2003 Ohio 5708 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2003
{¶ 2} The record discloses the following facts. On September 8, 1999, appellant filed a civil complaint in the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas. Appellant's complaint set forth a cause of action against Joseph Rimedio ("Rimedio"), Darcy Fletcher ("Ms. Fletcher"), and Lear. The complaint alleged that Rimedio physically assaulted appellant while on Lear's premises. Appellant maintained that due to a lack of security, Lear had breached its duty to protect her health, safety and welfare, in violation of R.C.
{¶ 3} Lear filed its answer with the trial court, and both sides engaged in discovery. The following events were gathered from various deposition testimonies. On July 20, 1999, appellant, as Lear's employee, was working the third shift at Lear's plant in Lordstown, Ohio. During appellant's shift, at about 1:30 a.m., Ms. Fletcher and Rimedio arrived at the plant and parked at loading dock D.
{¶ 4} Ms. Fletcher was also employed by Lear. When Ms. Fletcher arrived at the plant, she was not on duty or scheduled to work that night. Instead, she came to the plant to bring food to her co-workers and fill out paperwork regarding a disability claim.
{¶ 5} Rimedio was not employed by Lear, but was invited by Ms. Fletcher to accompany her to the plant. Ms. Fletcher was aware that Rimedio and appellant had been involved in a romantic relationship. However, she was unaware that appellant had recently ended the relationship.
{¶ 6} Upon their arrival at the plant, Ms. Fletcher and Rimedio met with some of her co-workers at an outdoor picnic table to enjoy a lunch break together. Following the lunch break, both Ms. Fletcher and Rimedio entered the plant so that she could attend to her paperwork. Once inside the plant, Ms. Fletcher paged appellant to say hello and obtain information about the disability claim.
{¶ 7} Appellant answered the page and located Ms. Fletcher and Rimedio inside the plant. After the three parties briefly conversed, Ms. Fletcher left appellant and Rimedio to fill out her disability claim paperwork. Following Ms. Fletcher's departure, the conversation between appellant and Rimedio escalated into a verbal argument. Both Rimedio and appellant walked out of the plant together, and continued to argue outside of the plant near the picnic table. While outside, Rimedio allegedly, without warning, hit appellant in the face and threw her against a wall. Subsequent to the alleged assault, appellant re-entered the plant and was assisted by her co-workers in seeking medical attention.
{¶ 8} On December 10, 2001, Lear filed a motion for summary judgment with the trial court. Lear explained that appellant's only theory of recovery would be under common law principles of negligence. Ultimately, Lear concluded that it was under no duty to protect appellant because Rimedio's actions were unforeseeable.
{¶ 9} In her brief in opposition, appellant argued that Lear's failure to install the appropriate security and procedural safeguards left her unprotected against Rimedio's alleged assault. Appellant also maintained that Rimedio's violent conduct was foreseeable because of unrelated previous security problems at Lear's plant. As proof of these security problems, appellant attached police reports of various criminal activities which took place in the plant's parking lot.
{¶ 10} On July 17, 2002, the trial court issued a judgment entry granting Lear's summary judgment motion. The trial court decided that neither R.C.
{¶ 11} From this judgment, appellant filed a timely appeal setting forth the following assignments of error for our consideration:
{¶ 12} "[1] The court erred in finding that Lear had no statutory duty under R.C.
{¶ 13} "[2] The trial court erred when it held that this incident was not sufficiently foreseeable to impose a duty on Lear.
{¶ 14} "[3] The trial court applied the wrong standard by erroneously weighing the evidence and by failing to view the evidence of appellant, as the nonmoving party, in a light most favorable to the appellant."
{¶ 15} Prior to discussing the merits of appellant's assignments of error, we will set forth the appropriate standard of review when examining a motion for summary judgment.
{¶ 16} An appellate court reviews a trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. (1996),
{¶ 17} Material facts are defined as facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law of the case. Turner v.Turner (1993),
{¶ 18} The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and of identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the essential elements of the nonmoving party's claim. Dresher v. Burt (1996),
{¶ 19} Appellant's first assignment of error contends that both R.C.
