id. at result, argues, 80-81. As a Gilson “[t]he (“Yeah, part being that’s parents.”). that he not permitted defense could have this child abuse was thus taken from him In his fourth and final challenge to the in giving the trial court’s actions decision, OCCA’s that ap- contends instructions on predicated laws amended plication of the newer statute in his case death, disadvantage to [his] after Shane’s deprived him of the defense he lacked in violation of Ex Post Facto authority permit permis- to withhold clause-” Id. at 81. sion from Bertha summarily Coffman. We reject arguments easily rejected. These are this contention for the reasons we found, As essentially the OCCA already and as we have discussed. provide penalty may [constitutionally]

Trial court’s death refusal instructions re lesser imposed under ... circumstances” where

included jury permitted “the was not to consider a offenses guilt verdict of of a lesser included non- appeal, In fifth Gilson con- his issue offense, capital and when the evidence “Eighth and Fourteenth tends that his supported would have such a verdict....” rights violated” as a re- Amendment were 627, 100 judge’s trial to instruct sult of “the refusal 447 U.S. at S.Ct. 2382. The Court jury on the lesser included offenses of explained that “when unques the evidence murder, degree depraved second mind and tionably establishes that the defendant is degree manslaughter.” Aplt. ‍​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‍on second serious, guilty of a violent offense—but Br. at relevant to 84-85. The facts this leaves some doubt respect with to an ele contention are as follows. At the conclu- justify ment that would conviction of a evidence, first-stage sion of the Gilson re- capital give jury offense—the failure to quested that the trial court instruct the ‘third option’ convicting on a lesser jury on what Gilson asserted were the included offense would inevitably seem lesser included offenses of murder in the enhance the risk an unwarranted convic degree second and second man- tion.” Id. at 100 S.Ct. 2382. “Such a Tr., slaughter. Vol. X at 2108. The trial risk,” stated, the Court “cannot be tolerat rejected requests. doing court Gilson’s ed in a case which the defendant’s life is so, that, the trial court concluded at stake.” Id. respect request to Gilson’s for an instruc- degree, tion on murder in the second Beck, To on a claim succeed under “there sufficient evidence to [wa]s no[t] capital a state seeking defendant federal depraved establish an element of mind and habeas relief “must show that the evidence respect conduct....” With Gilson’s trial presented permit would a rational request for an manslaugh- instruction on guilty to find him of the lesser includ ter, trial court concluded “there [wa]s *35 acquit ed offense and him first-degree of possible no of negligent evidence conduct. Sirmons, 655, Young murder.” v. 486 F.3d believed, If the State’s evidence is the acts (10th Cir.2007) (citing Hogan 670 v. Gib described are intentional acts which the son, (10th Cir.1999)). 1297, 197 F.3d 1307 jury find could occurred and caused the dissent, by As noted “this Court has and, so, death of Shane if Coffman were question decided whether a con n[ever] acts, knowingly permit- intentional done or cerning sufficiency the evidence to by ted the defendant.” Id. aAs result of support giving of a lesser included ruling, jury the trial court’s in- offense instruction is a matter of law or solely charge structed on the of first de- fact, and therefore reviewable under gree murder under the two alternative 2254(d)(1) 2254(d)(2).” § §or Boltz v. State, alleged by jury theories and the (10th Mullin, 1215, 415 F.3d 1233 Cir. ultimately a guilty returned verdict of 2005). Although it is no means out that charge. case, agree

come-determinative in this a) Clearly established Supreme Court question with the dissent that it is a mixed

precedent and fact thus law and is reviewable 2254(d)(1). See, Elo, § e.g., under Samu v. Alabama, Gilson identifies Beck v. 447 (6th Cir.2001) (re 477, Fed.Appx. 14 478 2382, 100 U.S. 65 L.Ed.2d 392 2254(d)(1)); § viewing question under (1980), providing “clearly estab- Abeyta, United States v. 27 F.3d 473 applicable lished federal law” to this claim. Beck, (10th Cir.1994) In held “that trial (treating court’s deci-

1234 evidence, (citation supported by included offense are give a lesser sion not omitted). question determining a mixed of law and and footnote instruction as fact). sufficiency sup we conclude that specifically, More the evidence to of whether port a court’s determination a lesser offense we look at whether state at trial was suffi- presented might jury acquit the evidence a the evidence allow justify the Beck standard cient under greater the defendant offense finding is not a lesser-included instruction Hogan convict him of the lesser. v. See fact, legal (10th rather a deter- Gibson, of historical but 197 F.3d Cir. аssessing body 1999) Alabama, mination reached after v. citing Beck U.S. of the elements of the light evidence 625, 636, 2382, 2388, 100 S.Ct. alleged offense. (1980). lesser-included Only L.Ed.2d 392 if there is negate evidence which tends to an ele law, “all Oklahoma lesser Under offense, greater ment of which would are forms of homicide considered lesser charge, reduce the should instructions degree offenses of first murder.” included given. on a lesser included offense be State, (citing v. 991 P.2d Shrum State], [611,] See Fairchild 998 P.2d [v. Thus, (Okla.Crim.App.1999)). both of (Okla.Crim.App.1999) 627 [ ]. See also Gilson, i.e., second- the offenses cited Scalf, United States 708 F.2d degree second-degree murder and man (10th Cir.1983) (“a lesser included slaughter, are were and considered lesser- given offense instruction should not be first-degree included offenses of murder. unless there is evidence to support

b) finding that the lesser offense was com rejection OCCA’s Gilson’s Beck greater mitted while the offense was claim not”). Gilson asserted his Beck claim on direct Murder in the second degree occurs rejected appeal. The OCCA it on the mer- perpetrated by imminently “when an act its: dangerous person to another and evinc- error, assignment In his ninth [Gil- mind, ing depraved regardless hu- trial contends the court erred son] life, although any man without premedi- failing to instruct the on the lesser design tated to effect the death of included offenses of second mur- O.S.1991, particular individual.” degree manslaughter. der and second 701.8(1). § argues, and the request- The trial court denied [GilsonJ’s concedes, State when an individual finding ed instructions “no sufficient evi- *36 wilfully maliciously injures, tor- [sic] an dence to establish element of de- tures, or uses unreasonable force on praved support mind and conduct” to child can question there be no but that degree second murder and “no evidence acting the individual is with a depraved possible negligent conduct” to support mind. agree and the also [Gilson] State degree manslaughter. second addition, in committing the abuse prosecution, In a criminal the trial child, in which results the death of a but duty correctly court has the instruct kill, without the imminently intent to is jury on the salient features of the However, dangerous conduct. as the law raised the evidence without a defendant, out, points State these elements do not (citations request by negate the element that the victim was a omitted). This means that all lesser child. necessarily forms of homicide are includ- O.S.1991, 701.7(C),

ed By enacting § and instructions on lesser 21 forms they Legislature clearly homicide should be administered if intended to make

1235 occurring during fully intentionally a homicide the commis inflicted such permitting or the of child abuse sion of abuse to the extent that Shane died as a Drew, degree murder. 771 to be first result or that he did nothing at all. The P.2d 228. Where child abuse commit support evidence does not a finding that O.S.1991, 7115, § 21 ted violation of merely acted depraved [Gilson] with a child, results the death of the having mind taking no intention of 21 specific provision homicide O.S. victim’s life. 1991, 701.7(C), § should be used. Fair As for the degree offense of second child, Here, 998 P.2d at 627. the victim manslaughter, to warrant such an in- child, clearly was has not [Gilson] struction presented evidence must be greater shown that the offense first trial showing the culpable defendant’s degree murder not committed. negligence, [citation omitted]. The evi- Therefore, support the evidence did not dence here did not degree show a an instruction on degree second de amounting carelessness to a culpable praved mind murder. disregard rights safety Further, was not entitled to [Gilson] others to warrant an instruction on sec- an instruction on degree second de- ond degree manslaughter, omit- [citation praved mind murder as he has failed to Evidence of par- ted]. active [Gilson]’s show that under presented the evidence ticipation in the abuse of the victim trial, jury acquit a rational him would jury would not lead a rational acquit degree of first murder and find him him degree of first murder and convict guilty of the lesser offense of second him degree of second manslaughter. degree murder. is entitled to [Gilson] Further, this Court has held that a an instruction on second defendant entitled to instructions only if the evidence at trial would allow any lesser included offense when he rationally conclude that his against charge by defends proclaim conduct was not with the done intention State, ing his innocence. Hooker v. taking an the life of individual. 21 1351, (Okl.Cr.1994), P.2d cert. de 701.8(1). O.S.1991,§ nied, 516 U.S. 116 S.Ct. Here the evidence showed that [Gil- (1995); State, L.Ed.2d 106 Snow v. willfully either and intentionally son] (Okl.Cr.1994), denied, P.2d cert. participated the abuse of Shane or 115 S.Ct. knowingly permitted that he Coffman (1995). L.Ed.2d 1120 defense [Gilson]’s abuse Shane to the extent that death was that he did not commit nor did he resulted. The Coffman children testi- any know of abuse to of the chil fied acted with Coffman each asleep dren. He claimed he was on the instance of abuse inflicted on Shane the sofa while Coffman was in the bathroom day he died. Coffman testified she disci- only with Shane. He confessed that his plined day Shane that and that [Gilson] hiding bad act body lying room, stayed in except the other for the *37 Here, about Shane’s death. the evi two times he attended to the shower dence showed either wilful [Gilson]’s doors and the him time she saw exit the and malicious infliction of or [sic] shortly bathroom before the victim was permitting the infliction of child abuse breathing. pre-trial found not In his nothing or it showed he knew about the statement, said all he [Gilson] did was Therefore, on sec abuse. instructions spank put him in Shane the bathtub. degree degree a ond murder and second This evidence would lead reasonable jury to conclude that Ac- manslaughter either will- were not warranted. [Gilson] support trial was more than sufficient the trial court did abuse eordingly, ” denying requested giving an instruction.... [such]

