32 N.W.2d 442 | Mich. | 1948
Marguerite M. Gignac, widow of Arthur L. Gignac, and Joseph A. Payne, administrator of the estate of Arthur L. Gignac, deceased, both made claim to the proceeds of a life insurance policy issued to Mr. Gignac in 1921 by the Columbian National Life Insurance Company. The amount due on the policy, $3,117.41, has been paid into court by the insurance company. The case was submitted to the court below on the pleadings without any testimony being taken. The facts are not in dispute.
When the policy was issued the insured was married to Amelia M. Gignac, who was named therein as beneficiary. She died in 1931, and shortly thereafter the insured named his three children, Arthur L. Jr., Marion, and James, as beneficiaries. Subsequently the insured married Marguerite M. Gignac, and, on June 3, 1932, he revoked the nomination of his three children as beneficiaries and substituted Marguerite M. Gignac as beneficiary in their place. Right to revoke the designation of beneficiary was reserved. On October 30, 1937, he again executed a change of beneficiary rider whereunder he revoked "the nomination of the present beneficiary" and designated as new beneficiary "Amelia M. Gignac, wife." At the time this instrument was executed, Amelia M. Gignac had been dead over six years. The contract of insurance contains a provision to the effect that if there be no beneficiary surviving at the death of the insured, the proceeds of the policy shall be payable to the executors, administrators or assigns of the insured.
The court below held that the rider of October 30, 1937, effectively revoked the designation of Marguerite *203 M. Gignac as beneficiary and that, inasmuch as the person named as beneficiary did not survive the insured, the proceeds of the policy should be paid to the administrator by virtue of the provision referred to above. Mrs. Gignac appealed.
Appellant contends that the insured intended to accomplish only one thing by executing the change of beneficiary rider, i.e., to change the beneficiary, and that inasmuch as it is impossible to give effect to this intent because no new beneficiary capable of receiving the proceeds of the policy was designated, the attempted change must be held to be wholly ineffectual and inoperative and that it in no way changes her rights as the beneficiary.
No exactly similar case has ever arisen in this State, nor, so far as we can find after lengthy search, in other jurisdictions. The cases cited by appellant are easily distinguishable. Thus, inGrand Lodge Ancient Order of United Workmen v. Frank,
A somewhat analogous situation to that in the instant case has arisen in other jurisdictions in cases *204
where the insured's right to designate a beneficiary was limited in the respect that only persons of a certain class were eligible to be beneficiaries, and the insured designated a person not of that class as beneficiary in a change of beneficiary form.Miller v. Prelle,
Just what the insured had in mind in the instant case is a matter of conjecture, except that it seems patent that he intended to revoke the designation of appellant as beneficiary. It is possible that he desired to leave part of his insurance to his children and reasoned that by naming a deceased person as beneficiary, who could not possibly survive him, the proceeds of the policy would go to his children, who were his heirs, or to his estate under the terms of the *205 policy and in that way his children and appellant would share therein. This is, however, conjecture.
We do hold that the change of beneficiary rider was effective as a revocation of the designation of appellant as beneficiary. The decree of the trial court is affirmed, but without costs.
BUSHNELL, C.J., and SHARPE, BOYLES, REID, NORTH, DETHMERS, and CARR, JJ., concurred.