Gilbert v. United StatesGilbert v. United States
Ezell Gilbert, a federal prisoner, wants to have an error of law in the calculation of his sentence corrected based upon a Supreme Court decision interpreting the sentencing guidelines, even though that decision was issued eleven years after he was sentenced. Gilbert insists that prisoners have a right to have errors in the calculation of their sentences corrected no matter how long it has been since the sentences were imposed. His insistence calls to mind Justice Holmes’ observation that “All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme.” Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355, 28 S.Ct. 529, 531 (1908). But as Holmes also explained in the same thought, “Yet all [rights] in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than those on which the particular right is founded, and which become strong enough to hold their own when a certain point is reached.” Id.
The principles of policy that limit the right to be resentenced in accord with the latest guidelines decisions are those regarding finality of judgment and the important interests that finality promotes. For reasons we will discuss, the statutory provisions and the decisions furthering finality of judgment are strong enough to hold their own against Gilbert‘s claimed right to have a long-ago error in calculating his sentence corrected.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts underlying the sentence in this case, and the procedural history, illuminate the issue and the competing considerations that we consider in deciding it.
A. Gilbert‘s Crime and Criminal History
On October 11, 1995, Ezell Gilbert set off for a day of work, plying his trade near the Cottage Hills Housing Project, a high crime area of Tampa, Florida. That day Gilbert was working out of his car, a four-door 1985 Chevrolet Celebrity. He was a drug dealer, and two officers of the Tampa Police Department, who were hidden from view, were conducting surveillance of illegal activity in the area.
Around 9:30 a.m. the officers spotted Gilbert as he stopped his car and
The officers discovered that Gilbert had not been alone in the car. In a drug dealer‘s version of “Bring Your Daughter to Work Day,” Gilbert had brought his five-year-old daughter, Keidra, along with him as he plied his trade. She had been seated in the back seat of the small car the whole time. She was there as two drug addicts climbed into the car to buy drugs from Gilbert, and he left her there as he attempted to run away from the approaching officer.
When police demanded to see the car‘s registration, Gilbert reluctantly
What was in that car, in addition to Gilbert‘s young daughter, was the bag that had fallen from the glove compartment. It contained 67 grams of crack cocaine, and there was a smaller bag containing 2 grams of powder cocaine in the glove compartment. And there were also 40 “ring baggies” containing a total of 111 grams of marijuana stashed under the car‘s front seat.
The record does not reveal whether that day was the first time that Gilbert had taken his five-year-old daughter into harm‘s way with him as he committed crimes, but it does reveal that this was not the first time he had committed crimes. Gilbert‘s known criminal history began in 1989, when he was only 19 years old. In March of 1989 he was arrested on state charges for possession of cocaine and possession of alcohol by a minor, but those charges were dropped. Two arrests followed in May 1989 for possession of alcohol by a minor, but the State evidently did not pursue the charges.
Gilbert soon graduated to more serious crimes. In September 1989, while
Instead of successfully completing probation, however, Gilbert chose to commit more crimes. As a result, a probation violation notice was filed on March 2, 1990, and a few days later Gilbert was arrested and charged with more state crimes, including possession of cocaine. He was convicted of the new cocaine charge on March 29, 1990, and on that date received a sentence of 2 years of community control.
Seventeen days later, on April 16, 1990, state authorities filed yet another notice that Gilbert had violated the terms of the probation that had been imposed on him just three months earlier. On June 6, 1990, he was found to have violated
How much time Gilbert actually served is unclear, but it certainly was not 30 months. By October 24, 1991, only 17 months after he had been sentenced, the 21-year-old Gilbert was free again, a fact we know because he was arrested on that date for possession of marijuana. Gilbert was convicted of that marijuana charge and on January 28, 1992, at age 22, he received yet another sentence of probation, this time for one year. Less than two months later, yet another probation violation notice had been filed, and in August of 1993, when Gilbert was 23, he was arrested yet again, this time on two counts of possession of marijuana with intent to sell or distribute. The State filed an “order of release” as to both those charges on September 8, 1993, but in what may have been a related action, on September 14 Gilbert was sentenced to one year imprisonment on the 1991 marijuana charge. He was then 23 years old.
Gilbert once again did not serve his full time in prison; instead, he was
The State of Florida charged Gilbert with trafficking in cocaine, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and child abuse, all in connection with his October 11, 1995 arrest. The child abuse charges stemmed from Gilbert‘s having his daughter with him while he was dealing drugs. All of those state charges, however, were nolle prossed in January 1996, in deference to the federal indictment of Gilbert for that same illegal drug conduct.
B. Gilbert‘s Indictment, Conviction, and Sentencing
The indictment of Gilbert in December 1995 included one count of
After Gilbert‘s motion to suppress was denied, he pleaded guilty in March of 1996. At the plea hearing, Gilbert admitted possessing with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine and more than 100 grams of marijuana. Given the prior drug convictions listed in the
Gilbert was sentenced as a career offender under
That part of the colloquy went as follows:
The Court: “I understand that you‘re pleading guilty to the indictment as originally charged without the enhancement; is that correct?”
Defendant: “Yes, sir.”
[Defense Attorney]: “That‘s the 851 enhancement.”
The Court: “The 851 enhancement.”
At the sentence hearing, Gilbert‘s attorney stated, without objection from the government, that: “[O]n page one of the sentencing memorandum, they have the mandatory minimum of life, which is no longer applicable in this case, it‘s a ten-year mandatory minimum.” And the Addendum to the PSR states: “The government has indicated that the enhancement in this case for a Life sentence was withdrawn at the time of the defendant‘s plea.”
If the
Gilbert objected on a number of grounds at sentencing, the only relevant one for present purposes being his objection to career offender treatment under the guidelines. He did not dispute that his prior conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute was a “controlled substance offense,” but he did contend
The district court overruled all of Gilbert‘s objections and sentenced him on March 25, 1997. Acting under the then-mandatory guidelines system, the district court sentenced Gilbert to 292 months imprisonment on the intent to distribute crack cocaine count after the judge made it abundantly clear that he would have preferred to give Gilbert a shorter term of imprisonment. The court also sentenced Gilbert to 120 months imprisonment on the intent to distribute marijuana count, to run concurrently.
C. The Post-Sentencing Procedural History
On direct appeal Gilbert raised three issues, one of which was his contention
In September of 1999 Gilbert filed pro se a
There the matter was laid to rest, and there it rested until a series of events beginning in August 2008 led to its being exhumed. The United States Sentencing Commission had published Amendment 706 on November 1, 2007, which provided for a two-level reduction in base offense levels for crack cocaine offenses.
