delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant was convicted by the Court sitting without a jury of grand larceny of a motor vehicle and sentenced to five years under the jurisdiction of the Department of Correction. He contends on this appeal that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the conviction. We agree.
The State’s evidence showed that on the night of November 7, 1968 appellant was surrendered by his bail bondsman to the custody of the Cockeysville Magistrate’s Court in Baltimore County; that he promptly fled therefrom, unnoticed, through an open window; that he then located a parked vehicle, which could be started without keys, and drove off in it without the owner’s permission. Appellant was returned to police custody the following-day, at which time he gave a statement admitting that “the evening I escapéd from jail, I wanted to get back to my wife, as soon as possible,” so he took the car in ques *3 tion and “proceeded White House Rd., on Rt. 1 where I left the car and hitchhiked to my homeand that “When I got home my wife, father, brother and mother-in-law and I talked about what I had done, and I decided to turn myself back in, and try and straighten it all out.”
The police recovered the vehicle on November 8 and towed it to a service station “above” Forest Hill, which is in Harford County, immediately adjacent to Baltimore County. While the record indicates that appellant resided in Harford County, just where he abandoned the vehicle in relation to his home cannot be ascertained from the evidence. Appellant states in his brief that he actually surrendered himself to police November 8, and notified them of the car’s location — a statement which the State seemingly acknowledges in its brief as being correct. On the other hand, the record contains testimony of a police officer that appellant was “apprehended” in Harford County on a warrant charging escape on November 8.
The appellant testifying in his own behalf denied taking the car at all and claimed he hitchhiked home.
At the conclusion of all the evidence, the court found appellant guilty of larceny of the vehicle, this being the first count of a five-count indictment which also charged unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. The prosecutor then stated that he would “stet” the remaining counts of the indictment and the court rendered no verdict on these counts.
Proof of the offense of larceny requires a proper evidentiary showing that the accused intended to steal the property,
viz.,
that he intended to
permanently
deprive the owner of his property.
Fletcher v. State,
The only evidence that appellant took the car is furnished by his own statement which, on its face, indicates that he took the vehicle for the purpose of returning to his home. While he drove the vehicle only part of the way to his home, we think the circumstances under which the car was taken, considered in light of appellant’s subsequent actions, were plainly such that the trial judge, in finding that appellant intended permanently to deprive the owner of his car, was clearly erroneous.
We think it obvious that the evidence would have supported a conviction for larceny of the vehicle’s use. But the trial judge rendered no verdict as to his guilt under that count. Ordinarily, where the court sitting without a jury renders no verdict with respect to counts of an indictment, such inaction operates as and is equivalent to an acquittal.
Jackson v. State,
Judgment reversed.