47 Tex. 548 | Tex. | 1877
This suit was instituted in the Bistrict Court of Bexar county, by G. H. Giddings as administrator of Emma Giddings, deceased, for the recovery of the amount of a bond and interest coupons attached, issued and delivered by the city of San Antonio to the “ San Antonio and Mexican Gulf Railroad,” dated March 1, 1852, the principal of said bond being one thousand dollars.
The plaintiff alleges in his petition that the issuance of the bond and coupons sued upon was “ authorized by a vote of the electors of the city of San Antonio, taken in accordance with the provisions of An act to incorporate the San Antonio and Mexican Gulf Railroad,’ approved September 5, 1850.”
The defendant demurred to the petition of plaintiff, upon
The only question presented for decision is, that the twelfth section of the act of incorporation, by the authority of which the bond and interest coupons were issued, provides for another and different object from that which is the main object of the act, and that such different object is not expressed in the title, and is, therefore, in violation of that part of our Constitution which says that “ every law enacted by the Legislature shall embrace hut one object, and that shall be expressed in the title.” (Constitution of 1845.)
The main object of the law, which was enacted on the 5th of November, 1850, was to incorporate a company, and invest it with ample powers, as a corporate body to construct and operate a railroad from the city of San Antonio to some point on the Gulf of Mexico, in Texas.
The title of the act is, “An act to incorporate the San Antonio Bailroad Company.”
The section of the act objected to as unconstitutional is as follows:
“ Section 12. That the mayor and aldermen of the city of San Antonio he and they are hereby authorized to subscribe to the capital stock of the said company, for said city, to an amount not to exceed fifty thousand dollars, as also such incorporated towns through which said railway may pass, inclusive of the town (if any) that may he its terminus on the Gulf, and to issue bonds bearing interest or otherwise, to pledge the faith of said city or towns to pay for the same; and the chief justices and county commissioners of the several counties through which the railway may pass shall be and they are hereby authorized to subscribe to the capital stock of said company, for their respective counties to pay the same: Provided, That the chief justices and county commissioners of said counties shall not make such subscription unless two thirds of the qualified electors of said county or
This is the fourth time this section of the law has been before this court for the adjudication of its constitutionality. In the first case, this point was not raised, and was not decided. (San Antonio v. Jones, 28 Tex., 19.)
In the second case, it was presented, and this 12th section of the act was held to be constitutional. (City of San Antonio v. Lane, 32 Tex., 405.)
In the third case, it was presented, and the 12th section of the act was held to be unconstitutional, as embracing a distinct object not expressed in the title. (The City of San Antonio v. Gould, 34 Tex., 49.)
In the opinion delivered in the last case, Justice Walker says: “ The plain and literal meaning of seventeen sections of the act make it an act of incorporation, the purpose of which is to build a railroad from San Antonio to .the Gulf of Mexico, with the ordinary powers, rights, and privileges incident to such a franchise.
“It will readily be seen that this section of the act (the 12th) is intended to enable the City of San Antonio and other towns and counties to become subscribers to the capital stock of the proposed San Antonio Railroad Company, directing the manner in which the stock shall be subscribed and paid.
“ The 12th section of the act would properly, in itself, be styled "An act to provide the means for building such railroad.’” (Id., 73.)
It must he held in mind that this is a special act of incorporation; that in 1850, when it was passed, there was in-existence no general law of this State authorizing cities,
This enumeration of the terms and resulting effects of this 12th section is made in order to present a full view of it, as a distinctive object of the act, which, had it been a separate act, might properly have been entitled “An act to authorize the city of San Antonio, and other towns and counties not therein named, to subscribe for stock in the San Antonio Railroad Company.”
Mr. Cooley lays it down that the object of this provision (in the Constitution) is to prevent log-rolling legislation, to prevent surprise and fraud upon the Legislature, and to give notice to citizens interested, through the publication of the legislative proceedings, of what is being attempted to be done affecting them. (Cooley’s Const. Lim., 144.)
Mr. Dillon lays it down that “ this provision has been fre
These two rules, correct in themselves, must be construed together, in framing an act; so that that which is made incidental and auxiliary in carrying out the main object of the act, shall not be itself a distinctive object of legislation, relating to the rights, powers, and interests of corporate bodies' and individuals, of which neither they nor their representatives in the Legislature would be given any notice .whatever by the title of the act.
So far as it appears in this case, this was an ordinary railroad charter by a private, special act of the Legislature; and, from anything in its title, the citizens of San Antonio, Goliad, Victoria, Gonzales, Port Lavaca, Indianola, Velasco, or Corpus Christi, or their representatives in the Legislature, could hardly have had notice that their charters of incorporation were being enlarged by this act, with so important a power conferred, upon condition that the road should be laid off and built through one or more of them. If the railroad was laid off’ through any one of them, that town would have the power; otherwise, not.