its discretion assignment of error This Aplt. challenge, instructions. Br. at 87-88. This howev- er, with, easily rejected. is denied. To begin is Gil- cases, cites to no and we found son have (internal I, para- P.3d 917-18 Gilson none, that would have bound the omitted). OCCA graph numbers purported the State’s concession as to the e) challenge to OCCA’s Gilson’s sufficiency impor- of the evidence. More analysis tantly, apparent it is that the OCCA’s con- challenges each Gilson hinged clusion not on its view of the evi- by offered the OCCA in three rationales trial, presented dence but instead on its that he was entitled to rejecting his claim that, legal conclusion under Oklahoma’s degree on second murder. an instruction scheme, statutory an guilty individual below, greater detail As outlined degree murder second child was that the final two rationales of conclude effectively responsible having for commit- are, indeed, by suspect, fered the OCCA ted, required and thus was to be convicted rationale, standing initial but that of, degree first child abuse murder. Stat- alone, represents application a reasonable Beck, effectively ed terms of the OCCA 2254(d)(1). § We Beck. See 28 U.S.C. concluded, view, reasonably inso our reasonably also conclude the OCCA that Gilson was not entitled to an instruc- applied rejecting Beck in Gilson’s claim because, degree tion on second murder jury that he was entitled to instruction scheme, statutory jury under Oklahoma’s on the lesser included offense of second rationally acquitted could not have Gilson degree manslaughter. degree of first child abuse murder and The first rationale offered the OCCA him degree convicted of second murder. rejecting request Gilson’s for an in- The OCCA’s second rationale for affirm- degree struction on second murder was ing the state trial reject court’s decision to that, assuming present- the evidence even request Gilson’s for a degree second mur- jury ed at trial would have аllowed a that, view, der instruction its reasonably find the existence of all the “evidence would lead a reasonable murder, degree elements of second willfully conclude either fact that the victim in uncontroverted intentionally inflicted such abuse to the effectively required case was a child Gilson extent that Shane died as a result or that degree of first be convicted I, nothing he did at all.” Gilson 8 P.3d at degree rather than second murder. More represents 918. Gilson this specifically, the noted that OCCA “an unreasonable interpretation of the Legislature “clearly Oklahoma intended to facts in Aplt. evidence.” Br. at 89. occurring during make a homicide particular, contends “the statement commission permitting of or the of child verdict,” jury’s is belied divided abuse degree to be first murder.” Gilson simply contrary “is to the pre- evidence I, 8 P.3d at 917. which, whole, sented considered as a could only challenge Gilson now asserts to “ support finding acted with a de- [he] this rationale inability ‘the to ne- praved having mind no intention of taking gate the element that’ the victim awas the victim’s life.” Id. child should not have barred the inclusion extremely question. This is an Al- jury instruction close [on second murder], party though presented because the the evidence proving the trial *38 case, State, clearly conceded the evidence at establishes that Gilson was inti- in, if mately primarily respon- only involved That leaves Gilson’s chal for, lenge the extreme abuse inflicted on to the OCCA’s sible conclusion that he death, jury jury to his a rational was not entitled to a prior Shane instruction on perhaps could have found Gilson acted the lesser included offense of second de Shane, gree manslaughter. intent to kill but rath- not with the conclu OCCA’s depraved with a mind and without the sion on primarily er this issue rested on the [Gilsonj’s taking intention of life. Even rationale that Shane’s as- ac “[e]vidence true, however, suming participation this is tive OCCA’s the abuse of the victim true, i.e., initial rationale still holds the would not jury acquit lead rational jury required have under him of degree would been Okla- first murder and convict statutory homa’s scheme to find him of degree manslaughter.”11 Gilson second I, guilty degree of first child abuse murder only Gilson 8 P.3d at 918. Gilson’s Thus, degree rather than second murder. challenge to this rationale is that unnecessary ultimately it is for us to de- guilty could have found him of second de gree cide whether the OCCA’s second rationale manslaughter “if Coffman [Bertha] ” passes muster under the AEDPA Aplt. stan- were believed.... Br. at 93. More dards. specifically, argues Gilson that “[r]eason jurors able could have concluded that evi by The final rationale offered the OCCA dence of failure to initially [his] intervene for rejecting Gilson’s claim that he was began physical when Coffman abuse of an instruction degree entitled to on second Shane showed he was careless that he murder, i.e., that Gilson was not entitled to did not ordinary exercise care and cau instructions on lesser included of- words, tion.” Id. at 98. other against fenses because he defended that, on the “[b]ased evidence and first-degree charge by proclaiming murder testimony, jurors may reasonable have innocence, previously rejected has been concluded was careless in his [he] failure by this court as inconsistent with Beck. See to intervene to prevent the abuse as it Mullin, Hooker v. 293 F.3d occurred.” Id. at 99. (10th Cir.2002); Gibson, Mitchell v. (10th Cir.2001). Thus, F.3d arguments 1049-50 Gilson’s notwithstanding, we it rejected must likewise be in this case. conclude the OCCA’srationale was neither noted, however, to, As we contrary have the OCCA’s nor an applica- unreasonable sufficient, of, standing alone, first rationale is Although tion Beck. it is true that Ber- rejection to render reasonable the attempt- OCCA’s tha Coffman testified at trial and that, Beck, downplay Gilson’s claim under he was ed to Gilson’s involvement Shane, to an testimony entitled instruction on second death of her was riddled inconsistencies12, murder. with internal was con- anything spank The OCCA also offered the alternative ra- he did more than tionale that Gilson was not entitled to instruc- general her correct children. Her denials degree manslaughter tions on second belied, because however, by were her admission against first-degree he defended investigators explosive that Gilson had an charge by proclaiming his innocence. As not- temper, punish- that there had “been so much ed, previously rejected this rationale has been house,” ment in [Gilson’s] Coffman 2/12/1996 by this court as inconsistent with Beck. Interview Tr. at that her were children "punishments,” afraid of Gilson’s id. at example, regard- 12. For Coffman's statements and that her children talked about Gilson ing types of abuse inflicted Gilson on "doing hustings most of his with force.” Id. dramatically. Throughout Shane varied most general at 184. Her denials were also belied interviews, post-arrest of her Coffman was during post- her admission her second Gilson, clearly protective generally denying *39 all of the other witnesses’ led to Shane’s death.” Dissent at 3. There virtually trary to contrary to testimony, significant and was likewise in this are at least three flaws by presented First, evidence physical analysis reasoning. the dissent’s af- overwhelming weight of the State. virtually fords no deference to the OCCA’s evidence, in which we recounted State’s presented of the evidence assessment addressing in detail Gilson’s Enmund/Ti- examining trial. Rather than the evidence claim, that Gilson was not son established eye presented at trial with an toward de- merely but rather was intimate- negligent, termining whether the determina- OCCA’s and, at a ly in the abuse of Shane involved reasonable, appears to tion was the dissent minimum, causing with the intent of acted presented review the evidence as if this State, physical him harm.13 See Ball v. ultimately a direct and substi- appeal, were (not- (Okla.Crim.App.2007) 173 P.3d judgment tutes its own for in “ordinary negligence resulting ing that OCCA. death is to warrant a conviction sufficient in major The second flaw the dissent’s ”). second-degree manslaughter..... for testimony reasoning is that the of Bertha Thus, reviewing the OCCA’s determination remotely begin Coffman does not even in under the deferential standard outlined injuries account for either the serious sus- 2254(d)(1), § we conclude the OCCA rea- tained Shane or the cause of his death. jury that a rational sonably determined According testimony, to Coffman’s her convicted of second could not have Gilson physical day contact with Shane on the acquitted him degree manslaughter spanking his death was limited to or swat- turn, murder. In degree first child abuse him ting approximately fifteen times on his reasonably applied we conclude the OCCA legs, carrying bottom and the back of his determining that Gilson was not Beck in bathtub, an instruction on second him to the pressing entitled to on his manslaughter. shoulders to force him to sit back down in attempted up. the tub when he to stand jury, that a rational

