96 Ga. 303 | Ga. | 1895
1. To charge the commission of an indictable trespass, it is ordinaxfily not necessary to allege the value of the property injured or eonveiffed thereby. If the trespass itself amount to a larceny, then, as one of the constituents of that offense, it is essential that the value be alleged. If the animus furandi be wanting, however, .and the taking merely wrongful, it is unnecessary to .allege the value, unless that enters as an element in the definition of the offense. An illustration of this is furnished in the section of the code we now have under review, viz. section 4440. Paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of that section presci’ibe that the several acts thei’ein enumerated shall constitute an indictable trespass, without alleging the value of the article injured or the extent of the •damage to the owner. Paragraph 2 of that section, while defining a trespass, creates in effect a species of
2. As will be seen from the report, the defendant was indicted, jointly with certain other persons, for the offense of willfully taking and carrying away from the lands of the prosecutor certain rails, the property of the prosecutor, without the consent of the prosecutor. It appears that the prosecutor and the father of this defendant owned adjoining tracts of land; that they had agreed upon a dividing line between them, and upon this dividing line had constructed a rail-fence. This fence was the joint property of the parent of this defendant (by whose authority he removed the rails), and of the prosecutor. We think, in order to constitute an indictable trespass, the alleged owner of the property must have the absolute individual title thereto, or there must he some special title in him through and by which he is
The two propositions here ruled control the questions made in the court below,and it is unnecessary to consider any others which may occur in the record.
Let the judgment of the court below be Peversea.