The same may be said as to a half-dozen counties between San Antonio and some part of the coast on the Gulf.
The amending city and town charters, and the conferring important special powers on counties, such as building court houses, jails, and other public improvements requiring a collection of extraordinary taxes, are themselves usually distinctive objects of legislation; most usually prompted by the wishes and consent of those who are concerned. And if it should be attempted without being so prompted, then one object of this provision is to enable them and their representatives in the Legislature to have reasonable notice of it in the title of the act.
This provision in the Constitution originated in, and was adopted to prevent the repetition of a most flagrant abuse of legislative power in the Stifle of Georgia in the last century. Its history is briefly sketched in an opinion delivered in the Supreme Court of that State, as follows, to wit: “As to the objection that the act of 1841 is violative of the 17th sec. 1st art. of the Constitution of Georgia, because its title is at variance with the body of the act, I would observe that the traditionary history of this clause is, that it was inserted in the Constitution of 1798, at the instance of General James Jackson, and that its necessity was suggested by the Yazoo act. That memorable measure of the 17th of January, 1795, as is well known, was smuggled through the Legislature under the caption of an act, “ for the payment of the late State troops,” and a declaration in its title of the right of the State to the unappropriated territory thereof, “ for the protection and support of its frontier settlements.” (Mayor and Alderman of Savannah v. The State of Georgia, 4 Ga., 38.) This obnoxious act was repealed the next year, and the large grant of land to private individuals embraced in it declared
Hence this provision limiting the legislative power, has been adopted in many if not most of the Constitutions of the different States of the Union. In some of the States it is held to be directory only; in others, mandatory. This court has held it to be mandatory. (Cannon v. Hemphill, 7 Tex., 208.)
While this has been regarded as the settled rule of construction here, in its application the most liberal construction has been given by the Supreme Court of this State, in accordance with the general current of authority, to make the whole law constitutional where the part objected to as infringing this provision of the Constitution could be considered as appropriately connected with or subsidiary to the main object of the act as expressed' in the title, which may be seen by reference to a number of cases that have been decided pro and eon, involving this question. (Cannon v. Hemphill, 7 Tex., 208; Parker v. Parker, 10 Tex., 86; Robinson v. The State, 15 Texas, 312; Tadlock v. Eccles, 20 Tex., 792; The State v. Shadle, 41 Tex., 404; Breen v. The T. & P. R. Co., 44 Tex., 302.)
In the case of Tadlock v. Eccles, Justice Wheeler says: “ For an act having one main or principal object in view, may incidentally affect, or be promotive of others, and it would be impossible so to legislate as to j>revent this consequence. The intention doubtless was to prevent embracing in an act having one ostensible object, provisions having no relevancy to that object, but really designed, other and wholly different objects, and thus to conceal and disguise, thé real object proposed by the provisions of an act under a false or deceptive title.” The same general idea, however, valiantly expressed, may be found in numerous cases in the decisions
The case of Mayor and Alderman of Savannah v. The State of Georgia, (4 Ga., 38,) may be referred to, as drawing the distinction clearly when this provision is applicable, and its effect when only part of the act falls under the prohibition.
It is not pretended that the question presented in this case is free from difficulty in its determination. The same question, upon the same class of claims, has twice been decided by this court: first, in favor of, and next against the constitutionality of this twelfth section of the act of incorporation—the court being composed of different members in the last case from those who decided the first case. This suit, it would seem, from the date of its commencement, was brought to take the opinion again of this court, when composed of still another set of justices; and the only question made, looks to the reversal of the last decision of the court made in it. While it is of the highest importance that the courts should be open at all times for the assertion of rights that are believed to be well founded, it would be unfortunate that it should be thought practicable, on a doubtful question, to easily procure a change of decision with every change in the members, who might, from time to time, compose the Supreme Court.
This question is, therefore, not before us as one of first impression, but stands with the weight in favor of an affirmance of the last decision of this court upon it.
The main object of the views and considerations that have been here now presented, is to show that the last decision in the case of the city of San Antonio v. Gould is sufficiently well grounded in law, as that it should not be readily reversed, and thereby add another to the changes of decision by this court on a question, both sides of which may be sustained with plausible reasons, as may be seen in the briefs of counsel in this case, and in the opinions and briefs of the two preceding cases.
Judgment affirmed.
Affirmed.
[Associate Justice Moore did not sit in this case.]