аfter stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.
To show that there was equity in the bill, the appellant advances the proposition that the act of Congress embodied in section 2319 of
“There can be no doubt of the power of the President to reserve those lands of the United States for the use of the Indians. The effect of that executive order wаs the same as would have been a treaty with the Indians for the same purpose, and was to exclude all intrusion upon the territory thus reserved by any and every person other than the Indians for whose benefit the reservation was made for mining as well as other purposes.”
The appellant seeks to distinguish that case from the cаse at bar by referring to the fact that the proclamation setting aside the Coll-ville reservation, which was under consideration in that case, was made beforе the enactment of section 2319 of the Revised Statutes. But, if the President had the power to set aside a portion of the public domain for an Indian reservation, it is clear that the power was not abridged by the enactment of that statute. Congress did not thereby dispose of any estate in the public lands, or create any burden thereon, or establish any right therein until the actual inception and assertion of mining rights thereunder. Statutory license to locate mining claims has never been held, prior to the acquisition of a vested right, to be an obstacle to either the disposition or the reservation of the public lands. We entertain no doubt of the correctness of our ruling in the McFadden Case. The power of the President to create a reservation of public lands for the use and benefit of the Indians and for other рurposes has been recognized both by Congress and by the courts — by Congress in enacting subsequent appropriation acts, appropriating money therefor, оr other acts, as in this particular case by the act of May 27, 1902, and by the joint resolution No. 24 (32 Stat. pt. 1, 245-277), and joint resolutions Nos. 25 and 31 (32 Stat. pt. 1, 742, 744). In Grisar v. McDowell,
But the appellant contends, and so alleges in his bill, that while it 'appears from the published statutes of the United States thаt the joint resolutions were approved by the President on May 21, 1902, they were not in fact approved until after June 1, 1902, and therefore after his locations were made, and he urges that this allegation of the bill presents an issue of fact to be determined by evidence. But the published record of the joint resolutions and their approval is unimpeachable. The appellant cannot go 'behind the authenticated published statutes of the United States, and show that an act which purports to have been approved on a certain date was in fact approved on a different date. Said Mr. Justice Harlan in Field v. Clark,
In view of these considerations it is apparent that the circuit court did not err in holding that there was no equity in the bill, and it becomes unnecessary to consider the further contention of the appellant that Congress could not, by joint resolutions 24, 25, and 31, deprive him of vested rights.
The decree will be affirmed.