On August 26, 2008, the district court on its own initiative issued an order directing the Federal Public Defender to represent Gilbert in an
Gilbert then filed through counsel what he styled a “Motion to Reopen and Amend First
The problem for Gilbert was that his Archer-based claim clearly was barred by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996‘s (AEDPA‘s) second and successive petitions provision,
Gilbert urged on the district court “two vehicles” by which it could grant him relief. He argued that the court could construe his motion as one under
The district court rejected both arguments. It concluded that Gilbert‘s 60(b) argument was foreclosed by the reasoning in Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524,
A panel of this Court reversed the district court‘s denial of relief. See Gilbert II, 609 F.3d at 1168. Without addressing the Rule 60(b) issue, the panel decided that the savings clause contained in
II. DISCUSSION
Gilbert‘s savings clause contention requires much more discussion than his Rule 60(b) one, so we will address it first. Before doing that, however, we need to address some assumptions the parties make that relate to the issues we will be deciding.
A. Assumptions About the Effect of the Error in Calculating Gilbert‘s Sentence
Gilbert‘s arguments presume that if Begay and Archer had been on the books when his case arose he would have received a lighter sentence because the career offender enhancement, which those decisions rule out for his case, did increase his mandatory guidelines range. His arguments also presume that if he were resentenced today, which is the relief he is seeking, he would receive a lighter sentence with the career offender enhancement out of the picture. We are not so sure of either proposition.
Gilbert‘s sentencing occurred in 1997, eight years before the decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), and while the mandatory guidelines system was still in effect. At sentencing his 1994 conviction for carrying a concealed weapon was counted as a “crime of violence” as that term is used in
If Begay had begotten Archer before Gilbert was sentenced and his sentence was affirmed on direct appeal, his earlier weapons conviction would not have been treated as a crime of violence under
On the possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute charge, Gilbert faced a mandatory life sentence under
If the Begay decision had been on the books when Gilbert was facing these charges, the government would have known that the guidelines range he faced was
While the government did waive its right to insist on a mandatory life sentence as part of a plea bargain, the record does not establish that it would have done so if it could not have counted on the career offender enhancement to double the sentence that Gilbert would receive. It is not as though the government needed a guilty plea because there was a risk of acquittal or the trial would have taken a long time. The evidence against Gilbert was overwhelming and the trial would have been short and simple. Two police officers saw Gilbert as he sold crack cocaine out of his car. Soon thereafter, when another officer approached him, Gilbert attempted to flee on foot. The charges against Gilbert were based on crack cocaine that was found in the glove compartment of his car, and marijuana that was bagged for sale and found under the seat. Even if Gilbert had wanted to take the stand and deny it all, there is little or no chance a jury would have believed him given all of the evidence against him and all of his prior convictions. And the fact
The point is that we cannot say with certainty that if Begay and Archer had been the law when Gilbert committed these crimes, he would have received a lesser sentence. Ironically, for the reasons we have just discussed, he might have received an even harsher one. Rather than speculate, however, we will assume for present purposes that if those two decisions had been on the books more than a decade earlier, Gilbert would have received a substantially lighter sentence then than he did—a sentence in the range of 151 to 188 months instead of 292 months.10 That is, however, only an assumption.
Gilbert also presumes that if he could just get a new sentence hearing, he will receive a shorter sentence than the one he now has. We have our doubts about
There are a number of
A sentencing judge could easily decide to vary significantly upwards from
Nonetheless, because it does not affect our reasoning or the result we reach, we will assume that Gilbert would receive a substantially lower sentence if he were resentenced today, just as we are assuming that his sentence would have been lower when he was sentenced in 1997 if the Begay and Archer decisions had been out at that time.
Begay and Archer were not, however, issued before Gilbert was sentenced. They were issued eleven years after Gilbert was sentenced, ten years after we affirmed his sentence on direct appeal, nine years after the Supreme Court denied certiorari review, and five years after his
B. The Savings Clause Issue
Having already unsuccessfully filed a
Gilbert’s primary contention is that his claim is cognizable in a
1. Some Issues We Need Not Decide
The government asserts, as its first line of defense, that a guidelines misapplication claim may not be brought in any collateral attack, not even an initial one. We have no reason to decide that issue because this is not Gilbert’s first
The government concedes that a claim that a sentencing error resulted in a sentence longer than the statutory maximum may be brought in an initial
That seems obvious, but attempting to bring himself within the scope of the government’s concession, Gilbert insists that the maximum sentence specified in the statute providing a punishment range for the crime of conviction is not really the statutory maximum sentence. Instead, he argues that with a pre-Booker mandatory guidelines sentence, the top of the guidelines range, as correctly calculated or recalculated to take into account any changes in case law, is the maximum statutory sentence. His reasoning is that because Congress authorized the Sentencing Commission to prescribe the sentencing guidelines and made the guidelines mandatory, they trump the statutory punishment range or at least
In any event, Gilbert’s point is beside the point. The government can shape its concession as it pleases. The government concedes only that a sentence beyond the maximum punishment statutorily specified for anyone who commits the crime may be remedied in a
2. The Text and History of the Clause
We turn now to the issue we are deciding. The text of the savings clause itself does not indicate that it authorizes the filing of a
3. The Relationship of § 2255(e) and 2255(h)
Assuming that a sentencing guidelines error that resulted in a longer sentence may be remedied in a collateral proceeding, the reason Gilbert cannot obtain relief through a
That simply cannot be, as every circuit to address the matter has pointed out. See e.g., Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 586 (10th Cir. 2011) (“If the rule were otherwise—if the § 2255 remedial mechanism could be deemed ‘inadequate or ineffective’ any time a petitioner is barred from raising a meritorious second or successive challenge to his conviction—subsection (h) would become a nullity, ‘a
Fundamental canons of statutory construction support the conclusion that the generally worded and ambiguous savings clause, which was first enacted in 1947, cannot override the specifically worded and clear statutory bar on second or successive motions that was enacted as part of AEDPA in 1996. An ambiguous or general statutory provision enacted at an earlier time must yield to a specific and clear provision enacted at a later time. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550–51, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 2483 (1974) (“Where there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment.”); Nguyen v. United States, 556 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir. 2009) (“The canon is that a specific statutory provision trumps a general one.”); ConArt, Inc. v. Hellmuth, Obata + Kassabaum, Inc., 504 F.3d 1208, 1210 (11th Cir. 2007) (“We don’t have the authority to excise specific statutory provisions in favor of more general ones.”); id. (“[W]here two statutory provisions would otherwise conflict, the earlier enacted one yields to the later one to the extent necessary to prevent the conflict.”); I.C.C. v. S. Ry. Co., 543 F.2d 534, 539 (5th Cir. 1976) (“Under the usual rules of statutory construction, where there is a conflict between an earlier statute and a subsequent enactment, the subsequent enactment governs.”).
