Gibson v. GibsonGibson v. Gibson
Richard L. Polin, Lauderhill, and Beverly L. Vesel, Margate, for respondent.
ANSTEAD, Chief Judge.
We treat the notice of appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari and grant the petition. In doing so, we direct the trial court to permit the attendance of a court reporter at the court-ordered psychiatric examination of the pеtitioner. Since the trial court has already authorized the attendance of counsel for both sides at the examination, we can see no basis for refusing petitioner‘s request to have a reporter in attendance.
In overturning the trial court‘s decision, we find ourselves more in agreement with the dissent rather than the majority opinion set out in Edwards v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 16 Cal. 3d 905, 549 P.2d 846, 130 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976), the primary authority relied upon by the respondent to deny the petitioner the right to have a court reporter, or some other suitable recording device, available at the compulsory psychiatric examination ordered by the trial court on motion by the respondent. In our view the petitioner should have the right, where the means are available as they are here, to preserve by objective means thе precise communications that occur during the course of the examination. Any concerns about rapport and candor should give way to this right since otherwise the petitioner will be сompelled to challenge the credibility of the examiner should a dispute later arise as to what took place. Such a dispute would be obviated by the presence of a meаns of recording the interview. Both the examiner and patient should benefit by the objective recording of the proceedings, and the integrity and value of the examination as evidence in the judicial proceedings should be enhanced.
It is important to note also, that it is the privacy of the petitioner that is involved, not that of the examiner, and if the petitioner wants to be certain that this compelled, although admittedly reasonable, intrusion into her privacy be accurately preserved, then she should be so entitled. There is no reason why the reporter, like a meсhanical device used for the same purpose, should interfere with the process. Indeed, the presence of the reporter should relieve any anxiety the petitioner may have as to her responses to the inquiries made being received and recorded accurately by the examining physician.
The petition for writ of certiorari is granted and the trial court is directed to enter an order in accord with this opinion.
DOWNEY, J., concurs.
GLICKSTEIN, J., dissents with opinion.
GLICKSTEIN, Judge, dissenting.
This is an appeal from that part of a non-final order disallowing the presence of a court reporter during the psychological examination of the appellant wife involved in a dissolution action. We have appropriately treated the matter as a petition for writ of certiorari; however, I would deny the рetition, thus occasioning this respectful dissent.
My position would undoubtedly be stronger if the two lawyers were not authorized to be present during the psychological examination. Judges Anstead and Downеy conclude that so long as there is intrusion, it is better that there also be present someone to take down verbatim everything that is said. I disagree in that I feel (1) the discretion of the trial judge is and ought to
It occurs to me that a verbatim report in a situation like this may be likened to a trial transcript before an appellate court. An appellate court cаn determine procedural error and the like from a transcript, but may not reweigh the evidence, because unvocalized aspects of the trial — e.g., demeanor of witnesses — have nоt been recorded. Here, the expert may be likened to the trial judge. The expert‘s determination of the emotional condition of the examinee is based not merely on what she says but аlso on her demeanor and perhaps on what she does not say. Is the trial court to second guess whether the expert‘s testimony or report is trustworthy on the basis of what the examination transсript states? If so, the trial court must be a mental health expert, more competent than the psychiatrist or psychologist, for the trial court can evaluate the test results without witnessing the exаminee‘s conduct. If the trial court should not use the transcript of the examination this way, what will the reporter‘s presence accomplish that the presence of counsel will not?
I think it would be better if no third persons were present during the examination, but it is not wise to suppose that to admit two extra people without admitting a third is arbitrary. Each additional person is an added intrusion, chаnging the climate of the examination; and the presence of one who is obviously making a verbatim record may invalidate the examination entirely. The reporter‘s presence would bе both intrusive and obtrusive.
Although there is no analysis by a Florida court of this question,
In Florida, too, the trial court has discretion to decide whether or not to permit a сourt reporter‘s presence at a psychiatric examination. The California Supreme Court‘s rationale for its holding in Edwards is very persuasive, and seems equally appropriate to а case where psychological examination is to assist in determining with which parent children of a dissolved marriage should be primarily domiciled.
It is noted that the California Supreme Court said only that ordinarily there should be no third persons present during a psychiatric examination. There are circumstances under which the trial court, exercising its sound discretion, could find such a presence desirable. In the instant case the trial court found it appropriate for the attorneys to be present. In my opinion, it did not abuse that discretion by excluding the court reporter.