46 Ky. 481 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1847
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This record presents a contest between two portions of the former congregation of members of the Methodist Episcopal Church at Maysville, each claiming, as a distinctly organized society or congregation, the exclusive use and control, for the purposes of worship, of the Methodist Meeting House or Church building, and the lot on which it is situated, in the city of Maysville. The opposing claims of the two parties, were brought into immediate conflict, by appointments made and published, under different authorities, for preaching and Divine worship, at the same hour of the same day, and in the same Church, by two different preachers, for each of whom the parties respectively claimed the use of the pulpit. To prevent collision and with the intent that the house should not be occupied at all, on the day referred to, John Armstrong, one of the original trustees to whom the lot had been conveyed, and holding also other official stations in the collective Church at Maysville, and being the representative of one of the contending parties, had the house fastened up; but other and more numerous officers and trustees of the other party, had the doors opened, and occupied the Church, with their preachers.
In this state of things, John Armstrong, in behalf of himself and others acting with him, filed this bill, complaining in effect of a forcible expulsion from the house, claiming that he and his associates, as members of the Methodist Episcopal Church, in the United States, were, together with their preacher, entitled by the terms of the deed under which the lot was held, and the building erected, to the free and undisturbed use of the house, but that the opposite party having renounced the authority of
The defenden-ts, consisting principally of the four remaining trustees, and several other officers of the collective- Church, not only deny the exclusive claim set up-in the bill, but d’en-y to-the complainant and his associates, as an-organized body or congregation, all right to the us-e of the' Church building at Maysville, and claim the ex. elusive- right for themselves and associates-; alleging, that at an- unusually large meeting of the Methodist Episcopal congregation-at Maysville, held after due notice, under the-authority of the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church of t-he United States-, and in pursuance of the recommendation-of the Bishops-of (he Church5, a clear majoiity of the members present, voted for adhering to the Methodist Episcopal Church South; which- had been-organized-under the authority of said General- Conference, whereby, and by the ascertained concurrence of so many of the absent members, as made, with- the said' majority of those present, a clear majority of all the members of said congregation or society, the Maysville society was, by the terms of the- resolutions passed by the General' Conference of 1844, and under their authority, lawfully placed in connection with the Methodist Episcopal Church South. Theyclaim-, therefore, that they as members of the Maysville society or Church, with their preacher, authorized by the Kentucky Annual Conference, with which the Maysville society had long been connected, are entitled to the uses provided in the deed, and that the minority having separated'themselves from that society, and formed an independent Church or congregation, in opposition to the authority of the Kentucky Annual Conference, and without the sanction and in violation of the resolutions of the General Conference of the entire-
. Notwithstanding the exclusive right thus asserted and insisted on by each party, the Circuit Cou.rt being of opinion that as this was a case of schism or division, not
I. We shall first consider the question as to the application and effect of the proviso. Conceding that the body of the statute applies not only to such religious congregations or societies as are completelyindependent, but also to such as may be under relations of dependence and connection as parts of a larger system, and that whenever a lot has been conveyed to trustees for the benefit of a congregation or society of either sort, for the purposes mentioned, the succeeding trustees, regularly chosen and having their names recorded in the County Court, are by the statute, invested with the legal title and with the powers expressly enumerated, subject to the proviso; still the proviso declares nothing more than that the act shall not be construed to authorize the said trustees, in case of schism or division, not caused by immorality, to prevent either of the parties from using the house .erected on the lot, for devotion, a part of the time, proportioned to the numbers of each ; and we are satisfied that it was not intended to' control the operation of the. deed, or to affect permanently, the rights of the beneficiaries, orto restrict the powers of a Court of equity in ascertaining and enforcing those rights according to the true intent of the deed by which they were conferred. The manifest object of íhé statute is to uphold the uses declared in the deed, by enabling the society to effect in an easy mode, the transmission of the title from the original trustees to others chosen as occasion may require. It cannot be supposed that as a consideration for this privilege, the Legislature intended to assume, in case of schism, the absolute disposal of the use itself, by the establishment of s
This is, in our opinion, the true extent and operation of the proviso under consideration. It prohibits the trustees in cases of division referred to, from shutting the door at their own discretion against either party. It prohibits them probably from expelling either party by an action at law, in which the legal title might prevail without regard to the equities of the case. It may perhaps prohibit them as mere holders of the legal title, and of the powers vested by the statute, and not being beneficiaries, from obtaining relief even in a Court of equity, in favor of one of the parties to the exclusion of the other. But it does not prohibit the persons claiming as beneficiaries under the deed, from appealing to that Court for the establishment of their right against opposing claimants under the deed. Nor does it prohibit the Court, in a case properly before it, from deciding the right, as it is bound to do, according to its opinion of the true construction-and operation of the deed under which it is derived. In such a contest, the trustees as holders of the legal title, need not be complainants. It is sufficient that they be
. The foregoing views are in substantial accordance with, the construction given to the proviso in the case of Curd vs Wallace, (7 Dana, 190,) in which it is said the proviso gives no right to either party which did not other, wise exist. And although in that case the rule of apportionment was adopted, this seems to have been done upon the assumption that the suit could only be sustained-under the authority conferred- by the statute, whence it was concluded that the relief obtained should be subject to the restriction of the proviso. But under the authority of the subsequent case of Shannon vs Frost, (3 B. Monroe, 253,) this assumption must be regarded as entirely overruled, or as being restricted to the particular circumstances existing ip the case of Curd vs Wallace.
