19 Mont. 263 | Mont. | 1897
The first question for decision is whether the covenant in plaintiff’s deeds embraces the United States. The
We shall now discuss the liability of the defendant trustees. The main question is whether or not the liability by virtue of the covenant alone is a debt, within the contemplation of section 460, Fifth Division of the Compiled Statutes. The section requires a corporation to report annually its “existing debts. ’ ’ The liability incurred by the Castle Land Company when it executed the deeds to plaintiff, as respondent himself contends, was not capable of enforcement in the courts until the Quinn entry was canceled, on April 5, 1894. Appellants’ counsel urge that any right of action against the defendant trustees because of failures of the corporation to file reports in the years 1891, 1892 and 1893 is barred by the statute of limitations. Answering this contention, counsel for respondent says in his brief : ‘ ‘The difficulty with their argument is that their premises are wrong, for, while it is true that the fee had not passed out of the United States, yet the federal government had permitted the entry, and the receipt of the Register and Receiver had issued, and was the property of the Castle Land Company up to the time of its cancelation by the Department of the Interior, on April 5, 1894. During that period of the life of the certificate, the courts were closed to the plaintiff by section 542 of the First Division of the Compiled Statutes of the State of Montana, which is as follows : ‘The receipt or certificate signed by the register or receiver of any U. S. Land Office of the entry or purchase of any tract of
Section 460 does not require a corporation to report, as existing debts, unliquidated demands against it, founded on torts. ° Our section 460 is substantially the same as that of New York, rom which state it was taken. In a case involving a con
The next question for our consideration is whether or not the report of the company made in 1894 was a false report.' From the record, we cannot say that it was false. It in no wise appears, even inferentially, that the King addition did not cost the Castle Land Company the amount of money for
Two separate appeals were taken from the lower court’s decision, — one in behalf of defendant trustees, and the other,, in behalf of the Castle Land Company, — and two transcripts are in this court. The costs of appeal in the one numbered 842 must be paid by the respondent, and in the one numbered 843 must be taxed to the Castle Land Company.
Remanded.