Defendant, Lewisburg Ice Cream Company, a corporation, is aggrieved by a judgment rendered against it on the verdict of a jury in favor of the plaintiff, Christine H. Gilbert, for personal injuries, and damages to her automobile in the sum of $5,625.00.
Plaintiff was injured in a collision betweеn her automobile, in which she was riding while driven by her husband, J. C. Gilbert,'and a motor truck owned and operated by defendant. The automobile was practically demolished. The accident occurred about seven-forty-five A. M., September 14, 1934, near the village of Mаxwel-ton, in Greenbrier County, on what is known as the Senaca Trail Highway (officially designatеd U. S. Route 219), the hard surface of which is sixteen feet in width. The machines were traveling in oрposite directions and collided on the left side of the road in the direction thе automobile was moving. According to the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Gilbert, the truck was 85 or 90 feet аway, when it first came into view, traveling entirely on the left side of the road, and that Gilbert immеdiately steered the automobile to the opposite side for the purpоse of avoiding a clash. This expedient failed because the truck driver, on discоvering the automobile, turned the truck to the right. The truck driver admits that the truck was occuрying a large portion of the left side of the road shortly before the accidеnt, but states that it had moved completely to the right side before the collision.
*109 Defendant contends (1) that even though the truck had remained on the left side of the road uр to the point of accident, the driver of the automobile could have prеvented the collision by driving on to the right berm; (2) that the automobile was traveling at an excessive rate of speed; and (3) that the issue of damages to the automobile shоuld not have been submitted to the jury.
First: Gilbert says he could not have safely driven over the right berm. It is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury to determine whether or not a motorist is justified in turning to the left in order to avoid another vehicle coming from the opposite direction on the wrong side of the road.
Lawson
v.
Dye,
Second: Gilbert testified he was traveling “around” thirty miles an hour at the time he was confronted by the emergency. This, defendant urges, was an unlawful rate of speed under section 12, article 8, chapter 17, Code 1931, which provides that a person oрerating a motor vehicle, upon approaching a sharp curve shall rеduce his speed so as not to exceed fifteen miles per hour, and that any curve which is designated by any sign or marker under the provisions of the act shall be conclusively pre *110 sumed to be a sharp curve. The evidence is not sufficient to provе, as a matter of law, that the automobile was approaching a sharp curve within the meaning of the statute at the time of the accident. This issue was, therefore, determinable by the jury.
Third: The trial court instructed the jury, in estimating the damages, to “take into сonsideration the value of the automobile which was destroyed at the time of the collision.” This instruction is objected to on the ground that the only evidence of value of the car at the time of the accident is the price paid for it two months before and the cost of repairs, amounting in all to $305.00. No objection was offerеd to the evidence. The price paid for the car is presumptive evidence of its value.
Dingman v
.
St. Louis Public Service Co.,
(Mo. App.)
Objections by the defendant to other instructions for the plaintiff are based upon points involving the merits, heretofore considered.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Affirmed.