The critically important nature of the finality interests safeguarded by
The single guidelines term that gave rise to this litigation illustrates the phenomenon. Many are the decisional oars that have churned the law about the meaning of “crime of violence,” as it appears in § 4B1.1. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1271–72 (2010); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, ___, 129 S.Ct. 687, 691–93 (2009); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144–148, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 1586–88 (2008); United States v. McGill, 618 F.3d 1273, 1274–79 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rainer, 616 F.3d 1212, 1215–16 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Williams, 609 F.3d 1168, 1169–70 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Harris, 608 F.3d 1222, 1225–26, 1233 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Whitson, 597 F.3d 1218, 1221–23 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Harrison, 558 F.3d 1280, 1293–96 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Lee, 586 F.3d 859, 873–74 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008).16 And there will undoubtedly be more churning to come as additional decisions are issued refining the term “crime of violence” as it applies to hundreds of crimes variously defined in the codes of the fifty states and in the federal criminal code that might be classified as violent. From 1991 to 2004 the § 4B1.1 career offender guideline was applied in 2,906 cases in this circuit alone. See United States Petition for Rehearing, App. B. It was applied in 16,049 cases nationwide during that same period. Id.
Of course, the finality-busting effects of permitting prisoners to use the
And the rule Gilbert is seeking could not be confined to sentence miscalculations based on enhancement errors. If the savings clause operates to allow attacks on old sentences that were lengthened by enhancements that later decisions have called into doubt, there is no reason it would not also operate to do the same with any other guidelines calculation error. As a result, no federal judgment imposing a sentence would be truly final until the sentence was completely served or the prisoner had gone on to face a different kind of final judgment. The exception that Gilbert would have us write into
As we have pointed out more than once, “one of the principal functions of AEDPA was to ensure a greater degree of finality for convictions.” Johnson v. United States, 340 F.3d 1219, 1224 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Jones v. United States, 304 F.3d 1035, 1039 (11th Cir. 2002) (“A fundamental purpose for the
The statutory bar against second or successive motions is one of the most important AEDPA safeguards for finality of judgment. As we explained in our en banc decision in the Gonzalez case, “The central purpose behind the AEDPA was to ensure greater finality of state and federal court judgments in criminal cases, and to that end its provisions greatly restrict the filing of second or successive petitions.” Gonzalez v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 366 F.3d 1253, 1269 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 125 S.Ct. 2641 (2005); see also Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 661, 121 S.Ct. 2478, 2481–82 (2001) (“AEDPA greatly restricts the power of federal courts to award relief to state prisoners who file second or successive habeas corpus applications.”). If second and successive motions are not “greatly restrict[ed],” there will be no end to collateral attacks on convictions and sentences, and there will be no finality of judgment.
That would be a bad thing because “[o]ne of the law’s very objects is the finality of its judgments.” McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1468 (1991). “Neither innocence nor just punishment can be vindicated until the final judgment is known.” Id., 111 S.Ct. at 1468. The principle of finality of judgment “is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system. Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.” Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1074 (1989). The lack of finality also frustrates rehabilitation. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 n.32, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1571 n.32 (1982). “Both the individual criminal defendant and society have an interest in insuring that there will at some point be the certainty that comes with an end to litigation . . . .” Id. at 127, 102 S.Ct. at 1571 (quotation marks and alteration omitted). Justice Powell, in a passage that the Supreme Court would
No effective judicial system can afford to concede the continuing theoretical possibility that there is error in every trial and that every incarceration is unfounded. At some point the law must convey to those in custody that a wrong has been committed, that consequent punishment has been imposed, that one should no longer look back with the view to resurrecting every imaginable basis for further litigation . . . .
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 262, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2065 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (quoted with approval in Engle, 456 U.S. at 122 n.31, 102 S.Ct. at 1571 n.31). And on another occasion the Court explained that “[a] procedural system which permits an endless repetition of inquiry into facts and law in a vain search for ultimate certitude implies a lack of confidence about the possibilities of justice that cannot but war with the effectiveness of underlying substantive commands.” McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 492, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1469 (1991) (quotation marks omitted). The Court warned that “[t]here comes a point where a procedural system which leaves matters perpetually open no longer reflects humane concern but merely anxiety and a desire for immobility.” Id., 111 S.Ct. at 1469 (quotation marks omitted); see also Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 497, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 1739 (1994) (“As we have explained, inroads on the concept of finality tend to undermine confidence in the integrity of our procedures and inevitably delay and impair the orderly administration of justice.” (alteration
We decline Gilbert’s invitation to undermine finality of judgment principles by using
5. Decisions of Other Circuits on This Issue
Every circuit to decide this issue has reached the same conclusion we do: the savings clause of
The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue in Kinder v. Purdy, 222 F.3d 209 (5th Cir. 2000), a case in which the petitioner had been sentenced, when the guidelines were mandatory, to a sentence enhanced by the
The Fifth Circuit explained in Kinder that the savings clause had not been—and it should not be—applied to sentencing claims, such as a claim that the
The Sixth Circuit agrees. In United States v. Peterman, 249 F.3d 458 (6th Cir. 2001), after the three appellants’ pre-Booker sentences had been affirmed, an intervening decision in a co-conspirator’s case established that the three appellants had received longer sentences than they should have under the law. Id. at 459–60. Because they were barred from filing a second or successive motion by
The Sixth Circuit reversed that application of the savings clause to sentencing claims, holding that while the savings clause applies to claims of actual innocence of the crime of conviction, it does not apply to sentencing claims, at least not where the sentence being attacked does not exceed the statutory maximum. Id. at 461–62. In reaching its decision, the Court warned that: “The circumstances in which
The Third Circuit has reached the same conclusion. See Okereke v.United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120–21 (3d Cir. 2002)
While acknowledging that no circuit has embraced her position, one of our dissenting colleagues views the Seventh Circuit’s decision in In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1998), as “favorable to Mr. Gilbert,” and suggests that “it may well be that he would prevail in the Seventh Circuit.” Dissenting Op. of Martin, J., at 100. Actually, the Davenport decision establishes just the opposite.
There were two petitioners in that case—Davenport and Nichols. Davenport, 147 F.3d at 607. Davenport, who had already filed one
[Davenport] complains that if he is indeed innocent of the “armed career criminal” offense, it is atrocious that he should have no remedy against languishing in prison except for an appeal, which is quite likely to be futile, to executive clemency. But if this complaint were to be accepted, it would make an arbitrary hole in the Antiterrorism Act. Davenport is attacking his sentence rather than his conviction, for the armed career criminal act is a sentence-enhancement statute; he is “innocent” (if his claim has merit) only in a technical sense. For him to be able to file successive motions for postconviction relief, but not someone who had been denied all right to counsel or had a confession beaten out of him but was unable to argue that he had in fact been innocent of the crimes of which he had been convicted, would correspond to no intelligible concept of either legal or substantive justice. And the privileged status for which Davenport contends would if accepted allow him to file not just one successive appeal; a prisoner who was claiming to be innocent could by the logic of Davenport’s argument file an indefinite number of successive motions for postconviction relief—could indeed file an identical new motion every day of his incarceration.
