64 Conn. 390 | Conn. | 1894
The complaint in this case is for the conversion of a certain promissory note belonging to the plaintiff, and it contains but a single count. The answer admits the ownership and delivery of the note, and the demand as alleged, but denies the conversion. It also sets out in detail certain facts, the substance of which is that the defendants with the plaintiff’s consent received the note to forward for the plaintiff to a western company for collection; that they had done so and the note had been paid to said western company; that said western company had never paid over to the defendants the proceeds of said note, but that it, shortly after such payment and while said proceeds were in its hands, became insolvent, and had been put into and was still in the hands of a receiver for the benefit of its creditors ; that in so receiving and forwarding said note for collection, the defendants acted as the agents of'the plaintiff, with his knowledge and consent; and that they had notified the plaintiff of the facts alleged. The parties were at issue upon all or nearly all of the special facts so set up.
The court below made a finding of facts, and upon them rendered judgment for the defendants.
The basis for an appeal upon certain claimed errors in the finding of facts appears upon the record, but no appeal was taken on'this ground, and the reasons of appeal are based wholly upon certain claimed errors of law. For this reason
The material part of the facts found may be stated as follows : The note in question was for one thousand dollars, dated December 11th, 1885, payable to the order of one Ton-cray, five years after date, at the Farmers and Merchants Bank of Freemont, Nebraska, and was made by one Stenvers. It was given for money loaned by said bank to Stenvers, the payee Toneray being an officer of the bank, and was secured by a mortgage to Toneray upon land in Nebraska. After it was given, and some time prior to 1890, the officers of said bank organized the Nebraska Mortgage and Investment Company to carry on the mortgage loan business of the bank, and this investment company succeeded the bank in the loan business, and Toneray became an officer and the manager of said investment company.
The defendants are brokers in New Haven and have been engaged in selling loans for said bank and said investment company and other western companies and agencies, receiving a commission from such companies for such sales. The note in question, with the mortgage securing the same, was sold to the plaintiff in December, 1885, by Alfred Walker, who was then engaged in the business since carried on by the defendants, and whom they succeeded in business. Said note and mortgage had been sent by the bank to Alfred Walker to be sold. The note was indorsed by Toneray without recourse, but the mortgage was never assigned by Toneray. -The note remained the property of the plaintiff till it was paid, December, 1890, and during this time the interest upon it was paid by Stenvers to the investment company, who forwarded the same to the defendants, and the defendants by their own check paid it to the plaintiff. In December, 1890, the defendants were informed by the investment company that Stenvers desired to pay the note, and requested them to forward the papers to it to the end that payment might be made. Thereupon in that month,
At the time the note was paid to the investment company, the defendants had in their hands for sale notes and mortgages belonging to the investment company to the amount of about ten thousand dollars, which upon the books of the investment company were charged to the defendants; and the investment company upon receiving payment from Stenvers credited the defendants with the amount paid. The defendants, however, fully accounted to the investment company for all of said loans, and they had no knowledge that the investment comp'any had charged them with the amount of said loans or had credited them with the amount of said payment. The investment company had no authority to do
Upon these facts the plaintiff claimed that the defendants had converted the note to their own use as alleged, and whether the court below erred in overruling this claim is the principal question upon the present appeal.
As already stated the only wrong alleged, and the only matter in issue, was the conversion of the note.
The plaintiff does not sue for the proceeds of the note, nor for any claimed negligent or wrongful conduct of the defendants in respect to the collection of the note, or its proceeds ; but for the loss and conversion of the instrument itself, the paper upon which Stenvers’ promise was written. To that specific wrong and to that alone, he has himself limited his proof, and for that and for that alone he has limited his right of recovery. Ives v. Goshen, 63 Conn., 79; Sanford v. Peck, id., 486. Unless then the facts found show a conversion of the note, the plaintiff cannot recover in this suit.
Conversion is usually defined to be an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods belonging to another, to the exclusion of the owner’s rights. Laverty v. Snethen, 68 N. Y., 522. It is some unauthorized act which deprives another of his property permanently or for an indefinite time; some unauthorized assumption and exercise of the powers of the owner to his harm. The essence of the wrong is that the property rights of the plaintiff have been dealt with in a manner adverse to him, inconsist
In the light of these principles, it is impossible to say that the conduct of the defendants amounted to a conversion of the note in question. The note was payable at the bank in Nebraska, and the payee of the note was the owner of record there of the mortgage made to secure it.
Even if the defendants had agreed, as the plaintiff claims, to personally collect the note, they were at liberty to do it through the investment company if they chose to take the risk of so doing. This certainly authorized them to forward the note in the manner they did, and authorized the bank to receive payment of the note. The defendants promptly forwarded the note, and it was promptly paid. As a note it then ceased to be the property of the plaintiff, and in place of it he became the owner of the amount paid.
It thus appears that every act done with respect to the note from the time it came into the defendants’ hands until, it was paid and delivered up and ceased to be the property of the plaintiff, was done by his authority and with his assent. The defendants then did nothing with the note which they were not authorized by the plaintiff to do. In Palmer v. Jarmain, 2 Mees. & W. 282, an agent was authorized to get a note discounted, which he did, and appropriated the avails. It was held that this was not a conversion of the note, because he did nothing with that save what he was authorized to do. The case at bar comes clearly within the principle here applied.
It may be, as claimed by the plaintiff upon argument before this court, that the defendants are or should be liable to him in some form of action, for their acts and conduct since the payment of the note and with reference to the money the proceeds of the note. How this may be we have no means of knowing, as the matter is not before us in any manner; but whatever wrongs the defendants may have done to the plaintiff in the premises, it is quite clear that their acts and conduct do not constitute a conversion of the note.
There remains to be considered very briefly the matters
There is no error and a new trial is denied.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.