116 Ga. 819 | Ga. | 1902
Lead Opinion
1. An indictment which charges that the accused broke and entered a certain railroad-car marked “ C. of Ga. 201,” and alleges that such car was at the time “in the custody and control” of another named railway company, sufficiently avers ownership of the car to have been in such company. See Adkins v. State, 115 Ga. 582; Clark’s Crim. Law (2d ed.), 277; 2 Bish. New Cr. Law, §789 (2); Com. v. Finn, 108 Mass. 466.
2. The above ruling is not in conflict with the decision in Cooper v. State, 89 Ga. 22, the averment in that case being simply that the car was on a named railway in the county. Even if there is a conflict, the ruling in the case cited was by two Justices only, and is therefore not absolutely binding as authority. ,
8. Where in the trial of one charged with breaking and entering a railroad-car the evidence showed that the goods stolen were in the car, that it was sealed, that it passed through the place where the accused resided, and was delayed there two days in the yard of the company by which the accused was em
4. The foregoing notes deal with all questions insisted on in the brief. There was no error in refusing a new trial.
Judgment affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. I dissent from the judgment in this case, because there can be no lawful conviction for burglary, in the absence of evidence showing a breaking, and no evidence of any character appears in the record that there was.any breaking of the car from which the goods were taken.