The dissent Coffman also testified that at one point relying on Bertha Coffman’s trial testimo- slipped Shane in the and fell bathtub and and, ny apparently, Gilson’s post-arrest hit his head or face on the bathtub faucet. police, statements to could have found that worst, assuming Even none of these played part abusing “Gilson no Shane jury events could have allowed the to make day he died and he asleep during on the couch the abuse that findings regarding rational how Shane because, “whipped” felony” "[a]cting jointly arrest interview Gilson had in the with Coffman, days” couple "a Shane before Shane’s he took Shane outside the trailer trial, Coffman, having at 147. At party death. and was to conduct which elicited child,” also, separated been together from Gilson for over two screams from the had, fact, Coffman, years, acknowledged that Gilsоn with “took Shane back inside the to,the severely all of her abused children. More- trailer ... and ... remained bathroom over, observing admitted periods Coffman use him in the bathroom head, I, turn, top a board to hit Shane on the of his time.” Gilson at 920. P.3d shoulders, chest, legs. his his She findings concluded have that those were am- person also that Gilson ply supported by presented testified last the evidence prior Although alone with Shane in the bathroom to his suggests trial. the dissent that the death, and that she was awakened a loud rationally could have found that Gilson during sound bathroom "played part from the that time. abusing day no Shane the died,” 3, any Dissent at such conclusion noted, OCCA, already contrary As we have would be to both the OCCA’sEn- making findings, specifical- findings its and our affirmance of Enmund/Tison mund/Tison ly major participant findings. found that Gilson "was a those *40 witness, pert acute multiple Draper, sustained the fractures Dr. Wanda testify or, by regarding credibility found the medical examiner14 more the of the Coffman importantly, testimony how he died.15 children’s violated his constitu- rights. tional begin analysis We our Lastly, assuming, arguendo, that even by reviewing key this issue events that rationally could have found that culminated in the ruling. state trial court’s asleep on the couch while Gilson Coff- Shane, ultimately man abused and April court, killed On the state trial then been an request, Gilson would have entitled to Gilson’s conducted an camera acquittal, not a of second-degree hearing regarding conviction competency of the is, manslaughter. surviving That Gilson’s conduct testify Coffman children to dur- would not ing have risen even to the level of the State’s Tr. case-in-chief. Vol. TV necessary culpable negligence to be con- During at 840. hearing, that Gilson pre- of second-degree manslaughter. victed In- testimony sented the of Dr. Drap- Wanda deed, trial argued er, Gilson’s counsel this who holds a Ph.D in development child (i.e., theory same factual being Gilson and was a professor Department death) asleep during the abuse and to the Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences jury at the close of the first-stage proceed- College of Medicine at University ings jury rejected and the it. Dissent at 9 Oklahoma. Draper indicated that she had (discussing first-stage closing arguments competency concerns about of the counsel). of defense testify. Coffman children to Id. at 855. with, begin Draper To noted that the chil- testimony Trial court’s to allow refusal period dren “for a living of months were expert witness from defense under assumption by [created their issue, In his sixth that the mother and Gilson] one of their broth- state trial court’s refusal to allow his ex- ers run away, [Shane] had but the assump- (i.e., Larry Balding, deputy vertebrae), 14. Dr. medical ex- brae the lower-most neck T- 2, T-3, T-4, remains, aminer who examined T-10. Id. at 1953-54. Shane’s testi- fied that he found evidence of acute fractures Ball, this with Contrast recent OCCA with, throughout body. begin Shane's To alleged support case cited the dissent in Balding testified there was a fracture to therein, position. its The defendant Carlis jaw, separation Shane’s and a fracture of the Ball, Anthony charged with and convict- (i.e., zygoma right on the side of the skull first-degree ed of child abuse murder in the bone). Balding opined cheek Tr. at 1943. scalding two-year-old death of his son. On by sepa- that these two fractures were caused appeal, argued Ball trial court erred they opposite rate blows because were on refusing request for instructions on the head, 1944-46, sides of the id. at and that it second-degree lesser-included offense of man- great would have taken a deal of force to slaughter. agreed, noting The OCCA jaw Balding cause the fracture. Id. at 1946. spill injury Ball had described an "accidental further testified that he found a "localized subsequent ... in his 911 call and state- complex fracturing involving the clavicle left responding firеfighters, ments” to P.3d collarbone,” id. at fractures of "the and that these "statements about his ribs, first, ribs," id., left second and third handling boiling of the water were sufficient blade, right a fracture of the shoulder id. at support as a matter of law an inference of Balding 1950-51. testified he found a left culpable negligence.” Id. at 91. Unlike the fracture, metaphyseal distal tibial here, which pro- situation the evidence cited Ball would have been consistent with some form explanation vided an alternate for how his twisting of blunt force or a severe young ultimately son was scalded and died. Lastly, Balding ankle. Id. at 1952. testified testimony Neither Bertha nor Gil- Coffman's spinal pro- that there were post-arrest provided fractures of the son’s statements an ex- (the bony protrusions) planation why cesses of the C-7 verte- of how or Shane died. a) Clearly established still alive. And then that he was tion was precedent they that he discovered changed Draper questioned not alive.” [wa]s Alaska, Davis v. Gilson identifies *41 “appreciate could the children whether the 308, 1105, L.Ed.2d 347 94 S.Ct. 39 U.S. the truth when their own to tell obligation (1974), Mississippi, 410 and Chambers ” them.... Id. at 859. lied to mother 284, 1038, 297 35 L.Ed.2d U.S. 93 S.Ct. be- stories “[t]he also noted Draper (1973), “clearly the estab- providing as the children among ha[d] tween and claim. applicable federal law” to this lished 862, opined that at and she changed,” id. Davis, emphasized In the Court trauma in enough had ha[d] the “children a criminal de- importance allowing very pros- it would be difficult adequately their lives that fendant to cross-examine accurately particular, recall witnesses. In the Court them over time to ecution exposure [prosecution] of a at At noted “that Id. actually happened.” what testifying proper is a witness’ motivation Draper’s testimony, Gil- the conclusion function of the constitution- important the testi- suppress moved to son’s counsel of cross-examination.” ally protected right children on mony based Coffman 316-17, at 94 1105. Such 415 U.S. S.Ct. accurately to competence lack of tes- their cross-examination, noted, would the Court relevant to the case. Id. tify about events revealing possible toward bi- be “directed state trial court overruled at 890. The ases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the motion, ruling reserved a final but they may directly witness as relate to is- competency to testi- each of the children’s personalities in the case at hand.” sues their individual voir fy until it had heard 316, right Id. at 1105. If this S.Ct. re- 895. With dire examinations. held, violated, the Court “no amount of testimony Draper, of Dr. spect to the showing prejudice of want of would cure concluded it “d[id] state trial court (internal it.” Id. at qualify meet the Daubert standards omitted). quotation marks testimony regarding credibil- expert direct Chambers, In the defendant in a Missis- “credibility ... a mat- ity,” [wa]s and that sippi proceeding sought state criminal fact.” Id. ter for the finder of prosecu- introduce reliable evidence that a 7, 1998, during the course of April Oh had, orally through tion witness case-in-chief, the state prosecution’s (that written confession was later recant- proceedings voir dire trial court conducted ed), being guilty of the murder admitted of each of the competency determine charged with. offense Chambers testify. At the conclusion children to trial to allow The state court refused thereof, trial court determined the state Chambers to cross-examine the witness on competent that all the children were credibility. Although Mississippi Su- at 1540. The testify. Id. Vol. VII State conviction, preme affirmed the Court testimony proceeded to introduce the of Supreme granted peti- Chambers’ children, each of the and Gilson’s trial and reversed. In tion for writ of certiorari counsel allowed to cross-examine each so, right doing “[t]he the Court noted that case-in-chief, During child. his own an in a criminal trial to due accused rеquest present essence, the testi- is, renewed his process right to a fair regarding credibil- mony Draper of Dr. opportunity against to defend the State’s Chambers, testimony. ity of children’s the Coffman accusations.” U.S. rights,” “Few the Court request. The state trial court denied that 93 S.Ct. 1038. held, (Okl.Cr.1995). “are more fundamental than that Daubert, present an accused to witnesses in his own Supreme Court stated expert that such Id. at defense.” 93 S.Ct. 1038. “In testimony is only admissible if it is both held, right,” the exercise of this the Court Daubert, relevant and reliable. accused, required State, “the as is 113 S.Ct. at inquiry 2799. This comply must pro- established rules of into reliability and relevance is two-fold. designed cedure and evidence to assure reliability The prong requires expert reliability both fairness and in the ascer- opinion testimony be about “scientific guilt tainment of and innocence.” Id. knowledge”. Taylor, 889 P.2d at 329. prong relevance involves the re- b) rejection OCCA’s Gilson’s claim *42 quirement that proffered testimony appeal, his direct Gilson challenged “assist the trier of fact to understand the state trial court’s refusal to admit the the evidence or to determine a fact in testimony of Dr. Draper, arguing that the issue.” Id. at 330. ruling state trial court’s was unreasonable argues Draper’s [Gilson] Dr. testimo- and violated his constitutional rights. The ny “undoubtedly involved ‘scientific did not argu- OCCA address Gilson’slatter ”, knowledge’ and that the relevant ment, simply and instead affirmed the question here is Draper’s whether Dr. evidentiary ruling: state trial court’s testimony would have assisted the trier ... the trial court of fact. While we appreciate [Gilson]’s in excluding testimony erred the trial offer to reduce our by focusing work Dr. Draper. hearing After in-camera only prong one analysis, of the Daubert testimony Dr. Draper, from trial we find it necessary to review both testimony court found the “does not prongs analysis prop- order to meet the Daubert qualify standards to erly ruling evaluate the trial court’s and expert testimony as direct regarding resolve allegation of error. [Gilson]’s credibility. credibility, The again, is a Co., In Kumho Tire Ltd. v. Carmicha- matter for the finder of fact.” The trial el, 1167, 1174, 526 U.S. 119 S.Ct. court did allow the opportu- defense the (1999), 143 L.Ed.2d nity to have Dr. Draper “expert serve as testimony Court extended Daubert advisory counsel” and remain in the based on “technical” special- and “other during courtroom the children’s testimo- knowledge. ized” The Court stated ny to advise the defense as to areas of are, whether specific Daubert’s factors possible cross-examination and closing not, or are reasonable of relia- measures Further, argument. prior to closing bility particular in a case is a matter case-in-chief, their defense counsel re- grants that the law judge the trial broad request newed the to call Draper Dr. latitude to determine. 526 U.S. at the stand. The court denied the re- quest, accepted Draper’s but Dr. in-cam- Reviewing the record under the crite- testimony era an proof. offer of ria set forth in Daubert and Kumho we expert testimony admission of find Dr. Draper’s qualifications as an governed O.S.1991, generally by 12 expert do not seem to inbe doubt. She § 2702. In areas of novel scientific evi having testified to Ph.D. Child De- dence, this has adopted the stan velopment and working teaching dard set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Pharmaceuticals, the field Inc., development ap- of child Dow proximately twenty years. 113 S.Ct. 125 L.Ed.2d She also (1993). State, Taylor See during previous 889 P.2d stated that ten each of the chil- Draper in a hands-on Dr. interviewed participated

