GILBERT v. MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICESGILBERT v. MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Case Information
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MAINE
DUSTIN GRAHAM GILBERT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) v. ) 2:24-cv-00371-JAW )
MAINE DEPARTMENT OF )
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Concluding a prior order from this court determining the plaintiff has standing to seek compensatory damages for non-economic harm under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act was not a manifest error of law or fact, the court dismisses the defendant’s motion for reconsideration.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 1, 2024, Dustin Graham Gilbert, acting pro se, filed a complaint against the Maine Department of Health and Human Services (Maine DHHS), alleging Maine DHHS violated the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by depriving him of his constitutionally guaranteed right to vote while he was in the care of a state-run psychiatric hospital. Compl. at 4, 7 (ECF No. 1). Mr. Gilbert specifically claims that, while in civil inpatient residence at Riverview Psychiatric Center (Riverview), he requested but never received a ballot for the November 2022 election, and thus he was unable to cast his vote in that election. Id. at 7.
After performing an initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), on December 9, 2024, the United States Magistrate Judge recommended this Court dismiss Mr. Gilbert’s complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Recommended Decision after Rev. of Pl.’s Compl. (ECF No. 9) ( Rec. Dec. ). Mr. Gilbert objected to the Recommended Decision on December 19, 2024, raising new claims under Article I of the United States Constitution and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Obj. to Rep. and Recommended Decision (ECF No. 10) ( Am. Compl. [1] ). On December 30, 2024, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the Recommended Decision and granted in part and overruled in part Mr. Gilbert’s objection. Order on Recommended Decision and Obj. at 11-12 (ECF No. 12). The Court’s order affirmed the Magistrate Judge’s recommended ruling on the Fifteenth Amendment claim, as well as on the claims asserted by the Plaintiff in his objection pursuant to Article I and the ADA’s employment provision. Id. Although Mr. Gilbert had failed to bring his ADA voting rights claim to the Magistrate Judge’s attention in his original complaint, the Court reversed the Recommended Decision to the extent it recommended dismissal of Mr. Gilbert’s case in its entirety and ordered that he be allowed to proceed on the claim raised in his objection for an alleged violation of the voting rights provision of Title II of the ADA.
On March 3, 2025, Maine DHHS filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Gilbert’s complaint, as amended by his objection, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for the Plaintiff’s lack of standing and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Mot. to Dismiss of Def. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. (ECF No. 17) ( Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss ). Mr. Gilbert responded in opposition on March 24, 2025, Resp. to the State (ECF No. 20) ( Pl.’s Dismissal Opp’n and Amend Reply ), and, on April 7, 2025, Maine DHHS replied. Reply Mem. in Further Support of Mot. to Dismiss of Def. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. (ECF No. 21).
Meanwhile, on February 20, 2025, Mr. Gilbert moved to amend his complaint a second time, seeking to augment his complaint with a First Amendment claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mot. to Amend (ECF No. 16); see also Additional Attachs. (ECF No. 18). On March 10, 2025, Maine DHHS opposed Mr. Gilbert’s motion, Def. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to Amend Compl. (ECF No. 19), and on March 24, 2025, Mr. Gilbert replied. Pl.’s Dismissal Opp’n and Amend Reply . While the Defendant’s motion to dismiss and Mr. Gilbert’s motion to amend were still pending, on April 9, 2025, Mr. Gilbert filed a motion to continue “for the reason of a Discovery request to the State.” Mot. for Continuance [B]ased on Disc. Req. to the Def. at 1 (ECF No. 22).
On April 15, 2025, the Court issued an omnibus order dismissing the Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on its conclusion that Mr. Gilbert’s Title II claim may be redressable through compensatory damages, dismissing Mr. Gilbert’s second motion to amend on the ground that the proposed amendment would be futile, and dismissing the Plaintiff’s motion seeking continuance. Omnibus Order on Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss and Pl.’s Mots. to Amend and to Continue (ECF No. 23) ( Omnibus Order ).
Maine DHHS filed a motion for reconsideration on April 22, 2025, asserting that the Court’s determination that compensatory damages may be available to Mr. Gilbert for non-economic harm constituted a manifest error of law, and again urging the Court to dismiss Mr. Gilbert’s Title II claim. Mot. for Recons. of Def. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. (ECF No. 25) ( Def.’s Mot. for Recons. ). Jamesa Drake, Esq. filed a notice of appearance on behalf of Mr. Gilbert on April 25, 2025, Notice of Appearance (ECF No. 30), and on April 29, 2025, requested an extension until May 30, 2025 to respond to the motion for reconsideration, Assented to Mot. to Enlarge Time (ECF No. 31), which the Court granted the same day. Order (ECF No. 32). Mr. Gilbert responded on May 30, 2025. Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for Recons. (ECF No. 33) ( Pl.’s Opp’n ). On June 13, 2025, Maine DHHS replied. Mem. in Support of Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.’ Mot. for Recons. (ECF No. 34) ( Def.’s Reply ).
II. THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
A. Maine Department of Health and Human Services’ Motion for Reconsideration
Maine DHHS asks the Court to reconsider its conclusion that Mr. Gilbert has standing to proceed because his alleged injury may be redressable through an award of compensatory damages under Title II of the ADA. Def.’s Mot. for Recons. at 1 (citing Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 5-9). Recounting that the Court’s omnibus order “ruled that Mr. Gilbert has standing because he pleaded that DHHS engaged in ‘deliberate indifference’ towards him and, therefore, Mr. Gilbert may be entitled to compensatory damages for non-economic harm,” Maine DHHS says the Court’s omnibus order “did not address DHHS’s argument that, under caselaw from the Supreme Court, [o]ther Circuits, and this Court, Mr. Gilbert is not entitled to compensatory damages for ‘mental anguish’ or ‘mental angst’ (emotional distress), a form of non-economic harm and the only injury Mr. Gilbert claims to have had.” Id. at 2-3 (citing Omnibus Order at 22-26).
The Defendant then restates its argument, first raised in its motion to dismiss,
that emotional distress damages are not recoverable under Title II, citing
Cummings
v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C.
,
The Defendant concludes, “[g]iven the caselaw cited above and in DHHS’s Motion to [D]ismiss, and the fact that the Court’s Omnibus Order does not address this issue, DHHS asks the Court to reconsider that Order and rule that Mr. Gilbert lacks standing to pursue his claim for emotional damages or has not plausibly alleged a claim for relief,” and accordingly dismiss Mr. Gilbert’s claims and deny his motion to amend. Id. at 4-5.
B. Dustin Graham Gilbert’s Opposition
Mr. Gilbert opposes Maine DHHS’s motion for reconsideration on the ground
that “[his] Title II claim is redressable, and this Court’s reasoning is sound.”
Pl.’s
Opp’n
at 1. First, Mr. Gilbert rejects Maine DHHS’s argument that the Court
improperly determined his Title II claim for non-economic damages is redressable,
agreeing with the Court that the First Circuit in
Gray v. Cummings
,
Further, Mr. Gilbert argues, “[e]ven if this Court were willing to engage on the
merits, its conclusion that emotional distress damages are available to Title II
claimants is correct,
Cummings
notwithstanding.”
Id.
at 4. Mr. Gilbert explains that
Cummings
concerns Spending Clause statutes, each of which conditions an offer of
federal funding on a promise by the recipient not to discriminate, and which views
the arrangement as “essentially a contract between the Government and the recipient
of funds.”
Id.
at 4-5 (quoting
Cummings
,
Furthermore, acknowledging that Title II’s remedial provision links the remedies available under Title II to the remedies set forth in the Rehabilitation Act, Mr. Gilbert avers, “ Cummings notwithstanding, Congress clearly intended that the ‘full panoply of remedies’ should be available for violations of Title II.” Id. at 7 & n.20 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, Part III at 52 (1990)). At bottom, Mr. Gilbert concludes the Court was correct to reject Maine DHHS’s argument regarding the availability of compensatory damages for emotinoal harm and it should deny the Defendant’s motion for reconsideration. at 8.
Next, Mr. Gilbert argues that dismissal is inappropriate even if emotional
distress damages were unavailable under Title II.
Id.
“That a plaintiff might
misconceive his remedy does not warrant dismissal of the complaint unless he is
entitled to ‘no relief under any state of facts,’” he insists,
id.
(quoting
A.W. v. Coweta
Cnty. Sch. Dist.
,
C. Maine Department of Health and Human Services’ Reply Maine DHHS argues Mr. Gilbert “ignores the well-established rule in the First Circuit that ‘a decision of the Supreme Court’ is an exception to the rule to continue to follow circuit precedent,” Def.’s Reply at 1 (quoting Eulitt , 386 F.3d at 349), an exception to the law of the circuit doctrine Maine DHHS claims is applicable here. Id. at 2. More specifically, Maine DHHS reasserts its argument that Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C. ruled that damages for emotional distress are unavailable under the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 12133 limits the available damages on a Title II action to those set forth in the Rehabilitation Act. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12133).