In the case of Shannon vs Frost, the Court following, as we think, the precedents and practice of a Court of equity, granted relief upon a bill filed by a committee slicing in behalf of a congregation, to protect it from, disturbance by expelled or schismatic members, and the trustees were made defendants. Then an act of 1835, (3 Stat. Law, 499,) authorizes any religious society to .appoint a committee or trustees upon its own record book, and without conferring on them the legal title or imposing any restiiction, authorizes them to enforce by suit, any claim of the society to property, and to recover for damages done to it, &c. It is obvious that a religious society may obtain, by proceeding under this statute, substantially, the same advantages for the protection of their property, as by proceeding under the act of 1814. And looking to both of the statutes and to the two cases which have been referred to, we conclude that no substantial right is lost or gained to the beneficiaries by proceeding
In the case before us, the bill, as already stated, was filed by one of the original trustees, sueing for himself and his associates. ■ The case is therefore not directly within the authority of Curd vs Wallace, where the trustees deriving authority from the act of 1814, were complainants. Two other persons named as trustees in the deed, who with the complainant, are the only suivivors, are made defendants. The trustees appointed by the undivided society, and by each party since the division, are also defendants, so that the legal title in whomsoever jt may be, is before the Court. The appointment of all of these trustees, except those named in the deed, has. been made since the passage of the act of 1845, But although we suppose the legal title to have passed to such of them as were appointed by the proper authority, and had their appointments recorded in the County Court, the proviso in the act of 1814, has, in our opinion, no-operation on the case, unless under the deed each of the parties, or one as much as the other, is entitled to partipate in the use. No question is made as to the competency of the parties to represent the claimants on either side, and we regard the case as fairly presented for decision on the merits of the respective claims under ail the considerations which should bear upon the question in a Court of equity.
II. We-proceed, therefore, to the inquiry, whether under a proper construction of the deed, as applied to the existing state of things in the divided Church, each of these parties is entitled to participate in the use of the property in question, or whether one alone, and if so, which one is entitled to the use in exclusion of the other. The consideration urged upon us, that this inquiry involves not merely the title or use of the Maysville Church building, as contested in the present ease, but also the title to a large amount of other property within the limits of thé Southern organization, referred to in the pleadings, gives to the present investigation and decision, an
The deed under which both parties claim, pursues strictly the form prescribed or recommended for general use in the book of discipline of the Methodist Episcopal Church, as early as 1796. It was executed in 1812, and for the consideration of fifty dollars, paid to the grantor, conveys to five named trustees and their successors forever, a designated lot or parcel of ground in the town (now city) of Maysville, upon the following trusts, (which we number for convenient reference:)
1st. That they will erect or cause'to be erected thereon, a house or place of worship for the use of the members of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States of America, according to the rules and discipline, which, from time to time, may be agreed on and adopted by the ministers and preachers of said Church, at their General Conferences in the United States of America.
2d. And in further trust and confidence, that they shall, at all times, permit such ministers and preachers belonging to said Church as shall, from time to time, be duly authorized by llm General Conference' of the ministers and preachers of said Methodist Episcopal Church, or by the Annual Conference authorized by the said General Conference, to preach and expound the holy word of God therein.
3d. And in further trust and confidence, that when one or more of said trustees shall die, or cease to be a member of said Church, according to the rules and discipline, then it shall be the duty of the stationed minister or preacher, (authorized as aforesaid,) who shall have the pastoral charge of the members of the said Church, to' call a meeting of the remaining trustees, &c. &c.; and the vacancy is to be supplied by choosing in the designated mode, one or more persons, who shall have been a member or members of said Church for one year.
4tb. Provided, that in case the trustees or any of them, shall be bound for any sum of money on account of said premises, and obliged to pay the same, they are authorized to raise it by mortgage or sale of the premises, after
In reference to a question arising incidentally in the case, we remark that the phrase, “the said Church,” used three times in the third clause, evidently means, in the second instance of its use therein, the local Church or •congregation worshiping on the premises,-of whose members alone the stationed preacher has the pastoral charge; and we think the same meaning should be given to the same words in the first and third instances of their use in the same clause. From this construction it follows that a trustee might be regarded as vacating his office by ceasing to be a member of the local Church, of which he was a trustee, and that his place might be filled according to the third clause of the deed, although he took membership in the local Church of some other place, and in that way continued to be a member of the Methodist Episcopal Church.