years she had once, trial, only just prior to directly worked dren which program The tri- five or six uniform neglected children. asked each of them abused have excluded her she had no questions. She testified al court seems theory her testimony upon knowledge of whether the statements based to testi- compеtent concerning not the facts the children were the children made qualifica- her lack of fy, upon or false. of the case were embellished tions. disclosure piecemeal She also stated among the facts is common child fac- generally to Draper

Dr. testified abuse victims. determining tors to be considered a competent could be whether child Having thoroughly reviewed the rec- ability including capacity and witness ord, trial court did not abuse we find the observe, ability to memory, intelligence, testimony. excluding its discretion in asked whether “it communicate. When testimony did not meet the Draper’s Dr. say failing correct to would be requirements Daubert “scientific or elicit information properly interview knowledge” testimony would not and the or impact a child can taint their from have assisted the trier of fact. Once the *43 ability accurately then relate an determined the children were trial court event?”, very answered “[t]hat’s she witnesses, competent Draper’s Dr. testi- yes.” Draper Dr. then great possibility, mony confusing and its would have been children specifi- addressed the Coffman speculative nature would not have been cally. Draper Dr. stated she inter- jury’s relevant to the determination of of the Coffman children viewed each credibility testimony. of children’s material from individually and studied Accordingly, testimony we find the was proceedings court and DHS. She assignment excluded. This properly as to whether each gave her conclusion error is denied. competent was of the Coffman children (internal I, para- at 907-08 Gilson P.3d concluded that testify. generally She omitted). graph numbers history life upon based the children’s c) challenge to the OCCA’s Gilson’s trauma, and neglect, abuse and the ef- analysis memory ability fect that on has not address Because the OCCA did Gil-

recall, the death of their combined with trial argument son’s the state court’s Shane, brother and the numerous inter- ruling rights, violated his constitutional in connection with the views conducted arguments de novo. must review those proceedings, court none the Coffman (“If Young, See 486 F.3d at 663 the state testify at competent children were merits, court did not decide a claim on the trial. procedurally it otherwise is not A review of the record shows there barred, legal we review the district court’s testimony regarding was no whether Dr. novo.”). so, doing how- conclusions de Draper’s theory effect of trauma ever, we ability competent the child’s to be a may provide corpus habeas relief on witness has been or can be tested. evidentiary rul- of state court basis showing general There no of its ings they rendered the trial so unless acceptance develop- in the field of child Further, fundamentally unfair that a denial of ment. Draper Dr. testified rights results. Because a only “great possibility” that im- constitutional as to analysis proper techniques im- fundamental-fairness is not sub- interview could elements, pact ability ject clearly legal to relate an event. definable child’s engaged when such an endeavor a Given the fundamental fairness gingerly federal court must tread analysis that applies issue, to this as well exercise considerable self-restraint. as the self-restraint that we are bound to exercise this setting, we conclude that (10th Mullin, Duckett v. 306 F.3d Gilson’s arguments can easily disposed Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks and ci- delving without into all of omitted). specif their tations ics. Although Gilson argues in essence Despite general Gilson’s assertion that trial state court applied Okla violated, his rights constitutional were evidentiary homa’s unfairly, rules a review supporting arguments focus almost exclu of the trial transcript firmly establishes sively on the merits of the state trial noted, otherwise. As the sole focus evidentiary court’s ruling. example, For Draper’s proposed testimony was the that, complains contrary Gilson to the con credibility of the Coffman trial children’s OCCA, clusion reached “the trial testimony. Although Draper formally judge ruling Draper’s based his on Dr. trained in child development, nothing conclusions, methodology not on her or her about her educational professional knowledge.” scientific Br. at Aplt. background necessarily qualified her to judge “once the ruled provide expert testimony on an issue nor competent children were under Okla mally exclusively reserved jury, for the homa Evidence Rules 2601 and i.e., credibility. Indeed, witness we have longer admissibility issue was no but the long held “credibility” of a witness “is weight jury give should their testimo generally appropriate not an subject for ny,” “Dr. Draper’s expertise should because, expert testimony” in part, it “en have been allowed to assist the in that upon jury’s croaches vital and exclu words, evaluation.” Id. In other *44 Gilson sive credibility function to make determi argues, “the trial judge gatek failed in his ” Adams, .... nations United v. States eeper role because he did perform not (10th Cir.2001) (internal F.3d proper rudimentary tests to assess the quotation omitted); marks and citations admissibility Draper’s of Dr. testimony in Smith, see United States v. 156 F.3d light of Daubert and proge its Oklahoma (10th Cir.1998) 1053-54 State, (Okla. ny, (affirming district Taylor v. 889 P.2d 319 court’s decision to proposed expert exclude Crim.App.1995).” Id. at 101-02. Similar testimony subject ly, eyewitness identi argues Gilson perpet “[t]he OCCA fication); Call, uated the trial United States v. judge’s error holding Dr. cf. (10th Cir.1997) F.3d Draper to general (“Although the outmoded accep experts the use of U.S., to bolster Frye tance standard of witness credi 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923).” disfavored, bility “This,” no pro Id. at absolute rule Gil- utilizing expert hibits argues, testimony son “is for this merely now an additional Moreover, purpose.”). important it is though not exclusive factor in to the Daubert ” that, emphasize analysis.... notwithstanding Id. the state Gilson also asserts that trial Draper’s court’s exclusion of OCCA further testimo “[t]he erred because it did ny, Gilson apply extensively was allowed to proper standard of review to cross-examine the proposition of error Coffman children and to regarding the tes timony Draper.” explore any alleged of Dr. Id. at 108. inconsistencies be More specifically, Gilson tween trial testimony prior that because the their and their judge testimony. Thus, state trial sworn gatekeeper “failed we conclude the role,” “the review of ruling this failure should state trial court’s un was neither have been de novo and not for abuse of reasonable nor rendered Gilson’s trial fun discretion.” Id. damentally unfair. powerful evidence investigate present two

In terms Gilson, trial court’s the state permanent extensive and establishing cases cited [his] depri- in a did not result evidentiary ruling Aplt. Br. at 110. “This damage.” brain right adequately vation of Gilson’s information,” argues, “could have Gilson (as witnesses prosecution cross-examine challenge capaci- been used to mental [his] Davis)16, deprive nor did it discussed and, crime” im- ty “[m]ore to commit the opportunity a fair right to Gilson of his ... should have been used as portantly, (as accusations the State’s against defend very well have result- mitigation and could ).17 noted, As Gil- in Chambers discussed in a less than death.” Id. ed sentence afforded a full and trial counsel was son’s arguments, each of opportunity support to cross-examine of these Gilson fair children, doing and in so was the Coffman temporarily paralyzed asserts that he “was credibility place their able to attack prolonged ... and unconscious suffered Further, jury. Gil- issue before of “an auto accident on ness” as result vigorously attacked son’s trial counsel 12, 1993.” According at 111. March Id. first-stage credibility during the children’s Gilson, impact caused severe head “[t]he Tr., X at E.g., Vol. closing arguments. injuries, including multiple, extensive facial (“These they to come kids know have fractures,” “in and cranial and resulted many things bad about say in here and organic damage.” brain Id. In permanent convicted.”); make sure he’s Don Gilson to turn, asserts, citing expert Gilson various all (“Unfortunately, pres- those id. witnesses, damage that the “brain had re all the trauma that light and in sures percussions personality on his and behav through, have been combi- these kids In particular, ior.” Id. at 112. Gilson unreliable, unbelieva- nation renders them damage asserts that the brain resulted ble.”). therefore conclude Gilson We personality dysfunc “severe executive and federal habeas relief on is not entitled to tion,” ability self-regu and a “decreased this claim. impulses....” late behavior or inhibit (internal omitted). present Trial counsel’s quotation marks These failure Gilson’s brain evidence behavior, post-accident changes in *45 damage contends, could have been affirmed tes timony family from members issue, “[n]umerous final that his failing acquaintances....” Id. at 113. trial “were ineffective for counsel omitted). view, simply inapposite. It 16. In Davis is tion marks is difficult to see how our Supreme in Davis "that the Davis is relevant to the issue of the state trial Court noted Draper testify. exposure [prosecution] court's refusal to allow Al- of a motiva- witness' though Draper would have testified as to the testifying proper important tion in is children, credibility constitutionally of the Coffman the state protected right function of the 316-17, ruling directly impact did trial court’s at of cross-examination.” 415 U.S. cross-examination, right Gilson's to cross-examine the Coffman 94 S.Ct. 1105. Such Indeed, noted, children. that cross-examination oc- “directed Court would be toward re- sought biases, curred well before Gilson to introduce vealing possible prejudices, ‍​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‍ulterior Draper's testimony. Dr. they may motives of the witness as relate directly personalities in the to issues or case 316, equate attempt Draper's pro- at hand.” Id. at 94 S.Ct. 1105. If this Gilson's held, violated, right posed testimony credibility is the Court "no amount with the crucial clearly showing prejudice evidence at in Chambers of want of would cure issue 318, (internal quota- ultimately unpersuasive. it.” Id. stretch and at 94 S.Ct. 1105 a) Clearly established Court Supreme resulting prejudice. Strickland

