*1 however, pointed conten- court, out We find that all of other order.7 The great doing difficulty petitioner, in this: tions of Louisiana Serv- Gas Corp., and, ice without merit there- are recognize . we instances by fore, the control the FPC exertion of may attempts Com- arise where prior adjudication in this case to a final to determine what it would mission FPC, subject refund, to years, previous fil- in have done ings compliance Affirmed. been made with unavailing may Act, be because absolutely data or lack of essential

may on the Commis- be so burdensome (and public purse) or

sion hence the prohibitive. parties Id. as to be at n. 13. al., GIBSON & PERIN CO. et Plaintiffs- points Here, as the out Commission Appellees Cross-Appellants, filings by brief, these rate United missing supply if data and the Com- al., Defend CITY OF CINCINNATI et go pass on mission is allowed to on and ants-Appellants Cross-Appellees. filings subject refunds, these rate all to Nos. 72-1608. parties adequately protected. Fur- Appeals, United States Court thermore, well within the Com- seems Sixth Circuit. mission’s discretion to decide that paid United, excess should be into sub- Argued Jan. 1973. ject interest, than with rather refund Decided June 1973. purchasers paid to be with jurisdiction if interest United found. The Commission far more has gas company

control over a natural like money

United to ensure that the refund actually be

would available if ever due. ample judi- find

We also there is position authority

cial for the may prior

Commission exert control issuance a certificate necessity regard

convenience and with In addition to sales involved. above, Huber case see v. F. Sun Oil Co.

P.C., 5 Cir. 281 F.2d

we stated: power of the Commission over [a

company] and its sales and deliveries having gas dependent upon is not application for

made and the Commis- having

sion issued Certificate Necessity.

Public Convenience

Id. at 278. Magnolia See also Petroleum Co. v. F.P.

C., 785; 5 Cir. 236 F.2d Natural Pipeline Edwards, Judge, Gas concurred Harrington, Co. v. 5 Cir. Circuit specially opinion. and filed F.2d formerly pipeline 7. Were the FPC not allowed to take where a intrastate has allegedly regulation, interim this become interstate in nature. control of rate problem present every be case would *3 Spiegel, Cincinnati, Ohio, Arthur S. Co.; Todd, Cohen, for Gibson & Perin Ohio, Spiegel, Cincinnati, Kite & brief; Hunt, Hawley Todd, Marshall C. Jr., Cincinnati, Ohio,of counsel. Nichols, Ohio, Cincinnati, A. David Ohio, Chadeayne, Columbus, William Cincinnati, others; Isabel Guy, Acting City Sol., Rehme, Thomas F. Cincinnati, Ohio, Sol., Asst. on brief. Bricker, Evatt, Eckler, Barton & Co- lumbus, Ohio, Dry for Associated Goods Corp. Redevelopment- and Cincinnati Corp.; Leach, Russell H. Franklin Craw- ford, Birath, III, Columbus, Jr., John F. Ohio, of counsel. WEICK, Before EDWARDS Judges.

CELEBREZZE, Circuit Judge. WEICK, Circuit controversy in this case arose out of the Cincinnati Business District Core Project Plan, Urban Renewal hereinaf- “Plan”, ter referred to as which Plan adopted by passed by City was ordinance Council in after two hear- ings. was Plan amended in 1964 dilapi- old, 1965. Under this Plan buildings blighted dated business areas Cincinnati been razed ga- shopper’s single-purpose proved privately-owned fine, new, replaced with designed rage ramps sole- help in- wth scissors buildings, with the ly east of whose store is agree the District dustry. with Fourth and Block D at the corner of Judge in Cincinnati renewal that urban .”; outstanding Race Streets. and a success been an has City. change real boon to made in the Plan public hearing; portion buildings that a without that have many new theOf Plan, only of Fourth was vacated without Street under constructed been ramps plaintiffs; ques- notice to here has been the one in issue pedestrian impede Pogue’s seven-story, on Fourth tioned, Street northerly opened of Fourth garage, traffic on the side parking shoppers’ adversely plaintiffs’ Although affect Street it was char- on June opposite located on the side businesses as a the District Court sin- acterized *4 designed garage Actually, of Fourth the scissors parking gle-purpose Street. ramps protect pedestrians on Pogue’s department who walk primarily to serve public shop- the only the sidewalk underneath store, actually it serves ramps. ramps department the the automo- Pogue’s Without pers at other and exiting garage entering on the biles stores, for it serves customers but also at the level Fourth would be same places Street in that downtown other business public sidewalk, as the and it would be people at- It serves also who area. very dangerous pedestrians for to walk tending evening the functions in other thereon. garage. fact is that area of the garage open general to the complaint In their filed third amended days twenty-four day, a seven hours a plaintiffs, in to the addition 1,200 least