It should be stated as essential to a proper understanding of the deed, and to a correct, application of its terms to persons and things, that the funds for purchasing the -lot and erecting the buildings thereon, were furnished in the first instance, by the Methodists residing in and near Maysville, and by some few others for their use, and that -such as have been since found necessary, have been furnished, probably by the members of the congregation which attended divine service on the premises.
1. The first proposition which we deduce from the deed'; i and the facts connected with its execution, is that -grantor was not the donor of acharitv, but the vendor of
2. A second proposition arising from the very nature and circumstances of the case, an'd demonstrated by the features of the deed and other considerations just referred to, is that notwithstanding the apparent comprehensiveness of the terms in which the use is declared in favor of the members of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States, the actual use, that is, the use of the premises by occupancy arid for accommodation, and the immediate control of them as a place of worship, was intended to be secured to the local congregation or society subject to the rules and regulations prescribed by the higher authorities of the Church. The primary object of the whole transaction must necessarily have been to provide and secure a place of worship according to the Methodist Episcopal discipline, for the local society, (of that denomination,) by and for which the contributions were made, and which was expected to attend worship on the premises. It is to such society and its Members alone, that the first clause of the deed secures any proprietary right or any tangible interest which can be the subject of adjudication by the civil tribunals. The members of the Methodist Episcopal Church at large, not belonging to the local society, can, in a general view, have no other use of the local premises but through the instrumentality of the local society, and by means of the subordination of the local use to the laws and authority of the
3. In case of a division of the local society into two organized parts, though the individuals of each party might still answer to the general description of the beneficiaries as contained in the deed, it does not follow that each party would be entitled to the use of the house of worship. For tbe members of each distinct society of the same denomination might come equally within the general description, and most obviously no one of these societies could, upon that ground, claim to oust any other from the use of its own house of worship. But as under
4. The second clause in the deed points out more explicitly than the first, the position in the general organization of the local society to which the use is intended to be secured, and establishes clearly one criterion of right which is included in the first clause only by reference to the rules of discipline. The second clause relates to the use of the pulpit, and secures it at all times to such ministers and preachers belonging to the Methodist Episcopal Church, as shall be authorized by the General Conference, or by the Annual Conference authorized by said Genera] Conference, to preach and expound the holy word of God therein. It is not necessary to go into any discussion of the official character and duties of the preacher, nor of his connection with the use of the house by the members, nor of his relation to them or to the society of which, in the language of the deed in a subse
It would be an absurdity to suppose that the use of the body of the house was intended to be secured to any society, whether its members claimed to be of the Methodist Episcopal Church or not, which would not receive the preacher to whom alone the use of the pulpit was secured. It is just as certain then, in case of division, that the exclusive use is secured to that portion of the society which receives the preacher authorized as mentioned in this clause, as it is that the use is secured to no other preacher but such as is thus authorized. This is the great point of external, union with the. general organization, which fixes the dependence and subordination of the local societies. It is moreover the especial means of securing the great principle of an itinerant ministry which characterizes this Church, and is regarded as the chief instrument of its success. So far, then, as the deed framed for general use in securing the preaching houses of the Church, is to be viewed as a means of perpetuating its peculiar organization and policy, the principle that the use of the houses is secured to those preachers only who are regularly authorized to preach therein, and to the local societies receiving such preachers, must be regarded as of paramount importance, and as giving proportional weight to the test of right which it furnishes.
5. The appointment by the proper authority, of a preacher for one of the portions of a divided society and its reception of the preacher thus appointed, constitute a mutual recognition, which being found to exist in favor of one portion and not of the other, must, unless in some most extraordinary case, go far to satisfy the mind of the Judge, that the party thus recognizing and recogized by the proper authority, stands legitimately and properly in the place of the entire original society, and is cloalhed with its rights. And if the authority thus re
But the General Conference of 1844, having adopted measures which, by many southern delegates, were deemed injurious to the rights, and character, and usefulness •of the southern ministry of the Methodist Episcopal '
Under the sanction of these resolutions, a convention of delegates from fifteen southern Conferences, assembled in 1845, renounced, by solemn act, their connection with the pre-existing organization and the jurisdiction of the General Conference as then constituted, and retaining the same faith and doctrine, the same rules and discipline and the same form of constitution and government, established for themselves a new and independent organiza, tion, under the name of “the Methodist Episcopal Church South,” and a new General Conference for that Church. The Kentucky Annual Conference, with the others represented in the Convention, ratified this act, and thus became connected with the southern organization, and a component part of the Methodist Episcopal Church South.