Id. (emphasis added). That explanation, and the decision it accompanied, strongly supports the conclusion we reach and is at war with the dissenting position.
At the same time it rejected Davenport’s claim, the Seventh Circuit ordered relief granted to Nichols, the petitioner whose case had been consolidated with Davenport’s. See id. at 607, 610–12. But that part of the Davenport decision is fully consistent with the denial of relief to Gilbert in the present case. Nichols, unlike Gilbert and unlike Davenport, “ha[d] a claim that he [was] indeed being held in prison for a nonexistent crime.” Id. at 610. Nichols had been convicted for violating
The Seventh Circuit reasoned: “A procedure for postconviction relief can fairly be termed inadequate when it is so configured as to deny a convicted defendant any opportunity for judicial rectification of so fundamental a defect in his conviction as having been imprisoned for a nonexistent offense.” Id. at 611 (second emphasis added). The savings clause contained in
The Seventh Circuit reiterated the point in Taylor v. Gilkey, 314 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2002). The appellant in that case was attempting to use the savings clause to raise a sentencing claim. Refusing to allow it, the Seventh Circuit stressed that the movant who had been granted relief in Davenport (Nichols) had asserted a claim of actual innocence of the crime of conviction, unlike Taylor who was asserting a sentencing claim. Taylor, 314 F.3d at 835–36. The opinion, written by Judge Easterbrook, is devastating to Gilbert’s position in this case, which our dissenting colleagues are espousing. This is how he explained the Seventh Circuit’s position:
What Davenport strongly implied—what we now make explicit—is that a claim of error in addressing the sort of constitutional theory that has long been appropriate for collateral review does not render
§ 2255 “inadequate or ineffective.” [Section 2255(e)] poses the question whether the remedy is adequate “to test the legality” of the detention. This implies a focus on procedures rather than outcomes. Judgessometimes err, but this does not show that the procedures are inadequate; it shows only that people are fallible. How often to rerun a search for error is a question to which § 2255[(h)] speaks directly, and the statutory limitation to a single collateral attack, unless the conditions of§ 2255[(h)] (elaborated in28 U.S.C. § 2244 ) have been met, does not render§ 2255 inadequate or ineffective. If it did, then the statute would be internally contradictory. It would not be sensible to read§ 2255[(h)] as making§ 2255 “inadequate or ineffective” and thus nullifying itself. This is a subject on which the courts of appeals are in agreement. Every court that has addressed the matter has held that§ 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective” only when a structural problem in§ 2255 forecloses even one round of effective collateral review—and then only when as in Davenport the claim being foreclosed is one of actual innocence. See, e.g., Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538–39 (3d Cir. 2002); In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333–34 (4th Cir. 2000); Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 902–03 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Peterman, 249 F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2001); Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1244 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 835–36 (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit’s position on the issue before us could not be clearer: Section 2255(e)’s savings clause does not apply to sentencing claims.
Contrary to Judge Martin’s characterization of our position, we do not categorically state that every other circuit has interpreted the savings clause of
The fact that the Second, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have reached the same conclusion that we do—and without a single dissent from any of their decisions—puts into context our own dissenters’ florid phrases. Pumping all the pedals on the prose organ, they charge that by disagreeing with them on this legal issue, we have not only “neglect[ed] our responsibility,” “shirked our duty,” and “diminish[ed] the institution of the federal courts,” Dissenting Op. of Martin, J., at
Instead, our intent is to apply the law to the facts of the case that is before us. That is our duty. In carrying it out, we do not question our dissenting colleagues’ sincerity, nor do we charge them with any offense more serious than sincerely disagreeing with our view about the meaning and effect of
6. The Suspension Clause
None of the other circuits that have refused to apply the savings clause of
The Supreme Court did have something to say in Felkner v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 116 S.Ct. 2333 (1996), about the Suspension Clause as it involves the AEDPA’s clamp down on second or successive petitions in
Although Felker was a
In their dissenting opinions, Judges Barkett and Martin express their view that Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008), requires that the savings clause lift the restrictions on second or successive motions found in
The Boumediene case did not involve prisoners who had been convicted and
The question was not whether the detainees in Boumediene were entitled to multiple rounds of habeas review of their detention but whether they were entitled to any habeas review at all. It was in that context the Court made the statement that Judges Barkett and Martin rely on, about each detainee having been denied “a
7. The Actual Innocence Exceptions
Section 2255(h) itself contains an actual innocence exception to its bar against second or successive motions, but it is a narrow one. The exception applies only when the claim is based on “newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense.”
A number of courts have held that the savings clause permits a claim of actual innocence of the crime of conviction to be brought in a
Bailey actual innocence claims are what the Wofford panel had in mind when it stated that the savings clause would permit a prisoner to bring a
The Wofford dicta and the Bailey-related actual innocence decisions of other circuits are of no use to Gilbert because the crimes for which he was convicted, possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute and possessing marijuana with intent to distribute, do exist, as thousands of federal prisoners can attest. Unable to colorably contend that he was convicted of a nonexistent crime, Gilbert asserts instead that he “is actually innocent of being a career offender, factually and legally.” Put in its best light, Gilbert’s argument assumes that he was convicted of the nonexistent offense of being a career offender with only one qualifying predicate offense. But he wasn’t. As the indictment and the judgment in this case show, Gilbert was not charged with, nor was he convicted of, being a career
offender. A defendant who is convicted and then has the
Nor is Gilbert helped by the actual innocence of sentence exception set out in Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 112 S.Ct. 2514 (1992). That case had nothing to do with either the savings clause of
There are four reasons the Sawyer actual innocence of sentence exception does not apply in this case. First, the Supreme Court emphasized in Sawyer that its exception to the rule against second and successive petitions for actual innocence of the sentence was “a very narrow exception,” id. at 341, 112 S.Ct. at 2520, and one that applied “in the setting of capital punishment,” id. at 340, 112 S.Ct. at 2519; accord Cade v. Haley, 222 F.3d 1298, 1308 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[A] showing of actual innocence can only refer to those state-law requirements that must be satisfied to impose the death penalty, i.e., the elements of the capital crime and minimum required aggravating factors.“). The limitation of the Sawyer holding to death sentence cases is not surprising, because the Supreme Court and this Court have long recognized that “death is different.” See Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 732, 118 S.Ct. 2246, 2252 (1998) (observing that “the death penalty is unique