week. It accommodates at charged foregoing, have the defendants cars, four times more which is about rights, with violation of their civil con- parking space previously avail- than was spiracy, fraud, of federal and violation area, really of able consists laws, everything state antitrust with garages. space two It has for retail also including else that could think of ground part floor, of businesses charge on depriving them of due already which rented has been to Clos- process equal protection of law and the son’s. They injunctive of the laws. asked for damages. relief and plaintiffs are retail merchants restaurant, and the owner of a French case, named in the Defendants places all with owned or City business Complaint, Third Amended were leased on the south of Fourth side Cincinnati; Wichman, William C. (but Street outside the Urban Renewal Manager, de- who was and is now Area), opposite ceased; and located on the side Redevelopment Cincinnati Cor- Pogue’s parking of Fourth poration corpora- Street [CRC], a Ohio garage. They design do not like the profit, purchased tion for the land parking garage. location of the from the after had ac- quired by by pur- condemnation or claim, Plaintiffs and the District buildings. chase, and had razed the old found, plaintiffs— Court (CRC “ parking ga- constructed the new expect . . . led to were rage conveyed and sold and thereon north of Fourth side Street would be Co., $4,000,000 Realty Adcor developed space, for retail and office subsidiary Dry Goods, of Associated shopper’s garage with a on Elm Street Inc., parent corpora- which is also Streets;” between Fourth Fifth Pogue Co., Inc., depart- tion of H & S instead, City— Continuing store.) ment of de- list “ only approved Co.; Dry . not the con- H fendants : Associated Goods garage Pogue Co.; Inc.; Realty struction Co., on Fourth & Adcor S ap- Morgan Guaranty Co., Race, Street between Elm and but Trust which ac- quired the from Ad- title to We affirm the District in its Court Realty conspiracy, cor rangement under a ar- Co. lease-back decision there was no operation of the fraud or antitrust violation. We reverse Pogue store; Regional department mandatory injunction against issued HUD; Secretary Pogue’s. Director of and the Housing Department and Urban Development, the latter two of whom I voluntarily dismissed STANDING case.1 garage new is located in Ur- The District Court heard the case D, ban Renewal Block which block con- against jury without a and decided block, city of an sists entire bounded on plaintiffs conspiracy, on the issues of by the north Street, Fifth on the south violations, fraud and antitrust Fourth on Street, the east Race found favor on the is- Street, and on the west Elm Street. garage sue that the construction of the Only Street, plaintiffs, places Fourth rather than on Elm whose Street, Plan, business are violated the located outside the Urban Renewal Urban although area, plaintiffs, They and that have filed located out- suit. area, design claim side the that the Urban Renewal location and had stand- ing injury to file the en- resulted in action. The economic Court mandatory— tered them. *5 “ question The threshold therefore injunction against . the persons is whether located outside the Division of Associated standing Urban Renewal area have to Dry Corporation, jointly Goods maintain this action. We are of the severally, requiring them to alter the opinion plaintiffs that do not have Pogue completed garage by installing standing. two elevators at Fourth and Elm (in existing Street Plaintiffs contended addition to the in the District they only standing three Court elevators do 80 feet from have on the grounds: following northwest corner of Fourth and Race Street) improve and to the fire tower 1) taxpayers; As federal on Fourth Street so that it and el 2) Under Administrative Proce- evators can serve the area Act; dure are located thus 3) persons having a.personal As stake blighting counteract the effect of the case; in the outcome of the garage (App.Yol. I, as constructed.” p. 55)2 4) private general. attorneys As original complaint 1. The Plaintiffs, was filed in the who are located on the south July 2, 1966, District Court on year Street, about a side of Fourth and their cus- acquired after CRC had tomers, only eighty the land to would have walk $587,770.04. at a cost of feet from the northwest corner of Fourth original complaint In the there existing was no and Race Streets to use three charge of garage. proof antitrust violation. elevators There is no February 21, 1967, On existing the District elevators are not ade- plaintiffs’ application quate Court properly garage. denied to serve Aside preliminary injunction, enjoin comple- damage to froni the occasioned garage. by tion of the An Amended Com- the construction of unneeded additional plaint 8, 1967; was filed on elevators, by June the construction ordered Complaint Third might $350,000. Amended was filed on Court cost as much as January 27, 1969; the trial commenced The exact amount of the construction so 2, 1970, on June and was concluded on ordered has not been determined since 25, 1970; Opinion June plans prepared. Memorandum therefor have been not July of the District Court was filed on 26, 1971. ferring plain- standing, here. ruled that which is absent Court The District Camp, Processing as fed- Data Service untenable tiffs’ contentions