One portion of the Maysville society adhering to the Methodist Episcopal Church South, and acknowledging its jurisdiction, receives its preacher as usual, from the Kentucky Conference, the other portion rejecting the new organization, professes adherence to so much as remains of the old one, under the name of “the Methodist Episcopal Church,” and receives its preacher, as is understood, from the neighboring Conference of Ohio. We have seen, however, that the members of this society or party claim that they being still members of the Methodist Episcopal Church, and the others being members of a different Church, they alone, as coming within the description of beneficiaries in the deed, and acknowledging the jurisdiction of the General Conference therein referred to, are entitled to the exclusive use of the property.
IV. In considering this claim, which merging the question as to the lawfulness of the southern organization, the division of jurisdiction between the two general Churches, and the true position of the Maysville Church or society,
The Methodist Episcopal Church as an organized body, instituted and maintained by the voluntary association of individuals, existed and still exists, independently of the deeds, and with the same power of changing its name and form and organization, as it had at first of fixing them. This power, inherent and inextinguishable in the Church, the deed, by whomsoever made, and although the grantor might be a donor, could not annihilate; and without ejs
The first object of the deed, we repeat, was to secure the local use to the local societies. They intended to secure it in subordination to the higher authorities of the Church, whereby the regular connection and relation of the parts to the whole would be secured. And they looked to the existing organization by which the great mass of the Methodist Episcopalians in the United States were constituted one body, as the whole, of which these societies were parts, and to whose laws their use of the local property was to be subject. But this union and organization, powerful and complete as they were, though connected by long cherished sentiments of affection, by the sense of power and by the pride of success, and though sustained by institutions apparently calculated to secure, not only the indefinite extension, but the continued integrity of the body, were still subject to the law of change, and to all the vicissitudes that belong to the creations of men. They were subject to change, not only from the force of external circumstances, over which the body itself might have no control, but more certainly perhaps, from the various and varying will or opinions or interests of its component parts, and at last, inevitably from its own extension, involving unwieldy magnitude, and the union of incoherent elements. The deed, though it may have intended to avert, has been powerless to prevent, and does not profess to prohibit a change of organization by which the union existing when it was executed, and when its provisions were framed, has been dissolved. That union has in fact been broken up by a division of the Church into two distinct parts. And we are caiied on to apply to the consequences of a cataslrophy which, if it had not occurred when and as it did, must at some time have happened, the provisions of a deed which having been made when the Church was united and division not contemplated, refers, as might be expected, to the existing name and organs and action of a united Church. The one united Methodist Episcopal Church referred to in the deed, and extending its name and au
If the unity of the Church had remained unbroken by the late revolution, there could, as we think, be no senous question as to the correctness ot a construction which would make the deed applicable to any changes which the Church might authorize, with the effect of se- . , , . , . ... curing the property to Ihe local society preserving its Proper relations in obedience to such change, to the ex-c*us*on °f any organized portion of it, which opposing the change, might refuse obedience to the authority of the Church, and throw off the appropriate relations of the society. In fact, before the execution of this deed, but after its language had been framed and recommended for general use, a most important change had already occurred in the composition and author ilyof the General Conference. That body, consisting originally, as might be implied from the reference to it in the deed, of all the ministers and preachers of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United Stales, in whom collectively subsisted without lestriction, the power of legislation and government in the Church, was transformed in the year 1808, by its own action, into an assembly of delegates to be chosen by the ministers and preachers in their several Annual Conferences, and to be possessed of restricted powers. This change was not even followed by an alteration in the terms of the deed referring to the General Conference, and certainly had no effect upon its operation in securing either the local property to the local societies, or the subordination qf its use to the legislation of the General Conference as newly organized. Nor can. it be doubted, that in case of division and contest in one of the societies, based upon a difference of opinion as to the propriety of this change, or of submission to it, the deed whether executed before or after the change, would have decided peremptorily against the party, which in an organized form, had renounced the authority of the new General Conference, and was renounced by it. And so if after the execution of the deed before us, there had