The Defendant asserts, “[a]lthough Mr. Gilbert is correct that the ADA is not
Spending Clause legislation, that distinction is irrelevant because Title II of the ADA
expressly links the ‘remedies, procedures, and rights’ provided by Title II to the
‘remedies, procedures, and rights’ set forth in the Rehabilitation Act.”
Id.
at 2-3. In
support, the Defendant points to the Supreme Court’s holding in
Barnes v. Gorman
,
Finally, Maine DHHS rejects Mr. Gilbert’s assertion that his complaint should be read to request “other relief” so as to survive a motion to dismiss. at 4-5.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order is available under
District of Maine Local Rule 7(f), but a court may only grant such a motion based
upon a “manifest error of fact or law.” D. M E . L OC . R. 7(f). A manifest error “is an
error that is plain and indisputable, and that amounts to a complete disregard of the
controlling law,”
Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records
,
IV. DISCUSSION
By the Court’s reckoning, the Defendant asks the Court to reconsider a portion of its April 15, 2025 omnibus order on the grounds that, first, the Defendant believes the Court did not respond to the Defendant’s specific argument, raised in its motion to dismiss, that compensatory damages are unavailable to Mr. Gilbert on his claim brought pursuant to Title II of the ADA and, second, the Court’s conclusion that Mr. Gilbert has standing to proceed is a manifest error of law. See Def.’s Mot. for Recons. at 1-5.
On the first contention, Maine DHHS is mistaken in its assertion that the Court did not address its argument regarding the availability of compensatory damages to the Plaintiff in this case. To the contrary, eight pages of the Court’s omnibus order considered the availability of punitive damages, injunctive relief, and compensatory damages for non-economic harm to Mr. Gilbert under Title II of the ADA. See Omnibus Order at 18-26. Four of these eight pages specifically addressed the availability of compensatory damages. Id. at 23-26. After concluding that neither punitive damages nor injunctive relief were available to Mr. Gilbert under Title II, the Court began its discussion of compensatory damages by stating “[t]he availability of compensatory damages for non-economic harm presents a more challenging question,” id. at 23, and proceeded to consider whether compensatory damages were available to the Plaintiff under the relevant First Circuit authority. at 23-26. The Court disagrees with Maine DHHS’s contention that it did not consider the Defendant’s argument regarding the availability of this form of relief.
Maine DHHS’s second line of argument, that the Court’s determination that compensatory damages may be available to redress Mr. Gilbert’s non-economic harm constitutes manifest error of law, is also unpersuasive. At bottom, the Defendant’s argument appears to be that because the Supreme Court has determined compensatory relief for emotional harm is unavailable under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, this Court is bound to conclude that Mr. Gilbert does not have a redressable claim for non-economic harm under Title II of the ADA. Def.’s Mot. for Recons. at 2-3.
The Court responds with two points. First, the Defendant is correct that Mr. Gilbert alleges he experienced “mental angst” on account of being deprived of his right to vote in the November 2022 election. Compl. at 7 (“No physical injuries. Mental injuries, yes, were had. Mental angst is what I felt[,] and contempt. It was especially upsetting to be in a state[-]run hospital and see such a failure. In relief I seek [$]3,000,000 in punitive damages and some sort of remedy to the problem of not getting civil in-patients their ballot that’s to the plaintiff’s liking”). However, the Court disagrees with the Defendant’s characterization that Mr. Gilbert seeks relief for purely emotional harm. Compare Def.’s Mot. for Recons. at 2-3 (describing emotional distress as “a form of non-economic harm and the only injury Mr. Gilbert claims to have had”) with Am. Compl. at 2-3 (“My loss is great. I lost the civil right that comes first, the right to vote . . .. It made me feel angst and tremendously defeated[,] like I was less than a citizen”) and id. at 3 (“voting is the right that builds our nation into a better place to live, work and pursue happiness. It’s everything to America”).
By the Court’s reading of Mr. Gilbert’s amended complaint, the primary injury
the Plaintiff seeks to redress is the loss of his right to vote, and the Court in its
omnibus order accordingly characterized Mr. Gilbert’s amended complaint as
pleading non-economic harm on account of his alleged voting rights deprivation as
well as his “[m]ental injuries” and “[m]ental angst.”
