5 N.H. 231 | Superior Court of New Hampshire | 1830
for the court.
The defendants claim a new trial, because the jury yvere instructed that the defendants, by being the first to erect a dam and mill, acquired no right to cause the water to flow back and obstruct the operation of a mill subsequently erected by the plaintiffs, and the question is, whether mere priority of appropriation of running water can confer any exclusive right ?
In general, every man has a right to the use of the water flowing in a stream through his land ; and if any one divert the water from its natural channel, or throw it back, so as to deprive him of the use of it, the law will give him redress. But one man may acquire, by grant, a right to throw the water back upon the land of another, and long usage may be evidence of such a grant. It is however well settled, that a man acquires no such
We are, therefore, of opinion, that the motion for a new trial cannot be sustained on this ground.
But it is contended, that there ought to be a new trials because the jury were told that the defendants had no right to cause the water to flow back beyond the limits of their own land, to the prejudice of the plaintiff, unless they had acquired such right by uninterrupted usage for twenty years, and that, although there might have been a usage for twenty years, yet, if the plaintiff, in one in* stance, interrupted it within the time, such interruption would defeat any right claimed to be gained by such usage.
Some have held, that a term of twenty years of exclusive uninterrupted enjoyment of the use of water, in ⅛ particular manner, is a conclusive presumption of right! presumplio juris etch jw'e. 4 Mason, 402 ; 6 East, 215 ; 1 Camp. 463, Balston v. Bensted ; 2 Saund. 175, a, b ; 1 B. & P. 400, Holcroft v. Heel.
And there is no doubt, that the use of water, in a pal4* ticular manner, for a less period than twenty years, and even an interrupted use, may be evidence of a right to be weighed among other evidence by a jury. 6 East, 215 ; 4 N. H. Rep. 14—15; 7 Wheaton, 109—110; 4 Starkie’s Ev. 1216.
But it seems to be now settled, that adverse posses» slon for a shorter period than twenty years, is not of it* self a sufficient ground to sustain the presumption of & grant. It is evidence, but unless the circumstances at* tending- it give it weight, it is not sufficient evidence. Phillip’s Ev. 121 ; 4 Burr. 1963 ; 4 Starkie’s Ev. 1216.
The weight,'which usage in these cases is entitled to have, as evidence of a grant, depends much upon the cii** cumstances which attend it. Suppose, in this case, the de» fendants had been accustomed, for fifteen years, to main* taina dam of a particular height, and in Bo doing had
As this case is stated, it seems that the defendants relied upon an uninterrupted usage for twenty years, as evidence of a right. The case states no circumstance that gives any particular weight to the usage. And such being the case, we think that the jury were rightly instructed, that nothing less than an uninterrupted usage for twenty years, could warrant them in finding a grant.