What effect then, in-this last case, would be given in the civil tribunal to the appeal of an organized part of one of the local societies, which separating from its own society, renouncing the authority of the Annual Conference to which it belonged, and rejecting the jurisdiction of the existing General Conference and of “the Reformed Methodist Church,” should claim the exclusive, or any interest in the local property, on the ground that “the Reformed Methodist’Church” was not “the Methodist Episcopal Churchthat a majority of the society and the Annual and General Conferences with which it was •connected, having become or adhered to “the Reformed Methodist Church,” were no longer parts or -members of “the Methodist Episcopal Church,” but that the members of the minority alone, rejecting the new name and the •new Church, and continuing to be a-s they had always been, members of the Methodist Episcopal Church, were -alone the true beneficiaries of the deed, and as such entitled to the exclusive use of the property conveyed by it? Most assuredly it would be a sufficient and proper answer to such an appeal, to say that the name, and form and ■organization of the Church, and the arrangement and ■functions of its different parts and tribunals, were all subject to be changed according to the will and judgment of the Church, uncontrolled either by the deed or the law ■of the land; that the Methodist Episcopal Church having by its own act, become the Reformed Methodist Church, this latter Church, whether differing in substance or in ■name only from the former, occupied its place and authority in the system, and must, in ascertaining tfie ope
And if, instead of the change just supposed, the Methodist Episcopal Church had, by its own authoritative act? divided itself into two distinct and independent bodies, each perfect in itself, on the plan of the original organization, and assigning to each on its own side of a common boundary, the entire jurisdiction which it had itself possessed within the same limits,- had denominated one “the Methodist Episcopal Church North,” and the other “the Methodist Episcopal Church South,” these two Churches differing from the original and from each other, only in locality and extent, and in the discriminating adjunct to the common name, would each undoubtedly possess within its territorial limits, the entire jurisdiction and authority of the original united Church, and would within those limits, fully represent it, and to all purposes occupy its place. The members of the pre-existing Church would of course, unless they chose to renounce their membership, be members of the Church North or South, according to the locality of themselves or of the societies to which they belonged. Each of these Churches would bear the same relation to the different parts of the system, within its jurisdiction, as the original Church had done to similar parís o.f the original system. And with respect to the construction and application of these deeds, each would be as to the property within its limits “the Methodist Episcopal Church,” for the use of whose members and in subordination to whose laws, the property was conveyed and held ; and the deeds would receive the same
Such acts as have been supposed, if done by a competent power in the Church, must, until annulled by a sim. liar authority, be binding upon whatever is subject to the legislation of the Church, whether it be the uses -of the local property, the relations of the local societies or other organic parts of the system, or the rights of individual members as such. And we maintain and think it has been clearly shown, that as the deed does not and cannot control these acts, it must be understood as intending to follow them, and by adapting itself to every vicissitude •to which the Church may be subject, to attain its great •object of securing the use of the local property to tire local societies in subordination to the legitimate .powers that be.
We come then to the case actually existing, in which, •according to the assumptions under which we are now considering the subject, the Church, instead of dividing ■itself into “the Methodist Episcopal 'Church North,” and “the Methodist Episcopal Church South,”leaving no ■residuum under the name simply of “the Methodist Episcopal Church,” has sanctioned the independent organization of the Southern Conferences, and under that sanction, the Maysviile society or congregation has been placed under the jurisdiction of the Methodist Episcopal Church South. But is there any difference, so far as the rights and jurisdiction of the Southern Church are concerned, between the ease as it actually occurred and the supposed case of a division of the original Church into the Methodist Episcopal Church North, and the Methodist Episcopal Church South? Does the fact that there still remains a portion, whether small or large, of the original body under the original name of the whole, invalidate the separation or the rights of the separating portion? Could the remaining portion of the original body, re-assert in the name of the whole, the jurisdiction which had been renounced by the whole, or revoke the assent which the whole body had once given to the independence of the separating portion? 'Certainly if the
But it seems to us too evident to require illustration, that the rights and jurisdiction of the Southern Church, and the rights of its members are precisely the same within its own organization, as if the present Methodist Episcopal Church were called the Methodist Episcopal Church North; that if the southern organization has the sanction of the original Church, it can suffer no disparagement from having been the separating portion, but its independence and jurisdiction are complete; and that to the extent of its jurisdiction it stands in the place of the Methodist Episcopal Church, and is to be so regarded, as well in giving construction and application to these deeds, as in determining the rights and duties of its members. It follows, upon the principles already established, that if the Maysville society or congregation has been properly placed under the jurisdiction of the Church South, the use of the property conveyed by the deed before us, is also within that juiisdiction, and belongs to the party adhering to that Church, which, so far as this deed and the Maysville society are concerned, is “the Methodist Episcopal Church,” for the use of whose local members the property is conveyed and held.