precedent Washington, 687, at 466 U.S. at S.Ct. 2064. See also Williams v. surprisingly, Not Gilson identifies Taylor, 862, 120 S.Ct. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. (2000). 146 L.Ed.2d 389 Strickland sets (1984), 104 S.Ct. 80 L.Ed.2d 674 as forth the two-part test which providing the must “clearly established federal applied to applicable law” determine to his claim of whether a ineffective defen dant Strickland, assistance of trial has been counsel. In denied effective assis Court tance First, held that “[a] convicted counsel. the defendant defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance must show that performance counsel’s was so defective require as to deficient, reversal of a second, he must show conviction or death sentence has two com- performance deficient prejudiced defense, ponents.” U.S. 104 S.Ct. 2052. [footnote omitted]. Unless “First,” noted, the Court “the defendant the defendant makes both showings, “it must show that performance counsel’s cannot be said that the conviction ... deficient.” requires Id. “This showing resulted from a breakdown in the adver that counsel made errors so serious that sary process that renders the result un counsel functioning was not ‘counsel’ Id., reliable.” 466 U.S. at 104 S.Ct. guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth at 2064. [Gilson] must demonstrate “Second,” Amendment.” the Court representation counsel’s was unrea noted, “the defendant must show that the sonable prevailing under professional performance deficient prejudiced the de- norms and that the challenged action fense.” Id. requires “This showing that could not be considered sound trial counsel’s errors were so serious as to de- strategy. Id., 688-89, 466 U.S. at prive the trial, defendant of a fair a trial S.Ct. 2065. The burden rests with whose result is reliable.” Id. “Unless a show that there ais reason defendant makes showings,” both probability that, able but unpro held, “it cannot be said that fessional by counsel, errors the result of conviction or death sentence resulted from the proceeding would have differ been a breakdown in the process adversary A ent. reasonable probability prob is a renders the result unreliable.” Id. ability sufficient undermine confi Id., dence the outcome. 466 U.S. at b) rejection OCCA’s Gilson’s claim 698, 104 at 2070. This Court has Gilson first raised the issue of ineffective stated the issue is whether counsel ex assistance of trial counsel on appeal. direct skill, ercised the judgment diligence The OCCA rejected Gilson’s arguments on of a reasonably competent at defense the merits: *46 torney light in of his perform overall in [Gilson] contends his thirteenth as- State, ance. Bryson 240, 876 P.2d signment of error that he was denied a (Okl.Cr.1994), denied, cert. fair trial and sentencing reliable pro- 1090, 752, L.Ed.2d 651 ceeding by the ineffective assistance of (1995). counsel. analysis An of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim begins with Filed with appeal the direct Ap- that is an presumption trial counsel was plication

competent Evidentiary for provide Hearing to guiding hand needed, Sixth accused Amendment and therefore Claim and Motion to the burden is on the Supplement, to pursuant accused demon- Rule strate both a performance deficient 3.11(B)(3)(b), and Rules of the Oklahoma upon that Penitentiary. Based State Title Ch. Appeals, of Criminal [Gilson] concluded (1998). testing, Hopewell in the Dr. asserts [Gilson] App. brain organic was ineffective from “irreversible counsel suffers

Application utilize avail- in nature and investigate and which is chronic failing syndrome in Attached to type damage evidence. mitigating classic for this able which [is] (12) affida- are twelve Application of traumatic a direct result and which is (2) are 18). two affidavits first (Exhibit The D, vits. Dr. pg. injury.” head trial counsel wherein [Gilson]’s from the C.A.T. he evaluated stated Messina medi- they received boxes they state concerning and medical records scans Hospi- Anthony’s Saint from cal records the records indi- He concluded [Gilson]. suf- injuries [Gilson] pertaining tal damage [Gil- extensive brain cated accident. automobile fered tempo- right and right frontal lobe son]’s see they did not state counsel Both and results from which remains ral lobe Axial (Computer C.A.T. to a reference accident on motor prior vehicle records, there- scan Tomograph) (Exhibit E). Dr. 12, 1993. March attempt locate no they made fore evaluated re- Rosenblum stated he dur- also state that Both counsel ?uch. Messina, Hopewell and as ports of Drs. case, they of the investigation ing their records. He as medical [Gilson]’s well who people mentioned to several spoke Hopewell of Drs. findings verified changes [Gilson] personality drastic that [Gil- and and Messina concluded also accident. Counsel the 1993 since damage in the area brain “severe son]’s trial, they did the time of that at stated Dr. compatible with affected is most physical extent the true not know evalua- neuropsychological Hopewell’s damage suffered psychological and/or result, prognosis As a [Gilson’s] tion. (Ex- accident. a result of the as [Gilson] very poor per- and improvement is B). A and hibits (Exhibit F). manent.” from L. Michael third affidavit The (6) affidavits are remaining six The Capital Di- Johns, investigator an co-workers family, friends and from of the Oklahoma Division Appeal rect drastic exhibited [Gilson] who state System. Mr. Johns Indigent Defense the 1993 au- changes after personality provided the files he reviewed stated mother [Gilson]’s accident. tomobile and counsel discovered trial [Gilson]’s to the prior step-father and state which indicat- Radiological Reports “two out of the did not act accident [Gilson] were of C.A.T. scans that two ed series attention to his ordinary, and showed and skull. brain [Gilson’s] taken of However, appearance household. 15, 1993, on March done first series was withdrew, accident he became after the done on series was and the second took appearance, careless stated Mr. Johns also March 1993.” eating only habits on bizarre such personally May that on unnatural having an foods and certain Anthony’s Hospital picked up from Saint (Exhibits G other food fear of items. conduct- the C.A.T. scans all of copies of H.) co-workers stated Friends and C). (Exhibit [Gilson], ed on distant un- often seemed (3) are from affidavits The next three ac- surroundings after the of his aware Ph.D., Albert V. *47 Alan Hopewell, C. L). (Exhibits I, J, K, and cident Rosenblum, Messina, M.D., Jay A. and contends in- Application [Gilson]’s he conducted Hopewell stated M.D. Dr. in the affidavits contained formation of [Gil- evaluation a neuropsychological convincing and the “clear 1999, 24, [sic] constitute May Oklahoma on son] necessary evidence” under 143, Rule 3. (1991), 116 L.Ed.2d 109 quot ll(B)(3)(b)(i) to demonstrate a strong ing Glick, United States v. 710 F.2d possibility trial counsel was ineffective. (10th. Cir.1983). Accordingly, urges [Gilson] this Court to Here, police [Gilson] told he never so find and to order an evidentiary hear- Shane, abused but merely assisted in the ing fully address the ineffectiveness decision concerning what to do with the issue. body and the removal of the body. Fur 3.11(B)(3)(6) Rule allows an appellant ther, he said he never any abused to request an evidentiary hearing when children, other that it was Bertha Coff- it alleged appeal is on that trial counsel man who abused the children. [Gilson]’s was ineffective for failing to “utilize mother step-father they testified available evidence which could have never saw [Gilson] abuse the children been made during available the course and that appeared children to be ” of trial.... Once application an has fond of [Gilson]. Based upon this evi been properly along submitted with sup- dence, it was a reasonable decision affidavits, porting Court this reviews the based upon their professional judgment application to if it see contains “suffi- for defense counsel to focus on Bertha cient evidence to show this Coffman as the perpetrator actual clear and convincing evidence there is a pursue a defense of actual innocence on strong possibility trial counsel was inef- part. [Gilson]’s That strategy fective for failing to identify utilize or proved unsuccessful is not grounds for complained-of evidence.” Rule branding counsel ineffective. Absent a 3.11(B)(3)(b)(i). showing of incompetence, [Gilson] Upon affidavits, review of the we find bound by the decisions his counsel trial counsel was aware of the automo- mistakes tactic and trial strategy bile accident any personality provide do not grounds for subsequent changes in [Gilson] since accident. State, attack. Davis v. 759 P.2d However, the record reflects that with (Okl.Cr.1988). To have also raised that knowledge, counsel chose defense any type of mental disorder defense innocence, of actual not one of diminish- would have been inconsistent with a de capacity. ed strategic That choice is not fense of actual innocence and would have