Because death is different, neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever applied the Sawyer actual innocence of the sentence exception except in death penalty cases, and the better view is that the exception does not apply to non-capital sentencing errors. See United States v. Richards, 5 F.3d 1369, 1371 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[The defendant] does not claim to be actually innocent of the offense for which he was convicted; he claims only that he should have received a lesser sentence. A person cannot be actually innocent of a noncapital sentence, however.“); see also Embrey v. Hershberger, 131 F.3d 739, 740–41 (8th Cir. 1997)
The second reason that the Sawyer exception does not apply here is that it operates where there is constitutional error, not statutory or guidelines interpretation error. The Supreme Court expressed the holding in these terms: “We therefore hold that petitioner has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error at his sentencing hearing, no reasonable juror would have found him eligible for the death penalty under Louisiana law.” Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 350, 112 S.Ct. at 2525; see also id. at 338, 112 S.Ct. at 2518 (“[T]he evidence he argued had been unconstitutionally kept from the jury . . . .“); id. at 347–48, 112 S.Ct. at 2523 (noting that Sawyer was advancing two claims, a Brady claim and an ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
The Sawyer requirement that the claim be a constitutional one is borrowed from the actual innocence exception to procedural bars for conviction claims in
The third reason the Sawyer exception is of no help to Gilbert is that even if it were not limited to death sentences, and even if it reached non-constitutional claims, he still would fail to meet the exception‘s requirement that but for the claimed error he would not have been statutorily eligible for the sentence he received. See Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 348–50, 112 S.Ct. at 2523–25; Sibley v. Culliver, 377 F.3d 1196, 1205 (11th Cir. 2004) (the petitioner must prove that “he is ‘innocent’ of the death penalty because none of the aggravating factors legally necessary for invocation of the death penalty applied“); Cade, 222 F.3d at 1308 (”Sawyer excuses procedural default . . . when a petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence that, but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty under the applicable state law.” (quotation marks omitted)). Because of the drug crimes for which he was convicted, Gilbert was statutorily eligible for a sentence of between 10 years and life. See
Finally, Gilbert is also outside the scope of the Sawyer exception for a reason explained by the Seventh Circuit in Hope v. United States, 108 F.3d 119 (7th Cir. 1997). In that case, the Seventh Circuit held that the pre-AEDPA “actual innocence” exceptions for second or successive motions did not apply to any sentencing guidelines errors after AEDPA clamped down on those motions. The petitioner in Hope had argued that AEDPA‘s language permitting a second
The “actual innocence” exception of the prior law was judge-made, and so its contours were appropriately judge-fashioned and permissibly judge-expanded. The exception in the new law is graven in statutory language that could not be any clearer. When we consider how limited the review of sentencing traditionally was, how strongly Congress evidently disfavors successive rounds of collateral attacks on duly reviewed convictions such as that of [the defendant], how doubtful it is that any violation of the sentencing guidelines rises to the level necessary to justify collateral relief even under the standards of the old law, and the absence of any indication in the legislative history that “offense” was being used in some special sense different from its ordinary meaning, we think it highly unlikely that Congress intended the word to bear a special meaning.
Id. at 120 (citation omitted). In other words, the actual innocence of sentence exception to the bar against second or successive motions involving sentence claims, as narrow as it was, did not survive AEDPA.
For all of these reasons, we conclude that the Sawyer actual innocence of sentence exception does not apply to claims that the guidelines were misinterpreted to produce a higher guidelines range than would otherwise have applied, and that is as true with pre-Booker sentencing errors as it is with post-Booker ones.
C. The Rule 60(b) Issue
The petitioner in Gonzalez was a state prisoner trying to get around the
We join every other circuit that has addressed the issue in concluding that the standard announced in Gonzalez applies to federal prisoner cases as well. See United States v. Buenrostro, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 1023696, *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 23, 2011) (“Because § 2254 is nearly identical to § 2255 in substance . . . . [w]e agree with our sister circuits and hold that Gonzalez applies to such motions.“); accord Curry v. United States, 507 F.3d 603, 604–05 (7th Cir. 2007); Nailor v. United States (In re Nailor), 487 F.3d 1018, 1021–23 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Nelson, 465 F.3d 1145, 1147 (10th Cir. 2006). Because Gilbert‘s motion sought to assert or reassert a claim for relief, instead of pointing out a defect in the integrity of the earlier
III. CONCLUSION
We do not decide whether a claim that the sentencing guidelines were misapplied may be brought in a first time
To put our reasoning and the result in the broader terms with which we began this opinion, a federal prisoner‘s right to have errors in the calculation of his sentence corrected is not without limits. After a case has passed the stage of a first
AFFIRMED.
Even though I initially agreed with the panel opinion, I now concur fully in the well-reasoned majority opinion and write separately to emphasize that after studying the issue further and having the benefit of en banc oral argument and briefing, I am persuaded that Gilbert‘s sentencing guidelines claim does not fall within the savings clause of
I fully agree with the court‘s explanation of why the district court could not grant Gilbert the relief he seeks, but feel obliged to make the following observations.
First, I think it unnecessary to describe in detail the circumstances of Gilbert‘s crime—including the presence of his five-year old daughter—and Gilbert‘s criminal record, and then posit that, if he were to be resentenced, the district court would likely impose the same sentence he received in the first instance. None of that is relevant. I therefore do not join in part II.A of the court‘s opinion. The sole issue we are called upon to decide is whether the savings clause applies in this case. The court holds, correctly, that it does not.
Second, having decided that the savings clause does not apply in this case, we do not need to imagine the potential consequences of a contrary holding. I therefore decline to join part II.B.4 of the court‘s opinion.
I join fully in the opinion of the majority. I write separately to respond to the dissenting opinions, which argue that this Court is “morally bankrupt,” Dissenting Op. of Hill, J., at 104, unless we find some way to read the Suspension Clause creatively or otherwise find a way to hold that Gilbert is entitled to immediate release from prison. The dissents are overwrought for several reasons, but I address only a few flaws that are particularly disturbing.