{¶ 20} R.C.
{¶ 21} Although the "frequenter" statutes are not a part of the Workers' Compensation Act, R.C.
{¶ 22} That being said, as is the case with the Workers' Compensation Act, the "frequenter" statutes reflect the state's policy to provide a statutory system for compensating workers for injuries and occupational diseases sustained in the course of and arising out of theiremployment. See, e.g., Conley v. Brown Corp. of Waverly,
{¶ 23} In the instant case, appellant's claim against Lear seeks damages from injuries that stem from the intentional tort of a third party, Rimedio. Clearly, appellant's injuries did not arise out of her employment relationship with Lear. Therefore, R.C.
{¶ 24} Based upon the foregoing analysis, appellant is precluded from asserting a claim under the "frequenter" statutes. Nevertheless, appellant's claim may still be brought pursuant to common law principles of negligence. Actionable negligence requires appellant to show the existence of a duty, breach of that duty, and an injury proximately caused by the breach. Jeffers v. Olexo (1989),
{¶ 25} The primary focus of the trial court was the duty element of negligence. The trial court explained that, after reviewing the totality of the circumstances, appellant failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that Lear could have foreseen the alleged attack by Rimedio. Therefore, based upon the evidence presented, the trial court decided that Lear was under no duty to protect appellant from Rimedio's unforeseeable assault. Although we ultimately affirm the trial court's judgment, the basis of our affirmance is fixed upon appellant's failure to demonstrate that Lear's alleged lack of security was the proximate cause of her injuries.
{¶ 26} "[T]he existence of a duty is fundamental to establishing actionable negligence. `*** If there is no duty, then no legal liability can arise on account of negligence. Where there is no obligation of care or caution, there can be no actionable negligence.'" (Citations omitted.) Jeffers at 142. Furthermore, the duty element of negligence is a question of law for the court to determine. Wallace v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce,Div. of State Fire Marshal,
{¶ 27} As an initial matter, we must place the facts of the case sub judice in the proper context. As Lear's employee, appellant also fits the definition of a business invitee. A business invitee is defined as "'*** a business visitor, that is, one rightfully on the premises of another for purposes in which the possessor of the premises has a beneficial interest.'" Provencher v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1990),
{¶ 28} "Because of the special relationship between a business and its [business invitee], a business `may be subject to liability for harm caused to such a business invitee by the conduct of third persons that endangers the safety of such invitee.'" Reitz v. May Co. Dept. Stores
(1990),
{¶ 29} The foreseeability of criminal acts of third parties is dependent upon the actual knowledge of the business-defendant or whether a reasonably prudent business would have anticipated that an injury was likely to occur. Reitz at 192. The knowledge of the defendant-business is based on the totality of the circumstances. White at 540; Feichtner v.Cleveland (1994),
{¶ 30} The totality of the circumstances standard is broad in scope and allows a court to take into consideration evidence outside of a business-defendant's knowledge of prior criminal activity when making its determination as to whether a duty exists. Reitz at 193. The adoption of this liberal standard allows the first victim of criminal activity on a business-defendant's premises to establish that the third parties criminal activity was foreseeable. Reitz at 194.
{¶ 31} In an attempt to demonstrate that Rimedio's actions were foreseeable, appellant attached various police reports of alleged criminal activity, which occurred in Lear's parking lot, to her motion for summary judgment. These police reports involved minor instances of car damage including mysterious dents, dings, and tire slashings. Although these reported activities took place after appellant's alleged assault, the broad totality of the circumstances standard allows us to consider such evidence when determining the existence of a duty to protect appellant from the criminal activities of third parties.
{¶ 32} While the police reports alone do not establish that Rimedio's alleged assault was foreseeable, deposition testimony demonstrates Lear had actual knowledge that adequate security procedures were necessary to safeguard its employees from third parties. Dean York ("Mr. York"), an assistant human resources manager, provided the following testimony:
{¶ 33} "Q: Do you have any worries that some unauthorized person that you don't know why they are there would cause any harm?
{¶ 34} "A: Sure.
{¶ 35} "Q: Okay. What kind of harm are you worried about?