V. But every part of the assumption which establishes the legality of the separation and of the position of the Maysville society as a part of the southern organization, is denied by the complainants, and it is necessary to investigate the assumed basis upon which the foregoing conclusion rests. This investigation involves an inquiry, first into the power of the Church to authorize its own dismemberment, and of the General Conference to act for the Church in this respect, and then into the terms of
That a Church organization, a self created body, subject j so far as its own constitution añilmganization are concerned, to no superior will, cannot by its own assent authorize and legalize its own dismemberment, is a proposition] contradicted by reason and analogy. That such a measure is inconsistent with the motives and ends of its institution, is no more true with regard to such a body, than with regard to other associations, private or national. Even in the case of States and Empires, the unauthorized separation of a part, though originally illegal, and subjecting the separatists to reclamation and punishment by the remaining government, is legalized by its subsequent assent, with the effect of establishing in the separating portion, all the rights of independence and self government. It is this assent alone which puts a final ■end to the right of reclamation on the part of the nation or government from which a portion has separated. And much more must the previous consent of the whole nation or its government to the future independence of a part, -have the effect of legalizing a separation taking place in virtue of such assent, and of terminating absolutely, all right of reclamation. If in the history of nations we find few instances in which this assent is yielded except .at the end of a struggle, often bloody and protracted, for independence on the one side, and on the other for re-■subjugation, there are still some examples of a government which, becoming sensible of the necessities of a ■connected and dependent portion, or perceiving the incongruities of the connection, has laid down beforehand, the terms of separation and independence, which on being accepted and acted.on by the portion to which they were addressed, have become a solemn compact, binding as •such, both upon the old and the new Stale. Among
The duty of earing for and promoting the welfare of every part of the body, the duty of self preservation itself, and the corresponding rights essential under various circumstances, to the performance of these duties, indicate the power of authorizing or assenting to a dismember, rnent, as one necessarily inherent in every association, to be exercised indeed according to the prescriptions of its fundamental law, if there be any on that subject, but unless there be some special provision or prohibition other than that which is implied from the duty of preserving the integrity of the body, to be exercised as convenience and experience prove by the active governing powers of the association. It does not admit of question that such a power belonged to the Methodist Episcopal Church, and that prima facie the General Conference the supreme active organ of its government, clothed with powers of legislation almost unlimited, and having alone in case of unlawful secession, the right of recognition or reclamation, might effectually exercise the power in advance. Indeed, the history of the Church shows that many years since, the General Conference, without reference to its constituents, assented to the separation and independence of the Canada Conference, then forming an inte, gral portion of the general organization, and having, or entitled to have its delegates in the General Conference itself. And although there seems to have been some doubt on the question of power, we do not perceive that the grounds of that doubt bring in question the power of
An earlier instance of the exercise of power on this subject by the delegated General Conference, must not be omitted. Societies of Methodists having been organized in the Canadas by preachers of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States, and preachers having been also sent into the same regions by the British Methodists, under whose ministrations local societies’ were also established in the saíne towns or neighborhoods, the , . . consequence was, that instead of harmonious efforts in extending their common faith and doctrines, there was sometimes exhibited between the parties acting.under these different authorities, an unseemly rivalry, degenerating into a mere struggle on each side to strengthen itself at the expense of its competitor. To put an end to a state of things so derogatory to the character of each of the principal parties, and felt by both to be at once injurious to the religion which they professed, and inconsistent with the relations which a community of origin and of faith and doctrine required, a negotiation was set on foot between the General Conference on the one side, and the British Methodists on the other, the result of which was an agreement fixing the boundary line between the two Canadas as. the line which should separate their respective jurisdictions. In pursuance of this agreement, the British Methodists surrendered their societies in Upper Canada to the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States; and the General Conference, without (so far as we have learned) consulting the societies which had been reared under its care in Lower Canada, or their preachers, or the Annual Conferences in the United States with which they had been connected, withdrew their preachers, surrendered the societies to the British Methodists, and dissolved all of their subsisting relations with the Methodist Episcopal Church in the U. S. An Annual Conference having been afterwards established inUp. .per Canada, in connection with the Methodist Episcopal
“1. Resolved, thatshould the delegates from the Conferences in the slave holding States find it necessary to unite in a distinct ecclesiastical connection, the following rule shall be observed with regard to the northern boundary of such connection: all the societies, stations and Conferences adhering to the Church in the south by a vote of a majority of the members of such societies, stations and Conferences, shall remain under the unmolested pastoral charge of the Southern Church, and the ministers of the Methodist Episcopal Church shall in no wise attempt to organize Churches or societies within the limits of the Church South, nor shall they attempt to exercise any pastoral charge therein, it being understood that the ministry of the south reciprocally observe the same rule in relation to the stations, societies and Conferences adhering, by vote of a majority, to the Methodist Episcopal Church; provided that this rule shall apply only to societies, stations and Conferences on the line of division and not to interior charges, which shall, in all cases, be left to the care of the Church within whose territory they are situated.”