The dissents argue that Gilbert has not had a “meaningful opportunity” to challenge the legality of his imprisonment, Dissenting Op. of Barkett, J., at 86; Dissenting Op. of Martin, J., at 98 n.3; Dissenting Op. of Hill, J., at 104, but that assertion is silly. To the contrary, the federal judiciary knows Ezell Gilbert well: Gilbert pleaded guilty to drug charges in 1996; he appealed his sentence to this Court, and we affirmed, United States v. Gilbert, 138 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 1998); he petitioned for rehearing en banc, but his petition was denied, United States v. Gilbert, 156 F.3d 188 (1998) (unpublished table decision); he petitioned for a writ of certiorari, but that petition was denied too, Gilbert v. United States, 526 U.S. 1111, 119 S. Ct. 1754 (1999); he filed a motion to vacate his sentence, which the district court denied; he tried to appeal this denial, but this Court denied him a certificate of appealability. Gilbert, like all other criminals prosecuted in the
Several constitutional provisions grant rights to criminals like Gilbert, but the Suspension Clause is not one of them. The Supreme Court explained, shortly after the ratification of the Constitution, that “for the meaning of the term habeas corpus, resort may unquestionably be had to the common law.” Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch. 75, 93–94 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.). “[A]t common law a judgment of conviction rendered by a court of general criminal jurisdiction was conclusive proof that confinement was legal,” United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 211, 72 S. Ct. 263, 268 (1952), a fact curiously omitted in the discussion of Hayman in one of the dissenting opinions, Dissenting Op. of Martin, J., at 94. Courts instead “exercised the writ in light of its most basic purpose, avoiding serious abuses of power by a government, say a king‘s imprisonment of an individual without referring the matter to a court.” Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 322, 116 S. Ct. 1293, 1298 (1996). Early American habeas legislation protected citizens primarily from arbitrary detention, true to the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679. See Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States—1776-1865, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 243, 251–52 (1965). That Act empowered judges to order the release of prisoners “other than persons Convict or in Execution.” 31 Car. 2, c. 2 § 3. The Judiciary
The arguments of my dissenting colleagues that the Suspension Clause entitles Gilbert to relief, Dissenting Op. of Barkett, J., at 86; Dissenting Op. of Martin, J., at 89; Dissenting Op. of Hill, J., at 105, must presume that the Suspension Clause underwent a metamorphosis sometime between 1789 and 2011. The dissents understandably fail to cite any authorities for this position. The Supreme Court has never held that the Suspension Clause protects anything more than the writ as understood in 1789. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 746, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2248 (2008) (“[T]he Court has said that ‘at the absolute minimum’ the [Suspension] Clause protects the writ as it existed when the Constitution was drafted and ratified.“) (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 2279 (2001)); St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301, 121 S. Ct. at 2279 (“[A]t the absolute minimum, the Suspension Clause protects the writ ‘as it existed in 1789.‘“) (quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663–64, 116 S. Ct. 2333, 2340 (1996)); Felker, 518 U.S. at 663–64, 116 S. Ct. at 2340 (“But we assume, for purposes of decision here, that the Suspension Clause of the Constitution refers to the writ as it exists today, rather than as it existed in 1789.“). Two of our sister circuits have concluded that the Suspension Clause protects access to the writ only as it was understood in 1789. The Seventh Circuit held, “What is protected from suspension is the writ that limits a person‘s detention by the executive branch without trial. There is no constitutional entitlement to post-judgment collateral review by the inferior federal courts, let alone to unending rounds of such review.” Benefiel v. Davis, 403 F.3d 825, 827 (7th Cir. 2005) (Easterbrook, J.); see also Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 867–68 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev‘d on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997). The Third Circuit similarly reasoned, “[I]t would appear that the complete denial of the writ of habeas corpus to convicted federal prisoners would not violate the Constitution” because in 1789
Because the Suspension Clause does not provide any rights to prisoners convicted and sentenced by courts of competent jurisdiction, any relief that
But the dissents fret, what is a judge to do when he or she thinks Congress was not generous enough when it gave prisoners the right to attack collaterally their sentences? The dissents offer an answer: Help Congress and the President with their work. After all, the President may be too busy “with the vast responsibility of exercising executive powers,” Dissenting Op. of Martin, J., at 95, and Congress may be too busy with other legislative responsibilities to provide relief to a recidivist serving a federal sentence that is less than the statutory maximum. In the light of the growing national debt, releasing Gilbert from prison may also be a good idea because his incarceration is “very expensive.” Id., at 97.
This grandiose conception of judicial supremacy would threaten the separation of powers and undermine the rule of law. The fundamental “role of the courts” is not to “hear [the] cases” presented by prisoners “detained without a
After charging that this Court is “morally bankrupt” unless it can find a way to do “justice,” Dissenting Op. of Hill, J., at 104, Judge Hill‘s dissent notes that the law sometimes provides relief to individuals as unsympathetic as Gilbert, such as the rapist Ernesto Miranda, id., at 105, but Miranda‘s victory does not mean that the judiciary must correct every error committed at trial or sentencing years after the sentence has become final. The first citation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), by the Supreme Court proves the point. Prisoners sentenced to death before 1966, whose confessions were obtained in violation of the rule established in Miranda, were denied relief because, as Justice William Brennan announced for the Court, Miranda did not apply retroactively. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 732, 86 S. Ct. 1772, 1780 (1966); see also Campbell v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1573, 1580 (11th Cir. 1984) (Hill, J.) (refusing to apply retroactively a new rule regarding racial discrimination in jury selection).
The denial of Gilbert‘s petition does not mean that “[t]he Great Writ is dead,” Dissenting Op. of Hill, J., at 102. Far from it. The federal judiciary steadfastly has protected the writ and ensured that it remains available to those who would have been entitled to it in 1789. The Supreme Court recently held that the writ is available even to enemy combatants who are captured abroad and detained
Congress generously has made the writ available to prisoners serving sentences imposed by state and federal courts even though those prisoners would not have been entitled to the writ in 1789. We have entertained thousands of petitions from prisoners sentenced by state and federal courts. The primary effect of the expansion of the availability of the writ beyond the requirements of the Suspension Clause has not been to vindicate the rights of prisoners, but to undermine the finality of judgments. A recent empirical study found that, for most state prisoners, the writ is an illusory remedy as it is granted for only 0.35 percent of petitions filed by state prisoners not sentenced to death. Nancy J. King & Joseph L. Hoffmann, Habeas for the Twenty-First Century 79 (2011). In addition,
It is also absurd to assert that we have “render[ed] the savings clause a dead letter.” Dissenting Op. of Martin, J., at 93. By operation of the savings clause for motions to vacate,
The dissents trivialize the Great Writ when they argue that it must issue to reverse the sentence of a confessed and recidivist drug dealer, who has already challenged his conviction and sentence both on direct and collateral review, only so that he may be resentenced by a court that could impose a sentence even greater than the one originally imposed. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 275, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2072 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (“There has been a halo about the ‘Great Writ’ that no one would wish to dim. Yet one must wonder whether the stretching of its use far beyond any justifiable purpose will not in the end weaken rather than strengthen the writ‘s vitality.“); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 536, 73 S. Ct. 397, 425 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[I]t [is] important to adhere to procedures which enable courts readily to distinguish a probable constitutional grievance from a convict‘s mere gamble on persuading some
Judges cannot mold the Suspension Clause to provide relief whenever they feel sorry for a prisoner or to comport with their personal sense of justice, and that fact does not mean that the “Great Writ is dead.” Congress allowed prisoners to attack collaterally their sentences, but Congress had every right to restrict second or successive collateral attacks. Gilbert is not entitled to relief.