{¶ 36} "A: Anything. Any kind of harm.
{¶ 37} "Q: Are you worried about harm to equipment?
{¶ 38} "A: Yes, I'm worried about the equipment, I'm worried about the employees, I'm worried about the technology, our trade.
{¶ 39} "Q: *** [Y]ou said you were concerned about the employees. Are you afraid someone would come into the building who is unauthorized to be there and harm an employee?
{¶ 40} "A: That's a concern.
{¶ 41} "Q: Okay. Are you concerned that some irate employee might come into the facility when they are [sic] aren't supposed to be scheduled and cause some harm?
{¶ 42} "A. That's a concern.
{¶ 43} Clearly, Mr. York's testimony reinforces the fact that Lear found it necessary to employ adequate safety procedures to protect employees, working on Lear's premises, from a third party who may possibly engage in criminal activity. The evidence provided by appellant demonstrates that Lear had knowledge of its basic duty to protect its employee's from a third party such as Rimedio. The evidence also confirmed that a reasonably prudent business would anticipate that an injury from a third party's criminal activity was a definite possibility. That being said, we find that Rimedio's actions were foreseeable, and, therefore, Lear was under a duty to adequately protect appellant from the criminal activity of a third party.
{¶ 44} Despite Lear's duty, we need not examine the adequacy of the safety procedures employed by Lear as it is evident that appellant failed to show that Lear was the proximate cause of her injuries. Instead, appellant's intervening actions destroyed her ability to establish Lear's alleged negligent security procedures as the proximate cause of any damages she sustained.
{¶ 45} "Negligent conduct is the `proximate cause' of an injury if the injury is the natural and probable consequence of the conduct." Reedv. Weber (1992),
{¶ 46} The Supreme Court of Ohio explained that an intervening event effectively breaks the causal connection between a defendant's negligent act and the resulting damage. Queen City Terminals, Inc. v.Gen. Am. Transp. Corp.,
{¶ 47} In the instant case, the intervening actions of appellant effectively broke the causal link between the original and successive acts and Lear's possible negligence. This is not an incident where Rimedio surprised appellant and immediately struck her before she could react. Instead, appellant's deposition testimony makes it clear that when she first saw Rimedio she did not attempt to walk away from him or discontinue their conversation. Even after their conversation had escalated into a verbal argument, appellant willingly accompanied Rimedio to the outside picnic area to continue their verbal confrontation. Although appellant had ample time to call for help to have Rimedio removed, or to inform Lear of any potential danger, she declined to do so. Appellant's actions demonstrate that even she could not foresee Rimedio's alleged attack.
{¶ 48} Regardless of the adequacy of Lear's security procedures, appellant's willingness to engage in a verbal confrontation with Rimedio and accompany him outside of the plant represents an unforeseeable intervening event. Due to appellant's willingness to confront Rimedio, even the best safety procedures would have been ineffective in safeguarding her from Rimedio's alleged attack. It was appellant's own actions, not Lear's, which lead to the alleged physical altercation. As a result, appellant's intervening action broke any causal connection between Lear's alleged negligent security and appellant's resulting injuries.
{¶ 49} Appellant had the burden to show by evidential input that Lear was the proximate cause of her injuries. She failed to do this. The fact that she was attacked by Rimedio does not per se, demonstrate Lear's negligence. The foregoing analysis has demonstrated that appellant's own actions intervened, thereby breaking the causal connection necessary to demonstrate that Lear's alleged negligent security was the proximate cause of her injuries. For this reason, appellant's claim under negligence fails.
{¶ 50} Our de novo review has found that Lear was not the proximate cause of her injuries. Thus, appellant's third assignment of error is moot.
{¶ 51} After reviewing appellant's assigned errors, we find that the "frequenter" statutes are not applicable and appellant's common law negligence claim is not actionable. Appellant's assignments of error are without merit. The decision of the trial
court to grant Lear's motion for summary judgment is hereby affirmed, although for a reason other than the one stated in the trial court's judgment entry.
Judgment affirmed.
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J., concurs.
DONALD R. FORD, P.J., concurs in judgment only.
