Gillette v. StapletonGillette v. Stapleton
Appellant/defendant brings this timely appeal from a judgment awarding appellee/plaintiff $8,808 compensatory damages and $2,000 punitive damages.
The appellant alleges that in July, 1972, he orally agreed with appellee to repair appellee‘s damaged automobile for $1,170. Appellant did not repair the vehicle and refused to return it to appellee upon his demand made about July or August, 1973. During the time the automobile was on the appellant‘s premises it had deteriorated from neglect and exposure to the elements so that at the time of trial its value was between $50 and $100. The case was submitted to the jury on two causes of action —
The Supreme Court of Florida has specifically stated that damages for conversion are limited to the reasonable value of the property when converted and are not to be based on the replacement value. Lilly v. Bronson, 1937, 129 Fla. 675, 177 So. 218. Thus, compensatory damages are not properly assessed according to the value of a replacement unit. It was improper and incorrect for the trial court to give such an instruction. It is well settled in Florida and other jurisdictions that the measure of damages in an action for conversion is the fair market value of the property at the time of the conversion plus legal interest to the date of the verdict. See Pettigrew v. W & H Development Co., Fla.App.2d, 1960, 122 So.2d 813; 18 Am.Jur.2d, Conversion § 82 (1965, Supp. 1976); 7 Fla.Jur., Conversion § 23 (1958, Supp. 1976). See also Sun First National Bank of Melbourne v. Batchelor, Fla.App.4th, 1975, 308 So.2d 649, rev‘d on other grounds, Fla. 1975, 321 So.2d 73. The conversion in this case occurred at the time the appellee refused to return the appellant‘s property when he was requested to do so. Star Fruit Co. v. Eagle Lake Growers, Inc., 1948, 160 Fla. 130, 33 So.2d 858; Murrell v. Trio Towing Service, Inc., Fla.App.3d, 1974, 294 So.2d 331. Therefore, the proper measure of compensatory damages is the fair market value of the damaged automobile as of July or August, 1973.
Although we do not decide whether sufficient evidence was adduced to support an award of punitive damages, the judgment on the issue of punitive damages must be reversed and remanded for a new trial. The general rule is that better practice and procedure requires that “if punitive damages are to be awarded it must be by the same jury that awards the compensatory damages.” Touchette v. Bould, Fla.App.4th 1975, 324 So.2d 707; DuPuis v. 79th Street Hotel, Inc., Fla.App.3d, 1970, 231 So.2d 532, cert. den. Fla. 1970, 238 So.2d 105; see Baynard v. Liberman, Fla.App.2d, 1962, 139 So.2d 485.
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings on the issue of damages consistent with this opinion.
McNULTY, C.J., and SCHEB, J., concur.