were L. taxpayers Adminis- U.S. n. under the eral agree. (1970). The Ed.2d Act. trative Procedure We Court, however, of federal Review of decisions having personal standing persons as agencies may the Ad under be obtained case, and as in the outcome of stake Contrary ministrative Procedure Act. general. disagree. private attorneys plaintiffs’ claims, is not a agency cited to us defined in the have federal as Act. No eases been 701(b)(1). by parties, Furthermore, nor have or U.S.C. the Court § Secretary any cases, persons locat where Director and the of the feder we found agency voluntarily area al dismissed ed outside the Urban design question plaintiffs. permitted or from the case been buildings approved location of Act does confer stand ease) (the agency City, present as in the ing judicial anyone upon to seek review Plan, being conformity with the said injury who suffers economic aas result agency having by Con been authorized regardless agency action, of whether general gress no statu to act. There is person’s private rights have been tory right appeal States to the United Realty invaded. Woodland Market Co. of feder decisions District Courts (6th Cleveland, F.2d agencies, al, local or 1970); Cir. Harrison-Halsted Communi proj engaged persons, renewal in urban ty Housing Group, Fi Inc. v. & Home seq. The et under 42 U.S.C. 1450 ects § Agency, nance 310 F.2d 99 Secretary and to be sue is authorized to 1962). Suits, 1456(c)(1). used. U.S.C. § standing have no as Plaintiffs course, for violation could be filed design taxpayers question the federal adopted by regulations specific Sec garage. They have and location of the provisions retary under the § HUD logical link between not established standing. by persons having 1455(c)(1) *6 legislation type of their status and the authority for find Nor do we attempting they to attack. which by mandatory the District order issued congression challenged They have not a pur ordering City and the Court taxing and al enactment under redeveloper, chaser of I, spending of the of Art. 8 clause Sec. buildings completed changes in to make Constitution, prerequisite for is a which acquired in purchaser had which Cohen, standing U.S. under Flast v. paid good it faith for which had and L.Ed.2d 88 S.Ct. money. large sum addition, (1968). In the Court said: recognized The District Court taxpayer must es- “. [T]he virgin charting ter- in a new course was that status nexus between tablish a ritory, would course we believe which —a precise the constitu- and the nature of future Urban adverse effect on have an alleged. infringement Under tional persons out- projects, if located Renewal requirement, taxpayer must this may question project deci- side the challenged enactment show by project made relating to the sions duly specific limita- constitutional exceeds agencies. local authorized imposed upon of the the exercise tions by project approved only was the Not congressional taxing spending and design HUD, and and the the Plan power simply that the enact- and not specifically garage were location approved by generally beyond powers ment City. delegated Congress by I,Art. to § established, nexuses are “private When both Standing at sue as to taxpay- litigant explicit will have shown general” on an torneys rests of the con- outcome regulatory er’s con- stake provision statute in the Secretary’s deci- ap- intent that proper sional troversy be a and will may judicially sion be reviewed. party a federal propriate to invoke (Id. jurisdiction.” at Processing Barlow, court’s Both Data 1954). at (unlike present case) S.Ct. reviews involve sought Proce- under the Administrative nexuses been estab- such No persons Both involved dure Act. cases Indeed, not es- plaintiffs have lished. protected, zone interests specific within the stat- violation of tablished present not true in the case as provision. ute or constitutional plaintiffs’ out- located businesses were relied on Data District Court side the Urban Renewal area. While Camp, Processing Service Processing pro- Data no the Court found L.Ed.2d 184 against review, in Barlow hibition standing (1970), was to wherein congressional found intent favor- Court processing petitioner, a data exist ing review.3 company, to review a decision provided Currency permitting In our case no was Comptroller review agencies Banks, respondent statute of acts of developers such as the National projects. bank, processing of Urban Renewal services to make data think it would was because. review and bank cus- to other banks available implementation provided Re- frustrate of Urban was tomers. Review discourage plans cities newal Procedure Act. would Administrative might redevelopers to who not want plaintiffs’ claim to eco- In addition litiga- protracted become embroiled in tion, competition injury nomic because expend- particularly they after had banks, they the interest which money participate ed in the their sought protect arguably within project. protected to be the zone of interests regulated by case, statute. under no our stretch imagination plain- can be claimed that To the effect is same Barlow v. Col- tiffs, the Ur- who were located outside lins, L. S.Ct. area, the zone Renewal within ban (1970), Ed.2d 192 wherein review was protected of interests statute. sought under the Administrative Proce- money they in the had no invested Since following Court, dure Act. The