Omnibus Order
at 19;
id.
at 23
(“The availability of compensatory damages for non-economic harm presents a more
challenging question”);
id.
at 25 (summarizing Mr. Gilbert’s allegations, as pleaded
in his amended complaint, regarding his efforts to obtain his ballot and his
subsequent inability to vote on election day). As the Court noted in its omnibus order,
its reading of the amended complaint was consistent with the Supreme Court’s
repeated instruction that pro se complaints are “to be liberally construed,”
Erickson
v. Pardus
,
Second, as the Court discussed in its omnibus order, the First Circuit, to which
this Court owes its allegiance, held in
Gray v. Cummings
,
Several of our sister circuits have held that a showing of deliberate indifference may suffice to prove this element. See, e.g., Haberle [v. Troxell] , 885 F.3d [171,] 181 [(3d Cir. 2018)]; Duvall [v. Cnty. of Kitsap ], 260 F.3d [1124,] 1138 [(9h Cir. 2001)]. But the question is open in this circuit, and we have stated that, “under Title II, non-economic damages are only available when there is evidence ‘of economic harm or animus toward the disabled.’” Carmona-Rivera v. Puerto Rico ,464 F.3d 14 , 17 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Nieves-Márquez [v. Puerto Rico] , 353 F.3d [108,] 126-27 [(1st Cir. 2003)]). This case does not require us to parse whether our use of the word “animus” demands more than a showing of deliberate indifference, cf. S.H. ex. rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist. ,729 F.3d 248 , 263 (3d Cir. 2013) (interpreting Nieves-Márquez as requiring “a higher showing of intentional discrimination than deliberate indifference”), particularly since the Town has not advanced such an argument. For present purposes, it is sufficient for us to assume, favorably to Gray, that deliberate indifference is the appropriate standard.
Gray
,
Relying on
Gray
, this Court concluded, after recounting the facts alleged by
Mr. Gilbert in his amended complaint,
Omnibus Order
at 25-26, that he had plausibly
alleged the Defendant’s discriminatory intent by virtue of its deliberate indifference
to his asserted rights for purposes of the Court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss.
Id.
at 26;
id.
(quoting
Nieves-Márquez
,
In its motion for reconsideration, Maine DHHS does not acknowledge the First Circuit’s analysis and holding in Gray. See Def.’s Mot. for Recons. at 1-5. The Defendant also does not cite countervailing authority, let alone any authority, from the First Circuit on damages for non-economic injury. See id. Instead, the Defendant primarily relies on a case from the United States Supreme Court which is, of course, binding on this Court. See Def.’s Mot. for Recons. at 3-4 (citing Cummings , 596 U.S. 212). The problem for Maine DHHS is that Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C. , as the Defendant acknowledges, addressed the Rehabilitation Act, not Title II, and considered the availability of damages for emotional distress specifically, not other types of non-economic harm. See Cummings , 596 U.S. at 222 (holding “[emotional distress] damages are not recoverable under the Spending Clause statutes we consider here”).
While the Court agrees with the Defendant that “[e]nforcement of Title II of
the ADA is linked expressly to the Rehabilitation Act,” a conclusion also reached by
Judge Singal in dicta cited by the Defendant, these are nevertheless distinct statutes
and, moreover, the availability of emotional distress damages is a different, and
narrower, issue than the availability of damages for non-economic harm.
See Def.’s
Mot. for Recons.
at 3-4 (first citing 42 U.S.C. § 12133; then citing
Faller
, 2022 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 134750, at *11 n.8) (“While the parties have not expressly briefed the
limits of any compensatory damage award, the Court notes that the Supreme Court
recently held that ‘emotional distress damages are not recoverable’ under the
Rehabilitation Act,’ [and] [i]t is likely that this limitation on compensatory damages
extends to Plaintiff’s ADA claim as well”) (in turn citing
Cummings
,
The Defendant’s citations to decisions from the Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuits, determining compensatory damages for emotional harm were unavailable under Title II, do not change the result. First, as discussed above, the Court regards whether compensatory damages are available for non-economic harm as distinct from the question of whether compensatory damages are available for purely emotional harm. Second, the caselaw cited by Maine DHHS does not bind this Court, particularly where the First Circuit reached a conflicting conclusion in Gray .
In sum, absent clear language from the Supreme Court or the First Circuit
that
Gray v. Cummings
,
V. CONCLUSION
The Court DISMISSES without prejudice Motion for Reconsideration of Defendant Department of Health and Human Services (ECF No. 25).
SO ORDERED. /s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 23rd day of June, 2025
Notes
[1] As the Court explains below, it regards Mr. Gilbert’s objection, which raised new grounds to relief, as an amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1)(B).