indicative of performance deficient as a considerably weakened both defenses. defense of actual innocence was reason- Counsel’s decision in this case was rea able based upon information provided to sonable trial strategy, which we will not counsel family [Gilson]’s and friends. guess second on appeal. Bernay v. attorney “[A]n who makes a strategic State, (Okl.Cr.1999). 989 P.2d choice to channel investigation into Further, counsel was not ineffective fewer than all plausible lines of de- failing present evidence of the upon fense which he bases his strate- injury during stage. second The record gy arе reasonable and his choices on shows stage the second the basis of defense focused assumptions those are ...,” being reasonable attorney’s An and con- productive deci- sion not to tributing interview society therefore, witnesses and to member of rely on information, other sources if punishment deserved a less than made in the professional exercise of death. This included evidence of his judgment, is not ineffective counsel. lack of prior violent conduct and his State, (Okl.Cr.1991), Boltz v. 806 P.2d skills and ability employ- to maintain denied, t. ment. While evidence of [Gilson]’smen- cer *48 Smith, 510, 524, 123 Wiggins v. inability to control his and condition tal (2003)). Sec- 156 L.Ed.2d 471 may have had S.Ct. behavior” “explosive his ond, that the OCCA’s effect, complains Gilson this evidence mitigating some a making to counsel as two-edged “determination[ ] sword. Evidence be a could based on sheer strategic control over decision poor [was] had his that [Gilson] enough.” Id. In proving is not potential speculation, which had the behavior society, includ- argues to that affida- regard, a threat this Gilson was [Gilson] indicate from society, and could to the OCCA his he submitted ing prison vits strategic ev- nothing future violence. Such of a “say for propensity trial counsel contradictory to intentionally been omit the evi- idence would have to decision lack of was no mitigating dence,” “suggest [Gilson]’s evidence in fact there conduct. of violent decision, they and lack culpability they admit over- strategic pursue strategic decision Counsel’s scans the reference to CAT looked that stage [Gilson] defense second nature and of the true were not aware Coffman, high- culpable less than injuries.” Id. at 117. of [his] extent head his character traits of positive light unnecessary it to address findWe prob- mental focusing on instead focus on of which arguments, both Gilson’s was well within the might have lems we con prong, because the first Strickland judg- reasonable range professional clude, standard of applying a novo re de ment. view, satisfy the second that Gilson cannot provided great has While Turning first to Gil- prong. Strickland affidavits, in his information we deal of attorneys trial complaint his son’s set forth sufficient has failed to find he auto acci of his present failed evidence evidentiary hear- an warrant evidence during first-stage dent and its effects to show clear and He has failed ing. that Gilson we conclude proceedings, strong possibility convincing evidence a failure.18 purported prejudiced this was ineffective for that defense counsel recognized defense Although the OCCA complained-of evi- failing to utilize at the time of Gilson’s complete insanity Accordingly, [citation omitted]. dence. trial, recognized, appears it had never application grant [Gilson]’s decline to recognized, a this date to never have evidentiary hearing. for an positing to first defense (internal I, para- at 926-29 8 P.3d Gilson incapable of form that the defendant was omitted). numbers graph due to a mental ing specific intent c) challenge OCCA’s Gilson’s insanity. complete See illness short analysis (Okla. State, P.3d Grant v. (“We need not reach Crim.App.2002) argues the OCCA’s decision Gilson capacity’ defense in issue of a ‘diminished respects. related was “flawed” two case, as Grant’s degree murder] First, [first this Br. at 116. Gilson Aplt. mental illness did regarding evidence the re- “overlook[ed] decision OCCA’s mental infirmi not show that he a ‘thor- suffered that counsel conduct quirement him incapa rendered ties that would have investigation.” Id. ough’ mitigation (citing trial, it failed to offer adequate- stages counsel in both question whether Gilson 18. We also regarding any specific arguments counsel's argument ly presented to the OCCA. Al- this first-stage performance, and instead focused "Application Evidentiary Hear- though present exclusively failure to evi- ing Claims” that counsel’s on Sixth Amеndment resulting accident and generally dence of Gilson's auto filed with the OCCA asserted second-stage during proceedings. effects effective assistance of Gilson was denied *49 forming specific ble of intent neces- positive traits of his character instead of saryMoreover, none of the evidence any focusing mental problems he to submitted Gilson the OCCA in con might have was well range within the nection with his ineffective assistance professional judgment. reasonable claim establishes ability that he lacked the I, Gilson P.3d 928. specific to form the necessary intent to be Whether or not we owe deference to guilty found degree first murder. To conclusions, these they are believe en- contrary, the clinical neuropsychologist tirely sure, accurate. To be the evidence (Dr. examined who Alan Hope Gilson C. presented by Gilson to the OCCA in con- well) concluded that Gilson “an had overall nection with his ineffective assistance 92,” IQ Hopewell score Report at and claim persuasively established that he ” , “technically right wrong’ ‘kn[e]w from involved in a 1993 accident, automobile but was “often unable to ‘conform his be sustained a serious injury brain as a result right’ havior to the impulsivity, due to poor accident, and has experienced nega- judgment, and the failure to see or under physical tive and mental effects since the the consequences stand of his actions.” (e.g., accident a constant “global” head- Thus, 10. purported failure of ' ache; photophobia; sensitivity increased attorneys Gilson’s trial pursue a dimin stimuli). to auditory Dr. Hopewell’s neu- capacity ished to the defense first ropsychological consulting report, howev- charge, based alleged on Gilson’s er, paints a bleak and picture ominous post-accident behavior, changes in simply Gilson’s personality, behavior, likely and prejudice did not Gilson. future conduct. For example, Hopewell We reach a similar conclusion re- noted that Gilson had a “tendency to be- spect to Gilson’s claim his trial attor- agitated come and belligerent easily when neys erred failing present accident- Hopewell frustrated.” Report at 12. In- related during evidence the second-stage deed, Hopewell reported that this tenden- proceedings. claim, respect With to this it cy played actually out during their inter- entirely is clear whether the OCCA view, with Gilson becoming frustrated at intended to the second prong address Hopewell and at throwing times pencil his test, the Strickland but opinion its does room, across yelling, answering in gib- contain the following language that rele- berish, and refusing to continue with re- to our analysis: vant second prong quested testing. Hopewell opined that [Gilsonj’s While evidence mental con- Gilson have extreme “w[ould] difficulties dition and inability his control terms of frustration tolerance as well as “explosive may behavior” have had some restrictions abilities to compli- deal with mitigating effect, this evidence could cated, stressful, complex, ambiguous two-edged sword. Evidence [Gil- situations.” Id. at Relatedly, Hopewell 8. poor had son] control over his behavior concluded that Gilson would difficulty have potential had the of proving [Gilson] was conforming his behavior to societal norms a threat to society, including prison soci- “due impulsivity, poor judgment, ety, and could a propensity indicate to see or future failure understand the violence. conse- Such evidence would quences have been of his actions.” Id. at contradictory Hope- to mitigating evidence of well also lack concluded that culpability [Gilson]’s had an “inability and lack of regulate conduct. violent Counsel’s or inhibit behavior strategic pursue impulses” decision to second thus often act be- “w[ould] stage defense that cul- fore thinking.” less Id. at 18. Given these pable Coffman, than highlight extremely negative descriptions of Gilson’s *50 the federal interpose in “to order as relief pres- that the behavior, conclude we