Data structures located in the Urban Processing Service, supra, held that area, personal interest or had no eligible payments farmers who were project. stake Agricultural under the Food and Act of standing challenge the va- Morton, The decision in Sierra Club v. regulation lidity of an amended issued *7 1361, L.Ed.2d 92 31 405 U.S. S.Ct. Agriculture, Secretary the of which against plaintiffs, (1972), as is the 636 they alleged, regulation, amended violat- the even under held there that the Court ed the Act. plain- Procedure Act the Administrative allegedly members, farm- The Court further that the who tiff and its personal interest; special conservation ers had a stake and in the a interest they clearly of the natu- that were within the zone of the sound maintenance Act; refuges, protected game parks, the forests of and that interests ral standing statutory congres- county, to en- the scheme evinces a did not have the allega- heavily 3. and the The District Court relied on Nor- on motion dismissed was Redevelopment accepted Agency, Foster v. as true. walk v. Norwalk tions were (E.D. (2d 1968), Detroit, F.Supp. 395 655 F.2d 920 Cir. which we of inapposite. Mich., 1966), F.2d 138 In aff’d 405 believe is Norwalk the directly (by inapplicable, 1968) in- it as involved re- likewise is process moval) in Detroit’s violations in the Renewal scheme. volved due Urban concerning They alleged specific procedures the violation of a stand- condemnation part compensation Act, right of on the ard in as well Urban complaint property taken. lands were whose as racial owners discrimination. public determine, approving once the an alone to join federal officials skiing purpose See development established. in Min- has been extensive Co., Bridge King Valley Sequoia Luxton North River in the National eral Highland supra; v. Russell Car case had not Petitioners in that Forest. alleged cf. Co., [, challenged development 314] 279 U.S. 253 S.Ct. that may public members in L.Ed. 688. The end be as or its would affect Club through agen- they activities, or better served an even used well their or that through cy alleged private enterprise King, proj- of than Mineral government change department of so adversely the area’s a ect would —or Congress might ecology. aesthetics conclude. say ownership public is cannot case, In our the District Court promoting pub- method of sole opinion in its stated: redevelop- community purposes lic of clear to the Court “It seems projects. ment What we said condemned the could not have disposes also of contention con- property in Block D the south half of cerning property the fact that certain erecting purpose permitted may in the owners area be Developer as one the built such repurchase properties to development their for re- Pogue’s. specifications of harmony with condemning “In effect this would be legitimate plan. That, too, overall is a it purposes, Congress agen- means which say authority needs no citation of may (Id. adopt, cies if choose. permitted.” I, p. (App. is not 103).” at 75 S.Ct. at 59). making it not the clear that proposition in the This set to rest function Courts to sit in review leading Renewal, case on Urban which legislative determinations, the Court ease involved District Columbia. stated: Parker, In Berman v. 348 U.S. 75 S. enough (1954), Ct. 99 L.Ed. Mr. Justice “. . But we have said Douglas, opinion for the indicate that it who wrote the is the need of the area Congress Court, stated: as whole which agencies and its evaluating. If owner object “Once the is within au- permitted after owner were to resist thority right Congress, to real- redevelopment programs these through ize it the exercise of eminent ground particular property that his power domain is clear. For the being against public was not used merely eminent domain is the means interest, integrated plans for redevel- to the end. Luxton v. North See opment greatly. ar- would suffer Bridge Co., River 529- 153 U.S. gument indeed, pressed is, plea on us [, L.Ed.2d 892] to substitute the landowner’s standard 808; Gettysburg United States need for the standard Co., [, Electric R. by Congress. prescribed But as we S.Ct. 40 L.Ed. Once 429] already stated, community have velopment programs rede- object authority within the not, by need force Congress, means Constitution, piecemeal on a *8 be Congress will be attained is also for to building. by lot, building by basis—lot determine. Here one of the means enterprise chosen is the use of It is not for courts to oversee the redevelopment Appel- for boundary of the area. the choice of the line nor to argue proj- lants particu- that this the makes in sit review on the size of a taking ect a project from one question businessman for lar the area. Once public decided, the purpose benefit of another businessman. the has been executing But proj- the means of the the amount and to character of land Congress Congress ect project are for be taken for the the need 944 Cleveland, City complete particular the in sued the tract to located for for a damages interest, integrated plan in the discretion to its leasehold rests alleged legislative to value of which was have been See of the branch. Shoe- destroyed activity States, 282, of the 147 U.S. maker v. United establishing 170; project. its [, L.Ed. Urban 390] S.Ct. activity Valley vio- Plaintiff claimed that such ex rel. Tennessee United States rights