I join in full the dissenting opinions authored by Judge Martin and Judge Hill. I write separately to emphasize that
Ezell Gilbert is now before us asking to be relieved of the consequences of a mistake we made in his direct appeal in 1998. He told us then that the District Court was wrong in sentencing him substantially more harshly based on that court‘s decision that carrying a concealed weapon is a crime of violence. We rejected his argument, and affirmed his sentence of more than 24 years. United States v. Gilbert, 138 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 1998). We did this on a record containing the District Judge‘s clear statement that the sentence was longer than he would have imposed, but for the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 1372–73. It turns out, of course, that Mr. Gilbert was right and we were wrong. Carrying a concealed weapon is not a crime of violence. We said so, belatedly for Mr. Gilbert, in United States v Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008).
The effects of our mistake are quite dire for Mr. Gilbert, insofar as his properly calculated (and advisory) guideline range would today be 130–162 months, or approximately 11 to 13 years. As I write this, I understand that he has already served more than fourteen years in prison. And yet the majority opinion tells Mr. Gilbert that the laws and Constitution of this country offer him no relief. I differ with the majority insofar as I believe the statute offers Mr. Gilbert a remedy
Second,
For me, Mr. Gilbert‘s particular circumstance is addressed by
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
Mr. Gilbert did not fail to apply for relief, but rather has diligently pursued every
Shortly after Mr. Gilbert was convicted, we mentioned the possibility that relief for a “fundamental defect” in a sentence might be available by way of this savings clause. Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1244–45 (11th Cir. 1999). In Wofford, we said “the only sentencing claims that may conceivably be covered by the savings clause are those based upon a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision overturning circuit precedent.” Id. at 1245. Here, the government has never disputed that the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Begay fits this description of a “retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision overturning circuit precedent.” Indeed the government could not, because the Supreme Court‘s ruling in Begay caused us to overturn circuit precedent, applied in Mr. Gilbert‘s
The majority today forecloses the possibility we left open back in 1999. This decision removes any possibility of habeas relief for Mr. Gilbert by equating the requirements for relief under
Requiring a prisoner to meet the requirements of
While the Hayman court was addressing
The plain text of
a. Statutory Construction
In construing the enactment of
b. Finality
In this case of statutory construction, the majority also speaks of the importance of finality. Surely Mr. Gilbert‘s case is a poor vehicle to promote the idea that finality builds confidence in our criminal justice system. Today we tell a man he must sit in the penitentiary for years beyond the sentence that a proper application of the law would have imposed, when we rejected his correct interpretation of what the law meant back in 1998.
Finality is valued in our system insofar as it promotes certain principles: (1) to build confidence in the integrity of the judicial system; (2) to minimize administrative costs and delay; (3) to avoid spoilation of evidence; and (4) to honor comity. See United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 n.11, 99 S. Ct. 2235, 2240 n.11 (1979); see also Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 451–53 (1962). We advance none of these principles by denying Mr. Gilbert relief here.
First, denying relief does not build confidence in our court system because this looks to the world like a court refusing to acknowledge or make amends for its own mistake. Second, to the extent that there have been administrative costs and delay in considering Mr. Gilbert‘s request for relief, they have already been incurred, and we need only grant him that relief to end his very expensive incarceration. Third, because the only issue before us is a purely legal one, there is no evidence we must consult. Thus spoilation is not a concern. And finally, Mr. Gilbert‘s case presents no comity concerns insofar as he seeks to correct a sentence imposed in federal court and not by the state.
It is worth pausing briefly to properly emphasize that this case does not raise comity concerns because we are asked to correct a mistake we ourselves made in federal court. We are not reviewing a state court conviction which would require our deference. To be sure, AEDPA was designed “to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436, 120 S. Ct. 1479, 1491 (2000); accord Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1040 (2003). As the Supreme Court has recognized, however, finality is
Finality has special importance in the context of a federal attack on a state conviction. Reexamination of state convictions on federal habeas frustrate[s] . . . both the States’ sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights. Our federal system recognizes the independent power of a State to articulate societal norms through criminal law; but the power of the State to pass laws means little if the State cannot enforce them.
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 480, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1469 (1991) (quotation marks and citations omitted). AEDPA codified the previously existing procedures which placed limits on the power of federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 337, 123 S. Ct. at 1039–40; Williams v Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 380 n.11, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1506 n.11 (2000). Giving life to this limit on federal courts where state convictions are concerned, the abuse of the writ doctrine was codified in
c. Jurisprudence from Other Circuits
The majority states categorically that every other circuit court has refused to interpret the savings clause (
In Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 1997), that court did wade into the meaning of the “inadequate or ineffective” language of
We have already stated that ‘inadequate or ineffective’ is not limited merely to the practical considerations suggested by the government, but refers to something that is still less than the full set of cases in which
§ 2255 is either unavailable or unsuccessful. We now hold thatthat ‘something’ is, at the least, the set of cases in which the petitioner cannot, for whatever reason, utilize § 2255 , and in which the failure to allow for collateral review would raise serious constitutional questions.
Id. at 377. In contrast to the majority‘s reading of this case, I do not read it to foreclose relief to Mr. Gilbert. Surely it must be true that keeping someone in the penitentiary for such a substantial duration beyond what the correct sentence would call for constitutes a “serious constitutional question.”
I also see the Seventh Circuit‘s opinion in Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, as favorable to Mr. Gilbert. The majority characterizes Davenport as rejecting the argument that a defendant may assert a
While we may be enriched by the consideration our sister circuits have given to the substantial legal issues we consider here, the decision in Mr. Gilbert‘s case is ours. For the reasons set out above, I see no impediment imposed by statute or legal precedent which prevents this court from correcting the mistake we made in Mr. Gilbert‘s case so long ago. To the contrary, I see it as our duty to do so.
Finally, I do not share the majority‘s concern that giving Mr. Gilbert relief under these extraordinary circumstances will open the floodgates to other prisoners. Indeed if there are others who are wrongfully detained without a remedy, we should devote the time and incur the expense to hear their cases. What is the role of the courts, if not this? But what is important today is the consequence to Mr. Gilbert of our unwillingness to correct our past legal error.
For these reasons I respectfully dissent. I would vacate Mr. Gilbert‘s sentence and remand his case to the District Court so that he can be resentenced with the law correctly applied.
Ezell Gilbert‘s sentence was enhanced by eight and one-half years as the result of his being found by the district court – reluctantly and at the explicit urging of the government – to be a career offender. Ezell Gilbert is not now, nor has he ever been, a career offender. The Supreme Court says so.
Today, this court holds that we may not remedy such a sentencing error. This shocking result – urged by a department of the United States that calls itself, without a trace of irony, the Department of Justice – and accepted by a court that emasculates itself by adopting such a rule of judicial impotency – confirms what I have long feared. The Great Writ is dead in this country.