The second resolution authorizes ministers of every grade in the Methodist Episcopal Church, to attach themselves, without blame, to the Church South. The six following resolutions relate principally to the book concern and the chartered fund, after first recommending to the Annual Conferences a modification of the constitutional restriction applicable to this particular subject, go on to provide, conditionally, for the equitable distribution of these properties between the two Churches. The
The spirit of equity which pervades these resolutions, the care and caution with which they were evidently framed, the respect which they pay to constitutional restriction when it was supposed to apply, the deliberation with which they were considered and passed, the interesting circumstances which led to their introduction and the importance of the interests which they profess to regulate, all concur in giving to their adoption, as an assertion of power by the highest functionary of the Church, a weight of authority not easily overcome. To this is to be added the concurrence of the Bishops of the entire Church, who evinced their opinion of the validity of the resolutions by publicly recommending a.proper method of taking and certifying the vote of the border societies, which they authorize. Then the precedents and more general considerations before odverted to, tend to establish in the General Conference the power involved in the passage of these resolutions. And the Southern Conferences having, in virtue of these resolutions, erected an extensive ecclesiastical organization, whose rights and jurisdiction are based upon their authority, we are by no means sure that a Court of Justice, a power outside of the Church, has a right to disturb the state of things sanctioned by such evidences of its legality, and by the acts and opinions of the highest tribunals of the Church, upon the ground of its own mere opinion that one of these tribunals has violated, not the law of the land, but the law or constitution of the Church. There would seem to be due from the tribunals of the civil government to those of the Chuich, at least so much respect as to require that the acts done by the latter, in the name of the Church, should be deemed valid under its law, and that the dependent right should be determined accordingly, until those acts
If the question of power were doubtful, we should bo bound to regard the act of the General Conference as the act of the Church, and therefore as effectual. And if we even entertained the opinion that the late General Conference exceeded its power in attempting to authorize, in advance, the anticipated separation, still the Chuich might by its subsequent sanction, ratify the act and give full-validity to its consequences; and as the question with the Church would be one not only of ecclesiastical law, but of ecclesiastical policy; and the same considerations which operated on the General Conference, might also bring the Church to the conclusion that its great objects would be better accomplished by two independent organizations-, with jurisdiction territorially divided, than by attempting to maintain a nominal union of discordant elements, or by spreading over the same territory two Churches-struggling for power in every congregation; it would be a serious question whether a Court, whose decision could not restore harmony and union to the Church, but might introduce local strife and discord and confusion, should not rather respect the existing slate of things until the Church itself should act, or assume inaction, to be itself a sanction, than undertake to decide for the Church, whether it should be united or divided.
But as under every view of the question of power which has been presented to our minds, we have no seri. ous doubt upon it, and as it may be of importance to the parties concerned, that the opinion of this Court and the grounds of it, should be expressed upon every point involved, we proceed to notice briefly, the constitutional restrictions supposed to bear upon if. The General Conference, in addition to other powers of a mixed character, is expressly vested with power to make rules and regulations for the Church, subject only to six restrictive clan
The other restrictive clause relied on, declares that the General Conference shall not “do away the privileges of our ministers and preachers, of trial by a committee, and of an appeal, nor shall they do away the privileges of our members, of a trial before the society, or by a committee and of an appeal.” According to the rules and discipline as existing before and since the separation, the appeal of ministers'or preachers is to the General Conference, but in the case of a member, it is to the Quarterly Conference,-or at most, to the Annual Conference. The ministers having a right, by the plan of sepa
VII. The resolutions constituting the plan of separation, do not expel any individual from the society of which he was a member, nor deprive him of any privilege of property or worship pertaining to that society. But as they propose and provide for a complete separation according to the organic or territorial divisions of the Church, they necessarily involve a partition of the governing power between two jurisdictions, each possessing within its
The complainant and his associates being in this condition, deny the pow.er of the General Conference thus to transfer them from one Church to another, without or against their consent. But as the measure takes effect by the concurrent action of the General Conference and of the Annual Conferences to which the terms of separation were addressed, the real question is, whether this concurrent action was competent to determine the question of separation, and to define its limits without more particular reference to the will or opinion of the individual members. If it was, then the reference to the vote of the border societies for determining the position of those societies, is a concession, which, operating of course according to its own terms, gave the power of determination to the majority', to which also it would have certainly belonged, if the vote were taken in the exercise of an unrestricted right in the members to determine the position of their society.