Authority Welch, supra, under Fifth lated U.S. [327 [, to the page Fourteenth Amendments Consti- at at 66 S.Ct. 546] alleged lease- 843]; tution. Plaintiff that its 90 L.Ed. United States originally Carmack, [, in the Ur- hold was included 67 S.Ct. project, that ban Renewal L.Ed. 209. 260] acquired instead later excluded it and grave The District Court indicated belonging adjacent property plain- to right concerning Agency’s doubts plain- tenants, thereby depriving tiff’s to take full title to land as distin- tiff of its tenants. guished buildings objeetional affirming judgment Dis- F.Supp. 705, In of the located on it. 117 715- dismissing complaint, we trict Court We do share those doubts. taking of Agency necessary no If the stated that there had been considers meaning plaintiff’s property carrying redevelopment within out project Amend- of the Fifth Fourteenth take full title to the real just property requiring payment of involved, ments may do It so. compensation; the losses sustained not for courts determine wheth- any by plaintiff in- did not result from necessary er it is con- successful plaintiff’s on unsafe, trusion or encroachment project summation of the property. re- unsightly, buildings estate has insanitary “Its leasehold or Id. 958. Plaintiff’s alone mained intact.” at be taken or whether title to the included, any resulted from the transformation land be losses more than it is neighborhood residential of the from a function of the courts sort and neighborhood among fol- land. We parcels choose vacant the various se- Parker, supra, in hold- Berman v. lected for lowed ing condemnation. drawing boundary lines rights property of these owners legis- project for a is a matter satisfied when receive that discretion, func- it is not the lative just compensation Fifth such discre- tion of the courts to review price Amendment exacts as of the tion. We stated: taking.” (Id. at at 75 S.Ct. essence, 104). reduced to its “When presented upon appeal is issue this D, The title to the land in Block having property whether a owner part of which the was con adjacent property to an urban renewal structed, acquired by City, ei may project maintain an action by purchase ther or No condemnation. compensation Fifth under such interposed any defense was con Fed- Fourteenth Amendments suit, demnation proof nor is there depreciation in eral Constitution for any purchases made property the value of his reason voluntary. were other than The title of project. This establishment purchaser may collaterally not be at opinion Court is of the that he can- tacked here. (Id. 959). not.” 426 F.2d at point States, Campbell case closest to the v. United present (1924), one our decision in 69 L.Ed. 328 Woodland Realty Market owner, Cleveland, Co. v. the Court held that a 1970). F.2d portion In that land was condemned whose case plaintiff, *9 public purpose, which held a leasehold for was not entitled to a interest damages property compensation certain commercial for to the residue

