Travis GILLION, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Supreme Court of Florida.
*811 Riсhard L. Jorandby, Public Defender and Marcy K. Allen, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Alfonso M. Saldana, West Palm Beаch, and Charlie McCoy, Tallahassee, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondent.
SHAW, Chief Justice.
We have for review Gillion v. State,
DOES THE MERE IDENTIFICATION OF A LOCATION AS A HIGH-CRIME AREA UNDULY PREJUDICE A DEFENDANT WHO IS ARRESTED THERE?
Id. at 720. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. In answering the question as stated, we hold that such an identification could be unduly prejudicial under some circumstances, see Johnson v. State,
Under the facts of this case the prosecutor elicited the following information concerning the area in which thе charged criminal activities took place:
PROSECUTOR: On that evening, what did you observe in that area?
MINTUS [a police officer]: Well, I drove through the area and I observed several individuals. I observed cocaine, street cocaine transactions take place.
MR. RICHSTONE [defensе counsel]: Objection, I would like to make a motion for the court now.
The certified question applies to locations which are identifiеd as high-crime areas. Mintus only testified relative to activities he observed on one evening in one area of Fifth Avenue in Delray Beach. This testimony did not label that area as one of high-crime, the characterization of the certified question.
When Mintus made the objected-to statement, the state was not attempting to characterize the area as one of high crime but was asking him what he saw when driving through it. If Officer Mintus actually saw criminal activity, testimony concerning what he saw is a factual matter, not a characterization of this location as high-crime nor аn attempt to impugn the area's reputation. Such testimony, although not directly relevant to a specific element of the crimes for whiсh Gillion stood accused, is relevant to clarify for the jury why this area was selected for this police operation, why this is where a drug buy would be made. That information is relevant for the jury to place in context testimony bearing directly on the legal issues of the case. To compel the state to put on its case in a factual vacuum, devoid of such necessary background information, would be a disservice to the faсt finder. "[C]onsiderable leeway is allowed even on direct examination for proof of facts that do not bear directly on the purely legal issues, but merely fill in the background of the narrative and give it interest, color, and lifelikeness." McCormick on Evidence § 185, at 541 (3d ed. 1984).
Petitioner relies on Beneby v. State,
The instant case does nоt approach the impropriety demonstrated in Beneby. The prosecutor did not mention in opening *812 statement the reputation or character of the area in question. When Officеr Mintus testified, he relied neither on what had happened in the past, nor the reputation of the neighborhood. The officer's testimony as to what he observed was not the focus of the trial and was not highlighted in closing argument.
Petitioner also complains that because Mintus saw people involved in drug dealings and he was later seen in the area, the only inference to be drawn is that he is a drug dealer. In Huffman v. State,
Testimony concerning the location of a defendant's alleged illegal activities is not unduly prejudicial. Whеther or not undue prejudice exists depends on the facts of each case, and, in this case, the facts do not support a finding of undue prejudice. We approve the decision of the district court.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, McDONALD, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., and EHRLICH, Senior Justice, concur.
BARKETT, J., concurs specially with an opinion.
BARKETT, Justice, specially concurring.
I concur in the Court's conclusion that the decision affirming the defendant's conviction should be approved. However, I do not agree that Officer Mintus's testimony regarding other drug transaсtions was admissible. The admissibility of that testimony, like every other evidentiary question, is controlled by the measure of its relevancy and materiality. In this cаse, Mintus's testimony that he had seen other drug transactions involving other people had no relevancy to Gillion, other than to impermissibly suggest that becаuse Gillion had been in that neighborhood, he must be guilty. We have repeatedly condemned such inferences. In Watkins v. State,
The rule "res inter alios acta" forbids the introduction against an accused of evidence of collateral facts which by their nature are incapable of affording аny reasonable presumption or inference as to the principal matter in dispute, the reason being that such evidence would be to oppress the party affected, by compelling him to be prepared to rebut facts of which he would have no notice under the logical relevancy rule of evidence, as well as prejudicing the accused by drawing away the minds of the jurors from the point in issue.
In civil as well as in criminal cases, facts which on principles of sound logic tend to sustain or impeach a pertinent hypothesis of an issue are to bе deemed relevant and admitted in evidence, unless proscribed by some positive prohibition of law. But this rule is always subject to the well-recоgnized exception that proof of collateral facts "res inter alios acta" are never to be admitted, especially in а criminal case where the facts laid before the jury to convict an accused person should consist exclusively of the transactiоn which forms the subject of the indictment and matters relating thereto, and which alone the defendant can be expected to come рrepared to answer.
(Citations omitted.)
Even the state candidly and correctly concedes that in Florida, introducing the fact that a defendant was arrеsted in a high-crime area is reversible error. See, e.g., Black v. State,
Notwithstanding this error, however, the error was harmless beyond any reasonable doubt on this record.