likely people, and the States during jury courts between to the evidence this of entation federal not people’s of would proceedings guardians second-stage uncon people outcome. from a different protect in rights have resulted —to presenta- Ross, that conclude 468 U.S. we Reed v. particular, action.” stitutional have likely (1984) would this evidence 1 2901, tion of L.Ed.2d 10, 82 1, 104 S.Ct. lin- any by erasing omitted). Gilson against weighed This (internal marks quotation as to existed may-have that gering doubts the defen when most crucial is protection con- murder, and in Shane’s his role “[D]eath in the balance. hangs dant’s life repre- that he conclusion jury’s firming the any from punishment of a different kind is threat, if confined even continuing sented a this coun may imposed in which other Thus, Gil- we conclude for life. prison in importance vital ... It is of try. of by the failure prejudiced son was that community to the and defendant this present and gather attorneys to trial be, sentence the death impose decision second- during the jury to the evidence rather be, on reason based appear to stage proceedings. v. Gardner or emotion.” caprice than is court the district of judgment The 357-58, 349, 97 S.Ct. Florida, 430 U.S. AFFIRMED. (1977). 1197, 393 51 L.Ed.2d is well-written majority opinion The dissenting in HENRY, Judge, Chief in issues a number of carefully resolves part. relatively a new prosecution under this v. crime.” Gilson horrible “This was a much agree I with statute. While unique 883, (Okla.Crim.App. State, 930 P.3d us, I issues before resolution of its It diffi 2000) J., dissenting). is (Chapel, pro- issue on one vital company part must heart-rending set more imagine a cult to heritage. In a case legal by our tected helpless and befell a those facts than facts, against filed disturbing such with is no There Coffman. innocent Shane history of at least some who had defendant history had Donald Gilson question convic- abuse, risk of an unwarranted at least some Coffman abusing of a “The high. absence especially is tion him, I children, fear of lived in who increas- offense instruction included lesser punished he will be rest assured ... jury will convict that the es risk two out abuse, as he convicted was defendant setting the to avoid simply Fur injury a minor. of five counts Florida, 447, U.S. v. Spaziano free.” adopt fit to ther, court see should (1984). 82 L.Ed.2d 104 S.Ct. dissent, Gil- partial this Mr. reasoning of in a case cannot be tolerated “risk This trial for murder again son would face at stake.” life is the defendant’s which properly instructed manslaughter with a Alabama, 625, 637, 100 v. Beck jury. (1980). 65 L.Ed.2d courts owe state aware that I we am may Coffman, ac- guilty plea AEDPA. was under We great deference whose Ms. in the court, their only reverse determinations was by the convicted cepted state Nevertheless, most circumstances. limited sen- and received first-degree murder must imposed a death sentence when dispositive prison. of life tence protec- the full that it be certain only about appeal is of Mr. Gilson’s portion the Constitution. tions of played Shane’s role Mr. Gilson what narrow determining the murder. When Congress mind that It with this in entitled Mr. Gilson was whether question habe- § providing enacted 28 U.S.C. to a second-degree instruction on The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap manslaughter, only we have question one peals characterizes the sufficiency of the before us—what could reasonable jury support evidence to a lesser included of have regarding found Mr. culpa- Gilson’s fense instruction as a legal issue. See e.g., bility in death? Shane’s Evidence was Young State, (Okla.Crim. 12 P.3d presented at trial that Mr. played App.2000). Moreover, in direct criminal part no abusing day Shane the died *51 appeals, we treat denials of lesser included and that he asleep on the couch during offense instructions as legal determina the abuse that led to Shane’s A death. See, tions. e.g., Castillo, United v. States rational jury could have believed this evi- (10th 874, Cir.1998). 140 F.3d 886 dence and found guilty Mr. Gilson culpa- of negligence, ble but not of actively permit- Consistent with this approach, the suffi- ting abuse, child as the Oklahoma statute ciency of the evidence to a support lesser requires for a first-degree murder convic- included offense instruction seems to me Because, tion. even under our deferential not to be a purely factual determination. review, standard of supported evidence See Hogan, 197 F.3d at 1306 n. 6 (stating giving an instruction on second-degree that although panel cannot resolve the manslaughter right protected under —a itself, inconsistency it unanimously agrees Beck Spaziano must respectfully —I that we should treat the determination as dissent. law). a conclusion of While a such deter- mination involves some application of the A. Standard Review facts, this is not the end of inquiry, as First, I must address the appropriate appellate “[t]his function does not involve standard of review. haveWe never defini fact instance, in the finding first but rather tively determined sufficiency whether a review of the record to determine wheth- the evidence to support a lesser included er the factfinder had an evidentiary basis offense instruction is a factual or a legal for its rulings which satisfy would legal See, question. Mullin, Boltz v. e.g., 415 question.” standard in Bryson Ward, v. 1215, (10th Cir.2005) F.3d 1233 (noting (Briscoe, J., 187 F.3d 1211 concur- that the Tenth yet Circuit has not decided added). ring) (emphasis case, In this the appropriate standard); v. Turrentine OCCA did Mullin, (10th facts determin- 390 F.3d 1197 Cir. find 2004) (same); ing that Gibson, Mr. Gilson was not entitled to Hogan 197 F.3d (10th Cir.1999) (same). lesser included If it is offense instructions. In- a legal question, stead, must ask whether it applied clearly OCCA estab- was contrary to anor appli unreasonable lished legal federal standard set forth in cation of clearly established federal law. Beck, to the facts in the record. 2254(d)(1). § 28 U.S.C. If it ais factual “No presumption of correctness attaches determination, we must ask whether the to legal conclusions or determinations on OCCA’s conclusion was “an unreasonable questions mixed of law and fact.” Case v. determination of the facts in light (10th Mondragon, 887 F.2d Cir. evidence presented.” U.S.C. 1989). Therefore, we must 2254(d)(2). review such § Further, factual, if we must legal 2254(d)(1), § determinations under presume the court’s state determinations reversing only to be if correct Mr. the OCCA determina unless its pre has clear sented tion was convincing application an unreasonable evidence 2254(e)(1). contrary. § 28 U.S.C. Beck. I maintain that it was. condi- circumstances and similar in- son under manslaughter second-degree B. The Jury Instruc- tions.” Oklahoma struction Uniform (2007). 4-104 Mr. Gilson tions —Criminal [may Beck, death “a sentence of Under on the couch asleep fell after a constitutionally imposed not] Coffman, Ms. was alone with Shane while offense, capital guilt on jury verdict abuse, actively permit Shane’s but did not to consid- permitted was not jury when re- statute first-degree included of a lesser guilt er verdict as used Okla- permit” “To quires. offense, the evidence and when non-capital means murder statute homa’s child-abuse a verdict.” such supported have would for the or allow care “to authorize (internal quota- 100 S.Ct. U.S. person by an individual when child omitted). jury’s duty It is the marks tion allowing such care knows authorizing or ours, and not the evidence—not weigh will that the child reasonably should know in order to allow But the OCCA’s. ” *52 of abuse.... placed risk be Stat. Okla. duties, must its freely perform to most 10, argued § As the tit. 7115. State Ann. Beck’s courts follow that state sure us, [of definition “[t]h[e] in its brief before “to eliminate mandate, designed which was encompass a mere does not permit’] ‘to factfinding process the distortion anticipates act ... but instead failure to jury is forced into when the is created that ” Br. Aрle’s .... action one’s affirmative capital all-or-nothing choice between an added). (emphasis at 42 Spaziano, and innocence.” See murder first-degree 455, “Permitting” Beck’s under 104 S.Ct. 3154. convicting requires active even when murder statute applies child abuse mandate act,” not to sen- A failure to the discretion “mere jury retained authorization. Hooks v. affirmative action the defendant death. not involve the tence that does Cir.1999). (10th Ward, 1206, first-degree 1227 a necessary support 184 F.3d Here, may instructions cul- supported the evidence conviction constitute child abuse second-degree negligence have culpable negligence. for Oklahoma courts pable Ann. tit. culpably under Okla. manslaughter guilty Stat. a of such a found defendant act, when, instance, for § 716. failure to negligent a medical care for sick to seek failed manslaughter Second-degree de- 1. State, v. 763 P.2d 695 child. Funkhouser fined “kaleidoscopic (Okla.Crim.App.1988).1 The degrees mental varying nature being by killing of one human “Every Green, N.Y.2d People v. act, negli- culpability,” culpable procurement, 437 N.E.2d manslaughter in 452 N.Y.S.2d ... gence of another is (1982), active makes the line between Ann. tit. degree.” Okla. the second Stat. mur- necessary first-degree neg- permission culpable § defines 716. Oklahoma to act culpably negligent failure something der and “the omission to do ligence as Determining given defen- hard to reasonably person careful would draw. which a hard culpability, however do, ordinary care dant’s or the lack the usual define, from the facts is “to be inferred of an act performance in the caution proved involve[s] ordinarily per- and circumstances exercised usually and case, kitchen), the defendant entitled subsequent OCCA not the Notably, in a second-degree comply negligence that where the man- culpable with Beck and held did State, spilled boiling on his son to water defendant 173 P.3d slaughter instructions. Ball point he died a result of his burns that as (Okla.Crim.App.2007). bedroom, (and tragedy place took this gradations fíne along single death, but a spec- could have found that Mr. Gilson (internal trum of culpability.” Id. quota- culpably negligent and therefore omitted). tion marks question for us guilty of second-degree manslaughter. whether a rational could have found The culpably negligent action this sce- that Mr. Gilson engaged in some failure to nario would have been falling asleep on the act falls short of necessary active couch Coffman, while Ms. to his knowl- required authorization to meet Oklahoma’s edge, disciplined Shane. In the closing “permit” definition of but is still actionable arguments during guilt phase of the culpable negligence. trial, Mr. Gilson’s said, counsel “He thought just Bertha was spanking 2. The evidence [Shane]; timeout; she had Shane in beyond “[I]t has been long dispute that he bathtub; was in the that he was the defendant is entitled to an instruction not being cooperative. Nowhere in [Mr. on a lesser included offense if the evidence Gilsonj’s statement is there anything about permit a jury would rationally to find him him being aware of [Ms. beating Coffman] guilty of the lesser offense acquit him Shane, hitting board, him with a hitting Beck, greater.” 635, 100 U.S. him the legs, him hitting arms, in the (internal quotation marks omit hitting head, him in the nowhere.” Trial ted). After considering all of the State’s X, Transcript, vol. at 2202-03. Mr. Gil- evidence, I believe there remains set of *53 son’s counsel pointed further report facts that a jury rational could have relied of the state’s investigator, Winkler, Cliff on to convict Mr. Gilson of second-degree which noted that Mr. testimony Gilson’s manslaughter acquit him of first-de was consistent with Ms. Coffman’s as to murder. gree Although, as the majority the fact that was asleep he when she came notes, Ms. Coffman’s testimony police in and reported that Shane was not interviews contained some inconsistencies breathing and that he performed thеn exactly as to happened what that night, CPR for an hour and a half. Id. “[Mr. Coffman consistently Ms. claimed that Mr. Gilson] said he inwas shock. He said he Gilson had not abused Shane day on the of had no conceivable idea what had hap- days the few preceding Shane’s death.2 pened.” Id. Whatever inconsistencies plagued Ms. Coffman’s testimony as to actions, her own A jury rational could this set believe

and whatever she stated about Mr. Gil- facts and find that Mr. Gilson did not son’s temper general, she was consistent actively permit Ms. abuse Coffman’s that one, as to this point. critical Shane, killed but instead negligently failed intervene,