945 changed acquisition occasioned the location of which was an of and/pse exchange adjoining lands of others of easements and was relocated theXsame project. property on underneath the abutting ramps. Plaintiffs were not Parker, swpra, We followed Berman v. owners of land on the north side of Steering in Nashville 1-40 Comm. v. El- Fourth not entitled to Street and were lington, (6th 1967), F.2d 387 179 Cir. Rev.Code, notice under Ohio law. Ohio holding routing high- of 723.06. § ways prerogative was a of the executive department state, ju- essence, plaintiffs not the In all that are real- diciary. ly complaining is the fact about they did not receive the benefits Further, in order to have they project Urban Renewal standing, plaintiffs must establish that expected. legal maintain interest suit, right that the invaded— II legal right, of “. is a —one THE arising LIABILITY OF CITY contract, property, one out of protected against OF CINCINNATI one tortious inva- sion, on or one founded a statute political City is a subdivi (Tennes- privilege.” which confers a It is not a of Ohio. sion State 118, TVA, see Power Co. v. 306 U.S. meaning “person” of the Civ within 137, 366, 369, L.Ed. 543 59 S.Ct. 83 Congress Rights not in did il Act and (1939)). municipal corporations should tend that v. also- States ex rel. TVA See United 28 to the Act. U.S.C. § be amenable 715, Welch, 546, 90 L. 327 U.S. 66 S.Ct. 1983; 1343; Moor v. Coun 42 U.S.C. § (1946); v. Ed. Co. 843 Alabama Power Alameda, 693, 411 U.S. 93 S.Ct. ty of Ickes, 464, 300, L. 58 S.Ct. (1973); Monroe v. 36 L.Ed.2d 596 (1938). Ed. Plaintiffs have estab Pape, 5 L. rights. dam such Whatever lished no (1961); of Ed.2d 492 Johnson ages plaintiffs as a result sustained Cincinnati, F.2d project damnum the Urban Renewal ,1971). absque injuria. reason additional There is an why be held liable cannot plaintiffs, Under Ohio law as under activities this action. abutting owners or land on lessees of engaged project it was Urban Street, the south side of Fourth have no governmental, performance of a right or in the continuation It proprietary, function. past maintenance the flow of traffic exercising power police state. property, their and the diversion of traf perform for the cannot be liable It public improvement fic as a result of is Broughton v. Cleve of such acts. ance impairment property right not an of a land, N.E.2d 301 St. 167 Ohio damages may for which be awarded. Arbenz, (1957); 116 Ohio Wooster Linzell, State ex rel. Merritt v. 163 Ohio (1927). N.E. St. (1955). St. 126 N.E.2d As a fact, matter the width of Fourth III changed improve Street was not in the ment. LIABILITY OF POGUE INTERESTS complain Plaintiffs about not having received notice from the not liable Inasmuch as injury allegedly portion vacation of a of Fourth sustained economic portion Street. Re- Actually, the Urban vacated account portion Plan, was not see how the traveled difficult newal street, purchase sidewalk, Pogue’s, included the north sin was whose *10 There no $4,000,000 is ridiculous. was garage pay This claim completed and proof any There relevant of market. held liable. it, possibly be for could competition proof any no of real be- was complain was the Plan that Plaintiffs Pogue’s. plaintiffs The tween the and

