Gilbert v. Albany Medical CenterGilbert v. Albany Medical Center
Lead Opinion
Aрpeal from that part of an order of the Supreme Court (Keegan, J.), entered May 12, 2003 in Albany County, which, upon renewal, denied plaintiffs motion for partial summаry judgment.
Plaintiff was injured when he fell while working on a ladder during an asbestos removal project that his employer was conducting at a building owned by defendants. He cоmmenced this action alleging liability under Labor Law §§ 200, 240 (1) and § 241 (6). Plaintiff subsequently moved for partial summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action. Defendants opрosed the motion and cross-moved for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of the Labor Law §§ 200 and 241 (6) causes of action. In January 2003, Supreme Court granted plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action, partially granted defendants’ cross motion by dismissing the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action and plaintiff withdrew the Labor Law § 200 cause of action. Plaintiff and defendants appealed and, while that appeal was pending, defendants moved to reargue and renew. Supreme Court granted defendants’ motion to renew and, based upon the additional evidence submitted, denied plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment finding triable issues as regards the alleged violation of Labor Law § 240 (1). Plaintiff elected not to pursue his appeal from Supreme Court’s January 2003 order which dismissed his Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action. He has, however, appealed from the order which, upon renewal,
Plaintiff does not contest on appeal the aspect of Supreme Court’s order that permitted renewal and, thus, we turn to his argument that, evеn considering the additional evidence submitted by defendants, he was entitled to partial summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240 (1) claim. Labor Law § 240 (1) is liberally construed to effect its purpose of providing protection to workers (see Melber v 6333 Main St,
Here, plaintiff was removing asbestos from a pipe located at a hеight of about nine feet. He was provided a six-foot stepladder to remove asbestos. The entire area, including the floor, was covered with polyethylene that had been sprayed with water creating a slippery surface. Plaintiff testified that, as he was working on the ladder, he felt it slip and then it collapsed. He fell on top of the ladder sustaining injuries. A coworker in the room did not see plaintiff fall, but he heard a noise and then observed both plaintiff and the ladder on the floor immediately after the accident. Plaintiffs supervisor, Michael Horton, was summoned from another part of the building and spoke with plaintiff shortly after thе accident. Based upon his conversation with plaintiff and inspection of the accident scene, he concluded that plaintiff had been reaсhing and extending from the ladder. Horton stated that the ladder was supposed to be placed under a three-foot section of the pipe, asbestоs removed, and then the ladder moved to another three-foot section. However, the evidence establishes that the ladder was open and placed on a slippery surface when it collapsed and plaintiff fell. This constitutes a prima facie showing of a Labor Law § 240 (1) violation that was a proximate cause of the accident (see Morin v Machnick Bldrs.,
Peters, J.E, and Mugglin J., concur.
Dissenting Opinion
In reaching its decision that plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240 (1) claim, the majority concludes that even if plaintiffs fall were caused by his reaсhing and extending too far out from a fully opened A-frame stepladder with rubber feet, his misuse of the ladder would not be the sole proximate cause of the accident because defendants failed to ensure that the ladder was properly placed or secured. Inasmuch as we read Blake v Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City (
In opposition to plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, dеfendants presented the testimony of the project manager who inspected the site immediately after plaintiffs fall and, contrary to plaintiffs testimony, reported that the floor was not slippery. He also corroborated plaintiffs admission that the ladder appeared to be free of any defects. In addition, defendants presented expert testimony from a professional engineer who, relying on photographs of the scene and testimony and reports describing the accident, opined that the accident did not occur due to any defect in the ladder or unsafe condition at the premises. Sрecifically, the expert concluded that, given the undisputed fact that the ladder was open, with braces fully extended and locked into place, it could not have slipped and fallen in the manner described by plaintiff in his deposition.
Defendants also presented evidence that plaintiffs misuse of the laddеr was the sole cause of the accident. Plaintiffs supervisor, relying on his interview with plaintiff immediately after the accident, his inspection of the work site and his familiarity with the work being done, concluded that plaintiff was overreaching, rather than moving the ladder along the pipe as he worked. Due to the nature of thе work being performed here, plaintiff could not safely reach beyond a three-foot portion of the elevated pipe, and he was allegedly instructed not to do so. Since plaintiff could move the stepladder as needed, however, the placement of
It is in this respect that this case is distinguishable from Morin v Machnick Bldrs. (supra), cited by the majority. In Morin, the improperly placed extension ladder slid out from underneath the worker due to the conditions at the wоrk site and, because this was a proximate cause of the worker’s fall, his own failure to secure the ladder was not the sole proximate cause (
Concurrence Opinion
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment granted.