Plaintiff appeals as of right from an amended order denying plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision to take judicial notice of law, granting defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition, and dismissing plaintiff’s remaining claims. We affirm.
Plaintiff’s decedent died of carbon monoxide poisoning in a November 14, 1990, fire in her apartment building in the City of St. Ignace, Michigan. The building, owned by defendant, was not equipped with smoke detectors. Plaintiff filed suit under the wrongful death act, MCL 600.2922; MSA 27A.2922, alleging two counts of negligence on the part of defendant. In count I, plaintiff alleged that defendant was liable under principles of common-law premises liability for various conditions throughout the building, including the absence of smoke detectors. In count n, plaintiff alleged that defendant was also liable for certain violations of the duty of care imposed by the Building Officials and Code Administrators National Building Code of 1987 (boca).
*189 In response to a request from defendant, the trial court took judicial notice of law and announced that no local or state law, including the common law, required the installation of smoke detectors in defendant’s building at the time of the fire that killed plaintiff’s decedent. Defendant then moved for partial summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) with respect to all negligence claims based on the alleged absence of smoke detectors in defendant’s building. In response, plaintiff answered defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition and moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision to take judicial notice of law. After a hearing on both motions, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and granted defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition. The trial court reasoned that, subject to certain exceptions, the state administrative rules adopting the BOCA specifically exempted “existing structures” from its provisions, including the provision requiring the installation of smoke detectors. See 1988 AACS, R 408.30401 et seq. Defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition was granted solely on this basis, and plaintiff’s remaining claims, based on theories of liability apart from defendant’s alleged failure to install smoke detectors, were voluntarily dismissed to achieve a final appealable order.
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision to grant a motion for summary disposition.
Atkinson v Detroit,
On appeal, plaintiff challenges only the trial court’s inteipretation of defendant’s legal duties under Michigan’s statutory and regulatory scheme. Plaintiff does not argue that the trial court erred with respect to the
*191
issue of defendant’s common-law duty.
1
Accordingly, we will not address the propriety of the trial court’s decision with respect to defendant’s duties under the common law.
Marx v Dep’t of Commerce,
The State Construction Code Act of 1972, MCL 125.1501
et seq.;
MSA 5.2949(1)
el seq.,
established the State Construction Code Commission, MCL 125.1503; MSA 5.2949(3), which is charged with preparing and promulgating rules governing the construction, use, and occupation of buildings, MCL 125.1504(1); MSA 5.2949(4)(1).
Ypsilanti Twp v Edward Rose Bldg Co,
With respect to existing structures, the State Construction Code provided:
The legal use and occupancy of any structure existing on the effective date of enforcement or for which it had been previously approved may be continued without change, except as may be specifically covered in the code or as may be deemed necessary by the building official for the general safety and welfare of the occupants and the public. [1988 AACS, R 408.30403.1, amending BOCA, § 103.1 (emphasis added).]
The parties do not dispute that defendant’s building was an existing structure before the effective date of enforcement. Roy Carlson, the St. Ignace building inspector, swore in an affidavit that defendant’s building was in existence since at least 1946 and that, to the best of his knowledge, he never told defendant that the building was a safety hazard without smoke detectors or that defendant should install smoke detectors. Thus, because the installation of smoke detectors was not required by statute or rule before the effective date of enforcement and not deemed necessary by the building official, we must determine whether a change in the use was specifically covered by another provision of the code. We conclude that it was not.
Article 10 of the BOCA addressed “Fire Protection Systems.” The first section of Article 10, entitled “scope,” provided that “this article shall specify where fire protection systems are required in all buildings or structures or portions thereof.” Boca, § 1000.1. Pursuant to § 1018.3.5, smoke detectors were required in the immediate vicinity of bedrooms and on every *193 floor, including the basement, of structures classified as “Use Group R-3.” Defendant’s apartment building was classified as “Use Group R-3.” See BOCA, § 309.4. Because the provisions in Article 10 “specifically covered” the use of smoke detectors in “all buildings,” but did not specifically provide that a change in use was required for existing structures, reasonable minds could differ with respect to whether the general exception allowing for the continuation of existing uses applied to the provision requiring the installation and maintenance of smoke detectors.
Judicial construction is appropriate where reasonable minds could differ regarding the meaning of a statute. See
Heinz v Chicago Rd Investment Co,
Moreover, deviation from the language in a model act is presumed to be deliberate.
In re Childress Trust,
Affirmed.
Notes
The issue of defendant’s common-law liability was not raised in plaintiffs statement of questions presented or addressed in the argument section of her brief on appeal.
Compare Article 10 to Articles 5, 7, 8, and 11, which specifically provided different rules for existing buildings as opposed to those for new construction. See BOCA, §§ 500.1, 505.0, 700.1, 702.0, 800.1, 804.0, 1100.1, 1105.0.