A jury, rational believing falling asleep Ms. Coffman’s while she was testimony with, along instance, for alone him. A Mr. rational could have Gilson’s claims that he was asleep on found act, that this failure to tragic, while couch during the abuse leading Shane’s did not rise to the level of affirmatively, See, VI, e.g., 2. Transcript, Trial vol. at 1403- [Shane before spanked died] that he had (Ms. that, stating Coffman Shane,” as she "Nobody boy touched that [Shane] said in the February police, 9 interview with and, but day. Nobody,” me that gone "I have Don Gilson did day not touch Shane on the this, this, over and over and over this and for died and that Mr. Gilson any- hadn't done six, me, for almost six months. But believe I thing discipline else to day). Shane that See day every day lived my this since life then. Br., also Add. 145, 154, Aplt's (Okla- And I don’t spanking remember him ever homa State Bureau Investigation Interview Shane that day.”). Transcript) (stating "[I]t was days about two by any ra- testimony unbelievable man’s Ms. Coffman wilfully permitting

actively, is, along jury. that tional Shane —that to abuse fail- Mr. Gilson’s culpability, spectrum Application of Beck negligent. culpably act was

ure to Ms. Coffman’s that majority states nor OCCA’s job, our The neither It is inconsistencies” testimony’s “internal side’s which and decide weigh the evidence of the State’s weight overwhelming “the not whether is question stronger. “Our is juror no rational establish evidence” offense to the lesser pointing evidence manslaughter Mr. convict could v. Hum States United ... was weak.” mur- first-degree him of acquitting Cir.2000). while (10th 1190, 1207 208 F.3d phrey, majority at 1237-38. Maj. Op. der. “there is Instead, must ask whether presented the State certainly right upon bear fairly tending to any evidence Mr. support Gilson’s evidence abundant offense, weak however lesser included but, re- first-degree conviction— trial court Id. A may be.” evidence question: is not the this spectfully, request deny a defendant’s may properly equiv- functional claim is A Beck instruction offense a lesser included for sufficiency of challenge to the alent of to reason no evidence there is only when rather, conviction; Beck the evidence See, e.g., that conviction. support ably constitutionality on the focuses (10th Sirmons, 486 F.3d Young v. conviction in the employed procedures Cir.2007) (defendant to a less not entitled and is trial capital in a a defendant instruc second-degree murder er included with the enhanced concerned specifically revealed evidence when “forensic tion capital conviction unwarranted of an risk weapons used three were least there stake life is at the defendant’s where no and there during gunfíght, con- jury could have and a reasonable [the but by anyone fired of shots evidence offense. a lesser included victed on *54 ”) (emphasis others] and two defendant added). (emphasis F.3d Hogan, 197 — -, denied, added), U.S. cert. closing in its noted itself As the State — -, (2008); L.Ed.2d during guilt phase argument (10th Mullin, 327 F.3d v. Darks consistently trial, has claimed Ms. Coffman Cir.2003) (defendant to a less not entitled responsible for is and she alone that she in manslaughter first-degree er included X, Transcript, Trial vol. death. Shane’s attorney was forced “[his] when struction argued that further 2161. The State evi that no argument, at oral to concede ver- Ms. Coffman’s not jury should believe adequate provoca supported] dence “[tjherе a bond is because sion of events added). element”) (emphasis tion two, Don- Jean and Bertha between those ample evi- Here, present did the State Lee,” Coff- “[Ms. id. at and ald of the treatment that Mr. Gilson’s dence the death got penalty she’s thinks man] was, times, nothing children Coffman try to her damnedest going and beat she Nevertheless, in con- of atrocious. short you.... gift the same out give him inquiry, offense our included ducting lesser is still jail cell Bertha Jean From her with ourselves only we must concern you if let things, she will trying to run death. The Shane’s that caused events certainly it is at 2163. her.” Id. While the State on which prior abuse evidence cov- may have been Coffman possible Ms. support capital relied Gilson, mere the State’s ering up for Mr. Gilson Mr. not charge is evidence moti- Coffman’s regarding intimations Ms. wilfully permitted necessarily caused render Coff- enough Ms. vation is death. Although Shane’s the State’s case himself and all similarly others situ- was strong, the presentation State’s ated; Sotpal Singh, on behalf of him- was not the only facts reasonable interpre- self all similarly others situated, evidence, tation of the jury and the did not Plaintiffs-Appellees, (and have believe it in fact did not believe the evidence in three of five WOODRUFF; Robert S. Joseph minor). injury counts of to a already We Nacchio, P. Defendants- jury know split as to whether Appellants, actively Mr. Gilson permitted the abuse or committed it himself. Especially light of Ms. Coffman’s unequivocal testimony Qwest International, Communications that Mr. played Gilson part no in abusing Inc.; Drake S. Tempest; James A. died, day Shane the and the testimony Smith; Arthur L.L.P.; Andersen of both that Mr. was asleep Gilson on the Craig Slater; D. Philip Anschutz, F. couch, it is not the case there was no Defendants-Appellees. evidence to support an instruction on sec- ond-degree manslaughter. No. 06-1482. progeny Beck its are meant to en- United States Appeals, Court of sure that no in capital case is faced Tenth Circuit. an

with all-or-nothing decision when the April supports evidence a third option. In this case, the just evidence did that. Because

“permitting” child requires abuse affirma- action,

tive juror rational could have

found that Mr. guilty culpa- negligence

ble of second-degree man-

slaughter, without finding that his failure

to act rose to the level affirmative action

required prove first-degree murder be-

yond a reasonable However, doubt.

jury was still faced an all-or-nothing Because, view,

decision. my

OCCA’s determination was an unreason- application able Herbert J. Stern Kilcullen, Beck and of Stern Mr. & LLC, Roseland, was entitled to a second-degree Jersey, New man- and David instruction, slaughter Chance, US, Meister LLP, I of Clifford must dissent. New (James

York, New York Miller and David Cook US, of Clifford Chance, LLP, New York, York; Jeffrey New Speiser and Joel M. Silverstein of & Kilcullen, Stern LLC, Roseland, Jersey, New with them on NEW ENGLAND HEALTH CARE EM- briefs), for Defendants-Appellants. FUND, PLOYEES PENSION on be- half of itself similarly and all others Boyd Boies, David R. Schiller & Flex- situated; Mosher, LLP, (Jonathan Clifford on behalf ner Washington, D.C. D. of himself and all others similarly Schiller, sit- Levitt, Alfred P. and Jorge uated; Tejinder Singh, on Boies, behalf of Schmidt P. of Schiller & Flexner notes in his J.). Florida, See Miller v. case “was ‍​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‍instructed that ‘permitting’ child 430, 107 2446, 2451, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 abuse 'could be committed ‘a person (1987). (footnote omitted). early As responsible for a child’s health or welfare’ opinions this explained, “ex which was language the new of 10 O.S. post facto law” a term of art with an § Aplt. effective Br. at 11/1/1995.” meaning established at the time of the turn, notes, 71. In person respon- “[a] Calder, framing of the Constitution. sible for child’s health or welfare was Dall., id., Chase, J.); (opinion defined for the as including an adult J.). (opinion Paterson, at 396 Justice parent ‘with whom the child’s cohabitates opinion Chase’s now familiar in Colder residing other adult in the home of ” expounded (quoting ROA, legislative the child.’ those Acts which State Vol. (Instruction 18)). implicated 6. at 637 No. in his view the core concern asserts, however, that at the time of Shane of the Ex Post Facto Clause: felony although murder or murder and Legislature’s sen- the Oklahoma decision upon underlying tenced to death based an expressly incorporate child abuse murder felony E.g., or act of severe child abuse. State first-degree appears into its murder statute Velazquez, v. 216 Ariz. 166 P.3d 91 unique, regarding its decision how to treat (2007); Beames, People v. 40 Cal.4th punish appear such crimes does not to be (2007); Cal.Rptr.3d 153 P.3d 955 Brooks unique. State, Thus, (Fla.2005). 918 So.2d 181

Case Details

Case Name: Gilson v. Sirmons
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date Published: Apr 2, 2008
Citation: 520 F.3d 1196
Docket Number: 06-6287
Court Abbreviation: 10th Cir.
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