155 Mich. 126 | Mich. | 1908
William H. Potter, late of Alpena, died testate on the 1st day of September, 1896. His wife, Ella J. Potter, died testate on the 14th day of May, 1905. The complainants are the executors named in the will of Ella J. Potter. This bill is filed to obtain a construction of the will of William H. Potter and also a determination as to the validity and effect of certain bequests made in the will of Ella J. Potter. The estate of William H. Potter amounted to some $800,000. His wife had an independent estate amounting to something like $250,000.
The will of William H. Potter, after bequeathing something like $50,000 to relatives and friends, proceeds as follows:
“To my dear wife, Ella J. Potter, I give and bequeath all the balance of my real and personal estate of every name and nature and I do appoint my said wife, Ella J. Potter, administratrix, of this my last will and testament, and it is my wish and desire that she be not required to give bonds for the faithful performance of any of the conditions of this my will, as I feel assured she will carry them out without it.
“I request that at my death, my said wife, Ella J. Potter, make her will and will at least two-thirds of what she receives under this, my will, to some charities, named and designated by her, said charities to be in the city of Alpena, Michigan, and the amount so willed to be payable at her death, as it is my wish that she have and use all the income from that portion of my estate willed to her as long as she lives.”
It is contended on behalf of the heirs of Ella J. Potter that the case falls within Jones v. Jones, 25 Mich. 401, Weir v. Michigan Stove Co., 44 Mich. 507, Dills v. La Tour, 136 Mich. 243, Moran v. Moran, 143 Mich. 322 (5 L. R. A. [N. S.] 323), and Turnbull v. Johnson, 153 Mich. 228, and that on the authority of these cases it should be held that a full estate was bequeathed to Ella J. Potter with full power of disposition, and that the subsequent request in the will should be treated merely as the expression of a wish, and not as a mandatory provision. In other words, that Mr. Potter did not intend to direct as to the disposition of the estate, but only to suggest. We think that no one of the cases cited is necessarily controlling in the present case. It is to be noted of the provisions of the will, first, that it does not in terms bequeath an estate in fee simple. While, doubtless, the first clause quoted would, in the absence of subsequent limitations, be adequate to convey a full estate in fee simple, it does not in terms do so. While it would also be adequate to give full power of disposition in the absence of any limitation, it does not in terms give such power of disposition. What follows therefore may well be considered either as a limitation upon the estate conveyed or as a mere suggestion, if such shall be found to be the intent of the testator, and it is a cardinal rule in construing wills that the intent of the testator, when
The point is that the vagueness of the purpose is evidence that the intention to impress a trust is wanting. The testator in such case has reposed a larger discretion in the donee, and from this fact an inference is sometimes drawn that the precatory words are used by way of suggestion, rather than as words of command or direction. So, also, where it appears that the purpose is too vague to be capable of enforcement, and hence to exclude the trust in a legal sense, the rule that such a construction should be given, if reasonably open, as to. avoid intestacy, is to be considered. These rules, however, are to be considered in connection with the rule that the intent of the testator, as gathered from the whole instrument, should control wherever no positive rule is infringed.
In this case, the intent to limit the bequest to the wife to the one-third of the testator’s estate and the use of the remaining two-thirds is manifest. In my view, it is a significant fact that a disposition of the two-thirds received by Ella J. Potter was expected to be made by her will to be made at the death of the testator, William H. Potter. It was intended that it should then he devoted to the purpose indicated, namely, some charities to be located in the city of Alpena. It is also significant that in this same
It is not contended but that precatory words, if the intent is manifest, may be treated as mandatory. See 20 Central Law Journal, p. 63; Colton v. Colton, 127 U. S. 300; Trustees of Hillsdale College v. Wood, 145 Mich. 257. But it is contended that there is a distinction between the case of an attempt by the testator by use of positive trust terms to create an express trust and where, by reason of the uncertainty in respect to the intended beneficiaries the attempt to create the trust fails, and the case of the use of precatory words expressing a request or wish in respect to the disposition of property, and the same uncertainty exists in regard to the intended beneficiaries. It is contended that, in the first case, the courts
It remains to consider the effect of certain items in the will of Mrs. Potter. Item fourth reads as follows:
“To women’s work in foreign fields, and to women’s work in home lands (not Tank Home) I give and bequeath each society or work, the sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00).”
The circuit judge held that by the bequest “ to women’s work in foreign fields” was meant the “ Women’s Board of Missions of the Interior.” There was evidence offered
It is claimed that the designation of the beneficiary was too uncertain. We do not concur in this view. In Gilmer v. Stone, 130 U. S. 586, the bequest was of the remainder of the testator’s estate, to be equally divided between the board of foreign and the board of home missions. This was the only designation. It was in evidence that there are various denominations having a board of foreign missions and a board of home missions. The testator, however, was shown to be a member of the Presbyterian Church and a contributor to the missions established by that church, and it was held that the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America and the Board of Home Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America were intended by the designation made. We think the uncertainty in the present case is no greater than in that case. The evidence in that case was of a similar character, and it was said of this testimony:
"The purpose of it was to place the court, as far as possible, in the situation in which the testator stood, and*133 thus bring the words employed by him into contact with the circumstances attending the execution of the will. Such proof does not contradict the terms of that instrument, nor tend to wrest the words of the testator from their natural operation. It serves only to identify the institutions described by him as ‘ the board of foreign and the board of home missions,’ and thus the court is enabled to avail itself of the light which the circumstances, in which the testator was placed at the time he made the will, would throw upon his intention.”
See, also, Cook v. Universalist General Convention, 138 Mich. 157.
There was also a bequest, item tenth of the residuary clause of her will, to the Protestant missionary work among the poor colored people of the South. This amount is claimed by the American Missionary Association, which is shown also to be a corporation organized by the Congregational Churches. It was shown that Mrs. Potter was a subscriber to the American Missionary, in which the work among the poor colored people of the South was described, and there was, in addition, evidence of an expression,of an intention to do something for this society. The same considerations which control as to item fourth control as to this.
The decree of the circuit court will be affirmed.