The complainants indeed seem not to rely upon the popular principle, which would refer a question affecting numerous individuals, to the decision of the majority, but rather upon some supposed indefeasible right of the individual members to, or in the unity and identity of the Church, and its jurisdiction or protection, which rising above all the powers of the Church, would enable a minority, however small, or perhaps a single individual, to obstruct or defeat, in a question of dismemberment, the ■will and action of the entire residue of the Church. But we perceive no foundation for the assertion of such a right, in any provision or restriction of the Constitution, and the rights of individuals as founded in or measured by the duty of protection on the part of the entire association, or its governing power must yield, as we have seen, to those occasions which justify or require dismem
In a measure of this kind, affecting the feelings if not the interest of numerous individuals, a diversity of sentiment may be expected even in the clearest case. Founded as such a measure should be, upon an enlarged view of both the general and local interest, these individual diversities must necessarily be merged in the general sense of interest and propriety to be ascertained by the voice of the majority of those concerned, to which the minority must yield, or by the action of the legitimate authority, which must be binding upon all. That the General Conference had a right to.ac.t for the whole Church in authorizing the separation and independence of the Southern Conferences, has been already sufficiently shown. And if that body might not also act for the part proposed to be separated, it has by the resolutions under consideration, lecognized if not established the competency of the several Annual Conferences to decide the question for the portions of the Church within their respective jurisdictional limits. We are not to decide whether, in point of policy or discretion, it might have been better to refer the question, in each Conference, to the determination of a majority of the individual mem
VIII. But it is objected that the proceedings which have resulted in the erection of a southern organization, have not been such as under the resolutions, give to that organization the sanction of the General Conference. Without detailing'lhe particular grounds of this objection, we shall proceed to answer them, premising that in determining upon the legality of the actual state of things consequent upon a great movement of this character, every part of the proceeding should be liberally construed to effectuate the apparent and reasonable intention of the parties, and there is no room for technicality. Then it is apparent upon the face of the resolutions that there is but one condition upon which the separation and the sanction of the General Conference are to depend, which, is that the delegates from the slave-holding Conferences should find it necessary to erect an independent ecclesiastical connection, &c. The distribution of the book
The result is, that the original Methodist Episcopal Church has been authoritatively divided into two Methodist Episcopal Churches, the one North and the other
IX. The application of the deed to this state of things has already been explained ; and it only remains to ascertain to which of these Churches the Maysville society, according to the plan of separation, belongs. The Annual Conference of Kentucky having adhered to the Southern connection, the Maysville society as a part of that Conference, would by that adherence have been placed in the same connection, had not the border societies been allowed to determine their own position by a vote of their members. The reference of the question to a vote, implies that according to common usage, the vote should be taken at a meeting of the members of the society. But the resolution having omitted all detail, these were supplied by the recommendation of the Bishops, who presented a plan of proceeding altogether proper, and according to the intent of the resolutions. In pursuance of this plan, a meeting of the Maysville society was held after due notice, and nearly all of the ascertained members of that society having been present, a majority decided in favor of remaining with the Kentucky Conference, in connection with the Southern Church, which was duly certified to that Conference. This meeting having been held upon regular notice, un
The members of the Maysville society of the Methodist Episcopal Church, have then, by the vote of a majoiity, placed that society in connection with the Southern division of that Church, and of course in subordination to its authority and jurisdiction. They have done this under the authority of that Motbodist Episcopal Church, of which both the majoiity and minority through their membership in this society were members, and to which all once owed obedience. They have done it lawfully and without blame in the eye of the Church. The position in which they have thus placed the Maysville society, is therefore its lawful position, and neither tho society itself, nor its members, are deprived of any right by this lawful act, which at least was not a rejection of their original condition, since the original Church had already been divided, but a choice between the two Churches which stood in its place, and a choice which resulted in retaining the Maysville society in the same Conference with which it had long been connected. The Kentucky Conference having been lawfully made a part of the Southern organization, it was only under the privilege conferred by the resolutions and by the vote of a majority of the Maysville society, that that society could rightfully have been taken out of the Kentucky Conference and placed in connection with a'different organization. The majority having determined against such a
Had the minority acquisced in the present instance, and remained in the society in which they had taken, and held their membership, it could not have been doubted that notwithstanding the division of the Church, and the adherence of the Maysville society to that portion which assumes the name of “(he Methodist Episcopal Church South,” (and not to that part which retains the name of “the Methodist Episcopal Church,”) the entire society and its members would have been the true beneficiaries under the deed, entitled to the use of the property conveyed by it, beyond the power of disturbance by toe present M. E. Church or its members. By attending toe meeting and going into the vote, all who did so recognized the authority of the resolutions under which the proceeding took place, and submitted the position of the society to toe result of the vote by which themselves and the society were placed in connection with the Southern Church. This implication of consent and of promised acquiescence in the determination of the majority, renders more obvious the conviction that the minority could not by their subsequent separation from the society, change its character or position, or; impair the rights of its members. These, however, were fixed, not by the concession or acquiesence of the minority, but by the authority of the General Conference of toe Methodist Episcopal Church, and by the action of the society under that sanction. And the minority having separated from the society and formed a new organization not authorized by
The decree is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to render a decree declaring the exclusive right to the use of the lot in question, and of the buildings thereon, and especially of the house erected thereon for the purpose of divine worship, to be in the defendanls and their associates, constituting the Methodist Episcopal Church or society at Maysville, adhering to the Methodist Episcopal Church South, with their preacher appointed to preach therein, under the authority of the said Methodist Episcopal Church South, and not in the complain