Gilbert raised his claim of sentencing error to every court he could, every chance he got. No court correctly resolved his claim until the Supreme Court made clear that Gilbert‘s claim was meritorious – he was never a career offender. Now, he has come back to us for relief from his illegal confinement. Our response to him is that he cannot apply for relief under
This “Catch-22” approach to sentencing claims is nothing more than a
Furthermore, to “seal the deal” on finality, we hold today that even the savings clause of
The government even has the temerity to argue that the Sentencing Guidelines enjoy some sort of legal immunity from claims of error because they are not statutes at all, but mere policy suggestions. And the majority appears not to understand that Gilbert‘s imprisonment – no matter how his sentence was calculated – is the act of the Sovereign, who is forbidden by our Constitution to deprive a citizen of his liberty in violation of the laws of the United States.2
I recognize that without finality there can be no justice. But it is equally true that, without justice, finality is nothing more than a bureaucratic achievement. Case closed. Move on to the next. Finality with justice is achieved only when the imprisoned has had a meaningful opportunity for a reliable judicial determination of his claim. Gilbert has never had this opportunity.
A judicial system that values finality over justice is morally bankrupt. That is why Congress provided in
Much is made of the “floodgates” that will open should the court exercise its authority to remedy the mistake made by us in Gilbert‘s sentence. The government hints that there are many others in Gilbert‘s position – sitting in prison serving sentences that were illegally imposed. We used to call such systems “gulags.” Now, apparently, we call them the United States.
One last thought. The majority spends an enormous amount of time arguing that Gilbert is not a nice man. Perhaps. But neither, I expect, was Clarence Gideon, the burglar, or Ernesto Miranda, the rapist. The Supreme Court managed to ignore this legal irrelevancy in upholding the constitutional principle under attack in those cases. Would that we could have also.
I respectfully dissent from the majority‘s holding. With the addition of these thoughts of my own, I join in both Judge Barkett‘s and Judge Martin‘s dissents.
Notes
1 Judge Pryor‘s concurring opinion is premised on the view that the Suspension Clause applies only where a prisoner has been convicted and sentenced by a court of incompetent jurisdiction. That view, however, is not one shared by the Supreme Court. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 785 (“Even when the procedures authorizing detention are structurally sound, the Suspension Clause remains applicable and the writ relevant. This is so . . . even where the prisoner is detained after a criminal trial conducted in full accordance with the protections of the Bill of Rights.“) (internal citation omitted).
1 The commonly referred to Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that ”
1 I refer the reader to the original panel opinion, now vacated but originally published at 609 F. 3d 1159, which recounts the district court‘s sua sponte effort to remedy the sentencing error in Gilbert‘s case, saying:
Unfortunately, Mr. Gilbert is in the unenviable position of having to remain in prison even though under the present interpretation of the law he is no longer deemed a career offender and has served the time that would be required of him were he sentenced today. Salt to the wound is that he legally challenged the very issue that now incarcerates him – but lost. It is faint justice to tell him now that he was right but there is no legal remedy. Having exhausted all avenues know to
the court, the Court determines that at this time it is unable to provide relief to Mr. Gilbert under the law as it currently exists.
2 Relying on Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663–64 (1996), the majority suggests that the statutory bar in
2 I recognize that my estimate of the difference between Mr. Gilbert‘s current sentence, and what his sentence would be if he were sentenced today makes the generous assumption that the District Judge would again impose a sentence at the low end of the guidelines. My estimate comes from subtracting the number of months which constitute the low end of what we now know to be Mr. Gilbert‘s correct guideline range from the sentence he is serving. The majority‘s estimate is much higher. The majority speculates that Mr. Gilbert could be resentenced to 292 months of incarceration or could get an even longer sentence. In order to get to this number the majority has second guessed the charging decisions made by the prosecutor with regard to Mr. Gilbert. This is not permitted by our precedent. United States v. Smith, 231 F.3d 800, 807 (11th Cir. 2000) (“The decision as to which crimes and criminals to prosecute is entrusted by the Constitution not to the judiciary, but to the executive who is charged with seeing that laws are enforced.“). Although the answer to the question of how long Mr. Gilbert‘s sentence would be if he were resentenced has some bearing on the extent of the deprivation for which he is here seeking relief, we can all agree that Mr. Gilbert has already been incarcerated for a period well beyond the top of today‘s accurate guideline range for the charge of which he was convicted in this case.
2 The government‘s suggestion, at en banc, that an application for clemency by Gilbert might be favorably received by the government mocks our constitutional guarantees by implying that they are gifts that may be bestowed or withheld at the whim of the Sovereign.
3 Not only does Judge Pryor dispute this point, he deems it “silly.” But every court to review Gilbert‘s meritorious claim, which he has pursued with diligence, has lacked the authority to correct the legal error he identified. Judicial review of this sort is vacuous and hollow, not meaningful. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 785 (“Habeas corpus is a collateral process that exists, in Justice Holmes’ words, to ‘cut through all forms and go to the very tissue of the structure. It comes in from the outside, not in subordination to the proceedings, and although every form may have been preserved opens the inquiry whether they have been more than an empty shell.‘“) (quoting Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (alterations omitted). The denial of such meaningful review is further compounded by the now-undisputed fact that Gilbert was sentenced pursuant to an erroneously-calculated mandatory guideline range that effectively increased his term of imprisonment by at least eight and a half years. In short, there is nothing silly—and everything solemn—about this case.
3 As the Supreme Court explained in Felker, the “abuse of the writ” doctrine constitutes “a modified res judicata rule.” 518 U.S. at 664, 116 S. Ct. at 2340. But abuse of the writ principles do not properly come into play here, because Mr. Gilbert has not abused the writ. To the contrary, he has never once had “a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or interpretation’ of relevant law.” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779, 128 S. Ct. at 2266.
To the extent that the dissenters would have us uproot the “serious constitutional issue” standard that Triestman applied to claims of actual innocence and transplant it into cases involving misapplications of the sentencing guidelines, no court of appeals, including the Second Circuit, has ever done that. Moreover, Triestman’s squishy standard has not been favorably received by other circuits. See Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 903 n.28 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that the Triestman test had been “criticized as too indefinite for practical enforcement,” agreeing with that criticism, and adding that the test “creates the appearance of a standardless test with no limiting principles”); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998) (criticizing the Triestman test as “too indefinite”). We have also justifiably criticized that standard. See Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1243 (“A ‘serious constitutional question’ standard is only about as definite as a ‘tough issue’ or ‘hard set of circumstances’ standard would be. Moreover, there is no apparent logical or textual nexus between the crucial ‘inadequate or ineffective’ language of
For that reason, a pure Begay error would fit within the government’s concession that the savings clause applies to errors that resulted in a sentence beyond the statutory maximum that would have applied but for the error. See supra at 29–31. That is not, however, the claimed error we have in this case. Instead, Gilbert’s claim is that his sentence calculation involved an Archer error in the application of