changed on Fourth locate are antitrust claims frivolous. Ac- on Elm Street. of instead Street judgment the District Court is of tually, on both streets. it is located City never reversed and the cause is remanded with Plan was contends complaint. brochures, reports, changed; instructions to dismiss news- articles, etc., plaintiffs paper on which indicat- relied as and the District Court Judge (concur- EDWARDS, Circuit Street, ing illus- on Elm a location ring specially). only part and trative were not a complex This and difficult case. approve City did the de- Plan. Council my judgment In there is merit to the sign garage. and location of the plaintiffs’ injury claims of economic as Judge. found the District Unfortu- change City did But even if nately plaintiffs, however, both right design,

the location it had the and applicable statutes and the re- case law so, held in do as Woodland Mar was quire decision of the of merits those supra, city Realty, ket where legislative body claims before changed original plan its to include City Cincinnati, and do not allow for plaintiffs in the urban renewal area and subsequent judicial remedy ordered changed plan plain then its to exclude Judge. the District tiffs. hearing opinion, In our join was I by Judge result reached required change not if even did opinion. join Weick’s I also in its design building or disposition location of a plaintiffs’ appeal antitrust Block D. disposition plaintiffs’ city claims of ordinance tardy filing and state Plaintiffs were law their nearly year violations. suit one after had passed approving an ordinance agree the bid I appeal also procedure that no being of CRC as “in legislative accordance with the decisions of the Cin- Plan,” Urban Renewal and after pertaining cinnati Council to the conveyed by to Council’s adoption formulation redeveloper. provided Urban Renewal Plan was by Congress in 42 seq. U.S.C. 1450 et § IV (1970), posture that under the fact appeal permissible this case ANTI-TRUST no un- VIOLATIONS der the terms of the Administrative The District Court found that there Act, Procedures (1970). 5 U.S.C. §. was no conspiracy evidence of to re- agree. I believe, findings strain trade. however, Judge of fact concerning of the District Although plaintiffs most of the plaintiffs’ injury claims of economic engaged have been in business clearly erroneous and that many years, Cincinnati no claim- standing bring this suit. See of antitrust violation was ever made Processing Data Corp. Camp, Service against Pogue’s until acquired after 25 L.Ed.2d garage. its new (1970). my judgment, however, Participation in an Urban Re proofs do support not serve to project newal does not violate the anti Judge’s District conclusion of violations trust laws. plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment allege Plaintiffs rights rele process equal protec- to due vant market was a “dramatic tion, elbow” at hence, this should case the corner of Fourth and Elm Streets. authority been dismissed under *11 Parker, S.Ct. v. Berman 98, (1954); States United L.Ed. 27 Welch, v. rel. TV A ex Tennes (1946); 90 L.Ed. S.Ct. TVA, 306 U.S. v. Power

see Electric (1939), L.Ed. 543 Realty v.Co. Market and Woodland (6th Cleveland, Cir. 426 F.2d 955 of 1970). Detroit, to Foster v. As 1968), and Norwalk Cir.

F.2d 138 Redevelopment Agency, 395

v. Norwalk (2d 1968), them I consider

F.2d 920 controlling forth the reasons set Judge opinion.

in footnote 3 to Weiek’s

Paul Darlene D. PRASHAR and Prashar, Appellants, AMERICA, INC., a

VOLKSWAGEN OF corporation, Import Motors of Chi cago, Inc., corporation, Appellees.

VOLKSWAGENWERK AKTIENGE SELLSCHAFT, corporation, also G.m.B.H., Volkswagenwerk, known as Appellant, Prashar, D. and Darlene

Paul PRASHAR Appellees.

Nos. 72-1670. Appeals,

United States Court of Eighth Circuit. April 11,

Submitted 1973.

Decided June 1973. July

Rehearings Denied