186 Pa. 193 | Pa. | 1898
Opinion by
While city passenger railway companies have not an exclusive right to the use of the parts of the streets occupied by their tracks, they have a right of way and a right to an unobstructed track for the passage of their cars. In the use of their tracks their rights are superior to those of the public. The convenience of tbe individual in the use of the part of the street to which the cars are confined must give way to the convenience of the public wbo use tbe cars: Thomas v. Ry. Co., 132 Pa. 504; Warner v. Ry. Co., 141 Pa. 615; Ehrisman v. Ry. Co., 150 Pa. 180. The use of electricity as a motive power by street railway companies has greatly increased tbe danger to those wbo drive or walk on city streets. Many uses of streets which were formerly comparatively safe are now extremely dangerous. Of the increased danger all persons wbo use tbe streets must take notice, and a high degree of watchfulness and care is required of them : Winter v. Ry. Co., 153 Pa. 26; Reber v. Traction Co., 179 Pa. 339. In Winter v. Ry. Co., supra, a driver who in unloading a wagon at night unnecessarily placed his horses across the tracks of an electric railway at a point where there was a descending grade was held to have been guilty of contributory negligence. In Gilmore v. Ry. Co., 153 Pa. 31, a driver wlio at night left his borse and wagon standing on tbe tracks of an electric railway in a narrow and unlighted alley was not allowed to recover because of his contributory negligence. In that case tbe negligence of the motorman in running tbe car too rapidly clearly appeared. In Warner v. Ry. Co., supra, tbe plaintiff was walking on a public road and came to a place where there was a snowdrift. The snow bad been removed from tbe railway tracks, making a passageway wide enough for the ears. She walked in this passageway and was run down by a car whose driver could have seen her if he had looked. It was held that she could not recover, because of her negligence in placing herself in a position of danger. The case before us cannot be distinguished in principle from those cited, and it shows on the part of the plaintiff a most reckless disregard of her safety in voluntarily remaining in a place of known and unusual danger.
The cars of the defendant company ran both ways on a single track, with turn-outs, in a city street. The plaintiff lived on the street, and was entirely familiar with all the surroundings, and
■ The case was tried for the plaintiff on the theory that she had a right to walk on the track longitudinally, and that if she was vigilant in watching for the approach of a car she had done her ■whole duty. This view was adopted by the learned trial judge, who in his charge said: “ If she used such care in looking back, in looking ahead of her and in looking behind her, in listening, under the circumstances of the case as a reasonably prudent person would have done, she would not be guilty of nogli
The judgment is reversed, and it is now ordered that judgment be entered for the defendant.