Gibsоn filed this appeal from the denial of her motion for new trial after being found guilty of the offenses of driving with an improper tag, driving without a license, and driving without аn emissions control sticker.
The appellant’s car was stopped by the Cobb County police because it bore a license plate which read as follows: “JUSTICE TOWNSHIP, COMMON-LAW MUNICIPALITY, SOUTH CAROLINA, PERMANENT, 58.” The officer asked the appellant for her driver’s license and for proof of insurance and placed her under arrest when she refused either to comply with this request or to identify herself. It was shown that her vehicle did not have the required emissions control sticker. Held:
1. The apрellant contends that the accusation was void because it was not “signed by the prosecuting attorney of the court” in accordance with OCGA § 17-7-71 (a) but was signed by an assistant solicitor with the solicitor’s name. Pretermitting whether this challenge to the accusation was timely raised in the court below, see OCGA § 17-7-111, wе conclude that it is without merit. The Legislature has specified that “[a]ll prosecutions in criminal cases instituted in the State Court of Cobb County shall be by written accusation made by the solicitor
or assistant solicitor. . .
.” (Emphasis supplied.) Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 3211, 3216. The Legislature has further provided that “[i]t shall be within the sole authority of the [Cobb County] solicitor to prescribe the duties and assignments of the assistant solicitors.” Ga. Laws, 1986, pp. 5065, 5066. Pursuant to these statutes, we must presume, in the absence of a cоntrary showing, that the assistant solicitor was authorized to sign the solicitor’s name to the accusation. We note that this court has previously upheld the vаlidity of an accusation which contained no actual signature whatever in the space provided therefor but only the solicitor’s typewritten name.
Hardeman v. State,
2. The appellant was issued a uniform traffic citation at the time of her arrest, specifying as follows: “Resident has 30 days to obtain tag in violation of Section 40-2-90.” Subsequently, a formal accusation was filed pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-71, charging her, in Count 1, as follows: “Driving with improper tag, to wit: Did being a resident оf the state for a period of 30 days or more operate a motor vehicle in this state without first obtaining a license plate to operate same.” The appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion *770 for a directed verdict of acquittal with respect to this chаrge because the state failed to prove the allegation that she had been a resident of Georgia for 30 days prior to her arrest.
The stаtute under which the appellant was convicted was quite clearly OCGA § 40-2-8 (a), which contains no residency requirement but applies by its terms to “[a]ny persоn owning or operating any vehicle described in Code Section 40-2-20.” Although OCGA § 40-2-90 exempts certain vehicles owned by nonresidents from the requirements of §§ 40-2-8 (a) and 40-2-20 where such vehicles are registered in another state and have not been used in this state for more than 30 days, it is not contended that such an exemption is applicable in the present case. Consequently, we conclude that the allegation that the appellant had resided in this state for a period of 30 days or more was mere surplusage. There having been no showing as to how the presence of this extraneous allegation сould have impeded the appellant’s ability to prepare a defense or how it could possibly result in her being subjected to a subsequent prosecution based on the same conduct, we further conclude that the failure to prove the allegation did not constitute a fatal varianсe. See
Shackelford v. State,
3. The appellant contends that the state impermissibly placed her character in issue in violation of OCGA § 24-2-2 when, during direct examination by the state, one of the arresting officers characterized the arrest as a “felony stop” and went on to explain this сharacterization as follows: “We did that because of some previous knowledge from school that I have had for certain types of stoрs of this nature. The type of tag displayed on this automobile that we are looking for is common to people who are tax evaders.”
The trial court admitted this testimony over the appellant’s objection for the limited purpose of showing the officer’s state of mind upon approaching the vehicle. The officer subsequently testified that he had received no information prior to the arrest concerning the appellant’s character or reputation and that he had no reason to believe that she was dangerous. It was thus made clear to the jury that this line of questioning was not intended to imply any prior misconduct on the part of the appellant but merely to establish the police procedures applicable to the stop of any vehicle under similar circumstances. Even assuming arguendo that the admission of the testimony was improper under these cirсumstances, we can perceive no reasona
*771
ble possibility that it contributed to the verdict in the context of the undisputed facts of this case. See generally
Dill v. State,
*771 4. During the course of their deliberations, the jury inquired of the court whether the failure to produce a driver’s license upon request by а police officer constituted the offense of driving without a license. See OCGA § 40-5-20. In response, the trial court supplemented his original jury instructions with a сharge on OCGA § 40-5-29, as follows: “[E]very licensee shall have his driver’s license in his immediate possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle. Every licensee shall display his license upon the demand of a law enforcement officer. A refusal to comply with such demand may give rise to an inferеnce of a violation of Code Section 40-5-20.”
The appellant contends that this supplemental charge injected an extraneous matter into the case and was therefore erroneous. We disagree. The instruction was a correct statement of the law and was adjusted to the evidence. See generally
Parks v. State,
5. From the evidence presented at trial, a rational trier of fact could reasonably have found the appellant guilty of each of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, her motion for new trial on the general grounds was properly denied. See generally
Jackson v. Virginia,
6. The appellant enumerates as error the trial court’s grant of the state’s petition for an assessment of thе costs of prosecution against her pursuant to OCGA § 17-11-1, contending that this Code section does not apply to misdemeanor prosecutions. This issue wаs recently decided adversely to the appellant in
Walden v. State,
Judgment affirmed.